


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
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


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


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THE GREAT WALL CRUMBLES



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By GROVER CLARK

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PREFACE

THIS book deals with the effects, especially in and related to China, of the breaking down of the barriers which have separated the two great streams of Eastern and Western civilization—the barriers which may be symbolized by the Great Wall. It is not, however, a history of China or of China's international relations. Nor is it a listing of the changes which are taking place as a result of the impact of Western civilization on the ancient structure of Chinese society. It is an attempt to sketch in broad outline not what has happened but why events have occurred in this particular way instead of some other. It is less an effort to tell the story of the crumbling of China's ancient wall of isolation and self-sufficiency than to indicate something of what that crumbling, and the rebuilding which now is going on, mean.

Why China? Because through the centuries China has been so overwhelmingly the predominant nation in the Far East. Because, too, in the number of her people, the size of her territory, and the qualities of her culture, China, though politically weak now, remains potentially by far the most important part of the Orient.

To understand why events are moving as they are, it is necessary to know something of the background of those events. Why have Eastern and Western civilization been fundamentally different? What is China and who are the Chinese? What were the earlier contacts between East and West? Through what stages did China develop—the China onto which the stream of Western influences began to pour? How was that China organized and how did it function, socially, economically, politically? Why did the Westerners go to China? How did the modern Westerners and the Chinese

feel toward each other during the first centuries of their contact? In what condition was China when the full impact of Western expansion struck the Great Wall? By what steps did modern Westerners push forward to get what they wanted? Why were the Chinese unable to resist this pressure? These, in general, are the kinds of questions dealt with, briefly, in the first part of the book.

Then the discussion turns to the China of today. What influences are proving potent in destroying the old China and building the new? Why did the Republic come as it did, and then collapse? Why did the Nationalist movement take the course it did? In what ways are modern transportation and communication altering Chinese life? Why has Communism spread in essentially anti-Communistic China? Why are the Chinese not satisfied with the surrender of Western privileges which has been made? What does Japan's rise to power mean for China and the Far East? What do China's disintegration and reintegration along new lines mean for the rest of the world? The answers to such questions are suggested, all too inadequately, in the second part of the book.

Necessarily, parts of the record of events have been given. But no attempt has been made to fill in the historical account completely, even in its main outlines. Many incidents of importance from the point of view of the historian or the student of international relations have been passed over entirely because they simply furnish further illustrations of points which have been covered in the incidents cited. Those interested in following the historical record more in detail will find it in numerous excellent volumes.

The author is well aware that in undertaking this task of interpretation he lays himself open to criticism on the grounds of presumption, of misjudgment, and of inadequacy. Agreement is easy on the occurrence of particular events at particular times. Disagreement is certain over why those events occurred, what they mean, and their relative importance. A bald recital of the incidents in the relations between

China and the other nations, or in the changes in China, would have been a comparatively easy task. But such a recital would do no more than furnish part of the raw material for an understanding of the deeper currents which shaped the course of those events. It is vitally necessary to see how those currents are moving, now that the means of swift communication have brought the East and the West so near to each other and have bound them so intimately together.

Mapping the deeper currents is a matter of judgment rather than of recording events—and no two men will judge alike. The author would be the last to claim infallibility for his judgment. All he can say by way of justifying his interpretation is that his chief interest since boyhood has been to understand what was happening in the resurgent Far East; that he spent many years of his life in that part of the world; and that he has tried to be impartial in discussing men and events. The interpretation is inadequate, of course; limitations of space and, more significantly, limitations of the author's own understanding and knowledge inevitably make it so. But perhaps those who read this book will find in it something to help clarify their thinking about China and the Far East and about the grave problems involved in the relations between East and West.

In writing this book, the author has had in mind neither the specialist on Far Eastern affairs nor the professional scholar, but the many friends who, though mainly occupied in other fields, seriously and sincerely want to know "what it's all about." On many occasions he has sat comfortably with a small group of such friends and discussed informally with them the Far East and China and the West's relations with those regions. They have been good enough to say that they found these discussions illuminating and worth while. The author has tried to preserve, in these pages, something of the spirit of such informal, friendly discussions.

Consequently, as will be seen, no attempt has been made

to follow the forms of technical scholarship. Footnotes, citations of authorities, elaborate bibliographies and such-like paraphernalia of Scholarship have their appropriate and valuable place, but that place is not in such a book as this is intended to be.

For specific dates, texts of documents and similar data, the author has referred to such standard works as H. B. Morse's "The International Relations of the Chinese Empire," Tyler Dennett's "Americans in Eastern Asia," H. F. MacNair's "Modern Chinese History; Selected Readings," T'ang Leang-li's "The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution," E. T. Williams' "A Short History of China," Payson Treat's "The Far East," as well as numerous other books, official documents and privately circulated pamphlets. For such specific factual material on the present Communist situation he has referred to government documents, press reports, and the recent volumes by Victor A. Yakhontoff on "The Chinese Soviets" and "Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far East" and by Agnes Smedley on "Chinese Destinies." The author also has used in substance some of his own material which previously appeared in the *Century Magazine*, *Scribner's*, *Asia*, the *Annals* of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, the *Proceedings* of the Institutes of Public Affairs of the Universities of Georgia and Virginia, and in his book on "Economic Rivalries in China" and the volume edited by Joseph Barnes on "Empire in the East." Acknowledgment is made, and thanks are extended, to the authors and publishers.

The author would not suggest, however, that the burden of responsibility for the judgments expressed or the interpretations made rests on any of these others. For what they may be worth, they are his own, as are the errors of interpretation and judgment.

The author wishes to express his thanks particularly to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace which has made it possible to take the time for writing this book, to

Dr. James T. Shotwell for ever-encouraging friendliness and valuable suggestions, to Mr. Chih Meng of the China Institute in America for checking over part of the material, to Miss Katharine Dewey for putting her artistic skill and time into making the drawings, to the staff of the Columbia University Library for aid in gathering data, and to many others, including Mr. H. S. Latham, whose interest in the ground covered has helped directly and indirectly to indicate both the possible value of such an attempt at interpretation and the approach which might be made. The author's chief debt and gratitude for assistance is to Kathryn Bird Clark, to whom he is privileged to be married.

GROVER CLARK

Wellesley, January 1, 1935.

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THE GREAT WALL CRUMBLES

AN ADEQUATE PERSPECTIVE

(CHAPTER I)

WE in the West, with naïve self-satisfaction and almost childish narrowness of knowledge, write and talk as though the history of the West included practically all that is important in human history. We grant a modicum of respect to the civilization which Egypt produced. We give heed to the history of a small tribe of people called Hebrews. The tiny city of Athens looms large in our thoughts of the sources of civilization. Rome holds our admiration and respect. From these Mediterranean sources we have derived impulses which have been powerful in the development of our civilization and culture; impulses which came to a new birth when the Renaissance set the stream of Western civilization flowing again after the frozen centuries of the Dark Ages. From the people who lived in North Europe we also have derived impulses and social forms which have been important in our cultural development, and to these also we give some attention.

Because our own civilization has sprung in the main from these sources, most of us—to judge by our history books, our literature, our philosophical studies, our political teachings, our art and all the other aspects of our culture—think that the civilization which originated in the Mediterranean Basin, and spread thence into North Europe and across the Atlantic into the Americas is practically the only civilization that matters.

The truth is, of course, that the West to which we have given such exclusive attention has been of primary importance in the world as a whole only within the past three or four

centuries. Other regions far exceeded in area the territory in which Western civilization had its roots. Other peoples who produced great and enduring civilizations far exceeded in numbers those who have shared in the development of modern Western civilization. Even if we leave Africa and the Americas out of account, the territory in which Western civilization grew was only a small corner of the vast land mass of Asia and Europe, and the people in that territory were only a small part of all those on this huge continent. The largest empires of history—largest in area and population—have been those of Eastern, not Western peoples. The only lasting civilization which mankind has evolved has been and is in the East, not in the West. The flow of basic inventions and ideas, through the long centuries, has been considerably more from East to West than the reverse.

The swift expansion of the West, by which, in the brief space of two centuries, it has secured political control over most of the world and has gone far toward imposing its culture on all mankind, is one of the most amazing phenomena in human history. The record so far, however, by no means conclusively proves that this expansion is anything but an incident in man's evolution. Perhaps this Western plant which has grown so swiftly and now overshadows the world will develop qualities of endurance. On the other hand, this expansion of the past two centuries may be only a mushroom growth. No Western social and political system since the days of Egypt has been able to survive for more than a few centuries. The towering structure of this present Western dominance may be destined to crumble as swiftly as it has been built, when the peoples of the East master the techniques by which the West achieved its present position.

II. MASS MIGRATIONS

Traces of man's development, carrying the record into the dim past, indicate that there has been a series of mass movements from the north southward, on the huge Euro-

Asiatic continent. The most recent of these waves began to rise roughly three thousand years ago. Concerning this we know a good deal. Before that, starting somewhere between six and eight thousand years ago, there had been a similar wave. We know less about this wave, but we do know something. Our knowledge of what took place earlier is of the sketchiest.

We do know, however, that both of the last two waves moved along the same broad channels: from the north southward into the Mediterranean Basin, into India, and into China. Both began as the southward drifting of barbarian tribesmen who conquered the more civilized peoples whom they found in the agricultural lands they penetrated. In both cases, the barbarians settled down and raised civilization to higher levels.

The Eastern part of the most recent wave overflowed the Orient and poured far westward toward Europe. The Western part, in the brief period of these last four centuries, after overflowing Europe, poured across the Americas and around the world to the Far East. The West's dealings with the Far East today are the lappings of this last great wave of expansion on the shores of the Far East—the wave which started three thousand years ago.

The immediately preceding wave of mass migration carried down into the warmer regions the people who built the early pre-Aryan civilization of the Dravidians, and the Sumerian, Cretan and Mycenæan civilizations of the Mediterranean Basin. Of these civilizations, recent excavations have told us a little something. That same wave apparently also carried people down into China—people about whom we know little beyond the fact that they were in the land and had made a small start toward civilization when the “original Chinese” arrived.

In the Mediterranean Basin and India the civilizations created by the peoples of the first of these two most recent waves were well advanced before they were overwhelmed

by the hordes out of the north who came down in the second wave; hordes of tall, light-haired, fair-skinned people whom we know as the Aryan invaders of India and the progenitors of Greek and Roman civilization. In China, this second wave began to flow a thousand years and more earlier than in India and the Mediterranean Basin. Consequently, the pre-Chinese people had a thousand years less time than the pre-Aryans, the pre-Greeks and the pre-Romans to develop their civilization.

This, perhaps, is the reason why, to judge from such few traces as have been found, the pre-Chinese civilization in China had advanced considerably less far than that of the Dravidians, the Sumerians, the Cretans and the Mycenæans although a definite start toward settled civilization had been made. (We do not know whether the hordes in this second wave into China were light-haired and fair-skinned like those further west. There is some evidence that they were. More will be said about this in the discussion of the origins of the Chinese people in the next chapter.)

In China, as in the Mediterranean lands and India, the conquering hordes destroyed as they advanced. But they were vigorously energetic, and had the creative capacity to build new civilizations after they had settled down. They began settling down in China between three and two thousand years before Christ. In the Mediterranean Basin and India, this stage was not reached until a thousand years later.

Specific years mean little in great movements of this kind, of course. But certain events in the principal regions over which these great waves swept indicate when the conquering hordes established mastery over the lands they invaded. The dates of these events also indicate roughly how much earlier this second wave moved in China than in India, and in India than in Europe.

This stage of development is marked approximately, in China, by the founding of the Chow Dynasty, about 1100 B.C.; in India, by Asoka's reign, beginning a little be-

fore 250 B.C.; in Europe by the crowning of Charlemagne as Emperor of Rome in 800 A.D. In each case, these events had been preceded by two or three centuries of the steady advance of crude but energetic tribes. These tribes moved into China from the northwest, coming out of the northern and eastern parts of Central Asia. The movement into India also was from the northwest, out of the western and southern regions of Central Asia. The drive into the Mediterranean Basin came from what is now northern and northeastern Europe.

This second wave kept rising, in the East, until the climax was reached with the vastly destructive Mongol expansion of the eleventh to the sixteenth centuries. It carried Mongol horsemen to the borders of Germany and the walls of Vienna. It put Kublai Khan on the throne of China in 1279. Before it subsided, it swept Tamerlane westward to terrorize Europe while Columbus and the others were feeling their way by sea to the Far East. It established the Mogul Empire in India in 1526.

In the West, the impetus of this second wave carried the crusaders into the Near East, brought about the Renaissance, and sent Europeans across the Atlantic and around Africa in their search for sea routes to the Orient. The wave from Europe swept on, to fill the Americas with Europeans and to bring India and the South Sea lands under European domination. The wave beat against and breached the dykes of Chinese cultural and political independence, but China escaped India's fate. Japan saved her political independence first by closing her doors and then by throwing up a powerful wall of modern arms.

The last four centuries have seen the most recent advances of this wave out of the north which began to run three thousand years ago in China; which carried the East deep into the West in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries; which has swept the West onward and back to the East.

Very definitely, the resurgence of the East has begun. To-

day it is taking the form of efforts to throw off Western domination. What form will it take tomorrow?

We are not here concerned with the first of these two great waves of expansion. Even the events of the first twenty-five hundred years of the second of these waves—the one in the last stages of which we of today are participating—interest us only as they form the background for the developments of today.

In this latter connection, we need to note one general but important point: the great streams of developing civilization have run separately, one eastward and one westward from Central Asia. During the past three thousand years, warriors and traders and a few emissaries of religion have crossed from one stream to the other. Yet in the main the two currents have remained distinct, cut off from each other by high and difficult barriers of land and sea. The mountains and the sea still are there. But in the past seventy-five years the steamship, the railroad, the airplane, the telegraph and the radio have encircled or cut through and across them so that they no longer are effective. The two great streams of civilization have met. They are flowing into a common channel—and clashing as they merge.

What the result of this merging will be, no one yet can say. It may be a world civilization far higher than any which man has hitherto created; a civilization to which both East and West will contribute of their best. It may be a conflict in which all civilization will be wiped out in blood. But one fact is clear: the West cannot hope to maintain the preëminence in the East as well as in the rest of the world which it achieved in the nineteenth century.

III. THE BASIC DIFFERENCE

Railroads, motor cars, telephones, electric lights, sanitary plumbing—such superficial trappings of comfort and convenience do not mark the fundamental differences between Western and Chinese civilization. These differences show

themselves in the organization of society. They appear, more revealingly, in the emotional, as contrasted with the purely intellectual aspects of living.

This is the main reason why it is so hard for Chinese and Westerners to understand each other's attitude toward life and living. It is not unduly difficult intellectually to grasp the differences in the physical equipment of living or even in the social structure. It is extremely difficult for either a Chinese or a Westerner to feel himself emotionally into the place of the other so that the other's emotional reactions and the emotional overtones and harmonies of his life seem normal and natural.

Using the word "civilization" to mean neither the kind of houses people live in, nor the clothes they wear, nor the food they eat, nor the mechanical adjuncts of their lives, but rather the structure of their society and their attitude toward life, it is safe to say that the fundamental difference between Chinese and Western civilization is this: in China, the group has been the basic unit of society and the individual as such has been of minor importance; in the West, the individual has been the basic social unit, and the group has been important primarily as it served the individual.

This difference is the result of the conditions of life of the people who have produced these two civilizations. Chinese civilization has developed in regions where, for a very long period of time, the people have been thickly settled. Western civilization is the creation of people who, back through several thousand years, have been thinly settled.

This difference in the relative congestion of population inevitably has produced a basic difference in the relation of the group to the individual. The inevitability of that result becomes clear when we consider three crucial facts:

The first fact is this: population tends to increase up to the limit of the food supply. Over a period of centuries, therefore, the number of people per square mile in any par-

ticular region will depend on the amount of food which the people can produce by the methods which they use.

Obviously, a good deal more food per square mile can be produced by farming than by hunting or fishing or tending herds. Consequently, there will be a good many more people to the square mile in agricultural countries than in the regions where the people are hunters or fishers or nomad herds-men, or in regions cut up by mountains so that the amount of land that can be farmed is relatively small. Agricultural regions with large plains, such as China or India, Egypt or Mesopotamia, thus come to have congested populations, with the people living in relatively large communities. In forested or arid or mountainous regions, on the other hand, such as northern Europe until relatively recently, or Arabia or Central Asia, where the people live by hunting or keeping herds or fishing or cultivating small patches of land in mountain valleys, the population will be sparse and the communities will be small.

So we come to the second fact, which is: in large groups, the individual as such is unimportant; in small groups he counts for much.

In a farming village of a thousand people who get their food from a square mile or so of land (like thousands of villages in China, for example), the loss of a dozen or two people does not reduce the amount of food that can be produced. Even if half of the people were to die, the other half still could do all the farming and get as much from the land as the whole thousand; in fact, the five hundred who were left actually would be better off because there would be twice as much available food. But in a hunting group which gets its food through the efforts of a small band, each of these hunters is of great importance, since the loss of one or two might easily mean a very serious curtailment of the food supply.

Similarly, the loss of a thousand men means little to an army of a hundred thousand, but the loss of one or two men

in a small fighting band (like the Viking crews that harried the coast of France and England) easily may make the difference between victory and death for the entire band.

Then there is the third crucial fact: the individual can assert himself effectively against group domination only when he has an opportunity to get a living apart from the group.

As a rule, the individual cannot do this in a region which has been thickly settled for a long time. In such a region, all the possible means of making a living get taken up. All the arable land is farmed. All the trades and crafts are overcrowded. Consequently, there is no niche into which the lone individual can fit; the one who does not belong to some group which controls one of the means of making a living—a bit of farm land, a craft secret, a trade right, or what not. The individual who is ousted by his group has no place to which he can go, and survive. Therefore, in such circumstances, the balance of power is with the group and against the individual. The latter must buy his very right to live by conforming to the standards and dictates of his group.

In such circumstances, too, the socially most useful man is the one who does conform; who does not make trouble. The aggressive, individualistic person is socially undesirable. Consequently, the strong tendency, generation by generation, is to breed for conformity and to breed out individualistic aggressiveness.

In regions where the population is scattered, on the other hand, all the opportunities for getting a living cannot be preëmpted. All the game cannot be killed. All the fish cannot be caught. In a newly opened country, there is unoccupied farming land, as there was in the United States until quite recently. In such regions, the individual ordinarily may prefer group to solitary life. But if he does not like his group's attempts to dictate his actions, or if the group expels him, he is not faced with starvation; he still can live. In such circumstances, the balance of power is with the in-

dividual against his group. The group must buy the allegiance of the individual by giving him a large measure of freedom.

Moreover, when groups are small, the socially most useful person is the exceptionally able fighter or hunter, or the one who can devise new stratagems or new tools or weapons to increase the effectiveness of the small hunting or fighting band on which the food or security of the group depends. Men who have these capacities, however, tend to be aggressive, individualistic, non-conformist. The strong tendency, therefore, in these circumstances, is to breed for individualistic aggressiveness and against submissive conformity.

Over periods counted in thousands of years, therefore, the people living in thickly settled agricultural lands inevitably will develop a society in which the social institutions, the political forms, the philosophical concepts of the relation of man to his fellows and to the world in which he lives, and the emotional attitudes, all center around the group rather than around the individual. The social system and the emotional attitudes of the people, not only of China, but also of Egypt, the Mesopotamian Valley and India illustrate the effects of congested population conditions.

For the same reasons, the people who have lived over long periods of time as hunters or fishers, or nomads, or in the mountains will develop political and social forms, philosophical concepts and emotional attitudes which place the individual at the center, not of society only, but also of the universe. The Arabs and the tribesmen of Central Asia, as well as the "Nordic" people of North Europe, developed democratic institutions. Their folk lore and literature stressed individual prowess. They put a high value on individual life and the individual soul. With variations in detail, all these thinly settled people evolved social forms and attitudes which emphasize the individual rather than the group.

Thus Chinese civilization, in its basic social aspects, differs fundamentally from Western because it is the product of a congested-population people, while Western civilization as it is today was created, in the main, by people who, until relatively recently, were few to the square mile. The physical aspects of these civilizations—the houses, the mechanical devices, the crops—differed for other reasons, of course. Soil and climate conditions also had their influence on the social structure, by playing an important and perhaps vital part in determining the way the people got their food, shelter and clothing. But the relative congestion of population was the primary factor in determining the relative importance of the group and the individual. Understanding of the way Chinese and Western civilizations function, and of how Chinese and Westerners feel toward their fellows, is to be reached through understanding the relation of group and individual in each part of the world.

The individualism of the thinly-settled peoples, however, has not been permanent. It has disappeared and social forms have become group-centric when tribes from thinly settled regions have migrated to congested areas, or when congested population conditions have developed in their home lands because of changes in the methods of getting a living.

The progenitors of the Greek and Roman civilizations, to which the West looks back as the sources of much of its civilization today, for example, were tribesmen out of thinly settled North Europe. They took with them down into the Mediterranean Basin their democratic institutions and their individualistic ways of thinking and feeling. They maintained these ways and attitudes for a few centuries, at least among themselves. Then the Greeks turned to their tyrants and Rome became an empire instead of a republic. In other words, the political despotism and subordination of the individual, characteristic of congested population regions, de-

veloped as the early Greeks and Romans came under the influence of the over-crowded conditions in the Mediterranean lands.

Similarly, the democratically individualistic organization and attitudes of the Aryan tribes disappeared in three or four centuries after they had settled down in India.

So too, in China, the individualism of migrant tribesmen disappeared when these moved into regions which were, or became, congested. One after another, through the centuries, the roving, democratically organized tribes out of Central Asia which swept as conquerors down onto the Chinese plains were absorbed into the life and culture which the folk of the long settled and congested agricultural areas had developed.

Are the new ways and ideas which are pouring into China from the West to be similarly absorbed? Railways and motor cars, the telegraph, the airplane, and the other products of the modern West's mechanics and science unquestionably are introducing new influences into Chinese life. But the basic conditions which determined Chinese civilization remain. Nothing has happened yet to alter fundamentally the fact that on the great plains and in the vast river valleys the people live closely together in large numbers.

Unquestionably, China will adapt to her needs many of the mechanical devices of the West. But the democratic ideas, the emphasis on the individual as such, which conditions in the West made so vital a part of Western civilization, have no normal or natural part in the scheme of living or the attitude toward life of people who live under the congested population conditions which still obtain in China and which seem likely to continue indefinitely.

The differences between the group-centric civilization of China and the individualistic civilization of the West show themselves in the art, the religion, the government, and all the other phases of life in the two parts of the world.

In Chinese painting, for example, man and the doings of man merge into the world of nature. In Western painting,

man has been at the center, with nature as his setting. Now, Western artists are making man less exclusively their principal subject.

Christianity became a highly organized, authoritative church system in the congested Mediterranean Basin. Protestantism, with its emphasis on the right of the individual against the group authority of the church, came inevitably when Christianity spread among the thinly settled North Europeans. Buddhism, in the East, underwent a change in the opposite direction. Buddha was a member of a ruling clan still close to its hunting-nomad forbears who had come as conquerors of India. He taught a religion of complete individualism. That teaching was rejected and an extreme denial of individualism came to be emphasized when Buddhism spread among the thickly settled peoples of China and other Eastern lands.

Democracy, with its conception of government as a device set up by men for the benefit of the individuals in the community, was carried forward and developed in the West, particularly in the United States, as the North Europeans rose to dominance. Despotism, which rests on the assumption of the practically complete unimportance of the individual, has been the normal condition in thickly settled lands like the Nile Valley, India, and China. If population in the West continues to increase until it becomes as congested as it is in these older regions, quite possibly the West will turn to despotism. Already it has done so, in part. The marked swing away from individualistic democracy in Europe, as illustrated in Fascism, Nazi-ism and such-like movements, is an entirely normal consequence of the great increase in population in recent decades. Similarly, the swing from "rugged individualism" to "planned economy" in the United States is an equally normal result of the recent filling up of this country.

The West, as is sufficiently obvious, has been developing a distinctly new sort of civilization in the past three-quarters

of a century—since, that is, it began to approach congested population conditions. This modern civilization is new not only in its scientific and mechanistic exterior but also in its inner and fundamental conception of the place of the individual man in relation to his fellows, to society, and to the world in which he lives. In every field of life and thought—in education, in business, in industry, in art, in religion, in politics—the individual as such counts for far less in the West today than he did two generations ago, and society is thought of and dealt with far more in terms of groups rather than of individuals.

As a matter of fact, the West seems to be moving more rapidly toward the Chinese conception of how society should be organized than China is moving toward the Western conception.

IV. REACQUIRING EQUALITY

The West has secured its modern dominance because it learned, through science and mechanics, to harness the forces of nature. This mastery over nature gave it the power to extend its conquests over the world and the races of men, to build the structure of political, cultural and economic pre-eminence which was at its height when the Western nations started to tear each other to shreds in the World War.

But there is nothing in Western science and mechanics which the East cannot learn. The West itself has done its best to teach the peoples of the East the secrets of this new power. The Japanese learned the lesson first and most completely, and what they learned they have used to meet Westerners on their own ground. They have proved themselves so apt pupils, in fact, that they now stand in most ways on a par with their teachers. The Chinese also are learning and will continue to learn. So are the people of India.

Once the East has mastered the techniques which enabled the West to rise so swiftly to dominance, what reason is

there to think that the West will be able to maintain that dominance? Hitherto, through the long sweep of history, when East and West have met on terms of equality of arms or trading equipment, the East usually has won. Now that the East is mastering the West's technique of power, now that it is approaching the condition in which it once more will be able to meet the West on terms of equality, will the result be the same as it has been through the millennia?

No one can say, now. But it behooves us, in the West, to set aside for a time our absurd and childish egotism and to look at the development of mankind in something like adequate perspective. Our self-esteem will not be flattered, but perhaps in the process we may achieve a little better understanding of what recent events mean, not as isolated incidents, but as indications of the great currents of man's development.

ACROSS THE BARRIERS

(CHAPTER II)

HIGH mountains and wide stretches of sea lie between China and the West. The first modern European to pass the last of those barriers was a Portuguese, on an exploring expedition in a Malay junk. He sailed from Malacca, which the Portuguese had seized after finding their way by sea around Africa and out to India. He reached China in the extreme south, near Canton, in 1516. The time was twenty-four years after Columbus set sail across the Atlantic. The place was almost exactly halfway around the world from where Columbus sighted what he thought were the shores of the Indies. Thus the relations between China and the modern West began.

II. FROM ANCIENT TIMES

Long before 1516, however, traders between China, India, the Near East, the Mesopotamian Valley and the Mediterranean Basin had crossed the barriers of sea and land. The precise beginning of this trading between the Far East and the Mediterranean region is lost in the dimness of very ancient history. It is quite possible, however, that when Helen of Troy wanted to look at "the face that launched a thousand ships," she gazed into the polished surface of a bronze mirror which had been made in China. Perhaps, too, she used face powder and rouge from China to re-win and hold the love of her husband Menelaus after the gay interlude with Paris. At any rate, it is known that as far back as fair Helen's time the Chinese were already skilled workers in bronze, and that they made and used cosmetics. There are indications, too, that trade was going on even be-

fore that time, across the great Central Asiatic Plateau which lies between China and the Mediterranean lands. Trade contacts between China and the West, in other words, began thousands of years ago.

As time went on, the trade increased. The Greeks had a word for China. They called it *Serica*, or the Land of Silk. That term came directly from the Mongol word for the fabric, showing that Greek contacts with China were by way of the land route across Central Asia and to China's north-west, rather than by sea around India.

Well before the time of Christ, Chinese silk, iron and furs were on sale in the great markets of Antioch, Alexandria and Rome. The fair ladies who strolled on the terraces of the Hanging Gardens of Babylon quite possibly kept off the evening chill with scarves of Chinese silk.

Hebrews, trading eastward, perhaps during or shortly after the Babylonian captivity, reached and settled in China. A few sorry descendants of these immigrants still maintain a degenerated Jewish community and ritual in the Chinese city of K'aifeng, on the Yellow River plain.

The trade with China helped stir up some of Rome's wars. Parthian tribes lay across the overland trade route. Rome tried to suppress them; in part at least because these half-civilized tribesmen exacted a heavy tribute from the trade across Asia. The Roman leaders were interested because, as a result of this tribute, Roman husbands were compelled to pay what they considered exorbitant prices for Chinese silk gowns for their wives.

About the time that Marc Antony was winning Cleopatra and losing the Roman Empire, Syrians succeeded in getting silkworm eggs and in producing silk in the Near East, in spite of Chinese efforts to keep the art of silk raising a secret. But the Syrian silk was inferior to the Chinese, and the demand for the high quality Chinese silk continued to grow. The Chinese silk did have one drawback for ladies' robes, however: it was too heavy to reveal the charms of the fair

ladies' figures sufficiently to please the sophisticates of Rome and other rich Mediterranean cities. So the Syrian craftsmen devised and used the trick of unweaving the Chinese silks and then reweaving the threads into more diaphanous material.

Long before this, the Carthaginians seem to have found the sea route around Africa to the East, and the Phœnicians had sailed down the Red Sea to India. Within less than two centuries after Christ, Syrian and Persian seamen had re-started the trade along the old sea route of the Phœnicians, through the Red Sea, around India and on along the coast to China.

According to Chinese records, an embassy arrived at the Chinese Imperial Court in 196 A.D. from the Emperor Marcus Aurelius. As there is no Roman record of such an embassy, the probabilities are that these visitors were Syrian or Persian merchants who forged credentials from Rome so that they might receive a better welcome, relying on Chinese ignorance of Latin to hide the fraud. In any case, traders from Mediterranean lands apparently were at the Chinese court in that year, having come by sea around India rather than across Central Asia.

The trade grew. In the fifth century after Christ, people strolling along the water front of the city of Hira, on the Euphrates River, frequently saw ships which had come from India and China. Some of these, according to the accounts, were Chinese built.

Two hundred years later, turbaned Arabs were mingling regularly with the Chinese crowds in Canton, Hangchow, Ningpo and other Chinese coast cities, where the Arabs had trading settlements. Things seem to have gone peacefully enough for another century. Then the first "Canton incident" occurred. In 758, the Arabs went on a rampage at Canton, burned the city and killed 5,000 of the people, according to Arabian accounts. The reasons for this outburst are not entirely clear, though it is significant that the fiery

fanaticism of Mohammedanism was rising at this time. This was not the end of Arab trading with China, however. Within a century, the trading settlements were reestablished and new mosques pointed their minarets to Chinese skies, while Arab ships, operating from their trading base in Sumatra, sailed the coasts of China at least as far north as the Shantung Peninsula.

The experiences of the Arabian, Persian and Syrian traders are distilled in the Aladdin and Sinbad stories which added so much to the "lure of the East" for Europe.

The trade also brought more tangible benefits to Europe, probably the most significant of these being paper: that material on which so very large a part of our modern civilization rests. It was the Arabs who introduced paper into Europe. The secret of paper making was discovered in 105 A.D., according to tradition, by a Chinese, after watching wasps at work. In 751, in fighting between the Arabs and Chinese, some of the Chinese were taken to Arabia as slaves. Some of the slaves knew the secret of paper making. They taught the Arabs, who in turn taught the Moors. The latter, when they were in Spain in the twelfth century, passed the art along to the rest of Europe.

Meanwhile, the Chinese had been exploring, traveling and trading along the land routes across Central Asia. They had set up regular customs stations to collect tariffs on imports and exports, as early as 522 B.C.

In 140 B.C., the Chinese emperor sent one Chang Ch'ien, the "Road Opener," out into Central Asia to find a tribe which had moved from the Chinese frontiers to escape the constant attacks of the Huns. He wanted these people back to serve as buffers. Chang was held for ten years as a prisoner by the Huns before he finally got through to the runaways. He found them in Bactria, near Afghanistan. They refused to return. So Chang went exploring.

He reached Bokhara, and there saw Chinese bamboo manufactures and other goods for sale. He asked how these

got there, and was told that trade between southwest China, India and Central Asia had already been going on for a long time—this was before 100 B.C.—and that the route went on further to the West.

When Chang got back to China, he made a report. In this he says that there were three routes from China to the West. One went northwestward, but those traveling this route were in serious danger of being captured by Hun tribesmen. Another went through Tibet, and travelers by this route had to cross sky-piercing mountains and go along narrow precipice trails. The third route, which he says was much the safest, went down along the eastern edges of the huge mountain masses in Western China, crossed through what is now Yunnan Province, and proceeded on to India.

Besides the account of his experiences, Chang brought back to China three important contributions to Chinese living: hemp, grapes and walnuts.

Chang's trip started a revival of trade. According to Sir Aurel Stein, "the intercourse of which he had been the pioneer rapidly developed and increased, until embassies attended by several men, we are told, 'followed upon one another's heels along the route.'" These were chiefly commercial ventures, but "the coming and going of ambassadors of the foreign countries of the northwest," as the Chinese records have it, became more and more frequent.

At this stage we find a most modernistic note in the records. Traders and official envoys got into trouble and required "protection." Armies were sent out, in the most approved nineteenth century fashion. "Big China" advocates became powerful at court. Conquests were pushed far into Central Asia. The territory which now makes up the three huge southern provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Yunnan was annexed. Tribesmen to the northwest, west and southwest were subdued or driven back. Siam, Burma, Annam and other countries in that part of the world, as well as lands lying far westward toward the Black Sea, acquired the

privilege of paying tribute to the Chinese emperors. Armies also went to the east, conquering Korea, and discovering the existence of Japan. (An embassy from the Island Empire came to the court in 57 A.D.—but before this the Chinese had given Japan two names: “The Land of the Rising Sun,” because it lay to the East, and “The Land of the Dwarf Slaves,” because the people were small and their civilization was at a low level.)

Most of this spreading out went on during what the Chinese consider one of the greatest periods in their past: that of the Han Dynasty, which ruled for four centuries beginning in 206 B.C., and the northern Chinese still proudly call themselves “Sons of Han.”

The name of an earlier dynasty, however, is the one which passed into the West and developed into our present name for the country. The old overland trade route between China and the West came across the northwestern marches. Eight centuries before Christ, the head of the powerful Ts'in (sometimes spelled Ch'in) clan ruled as feudal chief in this region. The tremendously energetic dreamer who was the Ts'in chieftain in the third century before Christ conquered the other feudal lords, and in 221 B.C., made himself emperor. He also made the Great Wall. But before that stupendous engineering task was undertaken—even before he became emperor—the name of his clan had been carried westward to become one of the names by which his country was known. The succession is clear from Ts'in to China, through such variations as Tsinista, Sinai, Thinæ, Cinisthana and Cinistan. It is interesting to note, however, that only much later, in the thirteenth century after Christ, did the people of Europe begin to suspect that they were dealing with a single country when they traded across Central Asia into the northwestern and by sea to the south-eastern parts of China.

Only scraps of knowledge, recorded more or less incidentally here and there, give us information about the trade

until five hundred years ago. These scraps do show, however, that it started very early and continued more or less regularly. They show, too, that the West made important contributions to China, as China did to the West. During this period the Chinese gave Europe paper and printing, perhaps the magnetic compass, and certainly gunpowder and silk. The West gave China, among other things, the water clock and the system of dividing the day into twelve periods, each of which equalled two of our hours. (Some of the water clocks which reached China during the Han Dynasty are still in good working order.) Probably from Persia, the Chinese got astronomical instruments which helped them to straighten out their calendar. Through India, it seems likely, they got a new sort of music—a music which traces, on one side, directly to that in use today and, on the other, through Alexander's conquests, directly back to ancient Greece.

Thus the interchange between East and West was neither meagre nor one-sided. Step by step, through the centuries, down to a thousand years after the time of Christ, trade and war coöperated to spin threads of contact between the Mediterranean lands and China.

III. RELIGION TRAVELS

Trade and war were not the only forces at work, however. The missionary zealots of the early Christian church turned their eyes toward China quite soon after Christianity began to spread, and those of other religious faiths journeyed to the Land of Flowers—to give China still another of its ancient names.

There is, for example, a tradition that Thomas, one of the twelve apostles, carried Christianity to China. The tradition probably has no foundation in fact, but its existence as early as the seventh century, when Syriac breviaries refer to Thomas as preaching to the Chinese, indicates that the youthful Church at least thought of converting the people of the land of Sinim, as the Romans called China.

Another, and better authenticated story, is that two Syriac monks went to China during the Eastern Han Dynasty, or some time within two hundred years after the death of Christ. This story has it that part of the purpose of their trip was to get silkworm eggs and to learn how to make silk—a mixing of business and religion that has quite a modern flavor. Perhaps as early as 411 A.D., the Nestorian Church appointed special high officers, called Metropolitans of the “Sinæ,” whose duty it was to watch over the spiritual welfare of the Chinese. There is nothing, however, to show that they actually lived in China.

Indefinite tradition gives way to certainty with the knowledge of the arrival of the Nestorian Christian missionaries at the Chinese capital of Sian (in Shensi Province) in 633 A.D. The record of this arrival is on the famous Nestorian Tablet which was discovered in 1625 near the ancient capital.

Very soon after they reached China, these missionaries began writing Christian books. (Quite recent discoveries indicate that the first book in Chinese dealing with Christianity probably was written between 635 and 638.) For a time, Nestorian Christianity flourished at the Chinese court and spread through the country, in spite of periodic difficulties with the Buddhists, Taoists and Confucianists. Then it lost ground, and by a little before 1000 A.D. it seems to have become practically extinct—the first of two failures to establish the religion on a secure foundation.

Buddhism reached China considerably before the arrival of Christianity. About the time that Paul was completing his work of spreading Christianity in the Roman Empire, Indian monks were in the suite of the Chinese emperor, teaching the faith which Gautama the Buddha had introduced in India half a millennium earlier. Conditions in China were favorable to the new faith at that time, for the Chinese had not yet worked their own Confucian and Taoist ideas into clearly defined systems. The way was open for Buddhism to become one of the “Three Religions” of the

land. Later on, between the fourth and seventh centuries, Chinese Buddhists went to India to drink at the fountainhead of their religion. They came back to spread the doctrine and, incidentally, to leave records of their trips which are of great value in furnishing knowledge of this period in India itself. By the time the Nestorians arrived, Buddhism already was fairly well established in China. It had its periods of prosperity and persecution, but it never suffered the fate of extinction which twice overtook Christianity.

Mohammedanism reached China quite soon after the Prophet of Allah began to spread his fiery teachings. The Arabian traders along the coast in the seventh and eighth centuries took Mohammedanism with them, and they had mosques in their trading settlements. But they were more interested in profits than in converts. Islam really entered from the northwest, as a result of trouble in China.

In 757 the Chinese emperor had a serious rebellion on his hands. He called in Mohammedan soldiers from Turkestan to help him put it down—as the Manchu soldiers were called in to help the Chinese emperor suppress a rebellion nearly nine hundred years later. These Mohammedans stayed after the fighting was over, though they did not take the throne for themselves as the Manchus did. They married women of the country, but they did not give up their religion. Today, most of the people in Chinese Turkestan and a good part of those in the northwestern provinces of China are Mohammedans, being descendants of these original soldiers or of others from the same fierce stock who came later. They have been a turbulent element from the beginning.

Zoroastrians, driven from Persia by the conquering Mohammedans, reached China in the seventh century. Manichæans arrived about the same time. Neither religion secured many followers in China, but Manichæan science had “a great influence on Chinese astronomy” as one account has it. Both religions suffered under the general persecution of alien faiths which came in the middle of the ninth century. Both have since disappeared altogether.

The Golden Age for foreign faiths in China was during the reign of the Emperor T'ai Tsung, in the second quarter of the seventh century. He welcomed scholars from all nations to his court and was, as Dr. Soothill puts it, "willing to exchange wisdom with them all." Buddhists were there, and Nestorians, Parsees and Manichæans, supported by the emperor and teaching the officials and the people. Japanese, Koreans, Tibetans, Tartars, Annamese and others came "to acquire Chinese culture, thus spreading its civilization all over the Far East." The Caliphs Omar and Otham knew of this emperor, and Theodosius, emperor at Byzantium, sent envoys to him.

But before 1000 A.D. feeling in China seems to have turned against the alien faiths. Manichæism was suppressed in 843 and two years later the emperor ordered the destruction of Buddhism, the edict saying: "We, therefore, ordain the destruction of 4,600 temples; the secularization of 260,000 monks and nuns; the destruction of 40,000 hermits' cells; the confiscation of millions of acres of arable land and the manumission of 150,000 slaves." The temples of the "heretical sects such as the Ta Ch'ing" (Nestorian) were ordered destroyed and the priests were to be "compelled to return to secular life, to go back to their native districts and to pay taxes like lay people. Should they happen to be foreigners, let them be sent back to their own countries." The next emperor cancelled this proscription, but the "good old days" of welcome to foreign faiths had passed—even though an Arabian writer, perhaps estimating somewhat too generously, does report that 120,000 Mohammedans, Jews, Nestorians and Parsees were living in the single city of Hangchow at the time of a rebellion in 878.

IV. THE CAULDRON OF ASIA

The huge central plain of Mongolia with its mountain borders, has been like a colossal cauldron whose seething contents have been fierce nomad tribes of Mongol and Tartar stock. From time to time that cauldron has boiled over,


spreading devastation southward into China and India, southwestward toward the Mediterranean, westward across Russia, and far into the confines of Europe. China's experience with these tribesmen has been longer and more bitter than that of any other part of the world. Indeed the Great Wall was built in what proved to be a vain effort to hold the raiders back by raising the sides of the cauldron. But the rest of the Asiatic and European world also has paid dearly in blood and property for its knowledge of what the thundering hoof-beats of Mongol horsemen meant.

This huge cauldron was seething long before the time of Christ, and hot streams of raiding horsemen which splashed from it wrought havoc before Alexander started for India. Half a millennium after Christ, the Huns, pouring out of this cauldron under Attila—whom Europe called the Scourge of God—raided and killed and burned across half of Asia and a good share of Europe. Rome fell at the hands of tribes who were on the move partly to escape other streams from this same cauldron. But the appalling climax came in the three centuries which followed 1000 A.D., when the boiling of the cauldron not only poured Mongol domination over China and practically the whole Far East, but also carried the savage Mongol horsemen across all except the comparatively small southwestern corner of the whole Euro-Asiatic continent.

Then the fires died down, and the boiling became less violent, though for a few centuries more the contents of the cauldron still occasionally welled up and spilled over—as in the terrible days of Tamerlane, and in the Manchu conquest of China. Gradually one region after another shook off Mongol control, but it was not until 1911–12, that the last hold was broken, when the Chinese ended Manchu rule.

The Mongol tribes have become a few small and diminishing bands scattered over thousands of square miles of desert or semi-desert country, able to hold this huge territory only because no one else seriously has tried to take it. But China

THE
CAULDRON
OF ASIA



KATHARINE JEWELL

still remembers the horrors of the rise and suppression of the great Mohammedan Rebellion in 1865-77, when fighting between the descendants of this ancient and turbulent stock and the Chinese made a bloody desert of an area in the northwest twice as large as the whole of New England.

The roll of names of these tribes is long, but only a few need be mentioned here. The Huns, of evil fame, were a comparatively small early tribe whose name has come to stand for the worst characteristics of the rest. The Khitans, starting to rise to prominence at the end of the fifth century, and ruling from Korea to Chinese Turkestan in the tenth and eleventh centuries, contributed another of the names by which China was known: Cathay. (The Russians, in fact, still call China by the Mongol form of this tribe's name: Kitai.) The Chins, otherwise known as the Golden Horde, rising in the twelfth century, drove the Khitans west into Chinese Turkestan and ruled the northern half of China. Then came the new power which was to bring most of Asia and Europe under its sway: the tribe called Mongol, whose name the West has chosen as the general term for one of the three great divisions of mankind—to the vast displeasure of most of those so defined.

Across the face of the great outpouring from the Asiatic cauldron which reached its climax in the thirteenth century, flames the name of Genghis Khan. He was chief of the "Brave Man" tribe, the Mongols. The boy who later was called Genghis came of a family surnamed the "Grey-eyed" and hence, perhaps was not of pure Mongoloid stock. He won his first victory and confirmed his chieftainship when he was thirteen years old, leading 13,000 men against 30,000. Characteristically, he celebrated his victory by throwing his prisoners alive into huge vats of boiling water, eighty of which had been prepared for the purpose. He went on with his cruelties and conquests, and when he was forty-four the assembled tribes elected him Genghis Khan, or Mighty

Ruler. By that time he had made his tribe masters of all Mongolia and beyond.

But his career was far from ending here. Operating from his base at Karakorum, far west in Mongolia, he led his horsemen across most of the territory of the Golden Horde. He crossed the Himalayas and made conquests on the Indus. He took Kashgar, Yarkand, Khoten and Georgia in his drive down toward the Black and Caspian Seas. He conquered Russia, through to the Baltic, thereby establishing the Mongol control of Russia which lasted two centuries and a half, until Ivan III finally threw off the Mongol yoke in 1480. Mongol rule in Russia was characterized by ferocious cruelty. (When the Muscovites finally threw off the hated Tartar rule, they kept the technique of the knout and sword which their predecessors had used so effectively in enforcing submission, and the common people of the Russias suffered scarcely less under their own rulers than they did under the Mongols.)

After Genghis had conquered most of the rest of the Euro-Asiatic continent, he turned back to take the supreme prize of China. But he died in 1227, before he really started on this new venture.

Genghis's son Ogotai succeeded him as the great khan, and the hordes kept moving. They seemed irresistible. In the vivid language of Professor Soothill: "On the west, Rizan, Moscow, Vladimir, Kieff were destroyed. . . . Hungary and Poland were invaded, Pesth, Gran and Cracow being razed to the ground. In Silesia a force of 30,000 Germans, Poles and Silesians was crushed. The invaders carried away the head of the Duke Henry on a lance, and filled nine great sacks with an ear from each of the slain. Moravia was given over to fire and sword as far as Bohemia and Austria, and Vienna was threatened. France and Germany were in terror of these Mongol demons, of a form and language described as inhuman. No wonder that, in 1238, even the Moslems of Asia turned to their erstwhile Christian foes and implored

the protection of France and Europe against the ferocious creatures who threatened the civilized world with destruction."

Then this great khan died—and Europe was saved. Instead of pushing on down into Germany, the commander of the Mongol army which had crushed the combined German, Polish and Silesian forces in 1241, stopped the advance and hurried back to attend to what he considered a really important matter: the selection of a new great khan. The advance into Austria had reached close to the walls of Vienna, about this same time. It, too, was stopped, not because the European armies were able to resist successfully, but because the Mongol commanders turned back to settle affairs at the center of their empire.

Had Ogotai's death not distracted the attention of the Mongol leaders from their drive into Europe, very possibly the Mongol horsemen would have pushed across Germany, Austria, France, Spain, Italy and the lesser European lands, to halt only when they reached the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. The record of Mongol conquest, and of conditions in Europe up to the time of Ogotai's death, certainly furnishes no convincing evidence to support the belief that Europe could have stopped the Mongols if they had really been interested in bringing all Europe under their control.

Ogotai succeeded Genghis as great khan in 1227. After him came Kuyuk in 1246, Mangu in 1251, and then the most powerful of them all, Kublai, in 1260. All three of these last were grandsons of Genghis. Kublai Khan finally brought all of China under his control in 1280. He established at Peking, which he called Khan Balig (Cambulac), the city of the khan, a court at which scholars from all the world were welcomed, and to which tribute from most of Asia and beyond brought blazing splendor and wealth.

Kublai, as emperor of China, was indifferent to the conquest of Europe, somewhat contemptuously so. From Peking, he ruled all of the Euro-Asiatic continent except the

remote southwestern corner which we call Europe. Why bother about that small bit? After the Mongol empire went to pieces, Europe did succeed in beating off Tamerlane and other lesser chieftains of the hordes. But Europe, then, was dealing with comparatively small fragments of what had been Mongol power. Only an historical accident saved Europe from being overrun by the Mongols in the last half of the thirteenth century: the accident of Mongol indifference.

After he had established himself in China, Kublai pushed on, to add Burma, Siam and the Loochoo Islands to his already vast empire. He sent two expeditions to conquer Japan. Storms destroyed the first, and the desperate fighting of the Japanese turned back the second. To the west, Kublai's power grew weak. Nevertheless, he held under his sway for a time far more territory and many more millions of people than any other man who ever has lived. Napoleon and Cæsar, whose conquests bulk so large in European history, were little more than pygmies when compared with Kublai Khan.

The story of this great Mongol boiling over is a fascinating one, but the fascination is one of horror, for these conquests laid waste vast areas and destroyed millions of lives and the Mongols made no compensating contribution to the development of civilization. Genghis Khan, the supreme combination of ability, savagery and love of slaughter for its own sake, set the key for their spirit and methods in his boast that he could ride over the sites of the cities which had resisted him without meeting an obstacle big enough to make his horse stumble.

Yet these men were not completely savage. Ruthless to the extreme in war, they were gentle enough in peace, and had a real respect for the civilizations which they overran.

Even Genghis himself, for example, impressed by the superiority of Chinese culture, sent from his court in Mongolia to far distant Shantung Province in China for an

aged Chinese monk named Kiu Chang-chun, who was famous for his wisdom and sanctity. The monk ignored the first invitation from the great khan. Genghis then sent word that he would be happy to provide a large bevy of beautiful damsels to keep the distinguished man company on his long journey, and to help him beguile the hours at court. The monk replied in great indignation that he wanted no women, no matter how beautiful, and refused a second time. Genghis, tremendously impressed by this evidence of the almost superhuman wisdom and holiness of the famous scholar, sent his personal adjutant to offer his apologies, and to try to overcome the man's reluctance to make the long journey. The adjutant carried a golden tablet from Genghis, engraved with orders that the Master should be treated with all the respect due to the great khan himself. The monk finally yielded to Genghis' urgent pleas.

Genghis' successors likewise honored representatives of other civilizations. They welcomed visitors from India and the West and invited others to come. Kublai had many learned and pious foreigners at his court, in addition to numerous Chinese scholars. Once established in China, the Mongols deliberately sought to absorb themselves into China's far advanced culture.

The Mongol expansion had a direct effect on Europe other than the destruction which it caused. For a century and a half the Mongols kept the trade routes open across Central Asia. Moved by the age-old lure of the East, by new tales of wealth and splendor at the Mongol court, and by the curiosity which the Mongol conquests had stirred up along with the fear, European merchants, artisans, priests and adventurers of many kinds and in comparatively large numbers went along the newly opened trade routes to the Far East. They brought back stories of lavish splendor, and jewels to confirm their stories. These tales in turn set fires of imagination going in Europe which drove Columbus and his followers out to sea—since by that time the land

routes were closed. The Moorish invasion, which brought to Europe so much of art, literature, mathematics and science, also was due in good part to the Mongol expansion, since Islam, checked and driven back in its push Asia-ward, turned to the Mediterranean for room to grow.

V. MEDIEVAL MEETINGS

Europe also was seething. The armies of the first crusade reached the Holy Land in 1096—about the time the Khitan horsemen conquered Mongolia. (Richard the Lion-Hearted was just five years older than Genghis Khan.) Kublai had been rebuilding Peking for three years, but still was ten years from completing the conquest of China, when the last crusade started in 1270.

The Crusaders came back with tales of Oriental splendor which they had seen, and with more vivid, if more imaginative, stories of even greater wealth and splendor in the lands which lay beyond the Near East. Merchants, churchmen and adventurers went beyond the military lines into those further countries, and the ones who returned brought back new ideas and information from the East which were the good hard wood that fed the fires of the Renaissance—the beginning of which overlapped by half a century the end of the Mongol dynasty in China.

Marco Polo, the intrepid Venetian, is the best known of the Europeans who got into China in Mongol times. Marco went to China across the newly opened overland route, on a second trip which his father and uncle made to the country.

Kublai Khan had sent a representative and a letter to the Pope with the two elder Polos when they returned from their first trip. He asked for a large number of missionaries to preach Christianity to his people. Kublai himself had not embraced the Christian faith, but his mother had. The Pope, Gregory X, sent two Dominicans with the Polos when they started back to China in 1271. The zeal of the

profiteers apparently exceeded that of the prophets, however, for the priests, disheartened by the difficulties of the journey, turned back, while the Polos kept on. They joined caravans when they could, travelled as beggars when necessary for safety from robbers, and almost perished from cold, heat, hunger and thirst in the long trek across the desert, where the route was marked by the skeletons of men and animals who had tried to cross and failed. Three and a half strenuous and dangerous years it took them, from Venice to Peking.

Young Marco was fifteen when he started on this trip. He was just under forty when he finally got back to Venice and began telling vivid tales of his adventures—tales so filled with references to hundreds of thousands of this, that and the other, that he was mockingly dubbed “Marco Millions.” While in China he had caught the fancy of Kublai Khan and travelled far and wide on imperial business. Kublai let Marco and his relatives leave China only after he had exacted a promise from them to return—a promise which they did not keep.

When the Polos reached Venice after a three-year trip by sea from China, they were in rags. Clothed thus they presented themselves at their old home and were at first denied admittance. They had been gone twenty-five years, and their relatives, who had given them up for dead, did not at first recognize them. Finally, however, they were persuaded of the identity of the travellers, and the coolness of the reception turned to warmth with great promptness when the wanderers took from their rags quantities of sparkling jewels, gifts from the Khan, which they had hidden in this way to deceive robbers.

A few years later, when Marco was taken prisoner by the Genoese, he told his tales all over again to a fellow prisoner. This man wrote them down. Thus the “Travels of Marco Polo,” which so stirred Europe’s interest in the Orient, came into being.

Marco Polo found Nestorian Christian communities scattered across China. Almost nothing is known about the first return of the Nestorian missionaries to China after the faith there had been wiped out at the end of the tenth century. Later on, Nestorian Christianity once more disappeared from China, this time so completely that even the memory of it apparently was lost until the Nestorian Tablet was discovered.

This, however, was not until after at least two Christian Chinese had figured prominently in Europe itself. Both these men were high dignitaries in the Nestorian church in China. One, after journeying into Syria, was elected head of the entire Nestorian church in 1281; the other, while on a mission from one of the Mongol kings in 1287, not only visited Rome and Paris, but went on to Bordeaux and there celebrated Mass in the presence of the English Court and gave communion to Edward I, king of England.

Four decades before this, and twenty-six years before Marco started for China, the Pope, alarmed at the threat of Mongol conquest of Europe and the extinction of Christianity, told the Council of Lyons that the Mongols must be driven back. He tried conciliation, sending a disciple of Francis of Assisi as a papal envoy to the East. This man spent more than a year in most difficult travelling through Bohemia, Poland, Russia and the Altai Mountains before he finally reached the Mongol court in 1246. He delivered his letter from the Pope, got a haughty reply, and returned to France.

A little over a year later, two Christian messengers from one of the Mongol chiefs reached Louis IX, king of France, when he was in Cyprus on a crusade. These men said that Kuyuk, the khan, and his mother, who was also Kublai's mother, had turned Christian. Louis thereupon sent ambassadors and presents to the Mongol ruler. By the time they arrived Kuyuk had died and his widow received the ambassadors. She accepted the presents from Louis as

indicating that the French king submitted himself to Mongol rule. This was natural enough, since at that time the Mongols were masters of a large part of Asia and Europe and were getting tribute from many lands. She sent the messengers back to Louis with a letter in which she haughtily demanded that he pay tribute every year.

Several years after this episode, Louis was told that other Mongol chieftains had turned Christian. In spite of his first experience, he sent another embassy, which finally got through to the Mongol headquarters at Karakorum in 1254. There they found, among others, a French goldsmith and his wife, who had been captured during the siege of Belgrade, and an Englishman named Basil, who seems to have gone to the Far East from a pure love of adventure. While King Louis' ambassadors were at the Mongol court, the khan presided over a great debate on religion in which representatives of Christianity took part with Buddhists and others. This mission also accomplished no tangible result.

Precisely forty years after this debate, the first Catholic missionary reached Khan Balig (Peking), which Kublai had rebuilt into what probably was the world's most splendid city at the time. He found Kublai—now turned patron of literature and learning since peace had been established—presiding over a court probably the most enlightened in the world, made so by the hundreds of Chinese scholars there and by those from other lands. This was a year or so after the Polos had left, and a couple of years before Kublai died.

John of Monte Corvino, this first Catholic missionary, arrived alone in China, his companion on the journey having died in India. But he was received by Kublai and given full freedom to preach. He met opposition from some of the Syrian Nestorians who were in Peking at the time, and found that a doctor from Lombardy, who had come adventuring two years earlier, had spread extremely derogatory stories

about the Popes, the Franciscans and Europe generally. Other Europeans who were in Peking gave him less trouble, apparently. In 1298 he built the first Catholic church in the city. Nine years later, three more Franciscans arrived to help him—six had started but three died on the way out. In 1313, John, now archbishop at Khan Balig, built a cathedral in the chief trading center of Fukien Province, the money, according to the accounts, having been provided by a rich Armenian lady.

A few more friars went out to China in the years that followed, and one or two of these returned to Rome to plead for helpers. But the Popes were indifferent, the Franciscans lacked enthusiasm for the work and, in 1355, in the midst of political disturbances which led to the overthrow of the Mongol dynasty in 1368, the new papal legate returned to Europe.

Unfortunately for them, the Franciscans had identified themselves almost entirely with the Mongol rulers, and most of the 30,000 converts whom they secured were not Chinese. Consequently, they were swept away with the hated Mongols when the founder of the purely Chinese Ming dynasty drove out the invaders from the north. "Thus, for the second time, Christianity was extinct in China," as a Catholic writer puts it.

Trade between China and the West also practically stopped at this time. The vast Mongol Empire fell apart when Kublai died, and before long roving tribesmen once more wandered and raided at will across Central Asia. Trading overland became too profitable for the marauders and too dangerous for the merchants to be worth while. A new boiling over from the Mongol cauldron, headed by Tamerlane in the fourteenth century, blocked the land routes altogether. (The Mogul Dynasty in India, decadent but still ruling in splendor when Clive and Hastings started to make India England's, was established as a result of this Mongol outpouring.)

The Turks, whose ancestors had boiled out from this same cauldron, had by this time secured a tight grip on the Near East, and had cut Western Europe off from the route down to the Red Sea and so by water to India and China, though Arabs and others from Mohammedan lands still sailed that way.

The narrow and shaky bridge spanning the chasm between East and West had been wrecked—the bridge which the Mongol conquerors, the Crusaders and the adventuring merchants had built.

VI. CONTACT REESTABLISHED

Yet the "lure of the East" still worked powerfully in Europe. With the land routes blocked, and the old sea route closed, Europeans looked for other ways of getting to the region which, they believed, was filled with wealth to be had for the taking. Through the fifteenth century they talked more and more about the possibility of going by sea routes which still were open. (Fifteen hundred, perhaps two thousand, years earlier, Carthaginians seem to have found the way around Africa; but Europe knew nothing of this in the 1400's.) A few bold spirits here and there began to raise doubts as to their sanity by suggesting that perhaps the earth was round, not flat, so that one could sail westward over the horizon to get to the East. (Some Greek philosophers believed that the earth was round, and five hundred years before Columbus started on his journey, Norsemen had crossed the Atlantic; but of these things fifteenth century Europe was ignorant.)

Then a Genoese navigator named Columbus, after being shouted down as a lunatic at home, went to the Portuguese with a proposal that the long and dangerous trip around Africa could be avoided by sailing directly westward across the horizon. The Portuguese would have nothing to do with so wild a plan. Finally Columbus got the ear of that gay defier of tradition, Queen Isabella of Spain. By making

an egg stand on end (cracking the shell to do it) he convinced her and a few others that the earth *could* be round. With many blandishments and much argument, he finally persuaded the Queen to give him money and jewels for what most of Europe considered a wildly suicidal venture. He bought three small boats and started across the Atlantic. The embarrassing presence of the American continents directly across his path kept him from reaching China or India. But he did prove that ships could sail beyond the horizon without tumbling off into limitless space. Before his time, the horizon was a wall hemming in the imagination as well as the ships of renascent Europe. Columbus swept that wall away.

Six years after Columbus first crossed the Atlantic, a more cautious but equally hardy Portuguese, Vasco da Gama, felt his way down the West coast of Africa and up on the other side until he reached India. Others of various nations followed both these men. Starting from the base which Portuguese had set up in Malacca, eastward from India, fellow countrymen of da Gama reached Chinese waters in 1516.

Up to this time, the current of influence had flowed far more from East to West than otherwise during historical times. China had not attempted to export its religion or culture to the West, but through trade and war, directly and indirectly, it had supplied Europe with goods and inventions and ideas which were of prime importance. It also furnished an appeal to the imagination of awakening Europe to reach out around the world. On the other hand, Europe at this time had not even thought of sending armies to conquer China or any other part of the Far East. At an early stage it supplied China with a few foods, and later on passed on to her astronomical information and a few convenient devices, but nothing which materially altered the way of life of the people. Europe, however, never awoke in China the impulse to go out and learn or get wealth in

the West. This was natural enough, since China's civilization at this time, when Europe was only emerging from the Dark Ages, was so much more advanced than Europe's and her wealth was so very much greater than that of any other country.

The current of contacts between East and West stopped flowing during the fifteenth century. When it began to flow again, in the sixteenth, it moved from West to East. Then it grew steadily in volume and force for four hundred years, with results which will be considered later.

CHINA AND THE CHINESE

(CHAPTER III)

MAP makers mark off a good sized part of Asia and call it China. Yet China is not simply, or even primarily, a section of the earth's surface. Its land boundaries are only vaguely defined, even in these days of precise map making, and those boundaries have moved back and forth across wide stretches, in the course of the centuries.

Even these far-flung boundaries do not contain all that really is China. Beyond them, in Siam, in the Malay States, in Indo-China, in the Philippines, in Japan, in Siberia, and at various places in North and South America, Europe and Africa, are communities of Chinese which are almost as vitally a part of the real China as are the cities and villages from which the members of these over-seas communities, or their ancestors, departed. In the long past, too, China in a real sense has meant almost the whole Far East, because its vast size, its ancient civilization and splendid culture so completely dominated all its neighbors.

Even the region which the map makers call China is not a unit, as Germany or France or Italy or Japan are units. The boundaries run north close to the Arctic Circle, and south well toward the Equator. The northeast is a vast plain, and not much smaller is the plain which stretches along the southern coast. The southern half is cut by range after range of mountains, so steep that no road for wheeled vehicles runs through. To the West are plateaus and then more mountains which climb high up onto the flanks of the Himalayas. Any one of these sections is larger than any country in Europe; together, they give China a greater

diversity of climate and soil and living conditions than all Europe can show.

Neither is China a racial entity. Mongols and Malays, fierce Turks pushing across Central Asia, wild aborigines who were in the land before China's first beginnings, primitive negroid peoples in the Himalaya foothills, Aryans from India and the West in ancient and modern times, Slavs and Semites—all of them have poured their blood into the veins of those who now go by the name of Chinese. Anthropologists have sought in vain for any specific single bodily feature to which they could point and say: "this is Chinese." The "Chinese race" is as much of a mixture as the "white race"; and the one term means as little as the other. In temperament, in bodily form, even in coloring, the Chinese differ among themselves almost as much as the peoples of Europe.

Nor is China a closely-knit social entity, like England or Belgium—and still less like Japan. Through the centuries and down to the present day, China has been essentially an inchoate mass of small groups. Each group is well organized within itself, but each jealously maintains its separateness from the others in the hard and continuous battle to hold fast to whatever means it has for getting a living.

Almost least of all is China a political unit. It never has been, nor has it become a State in the modern Western political sense. Judged by conventional Western standards, virtual political anarchy has been the rule rather than the exception in China, from ancient times. The people, working through their small groups, have managed their own affairs. The government has been organized and administered, by the mutual desire of governors and governed alike, on the theory that the less the people and the officials had to do with each other, the better for all concerned.

Yet in spite of being without unity in these ranges of life, where Westerners think unity is essential to any sort of national existence, China is a reality. Somehow the Chinese,

ages ago, worked out a technique of social adjustment, a way of living, which made survival possible. They wove a social web, tough enough to withstand the rending strains of periodic domestic upheavals and of conquest by foreigners, yet flexible enough to adjust smoothly to the almost infinite variety of local conditions.

China is a civilization, a social system, made coherent by the strong, all-pervading culture which is rooted deep in the past. In refutation of what seems at times even the most elementary sort of logic, China has a real and effective unity—a unity and coherence which have continued through millennia and have brought China vigorously alive into the modern world, while the Western contemporaries of her youth and middle age have long since passed into oblivion.

China well can be compared to one of the huge sand dunes which stretch for miles across the floor of the Ordos Desert. Worked upon by winds from far places, these dunes move slowly but irresistibly, as, under the pressure of the winds, the fine grains of sand at the back roll up and over the top onto the forward face. When watched for a short space of time, the dunes seem stationary. Seen at somewhat longer intervals, they seem to have moved a little; over a long period of time they may travel far. They change little in form for all their motion. Though made up of tiny particles, by sheer mass they overwhelm all obstacles in their path, and when they have gone by, it is as though the obstacles had not been. The winds carry some of the sands away, but this loss they make up from the plain across which they move. The majestic dunes cannot be hurried or turned aside from their own appointed way; nor can they be stopped or conquered.

II. WHO ARE THE CHINESE?

Relying chiefly on Chinese documents, most scholars formerly assumed that the "original Chinese" were a tribe of people who came out of Central Asia somewhere, moved

the frontiers of their control slowly down the fertile valley of the Yellow River, and started to create civilization around a center in the Wei River Valley—a basin of about a million acres in the western province of Shensi, with a good climate and exceedingly rich soil, where the Yellow River makes its abrupt eastward turn. The “original Chinese” were supposed to have changed from nomads to settled and crudely civilized farmers sometime between three and two thousand years before Christ.

These theories have been upset, however, by discoveries in recent excavations which create a presumption that Chinese civilization was started by “pre-Chinese” people living along the lower reaches of the Yellow River in the center of the vast North Chinese plain. Thus, probably, the “original Chinese” of the older theory were barbarian invaders out of the northwest who, by force of arms, made themselves masters of a region in which the people already had developed some measure of civilization—much as the barbarian Mongol and Tartar tribes later came down out of the northwest and conquered the civilized Chinese.

Perhaps the “pre-Chinese” whose civilization was overrun by this early spilling over from the great cauldron of Central Asia and Mongolia were themselves invaders—like the Dravidians who had a distinctly creditable civilization in India when the Aryan invasion began two thousand or more years before Christ. At any rate, the distribution of racial types and language remnants, as well as very ancient tradition and records, show that there were apparently at least three great movements of peoples into what we now call China.

The very earliest inhabitants of which any trace remains seem to have been negroid peoples, racially akin to the Negritos in the Philippines. Some of the people now living in the remoter mountain fastnesses in and near Tibet show clear evidences of negroid ancestry, and even in the more accessible regions one sometimes finds a person who in face

and form and hair appears to be a "throw-back" to such stock. Such negroid peoples also lived in India in very early times, and their descendants now occupy inaccessible mountain regions in the Indian Peninsula and the Himalayas.

The next arrivals seem to have been people closely related to the Malays of today—perhaps ancestors of the Malays. Apparently, they pushed the negroid tribes out of the fertile valleys and up into the mountains, or across the sea into Japan, Formosa, the Philippines and other neighboring islands. What perhaps are the remnants of these negroid expatriates still live in the Philippines and Formosa. The ancestors of the present day Japanese, when they arrived in Japan eight or nine hundred years before Christ, found there people whom they called the "spider men," who probably were of the same negroid stock. These the Japanese exterminated, in part, according to Japanese tradition, by smoking them out of their cave-burrows and catching them in nets as they emerged. In India, the negroid tribes appear to have been driven up into the mountains by the early Dravidians—who are racially somewhat akin to the Malays.

Then came a third invasion, probably sometime between three and two thousand years B.C., about which the evidence begins to be appreciably definite. Tribes moved out of Central Asia, down the Yellow River valley into China, conquering, exterminating, absorbing and driving before them the people who already were in the land. These invaders are the people usually, though loosely, called the "original Chinese." Some of the "pre-Chinese" apparently crossed the sea to the neighboring islands. A good many stayed in China. In the north they were almost completely absorbed or exterminated, though a few seem to have found refuge in remote mountain valleys. In the mountains, west and southwest, they remained in sufficient numbers and isolation to be ancestors of the present day Lolos, Miaos and other "wild tribes." These never have given more than a

grudging and nominal allegiance to Chinese authority, and they have kept, in the main, their own distinct customs. Still others settled, or remained, along the southeast coast and on the southern plains, where they have been absorbed into Chinese civilization. The invaders in the north, at this early period, and later, however, did not penetrate in large numbers very far south. The result is that today, as one goes south in China, one finds the people changing from the big, slow-moving, stolid, almost pure Mongol northerner to the small, vivacious, excitable, largely-Malay southerner—the change from one section to another corresponding roughly to the extent to which the invaders from the north actually penetrated southward.

The distribution of languages throws an illuminating sidelight on the way this invasion from the north affected the pre-Chinese tribes. All of China uses the same written language, though the ideographs are given varying sounds—just as, in the West, all the people use the same Arabic figures, though, for example, 55 is called “fifty-five” in English, “fünf und fünfzig” in German, “cinquante-cinq” in French, etc.

But most of China—probably well over three-fourths of the people—also uses the same spoken language, although with dialect variations comparable to those between Cockney and Yorkshire English. This “mandarin” is the language not only of the old capital at Peking and the present one at Nanking, but also of all north and northwest China and of the entire Yangtze Valley down close to the mouth of the river. A number of spoken languages, as different from each other as English, French, German and Italian, however, are used down along the southern and southeastern coast, from the mouth of the Yangtze around to the Indo-China border. It seems reasonable to assume—and there is evidence to support the assumption—that these coastal languages spring from the languages of the various “pre-Chinese” peoples who were driven across the mountains

that guard the coast but who managed to keep a foothold on the mainland. Similarly, scattered through the hilly parts even of North China are small "pockets" where the people talk peculiar and narrowly localized dialects, which also would seem to be derived from the languages of tribal remnants that had been driven into the hills.

The prevailing and erroneous Western idea that China is a land of an almost limitless number of languages apparently arose from the fact that, in the early days of modern intercourse, Westerners came almost exclusively into contact with the Chinese along the southern and southeastern coast, and since then most of their contacts have been with this same general region.

China also was settled from the southwest. About a thousand years after the movement of the "original Chinese" began out of Central Asia into China, the "Aryans" started pushing through the mountain passes down into India. They found the fairly civilized Dravidians there. The Aryans conquered the Dravidians, killing some, driving others into the mountains, and making servants of still others. Some of these Dravidian tribes apparently went eastward along the coast, through what is now Burma, the Malay States and Indo-China, and all the way onto the plains of South China. Considerably later, after the Aryans had settled down in India, there was a movement of peoples back from China toward India. This was the result of the expansion into South China from the Yangtze Valley because of pressure from still further north.

We know reasonably definitely that these people who moved into China from the southwest, under Aryan pressure in India, were closely akin to the Malay peoples of today. We know much less about the racial affiliations of the "original Chinese" who came in from the northwest.

Ancient Chinese records, for example, indicate that these arrivals from the northwest were conquerors who established themselves as an aristocracy ruling over the previous in-

habitants, much as the Aryans did in India, as the Greeks did in the Mediterranean Basin and as the Normans did in England. In these old Chinese records, those over whom the aristocrats ruled are referred to as the "black haired people," obviously implying that the aristocrats themselves were not black haired. There may have been some such difference as that between the fair haired aristocrats and the black haired common people which existed in early Greece.

Furthermore, the Ainus, a few of whom still live in far northern Japan, but who were dominant, in the main island at least, when the "Japanese" first arrived, have brown or reddish hair, and in other ways show clearly that they belong to the Caucasoid rather than to the Mongoloid division of mankind. No one knows how the Ainus got into Japan or where they came from. It is at least an interesting speculation, however, that they may be the last remnants in that part of the world of a very early movement of Caucasoids eastward out of Central Asia—the beginning of a wave of people of this racial stock which, later on, carried some of the same stock into India (the Aryans), and down into the Mediterranean Basin (the Greeks and early Roman peoples). However that may be, all traces have long since disappeared of whatever infusion of Caucasoid blood there may have been four or five thousand years ago in north-western China.

Traces of a possible early Caucasoid invasion still remain in Far Eastern folk lore, however. In Japanese as well as in Chinese folk tales, the villain of the piece, be he devil or some thoroughly evil person, always is fair skinned and frequently has red hair and blue eyes, while the hero, the good spirit, the admirable person, has black hair, dark skin and dark eyes. In the West, on the other hand, almost universally, the hero is a blond and the villain a dark brunette. Satan, his imps and malevolent spirits are dark, but St. Michael, the angels and the good fairies are pure blond "Nordic."

Such distinctions, as is well known, grow out of the experiences of the early peoples who spin the folk tales. Long before Western history began, brunette peoples around the Mediterranean were warring with negroids, and, somewhat later but still in far pre-historic times, blond peoples were drifting down into Europe out of the north and clashing with the southern brunettes. In both cases, the enemy was darker than the friend, so evil was associated with dark skin, eyes and hair. The blackness of evil beings in Hindu folk lore likewise is an Aryan tradition, apparently springing from the conflict of these Caucasoid invaders of India with the dark skinned Dravidians whom they found in the land. Similarly, the association of evil with blondness by the Chinese and Japanese would seem to indicate that the ancestors of the present occupants of these lands had long and bitter experiences with fairer skinned enemies.

The case in Japan is clear. The ancestors of the present Japanese, found the forebears of the Caucasoid Ainus in the islands when they arrived, besides the negroid "spider men" whom they easily overcame. For well over two thousand years—until the last couple of centuries in fact—the Japanese were compelled to wage more or less continuous warfare with these people of lighter complexion, as they gradually pushed them northward.

The folk tales of China, however, were native born, not borrowed from Japan; such borrowing as has taken place has been the other way. Where, then, did the Chinese get the idea of associating evil with blondness, unless at some time in the past they had long and bitter experience with some blond race? The people who trekked into South China to escape the invading Aryans in India may have brought the idea with them into that part of the country. But something more seems needed to explain the fact that the idea is expressed in the ancient tales which apparently have a purely northern origin.

This age-old Far Eastern association of evil with blond-

ness very directly influenced the feeling of the Chinese and Japanese about the modern Westerners when they first arrived—and it still influences that attitude. These new arrivals, with their fair skin, some with light hair and blue eyes, and practically all utterly lacking in what were considered the proper refinements of manner, seemed the perfect embodiment of the ogres of dreadful childhood association. And it must be admitted that in all too many cases the early comers from the West—and not a few of the later ones—acted in ways which completely confirmed the folk tale conception that fair complexioned peoples were barbarous and wicked. To understand why Chinese and Japanese children, even to this day, run screaming with fright when they see their first Westerner, one need only read accounts of the way in which English, French and American children screamed and ran when they saw an African negro for the first time.

In both East and West, very deep-going antagonisms center around differences of skin color; antagonisms in which the normal reaction against the unfamiliar is confirmed by an association of ideas built up from birth.

The fact that the people in each part of the world, East and West, have grown up for many generations associating evil with the skin color of the people in the other part, has had an important bearing on the relations between them. It is a fact which is far too important to be ignored, as it has been all too often, in the discussion of these relations.

III. FLOODS ACROSS CHINA

Scarcely a summer passes but that somewhere on the vast plain of northern China swirling flood waters break through the dikes, spread across fields, fill the trench-like roads through the villages, and gnaw ravenously at the mud walls of the houses until they crumble. Whole villages may be wrecked. But when the floods subside the villagers return, gather the timbers from their collapsed houses, bake some

more bricks in the sun or scrape mud together, and patiently rebuild their homes.

Such destruction and rebuilding have been repeated countless times in the long centuries of China's history. In more recent years, new materials and methods have come into use, here and there, which suggest the possibility of ending this periodic destruction. Dikes and parts of the house walls are being made of concrete. Channels are being dug to drain off flood waters. Here a little, there a little, new ways and materials are establishing safety from the recurrent floods. The ancient rivers still run to overflowing in flood time, however, and the houses are built mostly of the old materials and in the old style.

The plain where these floods occur, in its vast extent, is like China's history, swallowing up in its very immensity hills and valleys—times of glory and times of chaos—which, in a less extended setting would appear large.

Floods of social and political disorganization have marked the intervals between the Chinese dynasties. Such a flood now covers the land. But always the Chinese have rebuilt their social and political structure after the floods have passed, using for their rebuilding the very materials of which China herself is made, just as the villagers use their old timbers and throw over them walls and roofs made from the aboriginal earth. One powerful stream in the present flood, however, has come from the West. This stream has brought new ways of thinking and acting which will go into the new rebuilding, supplementing and perhaps partly replacing the old.

These flood waters of Western ways and ideas have caused their full share of confusion in China. But they have not been the sole cause of that confusion, perhaps not even the chief cause. One of the periodic floods of disorganization which have overwhelmed Chinese dynasties was rising when the modern Westerners first arrived. Another, after half a century of slow growth, burst in a devastating wave

which swept across most of the country and all but overthrew the Manchu dynasty just at the time when Westerners were getting into a position to push forward vigorously. Western influences had no part in stimulating the first of these floods which caused the downfall of the Ming Emperors and the establishment of the Manchu dynasty in 1644. The West had very little to do with causing the second, the great T'ai P'ing Rebellion, in the middle of the nineteenth century. That upheaval sprang almost entirely from purely Chinese sources: from governmental corruption and degeneration, with consequent popular discontent, substantially like that which produced the successive dynastic changes through China's long past.

Ideas from the West were an important part of the tide which, in 1912, finally swept the Manchus from the Dragon Throne, and cleared the ground for a New Deal. This change, however, came as the culmination of a century and more of growing revolt against the Manchus. A dynastic change was already long overdue. The political borrowings from the West at this time—most conspicuous among them being the idea of setting up the utterly strange structure of a Republic—caused more rather than less confusion.

In the other lands of the Far East, the swift-moving current of Western ways and ideas and force has more or less completely swallowed up the thin streams from the springs of national life, just as the great current of Chinese civilization flooded and fertilized the whole Far East in bygone centuries. In China, the river flowing out of the ancient past is too large, too powerful, thus to be engulfed by the stream from the West. Much of the present disorganization in China, in fact, is due to the very power of China's own civilization. Events would have moved with less confusion, though along quite different lines, if that civilization had been as incoherent as was India's, or essentially as uncreative as was Japan's. The very fact that the clash of these two great streams of civilization, from the West and from

old China, has produced disturbance and confusion is proof not of the weakness but of the strength and creative vitality of China.

Confusion was inevitable, in the circumstances; confusion and much disintegration. The incidents of this confusion necessarily form the raw materials of the "news" despatches from China, because they are the sudden and conspicuous features of what is taking place. But the deeper currents whose movements produce these surface manifestations are the proper concern of those who would understand what China is today and, consequently, the part which she may play in the development of world civilization. With these we shall be dealing in the subsequent chapters.

BUILDING THE WALL

(CHAPTER IV)

AN eclipse of the sun occurred in 776 B.C. This occurrence was noted in Chinese records, and that entry gives us the earliest absolutely positive date in Chinese history. It also serves as a starting point for calculation, both backward and forward, for the dates of other events. The farther back we go into the past, of course, the less exact becomes the timing of those events. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that by the time of that early eclipse, the Chinese had been moving definitely on the road of civilization for more years than have elapsed since the star shone over Bethlehem.

Yet that eclipse was only yesterday, in relation to the vast stretches of time dealt with in Chinese myths. Chinese philosophers, like Western, speculated about how the universe came into being and developed. For our purposes, however, the folk myths are more significant than the philosophical speculations because they indicate more clearly the underlying attitude of the people. These myths reveal that sense of being part of an almost infinitely long stream of events which is so characteristic of the Chinese attitude toward life. They reveal, too, that feeling of the comparative unimportance of man as such, especially of the individual man, which runs so characteristically through all Chinese art and literature.

It would be fascinating to follow the windings of those myths, and to trace the similarities to and differences from the corresponding stories of the Hebrews, the Greeks, the Indians, the Scandinavians and others. It must suffice here, however, to note the ever-present sense of long-drawn time

and of man's unimportance which these tales reflect—a sense so different from that which has prevailed in the West.

Contrast, for example, the story of creation in the book of Genesis—the story which for so long was accepted in the West as literal truth—with the account which has had the widest hold on Chinese popular imagination. This Chinese tale was put together as recently as three or four hundred years after Christ (there are no records of Chinese creation myths which trace authentically back to very early times), or about the time that the Bible account passed into current circulation in Europe.

According to the Western story, a definitely man-like God spent six days making the universe as we know it, the work having been done at a time which quite specifically could be fixed, as Bishop Usher calculated, at a mere four thousand years before Christ. Man was the culmination of creation, set to rule the earth which this god had made.

The Chinese myth allows a vague but vast time of chaos in which somehow the two antithetical principles—the *yang* and the *ying*; the active and the passive; the positive and negative; the male and the female—produced a dwarfish creature called Pan Ku. This person spent eighteen thousand years carving out of chaos the sun, the moon, the stars, the heavens and the earth, growing at the rate of six feet a day while so engaged. Then he died, and our earth derives from him. The mountains are his head; the rivers his blood; the rain his perspiration; the wind his breath; the rocks his bones; the trees his hair. Men are the insects which crawled on Pan Ku's body!

Chinese myths have it that many thousands of years passed, after the earth emerged out of chaos, before men began to be civilized. After the Ten Epochs, each of thousands of years, came Fu Hsi, with whom myth begins slightly to give way to history. By this time—placed variously between four and three thousand years before Christ—the Nest Dweller had taught men to make habitations, and the Fire Dis-

coverer had shown them the use of fire. Fu Hsi invented pictorial writing, musical instruments, and the calendar by which to determine the seasons. He also instituted marriage. His sister-wife, Nü Kua, repaired the cosmos which had become damaged by its long wear and tear, and stemmed a great flood. (Thus early did the devastating floods of the Yellow River leave their mark on Chinese life!) Shen Nung, coming somewhat later than Fu Hsi, taught the people farming and medicine. Still later, according to the tradition, came Huang Ti, or the Yellow Ruler; and with him history emerges more definitely out of the nebulous regions of myths.

Huang Ti's reign began in 2704, according to the more commonly accepted of the Chinese calculations. Tradition has it that he moved from place to place in the "northwest," and that in the course of his full century of rule he brought order among the tribes, fought off barbarian invaders out of the north and west, and extended his sway eastward along the Yellow River to the sea and southward across the North China plain to and beyond the Yangtze River. For the sake of the farmers, he studied the stars in order to mark the seasons more accurately. His wife was the first to produce, spin, and weave silk.

In the tales of these mythical rulers we get a picture of a nomadic people gradually settling down to agricultural life, building houses and walled towns, discovering one art after another, and slowly becoming more and more closely knit into communities under successive chieftains. Frazier's "Golden Bough" gives an account of early tribal life which corresponds quite closely to that indicated by the available scraps of information bearing on the life of these very early inhabitants of China.

II. YAO, SHUN, AND YÜ

The names of several minor rulers are listed in the Chinese chronologies as governing between Huang Ti and the first

of the three men whose names are household words in China, and to whom the Chinese look back as the great exemplars of righteousness and benevolence: Yao, Shun, and Yü. These men held the "throne" through about a century and a half, beginning somewhere between 2350 B.C. and 2150 B.C.—nearly a thousand years before Moses led the Israelites out of Egypt.

Yao became "emperor" by vote of the clan chiefs who had deposed his brother. After he had ruled for seventy years, Shun joined him as regent. Yao's choice and the will of the chiefs made Shun and not Yao's son "emperor" when Yao died thirty years later. Shun and the clansmen in turn set Sun's son aside and put Yü on the "throne" as a reward for his great services. At this period, the choice of the chief among chiefs thus was by election rather than by heredity, as it was among the tribes out of North Europe who, much later, moved down into the Mediterranean Basin.

When Yü passed on, however, his son, rather than his prime minister succeeded to the throne. The chieftains had a considerable voice in this selection, but the introduction of the hereditary principle marked an important turning point in the settling down of the tribes. Because the "throne" remained in his family, Yü is referred to by the Chinese as the founder of the first of a long succession of dynasties. This dynasty, known as the Hsia, was established about 2200 B.C.

The accounts of a great flood which occurred in the last years of Yao's reign throw further light on the stage of development which had been reached thus early in Chinese history. Shun rose to prominence in part because of his efforts to deal with this flood. Yü made the reputation which won him the "throne" by combating it successfully. The accounts of this flood are vague, but they indicate that it covered considerable territory and did a great deal of damage.

The geography of North China is such that there could not have been a very widespread flood except on the great plain across which the Yellow River wanders eastward to the sea. To the west of this plain is the valley of the Wei River, where for a considerable time, later Chinese emperors had their capitals. But the configuration of the land in the Wei Valley is such that no flood is possible which could cause widespread damage. The fact that the great flood with which Yao, Shun, and Yü were concerned did do great harm, therefore, points strongly to the conclusion that the center of civilization during their time was on the Yellow River plain, not further west and north. Other evidence, from traditions recorded in the ancient books and from excavations recently made, supports this view.

Still other evidence, however, leaves no doubt that the headquarters of the Chow Dynasty, established about 1100 B.C., were in the Wei River Valley, and that the Chow Dynasty was founded by the leader of tribes which had come down from the farther northwest.

Quite possibly, therefore, the tales of Yao, Shun, and Yü, and the remnants of the culture of their time, relate to a civilization which was being started by the pre-Chinese inhabitants of China, rather than by the more strictly Mongoloid "original Chinese"—a civilization which was overrun by barbarian invaders, as were the Dravidian civilization in India, and the Sumerian, Cretan and Mycenæan civilizations in the Mediterranean Basin.

Quite possibly, too, that great flood itself played an important part in wrecking this early civilization in China, just as another great flood of the Yellow River in 1853 vitally influenced the course of events by stopping the T'ai P'ing rebels and saving the Manchu Dynasty from overthrow.

In any case, the records of this Yellow River Basin civilization in China more than two millennia before Christ show that the people were well beyond the cruder stages of bar-

barism. The accounts of the flood report that Yü brought it under control by digging canals and building many miles of dikes which tamed the colossal Yangtze, as well as the Yellow River. Legend unquestionably has exaggerated Yü's feats. But there is little doubt, apparently, that the people of this period in China had a good working knowledge of hydraulic engineering.

The traditions of Yao, Shun, and Yü indicate that even thus early, a conception of government had begun to take hold which has remained fundamental in Chinese social and political thinking: the concept that legitimate authority rests on moral character, not on force. Yao, Shun, and Yü probably did considerable fighting to win and hold their leadership among the tribes. On this phase of their activities, tradition is silent. All three are honored, not as successful warriors, but as men of incorruptible integrity who served the people faithfully. The power of their moral character, not prowess in arms, earned for them the power and honor accorded them, as the Chinese see it.

The idea that "government rests on the consent of the governed" also has its roots deep in China's past. Heaven grants and takes away the mandate to rule, but "Heaven sees as the people see and hears as the people hear," as Kao Yao, minister of justice in 2550 B.C., put it, according to the Chinese Classics—thus anticipating by a couple of thousand years the Roman "*vox populi, vox Dei*."

The Hsia Dynasty, which Yü established, went the way of all dynasties which followed—and of all hereditary dynasties. Founded by able men, court luxury and the intermixture of less able blood in the family strain, step by step, brought weakness, degeneration and inefficiency, or worse, in the rulers. The Hsia completed its cycle of decay in four hundred years.

Then one of the feudal chiefs, heading a coalition of the rest, took control. His clan at that time had its headquarters down on the Yellow River plain, whither it had moved

from the Wei River Valley under pressure from other tribes further to the northwest.

Chinese mytho-history drapes the men and events of this time in trappings borrowed from a later period. Behind these trappings, however, it is easy to see the picture of the tribes drifting down through the forests of the upper Yellow River, spreading out into the fertile Wei River Valley for a time, and then moving eastward onto the great plain, pushed from behind by new tribes out of the northwest and lured forward by the vision of an easy life of authority over the serf-farmers of the plain.

Approximately six centuries passed before the cycle of decay ran its course for the second, or Shang, dynasty. Jade was carved. Bronze vessels were cast. Pictorial writing was conventionalized and made to express abstract ideas. The "empire" stretched from the Wei River to the sea, and included most of the North China plain southward to the Yangtze River. Feudal chiefs ruled the regions into which the territory was divided, exercising virtually absolute power over the common people and yielding such submission to the "emperor" as the latter could exact. The family or clan had replaced the individual as the social unit. The "emperor," the feudal baron, and the head of the family, each in his rank, stood as the mediator between the heavenly powers and the people. Fighting with tribesmen to the north and south was more or less continuous, but the "emperors" increasingly left such matters to the border chiefs and devoted themselves to the ease and luxury of court life.

Finally one of these border chiefs wrecked the tottering structure of the dynasty. For two hundred years before the end came, the "dukes of Chow," operating from their base in the Wei River Valley, had served as buffers between the "empire" on the Yellow River plain and the increasingly persistent attacks of tribesmen from the northwest. When the last of the Shang rulers came to the throne in 1154 B.C., the then head of the Chow clan had made his area the most

prosperous in the "empire." After watching the debauchery and tyranny of the court for some years, he protested vigorously. He was imprisoned for his pains, but his people, with whom he was exceedingly popular, raised funds to buy his release. Appealed to to seize the throne, he refused on the ground of his unworthiness. His son and successor was less modest. Allying himself with eight tribes in the west and northwest, he mustered, according to the accounts, an army of 250,000 chariots with which he defeated the Emperor's 700,000 men.

Chinese commentators state that the eight tribes which joined the Duke of Chow in his revolt did not have Chinese names. Some suggest that the Chow tribe itself was not Chinese. In any case, we have here a clearly marked advance of that wave of expansion out of Central Asia, in the last movements of which we today are sharing.

III. CHOW AND CH'IN

The Chow Dynasty, the longest in Chinese history, began in 1122 B.C., according to one reckoning, or in 1050 B.C., according to another. It was the dynasty during which Confucius propounded the ethico-political philosophy which expressed the already old essentials of Chinese life; the dynasty which saw Chinese literature and philosophy achieve their first full flowering; the dynasty to which the Chinese look back as their great classical period. During this time feudalism came to its fullest development.

The period was marked, especially in its later centuries, by a long succession of puppet "emperors" left on the throne by shifting combinations of feudal chiefs who fought among themselves as did the feudal barons in Europe two thousand years later. For not quite four centuries, the Chow rulers kept their capital at Sian-fu in Shensi Province, in the Wei River Valley where the clan headquarters had been. Then they moved east onto the great plain, to escape the attacks of barbarian tribes coming down from the northwest.

One of these tribes moved into the Wei Valley, acknowledged allegiance to the Chow rulers, took on Chinese civilization and, under the name of Ts'in (from which comes our word China), step by step built itself into the most powerful of the feudal clans. Like the dukes of Chow who had preceded them in the Wei Valley, the dukes of Ts'in served for several centuries as the "Guardians of the Western Marches" for the Chinese "emperors." In the later stages of its rise to power, the Ts'in clan had roused the jealousy of the other six principal feudal clans, but these could not unite effectively enough among themselves to stop their western rival. The last Chow "emperor" called on all six clans to help him crush the presumptuous Ts'in lord, but before they could get their forces together the Ts'in army had overrun the capital and the Ts'in chief had taken the "nine tripods" which symbolized the imperial authority. The Chow Dynasty was ended. This was in 256 B.C.

For ten years the Ts'in king fought with his feudal rivals. Then the Ts'in title passed to a boy of thirteen, officially but not certainly the son of a weak scion of the ducal line for whom an intriguer had secured the reversion of the Ts'in chieftainship. This boy "attained his majority and seized the sabre" in 238 B.C. Eight years later he made his first conquest among the principal rival feudal clans. He pushed his conquests eastward along the Yellow River until he reached the sea. Then he went southwest to destroy the strongest of his rivals, the Ch'u clan in what is now the huge western province of Szechuan. This accomplished, he moved down the Yangtze, subduing the last of the lesser clans, thus completing the work which the Ts'in chieftain had started more than a century earlier.

Thirty-five years had elapsed since one of these chieftains had overthrown the last of the Chow rulers. The boy who was thirteen years old when he inherited the chieftainship of the Ts'in clan had become a man of thirty-eight

when, in 221 B.C., he wiped out the last opposition to the authority of his clan, and took the imperial title.

This man, however, wanted to do more than simply to start another dynasty. He believed that China was much too cramped by the shackles of tradition from an already ancient past. He thought the time had come for a New Deal. He announced this new belief by calling himself, on ascending the throne, Shih Huang Ti or the "First Divine Autocrat." In using that title he rejected the idea that China had had any emperors before himself, at least since the mythical demi-gods. His successor was to be the "Second Divine Autocrat," and so on through the ages—but the Ts'in Dynasty which he founded turned out to be one of the shortest in Chinese history. It ended in 206 B.C., when the "Second Divine Autocrat" was murdered by the chief eunuch. Within forty-six days, his successor, installed as the king of Ts'in, but not as emperor, had killed the offending eunuch and had been forced to surrender to the man who, four years later, was to ascend the imperial throne as founder of the Han Dynasty.

IV. UNIFICATION

Shih Huang Ti, who had such ambitious dreams, wiped out feudalism in China and established the country's first really unified government. After his time, China several times broke up into politically independent states, it is true. Often the man who held the imperial title was the weakest sort of puppet. The idea of national unity as it has developed in the modern West did not appear in Chinese political thinking. But Shih Huang Ti definitely destroyed the older feudal idea of the "emperor" as, politically, a chief among equals, and established the conception of the emperor as the supreme and absolute authority, in theory at least.

In a real sense, this meant that he simply carried over into the political organization of the Chinese people the

ancient Chinese concept of the absolute authority of the head of the family. However much, from ancient times, the "emperor" might have stood as the ceremonial and religious mediator between the people and Heaven, politically the idea of the people as a great family was fundamentally incompatible with the feudal system. Chinese feudalism, like European, had appeared when clans developed coherence within themselves. It was ripe for collapse in China in the last half of the third century before Christ. China might have moved from this stage of political evolution, as Europe did, to the development of a number of independent states, each with its own language and each moving along lines of its own development, more or less divergent from that of the others. Instead, the whole area, in China, was brought under a single political authority, and the current of development was turned toward rather than away from a maintenance of their unity. On the political side the first divine autocrat, or Shih Huang Ti, as we shall call him hereafter, played a vital part in giving events this turn. He succeeded in doing what Charles V, as Holy Roman emperor, tried unsuccessfully to do in Europe.

Probably it would be more accurate to say, however, that the unifying forces which have held Chinese civilization together already had become powerful enough to overcome the disrupting forces of feudalism, and that Shih Huang Ti was simply a log moving on the surface of the current rather than a landslide which blocked one channel and turned the current into another. However that may be, it remains true that since his time, in spite of the periods of political disorganization between dynasties and of the conquests by foreign invaders, the fundamental social and cultural unity which is China has remained unbroken. At no time between Shih Huang Ti and the past fifty years or so, in fact, was that basic unity even seriously threatened—and there are many who contend that it will survive even

the tremendous rending strains of this present influx of Western civilization.

The memory of Shih Huang Ti has been blackened by the Chinese scholars because he permitted his prime minister to carry out the proposal for a "burning of the books." The avowed purpose of this vandalism was to destroy the political and related writings of Confucius and others who already were being called the "ancient sages." By this means, the emperor hoped to compel China to look forward instead of backward. Many records were irrevocably lost, though in later days a good deal was recovered by the discovery of writings which had been hidden away, and by appeal to some of the old scholars who had committed the precious words of the sages to memory. No student of civilization can condone this barbaric destruction. Nevertheless, a certain quality of real greatness inhered in the man who thus had the forward looking courage so completely to defy all the traditions of what was respectable and even sacred.

V. THE GREAT WALL

Something of that sweeping breadth of conception shows, too, in Shih Huang Ti's completion of the Great Wall, that stupendous structure which stretches for 1,800 miles from the sea to the far northwestern interior, along the crests of the hills which rise from the plains of the Yellow River Basin to the Mongolian Plateau—that structure which forms so perfect a symbol of many things about China.

Lords of feudal clans before Shih Huang Ti's time had raised walls along parts of this line, for defence against raiding tribesmen, as settlers on the plains had built governments. Shih Huang Ti strengthened these partial walls and linked them together to form a continuous whole, as he welded the feudal clans into China's first unified empire.

The Great Wall was built as a barrier between Chinese civilization and disturbing invasions from the outside. But

invasions came none the less, as new ways of thinking and acting have penetrated the isolating walls of ancient custom.

The Great Wall stood almost unscratched by the weak weapons of the earlier invaders, as Chinese civilization remained but little affected by their ideas and customs. But the Great Wall crumbles under the fire of modern artillery, as the structure of the ancient civilization is crumbling under the impact of modern Western civilization.

Today the Great Wall is an anachronism, serving no more useful purpose than to awe tourists, to arouse the wonder of engineers, and to recall ancient conflict and glory. Yet out of its materials, into the gathering and fashioning of which went so appalling an amount of human effort and blood, new and greatly useful structures can be built. Similarly, the age-old structure of Chinese civilization is inept for use in the modern world. Yet the materials with which that structure was reared—the materials which the Chinese people gathered and wrought through long centuries of thinking and experimenting, toiling and suffering—are rich with value for the building of the new civilization of the world as a whole.

The Great Wall crumbles, literally and figuratively, never to be rebuilt. The barriers are down between China and the West, nor can they ever again be raised unless mankind through its own folly and stupidity destroys all civilization and returns to barbarism.

VI. RISING CIVILIZATION

Shih Huang Ti made an important contribution to the evolution of political forms in China when he wiped out feudalism and established the first unified empire. Then, as now, however, politics—even the bloody politics of barbarian invasions, the feudal conflicts and the quarrels of the present day warlords—moved only on the surface of the great current of Chinese civilization.

During the two thousand years before Shih Huang Ti's

time, the settled folk on the North China plain and in the bordering fertile valleys had been evolving a pattern of social organization which fitted their needs. In these and subsequent centuries, invaders came out of the northwest, climbed one after another to the leadership of the feudal clans, or to the Dragon Throne itself, and then passed off the scene. Yet while their horsemen were raiding and slaughtering, while their soldiers were fighting and marching and fighting again, the work of building a civilization went on.

In its arts and crafts, that civilization was well along at the beginning of the Chow Dynasty, a thousand years before the birth of Christ. The common people lived in houses of packed earth or in dwellings cut into the loess cliffs, probably much as they do today in the Yellow River Basin. But Solomon in all his glory could not have outshone in splendor or luxurious ease of living or refinement of manner his contemporaries among the early Chow rulers.

By the end of the Chow Dynasty, the wealthy in China were living in well built and elaborated painted houses, set around courtyards in the manner which still prevails. They wore rich and colorfully patterned silks and had carved jewels for their adornment. They used furniture made of rare woods, inlaid with mother of pearl in conventionalized designs, or arranged in pictures depicting incidents from Chinese history. They had beautifully cast bronze vessels, and drank from cups of carved jade. They listened to well developed music played on both wind and stringed instruments, and read books which have remained among the world's masterpieces of literature. Their clothing, their houses, their manners, their religious and court ceremonies were in accordance with highly conventionalized and rigid etiquette. In a word, they had left the uncouthness of barbarism far behind.

The crude writing of primitive times had developed into a conventionalized set of "characters," each conveying a

definite single idea. These ideograms formed a written language which could and did express the most abstruse philosophical thoughts. The camel's hair brush, which is the Chinese pen of today, was still to be invented, and the "writing" was done by scratching the lines of the characters on strips of bamboo. (A single "volume" of these bamboo books was ample load for one man to carry.) Yet, in spite of these difficulties, a large body of written material had accumulated, recording not only the deeds of the rulers and teachings of the sages, but also quite a little of the folk lore and the poetry which voiced the emotions and experiences of the common people.

These common people still remained in many ways little more than serfs—a high grade of domestic animal tied to the land they tilled and subject to the whims of the feudal lords. Yet they could recall with pride that one of the three mythical Great Ones, the Emperor Shun, had been a man of the people. Running through the fabric of social thinking and practice, too, was the scarlet thread of the idea that while the "emperor" and the feudal lords ruled under a "mandate from Heaven," Heaven spoke through the mouths of the people, or, as Mencius had phrased the typically Confucian doctrine, "the people are the foundation of the state."

VII. ENDURING PHILOSOPHIES

Confucius' name has been given to the pattern of principles for carrying on relations between men which is characteristically Chinese. This is as it should be. Yet Confucius was not, nor did he claim to be, an innovator or a teacher of new doctrines. Nor was he by any means the most original of the long line of Chinese social and ethical thinkers. His avowed purpose was simply to reëxpress the principles of the "ancient sages." His actual accomplishment was to crystallize in coherent form and striking phrase the accumulated experience of the Chinese in the art of living together.

The system of ethics which the great sage formulated was a pattern of social precepts, customs and ceremonies which he edited and codified, drawing for his material both on the practices of contemporary society and on the experiences of earlier times which had been distilled in the folk sayings, the songs of the people, the traditions and such meagre writings as existed. He built this material into a guide for human relationships which became the system of *li*, or rules of propriety. One who faithfully followed *li* had a reliable guide for all his relations with his fellows. The nearest approach in Western social thinking to *li* is tactfulness, though tact is a pale thing indeed when compared with *li*.

Yet these rules of propriety were not laws in the sense of legislative enactments or governmental edicts. Confucius was strongly opposed to government by law, in this sense. Laws breed lawlessness, he argued, while good example leads men to follow their consciences—to use the Western word—and hence to act as they should. Or, as Confucius puts it:

If the people be led by laws and their conduct regulated by punishment, they may try to avoid the penalties, but they will have no sense of shame. Lead them by virtue and standardize them by rules of propriety [*li*], and they will not only have a sense of shame, but they will also become good.

Confucius, too, saw no need for going beyond this physical and human world for guidance in dealing with social problems. A personal god, creator, supervisor and director of the universe, had no place in his thinking. He was rigidly, even harshly, opposed to the vagueness and uncertainty of metaphysics of all kinds. This here-and-now world was for him essentially impersonal and at the same time moral. Man should know and put himself in harmony with the laws of nature as he finds them. He need not, nor should he, look beyond this tangible world in which he lives from day to day for principles to guide his conduct. He should not

try to know the unknowable; all his energies are needed to know what is knowable. "We do not know Life. How then can we know Death?" was the way he put this attitude when a disciple persisted in trying to get the Master to say something of a future life.

Nonetheless, Confucius was far from being simply a "materialist." His first and dominating interest was the welfare of human beings. He saw the suffering and waste which inevitably followed the failure of men to live well together. He spent his life trying to teach them how to live.

The very core of his teaching is embodied in the "Doctrine of the Mean." Put into English as "moderation in all things," this has a strikingly Platonic ring. Yet for Confucius, moderation applied to much more than simply eating and drinking and personal indulgence; it determined all the acts and every thought of the "Superior Man."

The Confucian Superior Man who "followed the middle way" considered himself not the superior nor the inferior, but the equal of his fellow men. He expected others to respect his personality, as he respected the personality of others. Thus he was tolerant in the finest sense without being subservient or indifferent. He allowed neither sympathy nor antipathy to carry him too far. He was not dominated by preconceived notions or fixed ideas, nor did he insist that either ideas or acts should be pressed to their ultimate logical conclusion. For him, to insist on the complete satisfaction of a right was to commit a fault, because to force any course of action through to the end inevitably would bring injury to someone. He did not withdraw from the world to escape the difficulties of living, for that would be to fail in the obligations to his family and his fellows, and to permit his dislike of unpleasant things to carry him to extremes. He was generous and aided the poor, but he did not permit his generosity or his sympathy to carry him to the extreme of sharing with others that which was necessary for himself and his family. He sought always, as Confucius phrases it,

to do nothing to others which he would not have them do to him. In brief, the Superior Man was superior not in intellectual brilliance nor in prompt and vigorous action which pushed things through to definitive conclusions, but in the capacity to live day by day in amicable, self-respecting, tolerant, courteous relations with those around him.

This Superior Man fitted perfectly into the Chinese picture. Crowded on the fertile plains, as they were and have been, the Chinese people were compelled to learn the art of living together. The alternative was mutual extermination. They developed and have continued to express in their daily conduct, the idea that there is no final solution to the problem of living and no conclusive answer to life's questions: the idea which Confucius wove into his "Doctrine of the Mean."

Confucius stressed, too, the other basic principle of Chinese social organization: that no man lives by or to himself; that he has significance not primarily as a separate individual, but in and through his relations with others—with his family in their varying degrees, with those outside the family circle, and with those in authority. Long before Confucius' time, the group rather than the individual had come to be the fundamental unit in Chinese society, with the family as the pivotal group. In this field of social relations, as in that of the relations of the individual, Confucius simply gave expression to principles which had been developed through experience.

While Confucius was putting his ideas before the princes and people in China—roughly between 525 and 475 B.C.—Buddha was going up and down India preaching his doctrine of release from the Wheel of Life, with all its pain and suffering, through one's own efforts in acting meritoriously. About a century later, Socrates began embarrassing his Athenian friends by asking them uncomfortably penetrating questions.

Both these men—Buddha and Socrates—were driven for-

ward by that desire for logical completeness, for nicely rounded wholeness in thought, for unswerving consistency in action, which has been and is so strong in the West, but which is so dangerously incompatible with easy day by day relations between men. The Superior Man of Confucius would have talked courteously with Buddha or Socrates, would have been interested in their views, would have allowed them unreservedly and as a matter of course the right to hold those views, would have expected from them the same recognition of his own right to his way of life and thought, not even resenting an effort on their part to convert him to their views—and finally, with perfect urbanity, would have taken a polite farewell and gone his way feeling that after all these men were rather immature in their thinking since they tried to fit life into rigidly logical patterns instead of recognizing that living is a matter of continually flexible adjustment to one's surroundings.

China had, at about this time, two philosophers, who went to extremes: Lao-tze, who was an elder contemporary of Confucius, and Mo Ti, who followed a century later. Others who deserved to rate as first rank thinkers likewise expounded, then and later, ideas which did not coincide with the Confucian pattern. But none of these competing systems of thought took deep root in China because each lacked that special appropriateness which Confucius' teachings possessed to so superlative a degree.

The "Old Philosopher"—to translate the nickname Lao-tze which this philosopher has carried through the centuries—advised men to follow the *Tao* (Way, or Path) of quietness, non-action, passivity, because by so doing they would escape the strife and disturbances of those who seek to move on their own initiative. The passivity which he preached was not, apparently, the complete withdrawal from all mundane affairs which later Buddhism (but not Buddha) advocated. It was, rather, a suppression of the individual will and initi-

ative so that one might move with and not counter to the sweeping currents of the universe. (Only very little is known of Lao-tze's own teachings, as he wrote nothing and much of what his disciples noted down of his sayings has been lost.)

Such a doctrine was too impractical to appeal to the eminently practical Chinese. While the religion of Taoism purports to root in Lao-tze's teachings, the Master's own doctrines have been almost completely discarded. Practically from its first appearance as an organized faith Taoism has been little more than a conglomeration of ancient animism, superstitious practices and charlatanry, though one or two of China's influential philosophers have called themselves followers of Lao-tze. This organized Taoism has had periods of considerable popularity and still is commonly called one of the three religions of China—the other two being Confucianism and Buddhism—but its support has come because it gives the people at least the show of that certainty about things and forces unseen which mankind so universally craves.

Confucius could not have been a Taoist. He followed the custom of his time in practicing the rituals of divination, but he bluntly refused to discuss "spirits" or the life after death. He was concerned with instructing men how to live wisely in their here-and-now relations with their fellow men.

Mo Ti, coming a century later than Confucius and so about the time of Socrates, went to an extreme almost at the opposite pole from that of Lao-tze. His ideas have suffered an even more complete eclipse than those of the "Old Philosopher." For centuries, in fact, his doctrines lay buried under the scorn and detraction which scholars heaped on them in their strenuous efforts to prove the soundness of the Confucian orthodoxy. Only recently has interest in him revived. Yet Mo Ti was a far more original and daring thinker than Confucius, and his ideas possess a strange power to disturb complacent self-satisfaction.

Like Confucius, Mo Ti turned to the ancients for authority to support his teachings. Instead, however, of Confucius' studied moderation, he urged unstinted and universal love and compassionate benevolence, in terms which to an amazing degree anticipate and parallel the teachings of Christ. Simplicity of life, frugality, economy, so that riches are neither needed nor desired—these are the means, he said, to end human conflicts, including wars, since conflict springs from cupidity and the desire for enrichment. All men love justice and humanity, he asserted, and for men the one prime duty is charity toward all. Heaven watches, said Mo Ti, to see if the princes do well by their people, and if the people love one another. Heaven raises up those who love all whom it loves and degrades those who hate their fellows. Since Heaven loves all men, to feel love for and show compassion to all one's fellows is to be in tune with the Divine.

Neither Confucius nor Lao-tze show the warm human sympathy which is so strikingly apparent in Mo Ti. Yet Mo Ti's doctrine was no more—and no less—practical than the Sermon on the Mount. The Chinese, being an intellectually honest and practical people, have not mocked it with the empty honor of lip service.

The teachings of these three men were spread before the Chinese people like three rich feasts, each one different from the other two, but each tempting in its own way. The people chose the feast containing the most familiar dishes and the ones which experience had taught them would be most nourishing. They have remained at the feast spread by Confucius.

VIII. TRANSIENT DYNASTIES

Chinese historians list, altogether, thirty-two dynasties, beginning with the Hsia Dynasty founded by Yü in 2205 B.C. (according to the usual reckoning) and ending with the abdication in 1912 A.D. of the last emperor of the Ch'ing

Dynasty—the eight year old boy, P'u-yi who, in 1932 was dragged from retirement to be made the unwilling titular head of “Manchoukuo.”

Three of these dynasties had risen and fallen before Shih Huang Ti, in 221 B.C., brought the country for the first time under unified political control. Of the other twenty-nine dynasties, only eight even temporarily held authority over the entire territory of China. These eight occupied the throne for 1594 out of the 2311 years between 221 B.C. and 1912 A.D. In other words, for more than a fourth of this time China was not even nominally “unified” in a political sense. If to the time when the country was avowedly divided be added the periods of political disintegration which heralded the collapse of each of the “national” dynasties, the record would show that China has been a reasonably coherent political unit for only about two-thirds of the past twenty-one centuries.

During this time, furthermore, only four of the eight dynasties which held “nation-wide” authority were definitely Chinese in origin. The other four were alien in the sense that the emperors belonged to invading clans out of the north or northwest. Two of these four—the Yuan (or Mongol) and the Ch'ing (or Manchu) Dynasties—were set up by leaders of tribes which had come directly across the Great Wall and taken the throne without any intervening period of residence. The founders of the other two—the Ts'in and the T'ang—were the chiefs of clans which had been in China for some generations but still were more barbarian invaders than assimilated Chinese. The affiliations of Shih Huang Ti, who founded the Ts'in Dynasty, already have been discussed. The founder of the T'ang Dynasty not only belonged to the recently arrived clan which ruled in what is now Shansi Province, but he was himself, through his mother, half Turk.

Of the twenty-one so-called dynasties which ruled parts of China for varying lengths of time, the majority were defi-

nitely of invader origin; those which held the northern areas were almost entirely so.

Not one of the thirty-two dynasties was established by a man who came from south of the Yangtze River Valley.

In all Chinese history, it is interesting to observe, only one politico-military movement which started from south of the Yangtze basin ever succeeded in getting even nominal control of the whole country. That was the Nationalist drive which began in Canton in 1926, and accomplished nominal unification in 1928.

In order to get clearly before us the political record in China, we must, unfortunately, cumber the story here with some dates and other figures. We must note that the four strictly Chinese dynasties, after Shih Huang Ti's unification of the country, were the Han (202 B.C.-220 A.D.), sometimes divided into the early Han (202 B.C.-9 A.D.) and the Later Han (25 A.D.-220 A.D.), the Sui (589-618 A.D.), the Sung (960-1126 A.D.), and the Ming (1368-1644 A.D.). Together, these four occupied the throne for 893 years, or an average of 224 years each. The longest was the Han (422 years, counting together the "early" and the "later" divisions) and the shortest, the Sui (29 years).

The alien dynasties were the Ts'in (221-206 B.C.; 15 years), the T'ang (620-905 A.D.; 285 years), the Yuan or Mongol (1280-1368 A.D., founded by Kublai Khan; 88 years), and the Ch'ing or Manchu (1644-1912 A.D.; 268 years). These primarily non-Chinese dynasties ruled for 656 years, the average being 164 years.

The periods of divided or non-existent authority include the forty-four years of the "Three Kingdoms" (221-265 A.D.) after the Han Dynasty, the 169 years of the "Division into North and South" (420-589 A.D.), and the fifty-five years of the "Five Dynasties" (905-960 A.D.) which followed the T'ang Dynasty.

Even though, in accordance with the usual reckoning, only four years be counted between the Ts'in and Han Dynasties,

two between the Sui and T'ang and none between the Yuan and Ming or the Ming and Ch'ing, the periods when China was not even nominally "unified" averaged eighty-three years.

This is an astonishing record of political instability. Yet through it all China held together. Politics did not produce this continuing coherence; common customs, common forms of social organization, common traditions, common attitudes toward life, common adherence to the lessons of long experience in getting on together did.

Dynasties rose and fell. Armies marched and counter marched. The political machinery of the country as a whole worked moderately well some of the time, rattled toward collapse for long periods and lay in complete confusion for decade upon decade. But through it all the people went on managing their own affairs, with only the barest minimum of participation in or contact with the government as such.

The settled areas expanded. Trade grew. Banking was organized on a nation-wide scale. The craftsmen became more skilled. Literature and art had their periods of flowering and decadence. The farmers in their villages sowed and planted and reaped and sowed again. They were caught sometimes in the devastation of flood or drought, of pestilence or war, but always stepped back into the eternal cycle of seed time and harvest when the disturbance had passed. Throughout the land, men thought and lived in terms not of the brief span of one individual's life but of the long flow of generations in the family. Chinese government collapsed time after time. Chinese civilization and culture remained and grew slowly.

Nothing could reveal more clearly than this record the fact that the political organization in China is neither the root which supplies vitality to the tree of Chinese society nor the trunk and principal branches of that tree. The governmental system as such, rather, has been a vine growing beside the tree—a perennial vine which has times of vigor and times of

inactivity; a partly parasitical vine which sometimes consumes a goodly share of the tree's sap; a vine which may bear luxurious flowers; a vine up which ambitious men climb to pluck the tree's fruit of wealth and power; but a vine nonetheless, and not the tree itself.

IX. THE HAN RENAISSANCE

The Han Dynasty was a time of particularly rich flowering for both the vine and the tree—so much so that to this day "Sons of Han" is a name which the Chinese, except those of the far South, claim with pride. During this dynasty, China experienced a rebirth of the spirit paralleling in many ways the awakening in Europe which we call the Renaissance.

Shih Huang Ti did not succeed in his attempt to cut the past entirely out of Chinese life. But he did break the paralyzing grip of tradition, thus enabling thought and action to move more freely. By destroying feudalism, too, he shifted the fields of battle from the interior to the borders of the Empire, thereby promoting peace at home and creating the opportunity for conquest abroad. He counts significantly in Chinese history because he did these things, though neither he nor his dynasty lived to start the upward swing.

That privilege came to a son of the common people, who founded the Han Dynasty. In his young manhood, Liu Pang, the emperor-to-be, was an uneducated constable of ten villages near the place where the coast of China, sweeping northward, turns east along the Shantung Peninsula. Some prisoners who were in his charge escaped. To save himself from punishment, he gathered around him a band of reckless men and set out to carve his way to fortune. He joined a rebellion against the Ts'in emperor (Shih Huang Ti's successor) which was gathering headway in the region of the feudal state of Ch'u, roughly the present-day province of Szechuan. In 200 B.C., under orders from the leader of the rebellion, he led an army into the Ts'in capital in the Wei River Valley. He ousted the grandson of Shih Huang Ti,

but omitted the usual slaughter of the people and the ruler. Powerful rivals and his obligations to the king of Ch'u kept him from taking the throne for himself. One of his rivals killed the king. The road to the throne was open. Four years after he had first captured the capital, this man of the common people who had inherited neither title nor riches, reëntered the capital, seized the nine ancient tripods symbolical of imperial power, and declared himself emperor.

For the first time since the semi-mythical Shun a common man and not a feudal lord wore the imperial yellow. For the first time a man of long-settled Chinese stock and not a member of an invading clan carried out the emperor's ceremonies of mediation between Heaven and the people. Since then, many others have risen from the masses to rule, or have been the power behind the imperial throne. But Liu Pang was the first to climb from the bottom to the very top.

The China over which he began his rule lay between the Great Wall and the southern side of the Yangtze Valley. It stretched from the sea westward onto the high plains of Szechuan and up into what is now Kansu Province. Kansu was a tributary state, and the emperor's authority reached vaguely across the Wall into the areas which are now Mongolia and Manchuria.

Within a couple of centuries, Han armies had carried the boundaries of the empire down to the southern seas and on along the coast to include Tonking and Annam. The "wild tribes" in the southwestern mountains had been slaughtered or driven into the high places, and the territory of Yunnan and Kweichow Provinces had been added to the Emperor's domain. The northwestern frontier had been pushed back a considerable distance into Central Asia. Thus when, in the year 1 A.D., a boy of nine succeeded to the throne, with the title "Emperor of Peace," the territory of China was nearly twice as large as it had been when the dynasty started.

A few years later (in 9-23 A.D.) one of the three "arch traitors" of Chinese history—of whom more later—usurped

the throne for a short time, splitting the Han period into two almost equal parts. The dynastic continuity was resumed, but the Chinese historians speak of this second period as the Later Han Dynasty, distinguishing it from the First or Early Han Dynasty. The flowering of the Han Renaissance continued from the first into the second period.

The founder of the Han Dynasty had made the first move. Promptly after Liu Pang took the throne, he promulgated a new code of laws which considerably improved the lot of the common man. Shortly thereafter he cancelled Shih Huang Ti's ban on the Confucian and other classics and ordered a search for copies of these writings which had been hidden to escape the First Divine Autocrat's "burning of the books." This action threw wide the gates for a revival of learning which brought out not a few of China's most brilliant historians and commentators. By making ceremonial sacrifices at the tomb of Confucius, the first Han emperor promoted the Sage to the rank of demi-god. Under the patronage of later emperors, scholars reassembled the books of the Confucian canon and adopted an official text, which was carved in full on stone tablets that it might be preserved for all time. (Visitors to modern Peiping may see them in the Confucian Temple there.)

Under the Han emperors, new and fruitful contacts were established with the outside world. The conquering armies went far afield and brought back information as well as loot in which were art treasures from India and the Near East. Chang Ch'ien, the "Road Opener" and others made long and difficult journeys west, southwest and south, returning with more information and establishing contact with the Western world. Traders from the Mediterranean region came by sea and land—among them Jews who established a colony in China. Ambassadors from rulers to the north, south, east and west came bringing presents and information.

In terms of influence on Chinese civilization, however, by far the most important result of this reaching out beyond

China's borders was the bringing in of Buddhism. Buddhism, in fact, is the only important element in Chinese thought, ethics or religion which the Chinese have borrowed from others. All the rest they worked out for themselves. Even the borrowed Buddhism was made over so completely that the Chinese form of this religion stands by itself, with only the most general likenesses to the Mahayana Buddhism of India which was borrowed, and almost nothing in common with the Buddhism which Buddha taught.

Buddhism was brought into China in this wise. Before the time of Christ, the religion had spread into Central Asia. Rumors of it had reached China and perhaps the Han court. In 61 A.D., the emperor dreamt, so the story goes, that a golden image of a man entered his palace. Seeking an interpretation, he was told of a new teacher who had arisen in India. He despatched an embassy to inquire about the faith. The emissaries returned in 67, bringing two Indian Buddhist monks, Buddhist books and Buddhist images.

The monks did not try to broadcast the gospel. They worked at the imperial library, translating their documents into Chinese and talking with the scholars. Buddhism did not, in fact, begin to spread widely among the people until more than three hundred years after this first importation. But, through the scholars, Buddhist ideas soon began to influence Chinese thought, and almost at once the Taoists started the borrowing from Buddhism which in the course of time made the two religions nearly indistinguishable in China.

Buddhism likewise profoundly influenced the development of Chinese art. Buddhist subjects became exceedingly popular with the painters. Sculpture practically began in China with the carving of figures of the Buddha and of the Buddhist saints—and since Buddhist sculpture in India sprang from Greek influences introduced by Alexander, it is not surprising to find in Chinese sculpture definite, if sometimes dim, evidences of derivation from the work of Praxiteles and his fellows.

The record of the introduction and spread of Buddhism in China is worth pondering, in connection with the failure of the efforts to gain a following there for Christianity. The Chinese sought Buddhism out; it was not brought in to them by uninvited aliens. Buddhism never has been propagated in China under the ægis of armed force; nor has it been associated in any way with foreign military or political aggression. It has spread, and become one of the three religions solely by the contagion of ideas. No foreign religious bodies supported foreign workers in China to preach Buddhism. A few Buddhists came from India, it is true, but, like the Chinese teachers of the faith, they persuaded the Chinese people that their teaching was worth paying for, or they went hungry. One cannot but wonder whether Christianity might have prospered better in China if its spread had depended more on Chinese welcome and less on foreign backing.

X. A MODERNISTIC INTERLUDE

Besides its brilliant scholars and bold travellers, the Han Dynasty produced three men whose names have become the folk-lore symbols of arch treachery: Wang Mang, who usurped the throne for a short time at the middle of the Han Period; Tung Cho, who pulled the strings of the puppet boy emperor just before the end; and Ts'ao Ts'ao, who overthrew the dynasty. All three were able men. All three have been condemned as traitors because they failed to establish dynasties of their own—that failure proving, as the Chinese saw it, that they did not have Heaven's support and hence must have been evil.

Of the two latter, we need remark here only that Ts'ao Ts'ao has passed into Chinese drama as the chief hero of the romantic "Three Kingdoms" period. He is counted a traitor and condemned as such, but he is none the less beloved for his courage and Robin Hood qualities.

Wang Mang deserves a word because of the far-reaching reforms which he attempted, and because of the circumstances

of his failure. Some of these reforms have a strangely modern ring.

When he had mounted the throne, he tried to create a stable and uniform currency. He ordered the end of slavery and decreed that there should be no private property in land, saying that "the land shall belong to the state; the slave shall belong to himself." He introduced an income tax. He arranged for state loans to the farmers and set up an agricultural products price control board which bought and sold grain with government funds in order to stabilize prices and aid both producer and consumer against the middleman.

But he did not have Heaven's mandate to rule. In other words, the people were not with him because, before his usurpation, he had been known as the evil genius of the court. When he seized the throne, the common people distrusted him. When he struck at the foundations of property, the wealthy turned against him. After only fourteen years he was overthrown. His headless body, torn to pieces by the crowd, cried aloud the ancient Chinese beliefs that righteousness is the very foundation of legitimate authority and that moderation in all things is the essence of wisdom.

After Wang's interlude, the vigor of the dynasty temporarily revived. But intrigue, corruption and licentiousness soon began again to sap the vitality of the court. Rebellion broke out anew. Barbarian tribes on the north and northwest, always troublesome, increased the number and extent of their inroads, in spite of the Great Wall. The end came in 220 A.D.—the end of the Han Dynasty and the beginning of three and a half centuries of political and military confusion.

XI. FUNDAMENTAL STABILITY

The record of events after the fall of the Han Dynasty need not detain us long. This is not a history of China, and in other connections we shall have occasion to consider such of these developments as are pertinent to this discussion of

China as she is today. Certain points, however, do need brief mention.

When Shih Huang Ti and the Han emperors, scholars, generals and travelers finished their work, China definitely had left "ancient times" behind. During the four centuries between roughly 200 B.C. and 200 A.D. Chinese civilization was in flux. By the end of that time it had settled into channels along which, in the main, it would move for another seventeen centuries. During the four centuries, too, Chinese territorial expansion had pushed the boundaries of the Empire out substantially to the natural geographical confines where, with minor shiftings one way or another, they have remained.

In broad outline, as has been suggested, the reorientation of Chinese civilization during the Ts'in and Han periods was like the Renaissance transformation of thought and attitude in Europe—though the change in China started fifteen centuries before that in the West. Both Europe and China drew heavily on the wisdom and learning of an old and re-discovered past. Both reached out into the contemporary world. Both, when the period of flux ended, possessed a readjusted system of ideas and attitudes toward life which was to remain essentially stable for a considerable time. It would be unwise, of course, to carry the parallel too far. It would be equally unwise, however, to overlook it altogether and by so doing miss an opportunity to add to our understanding of Chinese civilization.

In seeking that understanding, we need to remember that there is only a very qualified sort of justification for the frequently heard remarks about the "unchanging East," as these apply to China. During the seventeen centuries which followed the end of the Han Dynasty, China underwent no such fundamental upheaval as the industrial revolution and modern science caused in the West. Nevertheless, she did not simply stagnate.

Dynastic struggles for power, rebellions, invasions from

outside, expansion campaigns from within—enough already has been said of such military affairs to suggest how relatively few and brief the times were when the country really had peace. War by no means covered all the country all the time, however. Just because the territory was so vast, and because communications were poor, fighting in one region frequently left other areas undisturbed. Thus large sections had peace for comparatively long periods. Perhaps it would be safe to say that a majority of the people, taking the whole country and the whole seventeen centuries together, lived and died without ever having been touched by the skirts of the god of war. Certainly China as a whole was far less war torn than Europe as a whole during this period.

Art and literature, philosophy and law and the other disciplines of peace had their periods of brilliant expression and development in these seventeen hundred years. The world ill could spare the masterpieces which were produced; if the West only now is beginning to know a little of them, that is its loss. T'ang and Sung painting and poetry, Sung philosophy, history and criticism, Mongol and Ming drama and novel writing, Ming and Manchu legal and encyclopædic compilations are all among the very best that mankind has produced at any time or place.

Nor were the accomplishments achieved in the fields of art and literature alone. Printing was invented—and passed on to Europe. Chinese craftsmen produced porcelain which is utterly without rival; their bronze castings are scarcely to be matched; their wood carving and work with precious metals and stones never have been surpassed. Chinese bankers developed an organization (the Shansi Bankers' Guild) which for several centuries served the entire country as no single banking organization ever has served Europe. Chinese administrators developed a system of examinations for government posts which, whatever its faults may have been, was in essence the most democratic method of selecting government officers which the world ever has seen; it also

was more successful than any other plan which men have devised for drawing into the government service, generation by generation, those who were intellectually and by training the best qualified to meet the accepted requirements for governing.

It remains true, however, that through this period Chinese civilization and the life of the Chinese people moved in the main along well marked channels. No such sharp turn came as that in Europe in the past century and a quarter. Why not? Anyone may speculate as to the answer to that question. No one can answer it completely and positively.

It is not inappropriate to suggest, however, that the fundamental stability and continuity were due in perhaps large part to the fact that the Chinese had developed a form of social organization and method of living together which substantially fitted their needs. The basic conditions of geography, climate and soil did not change. Furthermore, there was no powerful influx of ways of thought and life which were essentially different but equally well developed. Nor were there serious conflicts of civilization within the large territory of China. Why should there be fundamental changes?

There was no such influx, that is to say, until the flood of modern Western civilization started to run against and over the land. Then changes did begin.

Twenty-one hundred years ago Chinese civilization entered on a period of flux and readjustment. It now is in the first stages of another such period. The stimulants to change now are more powerful and more alien than they were then. Quite possibly the changes will go deeper and reach further. The transition period lasted four hundred years, then. It now has been under way scarcely half a century. But events move much more rapidly in these days than they did when Shih Huang Ti called himself the First Divine Autocrat, and Liu Pang, the village constable, climbed to the Dragon Throne.

INSIDE THE WALL

(CHAPTER V)

Not far north of Peiping is a small village, like thousands of others on the North China plain. A few years ago an elderly man in this village took unto himself a new, young and handsome wife. The youthful village Don Juan saw her. He became too attentive. One day the elderly husband met the young would-be lover in the village street. Hot words flew and emotions got out of hand. The injured husband finally drew a knife and in gory fashion ended the young man's career.

Promptly after this, the three "village elders" met. They called in the husband, the young man's widowed mother and some of the neighbors. They talked things over. The next morning they met again.

First, they dealt with the husband. They said he had been guilty of disturbing the peace of the village. They ordered him to pay a fine of one hundred dollars. He had been warned in advance, and put the cash on the table.

Then they called the young man's mother. They consoled with her in approved form. She wept the appropriate amount. The elders gave her fifty dollars of the one hundred as compensation for her loss.

Finally, the elders recalled the husband. It would have been a great disgrace to the village, they said, if a married woman had run off with her lover. The husband had saved the village from that disgrace. He should be rewarded, said the elders. They thereupon gave back to him the remaining fifty dollars. This closed the incident.

There may be some disagreement as to whether the Chinese way of handling the case was better than the

Western would have been. But what actually happened illustrates admirably a number of fundamental points in the Chinese approach to social problems, and their method of dealing with such problems.

To begin with, this affair was handled throughout as a strictly village matter. Since the general peace had not been disturbed, there was no occasion for the government, as such, through the police or district magistrate, to step in. (The principle followed was that the government is concerned with difficulties between the people only when the people themselves cannot settle such difficulties peacefully.)

Furthermore, the affair was dealt with in terms of the welfare and reputation of the village as a whole. The individuals concerned were, as individuals, of minor importance. The essential requirements of continuing group life in the village were upheld: that disturbers of the village peace should be punished; that compensation should be given for injury done; that family integrity should be protected; and that those who benefited the village should be rewarded.

The case was handled and settled, too, not in terms of abstract principles of an impersonal law, or of legally established precedents from the past, but of the essential equities of that particular affair. The assessment and levying of the fine, which the husband was called on to pay, were in accordance with a well-established practice of permitting money compensation for physical injury, the amount of the compensation depending on the seriousness of the injury, the relative wealth of the persons concerned, and similar factors. The fine of one hundred dollars for "disturbing the peace" was in reality an exaction which, in relation to the poverty of both the husband and mother, was somewhat excessive for the killing. The remission of half of the fine brought the actual payment down to a reasonable amount. The mother, not the community, got the compensation. (A few

days later, she remarked to one who started to express sympathy, that this son had always been a ne'er-do-well, and that she had received more than she ever expected to get out of him.) But in levying the excessive fine and then returning part of it, for the reasons given in each case, the village elders emphasized strongly the fact that the peace and good name of the village must take precedence over all other considerations.

II. THE FOUNDATION OF AUTHORITY

Speaking in the most generalized terms, the West has had two theories about the source of governmental authority (using the word "government" in its narrower sense). One was that government was instituted by God (or some superhuman authority) and that the head of the government ruled by "divine right," being himself either a god or a man selected by God to rule. The other was that government was set up by the people through a "social contract," and for their convenience; that the officers of the government either were chosen by the people or, being co-signers of the "social contract," were under obligation to the people; and that governmental authority derived from "the consent of the governed" rather than from any superhuman being or beings.

These theories need not be elaborated here, as to their origins, their development or their application in practice. They are too well understood to require such treatment. But they should be kept in mind when, as now, the discussion turns to the Chinese theories of the place of the government in the scheme of things and of the foundation of the right to rule.

Among the Chinese, as among Westerners, the attitude toward government comes up for reasoned analysis in the minds of only a comparatively few people and at infrequent intervals. For most of the people all the time and all of

them most of the time it is an unthought-out feeling. Yet this feeling largely determines the reaction to the doings of those in positions of authority. Some understanding of this unreasoned and underlying feeling therefore is necessary. But precisely because it is unreasoned and underlying, it is difficult to define or express in exact terms, especially in terms which will make it comprehensible emotionally as well as intellectually to Westerners whose own unreasoned and underlying feeling is so different.

The government of China was a despotism founded on morality and tempered by the moral right to revolt.

Government, according to the Chinese feeling, is coeval with human society. No superhuman authority imposed it on man, nor did the people set it up for their own convenience. It simply has been ever since there were people, because, the Chinese say, in human society there must be rulers and ruled just as in the body there must be a head and hands. But both rulers and ruled have obligations as well as rights in relation to each other, and the justification for the exercise of the rights is the fulfillment of the obligations.

People must live together, the feeling runs. In the process of this living, disputes inevitably arise, men being what they are. Furthermore, certain things can be done most conveniently through group organization. These disputes and these common affairs should be dealt with by the people most concerned. There is no need to call in the rulers to deal with such matters. But sometimes calamities occur on so large a scale that the self-contained groups are overwhelmed. Sometimes, too, the disputes become so involved or so acrimonious, especially those between the smaller groups, that the people directly concerned cannot settle them amicably and fairly. In such cases the rulers should take matters in hand. The function of government, in other words, is not to handle the day-by-day affairs of the people, but to start the wheels of society turning again when they

have been stopped by natural calamities or by the stupidity or wickedness of the people. As long as the people's activities run smoothly, there is nothing for the government to do.

The ideal people obviously would need no government. The ideal rulers would set their subjects so perfect an example of righteousness, wisdom, and benevolence that everyone almost instinctively would follow the ways of peace and orderliness. The preparation for meeting calamities would be so perfect that destruction would be prevented or dealt with automatically. Consequently, the ideal ruler would have little or nothing to do. He would not act; he would simply *be*—and real public esteem went, not to men who were merely efficient, but to those of good character.

Being realistic, the Chinese were well aware that neither the ideal people nor the ideal rulers ever had existed or were likely to exist. Therefore, precisely on a par with the obligation to obey the rulers, they put the right of the people to revolt if the rulers proved to be too far from ideal. Therefore, too, equally valid with the rulers' obligation to be righteous and benevolent, was their right to use strong measures to preserve order, should this be necessary.

While the emperor ruled by a "mandate from Heaven," the heavenly mandate was given only to men who were morally worthy, according to the theory. It could be withdrawn. The right to rule which it conferred was conditional on good behavior; it was not absolute.

This conception clearly had its origin in the very early times when the "king" was the chief link between the primitive folk and the spirits of nature. The primitive people in the West also had their priest-kings. But the development there led to the deification of the "king," and, eventually, to the conception of a "divine right to rule," which was absolute and not conditioned on moral worth. In China the development was in another direction. The "king" never became a god in his own right; the emperor

remained a human being though he was called the "Son of Heaven," and the idea was stressed that moral worthiness was the foundation of authority.

In practice, of course, authority went in the main with power. But the right to revolt was as fundamental as was the obligation to obey. Revolt, indeed, became an obligation when the authority was exercised too unethically. Rebellion, therefore, whether against a wicked emperor or an oppressive district magistrate, carried no such moral stigma as the West has attached to rebellion against the "divinely constituted authorities." Instead, rebellion in China was a morally worthy act—provided that those against whom the rebellion was directed were morally unworthy, and that the rebels were persons of good character seeking the welfare of the people and not simply their own advantage.

That threat or fact of rebellion has been a powerful influence in Chinese political affairs, and it remains so today. In many cases rebellion has taken the form simply of passive resistance in some kind of boycott. There is, for example, the perhaps apocryphal story of how the people of Peking dealt with one of the emperors who, in their opinion, had been grossly unjust to an excellent and honest old official. The people of the city simply declared a boycott on the imperial palace until the official was released, and for a week or more no one from the palace could get any food in the markets of the city. The emperor submitted, not to force, but to the pressure of organized public opinion. Local magistrates not infrequently are dealt with in the same way—and usually one such protest from the people is quite sufficient to make the magistrate walk very warily for the rest of his term in the district. Such use of passive pressure was a mild form of the exercise of the right to revolt; the extreme form of violence was resorted to only in extreme cases.

Boycotts and violent rebellions, however, were not attempts on the part of the people to take over the functions of government for themselves. Governing was the business

of the rulers, not of the people. If a particular ruler—emperor, provincial governor, or local magistrate—was too unrighteous, the people had not only the right but the obligation to protest with whatever degree of vigor might be necessary to bring him back to the right path or drive him out altogether. This having been done, the people went about their affairs again. It was not their responsibility to choose a new ruler to replace the one who had been ousted. The selection of the new man—for the throne, the province or the district—was the responsibility of those who held, or had control of, the reins of government.

The people were not particularly concerned about how a man got into the position which their revolt had made vacant, except as the means used threw light on the man's character and hence on the prospects of his carrying out properly his functions as ruler. This was especially true in the case of village magistrates and other officials who were nearer to the people than was the emperor. The people often did drive out an undesirable magistrate, but it never occurred to them that they choose his successor by any such process as an election.

One finds this emphasis on virtue as the basis and justification of authority running consistently through the popular attitude toward historical characters. The three semi-mythical rulers, Yao, Shun, and Yü, are renowned, not for their achievements, but for their unselfish benevolence. King Wen, who might have made himself the first Chow Dynasty emperor but refused because he felt himself unworthy, is held in high esteem because of his moral self-restraint. Shih Huang Ti was one of the world's greatest organizers and administrators and did much to bring order and stability in China, but his memory is reviled because he sought power for himself, and, by his "burning of the books," expressed contempt for the ethical teaching of the sages. The founders of the Han and the Ming Dynasties are revered because they rose up to free the people from cruel oppression and

continued to rule benevolently after they had received "Heaven's mandate." Wang Mang, an able man, tried to introduce reforms which notably would have improved the condition of the common people, but he is counted among the great traitors because he had shown himself personally wicked and had seized the throne by evil means.

In more recent times, the leader of the great T'ai P'ing Rebellion, in the middle of the nineteenth century, at first commanded widespread popular support. But when he and his associates turned to excesses of destruction and personal aggrandizement, the feeling swung against the movement. The principal commander of the forces which finally crushed the rebellion, Tseng Kuo-fan, was a Chinese fighting on behalf of the alien and hated Manchu Dynasty. Without him the Manchus could not have put down the rebellion. In the West he would be despised as a traitor to his people. In China, he is remembered with honor because he was a man of unquestioned integrity and noble character who was not seeking personal advancement. Although Yuan Shih-k'ai secured the abdication of the Manchus in 1912, his name is anathema to the Chinese, because he was a completely selfish intriguer who proved himself unfaithful first to the dynasty under which he served and then to the Republic. Sun Yat-sen is revered, not because he was a great administrator or thinker or scholar—he was none of these—but because he was a good man personally and because he showed himself through long years of struggle completely unselfish in his devotion to what he believed was the welfare of the people.

High moral character has been revered and honored in the West, it is true, but it has not been the *sine qua non* of winning lasting fame and popular admiration, as it has been in China. Successful military conquests have been the road to fame and honor for many in the West, but for none in China. Under Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty, the

territory of China was doubled, but he has been thought of with scorn rather than with pride, because he was cruel and superstitious and, more particularly, because he had such a poor sense of the real values of life as to call himself the "Martial Emperor." Napoleon would have been admired in China not for his military achievements, but for his production of the Napoleonic Code, as the Manchu emperor, Ch'ien Lung, is respected not because his soldiers conquered Tibet, but because he was a producer and patron of literature.

Characteristic of the Chinese practicalness was the assumption that while Heaven's mandate to rule was supposed to be held only by the morally worthy, the actual possession of authority was the practical evidence of the heavenly mandate. The failure of an armed rebellion proved that the ruling dynasty had not yet made up its full cycle of wickedness, or that the rebel leader was not himself worthy to rule. Success of a rebellion proved that Heaven had transferred its mandate and that, accordingly, the new ruler should be obeyed until a new revolt was called for—as it inevitably would be in due course with the progressive degeneration of the dynasty. This waiting to render judgment until after the event was entirely in line with the Chinese feeling that the people were spectators of, not participators in, the quarrels between those who sought to rule.

Yet public opinion was a powerful factor in determining the success or failure of a rebellion while it was still in progress. No rebellion could succeed which did not have the people behind it; no dynasty could hold the throne in face of a strong desire to drive it out. In practical reality, therefore, government was by the consent of the governed, or, to use the Chinese phrasing of the same idea, "Heaven speaks as the people speak."

So long as the emperor held his post, he was, in theory, absolute. All the land in the empire belonged to him and the lives and property of all the people were at his disposal.

In form, too, the government was completely despotic. The advantages of benevolent despotism were fully recognized, and as long as the despotism did not become too unbenevolent, no popular protest was needed. But the emperor held that theoretically absolute power only conditionally, as has been said. Heaven, which had given it to him, could take it away, and if he proved himself too completely unworthy the people were under moral obligation to act as Heaven's agent in driving him from his throne.

This conception is an excellent illustration of the Chinese unwillingness to carry ideas to their logical conclusion. Logically, of course, the obligation to obey and the right to revolt are mutually incompatible. But in this, as in other matters, the Chinese avoid extremes. When the time and the conditions called for revolt, they revolted. They also avoided the logically correct, but practically impossible, undertaking of trying to define precisely in what circumstances obedience or revolt is proper. They deal with each situation as it arises, in terms of that particular situation, not of any abstract "fixed principle"—and, usually, there is remarkable unanimity of opinion on what should be done.

This is one of the reasons why it is so extremely difficult for Westerners to predict what the reaction will be to any situation. They start from premises drawn from their own ways of looking at life, reason through to a logical conclusion, and then expect the Chinese to react in accordance with that conclusion. But the Chinese start out with different premises, and they stop part way through to the conclusion—not because they cannot reason logically, but because the Confucian "Doctrine of the Mean" is part of the bedrock of Chinese life and thought. This stopping part way, this refusal to apply principles through to the bitter end, this unwillingness to take a decisive final step which leaves no room for compromise or later readjustment, is almost instinctive. It springs from the unreasoned and underlying feeling of the people for moderation in all things—a feeling

which shows itself in every range of living, and not simply in political affairs.

The Chinese feel and judge in terms of particular cases and persons, not of abstract principles. They will tolerate much, but they do balk at some things. Their respect and approval, however, go only to those who possess the three qualities of common sense, a sense of proportion and good character—and the greatest of these is good character.

III. THE CONTROLLING GROUPS

One day during the great famine of 1928–30 in north-western China, a few Westerners and Chinese were discussing arrangements for famine relief during the course of dinner in a village in Shensi Province. The "village elders" were there, and a few others. After the business of the meeting was settled, the conversation turned to village affairs in general, and to the way they were run. One of the Westerners suggested that the elders were in effect part of the government of the country, since they actually did so many things that a government is supposed to do.

The elders were surprised and somewhat indignant at the suggestion. "We are not officials," they said. "We do business with the officials and with others on behalf of the village, and we manage village affairs. But certainly we are not part of the government."

Using the word "government" in its narrow, technical sense, these men were quite right. They were not part of the *cheng fu*, the official political government structure. But in a somewhat broader sense of the word—a sense which the Chinese term does not carry but the English does—they were the village government since they managed village affairs. When this extension of the meaning of the term "government" was made clear, the elders quite agreed that they were part of the machinery by which the people were governed. They went on to point out, too, that, in this

broader sense, the families and the guilds in China also had their governments even though the heads of the groups were not part of the official structure.

The difference in connotation of the English and the Chinese words for government reflects a fundamental difference in the method of handling group affairs. We in the West have carried our political organization down into close contact with the daily life of individuals. We expect our governments, national or local, to provide and maintain roads, to furnish police protection, water, sewage facilities, sanitation, food and drink inspection, poorhouses, hospitals, education and scores of other services. We call on our governments to regulate labor conditions, communications, banking, industry and what not. Whenever something goes wrong or others do things which we dislike, we rush to "pass a law." As our economic and social life has grown more closely knit and complex, through the development of communications, the use of machinery and the increase in population, we have turned more and more to our governments as the agencies for adjusting the conflicts of interest and for protecting and furthering the welfare of the people as a whole. We have come to expect our governments to supply that integration in the life of the community which is essential when many people live close together.

The Chinese worked along different lines. They needed that social and economic integration even more than we did. But poor communications made that need one which existed primarily in short time, narrow radius activities. They secured the integration not through the political government, but through the group organizations which provided elaborate and highly developed machinery for carrying on day-by-day affairs. They had a political government, it is true, but this worked at best only with a good deal of creaking. The line between this government and the group organizations which actually managed the people's businesses was sharply drawn, and the theory and practice were

that the less those on one side of the line had to do with those on the other, the better for all.

For this reason it is stretching the legitimate meaning of words only a little to say that China had no government in the sense that we usually think of government. Certainly the contact and mutual influence between the official administration and the people were very much less than in the West—so much less as to constitute in reality a fundamental difference in kind, not simply a difference in degree. Nor did the Chinese have in their theory or practice anything corresponding to the Western idea of the State.

Yet in the sense that their affairs were managed, that their actions were controlled, that their life was well organized around definite centers of interest, the Chinese were very much governed. In this sense, it is more than half correct to say that the Chinese had not one government but a great many small governments. Each family, each guild each village was, in fact, a nearly self-contained, self-controlled entity with many of the characteristics which we associate with government even in its technical sense. The official government could, of course, break through this ring of organizations by which the people governed themselves. But to do this was to go counter to the whole stream of tradition and custom, and any serious interference with the self-government of the group organizations inevitably aroused strong protests.

The most significant of these people's organizations, by which daily affairs were regulated and individual conduct was controlled, were of three principal sorts, centering around the ordinary man's three chief objects of concern: his family, his work, and his place of residence. Other organizations came into being as circumstances required, but the family-clan, the guild, and the village were the three-fold foundation of Chinese society. Of these, the family-clan was easily the most important.

These groups overlapped in membership, but they did not

conflict in purposes because each had its own function. Every normally situated Chinese was an integral part of a family-clan group, for example. But one member of a family might belong to the porters' guild and another to the silversmiths'. One part of a family-clan might be settled in a northern village or city, and another in a southern. Each village might have its own carters' or blacksmiths' or weavers' guild, with outside affiliations, and contain a number of families. So it came about that from his birth to his death, in his work and in his relaxation, in his staying at home and his going abroad, virtually every Chinese was bound up in an intricate network of organizations which limited his freedom of action but provided him with security and watched over his welfare, which defended him against oppression and the wrongdoing of others, but rigorously checked his own impulses to do wrong.

The heads of the families, the guilds and the villages were the links and buffers between the official government and the people. Official business was transacted through and with them, not directly with the individual ordinary persons. Most of the dealings between the organizations—business between the guilds or between villages, or marriages or property transfers between families, for example—were arranged by the heads of the groups on behalf of the members. In important matters, these heads acted only after consultation with the members of their groups, so that the action taken was in a real sense that of the group.

Furthermore, each group was obliged to control its own members because it was responsible to other groups and to the officials for what its individual members did. Against a decision of the group, taken after due deliberation, the individual had in practice no recourse except the extreme and usually disastrous one of withdrawal from the group.

These family-clan, guild, and village organizations were the nearest approach in the Chinese system to the State of modern Western political theory and practice. They were not

fully "sovereign" since they were, after all, subject to potential control by the official government. But the groups functioned as units through leaders whose authority was recognized in dealing with both their "internal" affairs and their "external" relations. Each group, too, had its "territory" in the sense of being concerned with a particular interest.

These are Western terms. To use them in describing the forms of organization in China is perhaps unwise because of the danger of creating the impression that the parallel goes further than really is the case. Nevertheless, and with due reservations, the terms are pertinent and their use may help to make possible that emotional entering into the life of the ordinary Chinese which is so necessary for real understanding.

Our Western loyalties, for example, center around the nation. The corresponding loyalties of the Chinese centered around the groups to which they belonged. Our relations to our governments, both as passive acquiescers in and as active directors of what the governments are to do, correspond much more to the Chinese relation to his group than to his association with his official government. While the parallel between the Chinese groups and the Western State can be carried only a little way, it is suggestive and therefore worth drawing.

The precise form of organization varied considerably between the three principal kinds of groups, and between individual families, guilds and villages. But the broad outlines, of both organization and way of working, were much the same. The village will serve as an example.

Three-quarters of the people in China have lived in villages properly so-called. In addition, however, the towns and larger cities were, to a considerable degree, conglomerations of small village-like communities, each functioning more or less completely within the boundaries of its own interests and area, rather than integrated municipalities like

cities in the West. Practically all of the people, therefore, actually came within what were in effect organizations of the village type.

Furthermore, the smallest unit of the official governmental structure was the *hsien* or district. This included a principal city, perhaps several medium-sized towns, and numerous villages. These districts were too large for detailed governmental contact with the affairs of the people, even if such contact had not been contrary to the Chinese conception of what the relation between the government and the people should be. It was as though there were, in England or the United States, no governmental divisions smaller than the counties.

Village affairs were managed by the village elders. These were not elected, nor were they necessarily old. They were the leaders primarily because they had outstanding personalities. Generally, some one of them was accepted as the principal figure, but the number of persons in any village who were recognized as belonging in the group of elders was not fixed. In some cases there was only one elder; in others there might be five or six. The elders usually were men; there might be a woman or two among them. Age or property or education or previous distinguished service were usual but not necessary qualifications for eldership; on occasion young men who were illiterate and possessed virtually no property dominated village affairs by sheer personality.

These elders administered and were the "government" of the village. They settled disputes, assigned the share of the village taxes which each village family was to pay, saw to the maintenance of good order within the village, on occasion acted as a judicial body in judging and punishing breaches of the "law" (which was the local custom), held as trustees the title deeds to land and other property of the village as such (sometimes an important responsibility), and in all the other varied ways saw to it that the life of the village went on smoothly. These were their functions in

what, to use Western terms, might be called the "domestic affairs" of the State.

They also had important functions in carrying on the "external relations" of the village. They were the ones who dealt with the district magistrate, or went over the magistrate's head in presenting memorials to higher authorities if they thought necessary. They made "treaties" with neighboring villages or with outside organizations or individuals who wanted the use of village property or the assistance of village workers. (Foreigners wishing to rent temples or other places near Peking, for example, deal with the local village elders and secure their approval of any agreement even though the property may be individually rather than communally owned. Red Cross and famine relief agencies who wish to employ a number of workers on road building or other work hire them through the village elders rather than by direct negotiations with individuals.) On behalf of their single village, or in alliance with neighboring villages, the elders "declared war" on officials of whose wrong conduct they strongly disapproved. In most cases, the threat alone of such "war" was sufficient to check official rapaciousness. The "war measures," if they were applied, consisted of boycotts or, in extreme cases, actual violence. The "war" generally ended in victory for the village, the conclusion of "hostilities" coming with the removal by higher authority of the official who had been unable to keep peace in his district or by the signing of a "peace treaty" between the official and the village elders. Similarly, "wars" sometimes were waged and settled by "treaties" between villages.

In theory, the rule of the village elders over the ordinary villagers was absolute. The villagers, however, had in the main ample protection against abuses of this absolutism, for the very foundation of the authority of the elders was the acquiescence of the villagers. Any gross injustice, or any protracted series of minor injustices, would cost the elders who were responsible that general good will and support without

which they could not continue as elders. Effective working justice was reasonably well insured by this necessity of keeping popular support, together with the detailed and intimate knowledge which the elders and the villagers had of the affairs of everyone in the village, and of every dispute or crime. The system combined the advantages of autocracy with protection against the abuses of autocratic government. It worked, on the whole, extraordinarily well, because the "State" was small enough to permit constant and intimate personal association between the "governors" and the "governed."

Neither the villagers nor the elders, as has been suggested, thought of themselves in political terms such as those which have been used here. Nevertheless, and carefully avoiding pressing the parallel too far, the villages were organized and functioned much like microcosmic States.

In this respect, the guilds, within their sphere, were like the villages. There were several kinds of guilds, but the most important were those built around the control by the members of some means of getting a living: a trade secret like the method of making certain kinds of porcelain or lacquer; or a special skill like jade cutting; or the right to do a particular kind of work like carpentering or portering in a district; or participation in a particular line of business like butchering or cloth selling. The farmers did not have special guilds, since the village organization served this purpose for them. The organization of the officials could not properly be called a guild. But practically every means of earning a living otherwise than by farming or as an official was controlled by some organization to which, for lack of a better term, the word guild can be applied. The butchers, the bakers, the candlestick-makers, were all organized. So were the doctors, the merchants, the bankers and the beggars, as well as the thieves.

These various guilds generally maintained working relations with each other. Those in the same city or district, but

concerned with different occupations, coöperated to protect their common interests, and to maintain a common front against attempts at official oppression. In some of the larger cities, this coöperation was carried on through a "guild of guilds." The guilds covering the same occupation but in different cities frequently had informal understandings about the exchange of guild memberships and similar matters, though there was little formal centralized organization.

The chief purpose of the guilds was to insure to each of the members a chance to earn a living. The guilds in the main fixed apprenticeship conditions, prices of commodities, wages, standards and hours of work. The trade and craft guilds divided up such work as there was in their fields so that all might have a share. The merchants' guilds on occasion agreed on divisions of the market. The guilds fought any encroachment on their exclusive control of their particular means of livelihood. They exercised a strict control over what their members did within the range of their work, and breaches of the guild rules were serious matters—for a member who was ousted by his guild found it extremely difficult to get work of any kind. (Even the beggars did everything they could, which was a good deal, to stop "scab" begging by those who were not in the beggars' guilds.) In return for subordination to the guild control, the members got the certainty that they would share in whatever chance to make a living existed in their line.

The form of organization varied from guild to guild, from time to time and from place to place. Guilds also started, grew, became powerful, decayed and disappeared, as local conditions changed. Some of the workers, too, always were outside the guild structure. The economic life of China, however—except agriculture, but including the trades and the crafts, the commerce and the finance—was dominated and carried on, in the main, by these bodies which in their fields were more or less completely self-contained and self-governing.

The family-clans, within their sphere, had a similar but more inclusive protecting and controlling function. They were the most important of the three principal kinds of groups, for they included virtually all the Chinese. They held the final responsibility; they were the ultimate refuge in case of need, the center from which men went out into the world and to which they returned, the channels in which the generations flowed with the members of each generation forming part of the stream.

So much has been written about the Chinese family system that no elaborate discussion of it is needed here. It is worth recalling, however, that the family-clan was responsible both to and for its members.

It was responsible to its members for insuring to them a share in whatever property or income the family as a whole might have. Property might be recorded in the name of an individual member, but it was held, in effect, in trusteeship for the whole. Income from an official post or a business undertaking might come to an individual, but this was to be shared with all according to their need. A man might go far afield in government service or in business, and remain away from the family center for decades at a time. He might set up a sub-family in his new place of residence. But the connection with and the obligation to the family-clan were not broken. (Provision was made for formal severing of family connections by the expulsion of a member for misconduct or by voluntary and friendly agreement. Such severing of connections, however, was rare.) Disaster, such as flood or famine, might overtake so many members of the family clan and so many of its sub-families at once that a family-clan itself would be destroyed. Short of that, there was security for all.

This communal sharing within the family-clan provided an effective sort of social insurance. The family-clan as a whole was economically more secure than the sub-family (which corresponded to the Western family) because it was

large and its members generally were engaged in a wide variety of occupations. (The membership of family-clans usually ran into several scores; not infrequently the number would be in the thousands or even tens of thousands. In the South especially, all the people in a village might belong to one family-clan.) The contributions which the individual members and the sub-families made to the clan as a whole sometimes involved considerable sacrifice. But since no man could know when his own time of need might come, it was worth while for each member of the family clan to help others in their need so that he might receive help in his turn. This mutual sharing within the family-clan was sound and shrewd economy in the long run.

This system of responsibility for mutual aid resulted in two features of society which seem to some Westerners evidence that the Chinese are much less sympathetic with suffering than are the people of the West. In this connection, certain necessary consequences and implications of the Chinese mutual aid system need to be considered—without entering into any discussion of the relative kind-heartedness of Chinese and Westerners.

In the individualistically organized West, the socially unfit in a great majority of cases become a charge on the community as a whole because there are no blood kin or common occupation groups which can take care of them. In China, theoretically at least, all those who could not care for themselves were cared for within the family-clans since everyone belonged to some such clan. Practically, the very large majority of these socially unfit were so cared for, and therefore did not become "public charges." The guilds also regularly had arrangements for carrying members through times of special stress, and the villages had their provisions for the needy. Most of those who had no refuge and no means of support except charity were persons whose families had been wrecked by disaster of some sort, or who for some defiance of group control had been expelled from their

family, their guild, or their village. (There were, of course, the professional beggars, mendicant priests and others of this sort. But they could not properly be counted as "public charges.") Even these victims of disaster or of their own rebellion were in part provided for by the long-established custom which made it virtually obligatory on those who had an abundance to give charity to those in want. There was, therefore, in the Chinese social structure no normal place for the public orphanages, insane asylums, old people's homes, poor farms and other similar institutions supported at public expense which the West was compelled to develop to care for the socially unfit. The family-clans, supplemented by the guilds and the villages, were the machinery by which this care was provided in China.

The reverse side of this responsibility for mutual aid within the family also is significant. The pressure was strong against helping outsiders because the family-clan itself might at any time need all its resources to take care of its members. At best, under the crowded population conditions, and with floods, famines or devastating armies liable to bring destruction, the economic security of the family-clan was on shaky foundations. Experience through the centuries had shown that even the wealthiest might be reduced to poverty and the family-clan broken up. An unnecessary drain on the family resources, therefore, was an attack on the family's foundations. Hence, the people passed quickly by without any offer of aid to the victim of a serious accident, or made no attempt to save a person from certain death, not because they were Pharisaical or cold-hearted, but because none dared to add to the already heavy burden on his own family by assuming any sort of responsibility for the one in need. Thus, for example, one hesitated to save a drowning person because if one did save him, one assumed responsibility, in theory, for the rescued person for the remainder of his life.

The family-clan system brought very real benefits to the individuals. But the latter paid for what they got in limita-

tion on their individual freedom. That limitation was essential, not only to keep family affairs running smoothly, but also because the family was responsible to outsiders for the acts of its members. This group responsibility was strongest in the families because the families were supposed to, and did, have the greatest share in shaping the individual's character and controlling his acts.

Examples of the effects of this family responsibility for the individual are endless. Several extreme cases are on record of the extermination of an entire family-clan of a man who had been guilty of a particularly heinous crime, such as the murder of a father or mother, or an attempt to assassinate the emperor; the theory presumably being that a family tree which had produced so thoroughly poisoned a branch should be rooted out entirely. The regular custom, if a crime had been committed and the criminal could not be found, was to seize and punish a brother, or even a cousin—and the one punished accepted his fate without undue indignation because the family tie was so strong. Sometimes voluntary "atonement" was made by fellow members of the family. This occurred, for example, in the case of the maid of one of the secretaries of the American Legation in Peiping not long since. She committed suicide by swallowing match heads because her son had stolen her mistress's watch. The watch was recovered before the old woman killed herself, but that did not alter, to her mind, the fact that she had failed in her duty as a mother since her son could commit such a crime. She felt obliged to show her regret and make her apologies on behalf of her family by ending her own life. In this way, also, she restored the family honor. This was going further than usual, in such cases, but the woman's action was by no means unique.

The administration of family affairs was, in its broad outlines, too much like that of the villages and the guilds to need detailed exposition. At the head of the family-clan was the senior man, seniority being determined by somewhat dif-

ferent rules in different families but always involving close blood relationship with the previous head, and also maturity. The head's word was law, even to expulsion from the family and life or death. No outsider could overrule his decisions, least of all the government officials. But in grave matters he consulted with the maturer and more responsible members of the family and generally no action was taken until unanimous approval had been secured. Nominally, the women of the family were under the authority of the head. In practice, and by long custom in many families, the wife of the head exercised control over the affairs of the women and children and the household while the head dealt with outside business. Even more strikingly than in the villages, the organization and management of the family was despotic in theory but usually democratic in practice.

The Chinese practice of holding the group—family-clan, guild or village—responsible for the acts of individual members operated powerfully to keep the peace and prevent crime. Because of this practice, every member of the group was directly interested in making sure that no member did anything which would be likely to bring trouble. Similarly, if a crime were committed, it was to the interest of the group as a whole to fix the responsibility on the criminal as soon as possible so that the other members might not be involved in punishment. Thus the family-clan especially, and the other groups to a lesser degree, provided a very large part of that supervisory and police control which, in the West, is one of the important functions of the government as such. The use of this method of handling the problem of control contributed largely to making the Chinese the notably law-abiding people which they were and are.

The existence of group responsibility, moreover, has been a powerful stabilizer in the business of the country. A debt was not the obligation of the individual alone who contracted it, it was the responsibility of his entire family in his own and succeeding generations. Behind a business agreement

stood not simply the individual who made it but, on one side, the commercial organization to which he belonged and, on the other, his family. Those who loaned money to or entered into contractual relations with irresponsible people who did not have family or other organizational support did so at their own risk, and as a rule no such transactions were put through in case any doubt existed on these points. But in normal circumstances, such obligations were secure not because the "courts" or the government could be called in to enforce them, but because they rested on the bedrock of Chinese society.

What will happen now that the system is being subjected to the strains of new ideas and techniques from the West, remains to be seen. Already the old family-clan system is breaking down in various ways. The concentration of large numbers of isolated individuals in the modern factories, for example, disrupts the whole family structure. The introduction of railroads and motor buses has set people and goods moving from place to place in a way which may be ruinous to the guild and village as well as to the family organization.

Of these matters, more will be said later. Meanwhile, it should be noted that with the system of group organizations to handle the affairs of the people, the smooth working of the political governmental machinery was of comparatively little importance. Emperors might come and go. Dynasties might rise and fall. The life of the people went on, directed and ordered by the groups.

If a local magistrate became too exacting, he was tamed or ousted. If an army marched through, the calamity, like a flood or a drought, was endured but not permitted to destroy social coherence—or if drought or famine or armies did bring complete disruption, the threads of life were picked up again as soon as possible. If a new ruler—emperor or local magistrate, alien or Chinese—came, he was accepted and permitted to carry on the business of governing provided he kept on his own side of the line which separated the people

from the government. He was to be duly dealt with if he tried to cross that line. But through it all, the people went about their affairs, governing themselves in the truest sense and to a striking extent of completeness and reasonable success.

The incident of the elderly husband and the village Don Juan, told at the beginning of the chapter, illustrates the way this system worked. As it happened, that incident occurred at a time when the political government of the region had completely collapsed. Both the official police and the magistrate had disappeared from the district. But this disappearance did not mean that all control over the individuals in the village had disappeared. The villagers themselves were entirely able to deal with a village affair.

Similarly, on several occasions in the last few years, all political government in Peking disappeared in the course of the squabbles of the war lords for the control of the shell of government. One such occasion, which came in 1926, was particularly interesting.

Large numbers of undisciplined soldiers were nearing the city. The president had left. The prime minister and all the members of the cabinet had disappeared. The mayor of the city was in hiding. The chief of police could not be found. Altogether, the regular political machinery of the country and the city had vanished into thin air. Some of the leading private citizens, partly on the initiative of the various guilds in the city, organized themselves into a committee of safety and assumed the management of affairs. The city gates were closed—and remained so for nearly two months. When the commander of the advancing troops drew near, the committee negotiated with him. After all arrangements had been made for a new set of officials, and after suitable guarantees against looting by the soldiers had been secured, the committee opened the city gates and duly handed over the city to the new authorities.

Meanwhile, the life of the city had gone on very much as

usual. Gossip on the street corners was a bit more excited than usual, and the newspapers carried more, and less reliable, rumors than customary. But there was no "crime wave." Fresh vegetables and other food continued to be available in adequate amounts within the high walls. Prices rose very little. The streets remained as safe before and after dark as always. The whole affair was a completely convincing demonstration of the unimportance of the government as such in the ordinary life of the people, of the Chinese capacity to improvise a temporary organization to meet a temporary need, and of the practical common sense of the people.

The Chinese system has various obvious disadvantages in the present day world. But it did make possible the striking continuity and stability of the economic and social life of the country in spite of the often repeated and sometimes long continued periods of political chaos. It is because Chinese society was organized in this way, too, that the political confusion of these past two decades and more has not prevented marked progress in non-political directions.

Some of the Western countries, involved in less serious political chaos for considerably shorter times, turned to dictatorships. This political solution was impossible in China, partly because of the vast size of the country and the lack of speedy and adequate communications, but even more because of the fundamental political incoherence of the whole social structure.

The organization of the life of the people in and around the many small groups has been China's strength in one direction, her weakness in another. The people's loyalties, their interests, their thought, their work—all have centered around these groups. Thought and action in terms of the country as a whole had no place in this system. The emperor stood as a vague sort of symbol for the oneness of the people, and the Chinese possessed a remarkable cultural unity. But of political unity there was and could be none under the system by which the people ran their affairs.

In her relations with the closely integrated states of the West, China has suffered severely from this lack of political unity. That same lack has been a grave handicap in the reconstruction of the country along modern lines—in some ways the most serious handicap—in spite of the essential unimportance of the political government, since there has been no one center from which leadership in the reconstruction could be exerted. The overthrow of the empire removed even the small measure of political unity which centered around the emperor. The new and intangible concept of the nation as an entity, introduced from the West, is only just beginning to find a place in the feelings of the people.

The Chinese system did not work perfectly, of course. There was poverty and injustice, excessive wealth, dishonesty and crime. The rich ground down the poor and the poor on occasion destroyed the rich. One might fill pages with illustrations of how the system broke down at this point or that—or with examples of its smooth working. But why take up space with either? The Chinese, like Westerners, are "all too human."

Furthermore, we are not here concerned with the question of whether the Chinese system is better or worse than the Western. Our interest is in what the Chinese system was, in its broad outlines. And this much at least may be said for the Chinese system: it has shown a notable durability and a remarkably flexible adaptability to local and changing conditions.

IV. THE TECHNIQUE OF JUSTICE

One day, in 1929, a district magistrate in Shansi Province had before him a case involving two old women and a hen. The two women were neighbors. One had had the hen for half a year. The other claimed she had lost the hen six months earlier. Neither could produce proof of ownership. Neighbors refused to express an opinion either way, though they talked vigorously about their efforts to settle the matter

without appealing to the magistrate. For a couple of hours the air was all cluttered up with words, the magistrate himself joining actively in the discussion now and then.

Solomon might have decided that the hen should be divided equally between the two old women. The Chinese magistrate, when he at length restored order, scolded the old women roundly for bringing such a matter before him instead of settling it themselves or with the help of the neighbors. Then he ruled that the hen should be held turn and turn about six months at a time, that each third egg which the hen laid should go to the woman who was not in possession, and that the one in whose possession the hen died should pay to the other one-half the market value of the hen. The hen was to go first to the woman who had not had it during the previous six months.

The two women were satisfied, because each could claim she had scored a victory. The neighbors praised the judge for his fairness and wisdom and went away glad that this particular trouble between the two old scolds was over. The hen, with its life insured by the penalty for its death, would contribute to the feeding of the old women.

Was this justice? The case was not handled or decided in accordance with Western legal practice. The magistrate did not refer to any statute or legal precedent in coming to his decision. It never occurred to him, in fact, to look for such authorities. He simply took that particular situation and dealt with it in terms of the particular persons and conditions involved. He tried to give, and succeeded well in giving, a decision which not only would be fair to both sides but also would prevent further trouble. In Western phraseology, the decision was one in equity rather than in law, or, to put it in terms which more accurately describe what really took place, the magistrate sat as an arbitrator rather than as a judge.

The hen was worth only a few cents. But the case was significant because it was handled in complete accordance with

the characteristically Chinese feeling not only about how disputes should be settled but also about the part which officials, representing the government as such, should have in settling disputes between the people.

In China the "administration of law" is personal. In the West, on the other hand, men fought a long and strenuous battle to establish the supremacy of law over persons, even over rulers. This impersonality is involved in the conception that fundamental legal principles have the absolute and binding quality of laws of nature. The Romans worked toward such an idea in the process of creating unity in the administration of their empire with its many peoples. The English and others in more recent times found in the concept an increasingly useful weapon against the arbitrary power of those in governmental authority. There was, also, a significant synchronization between the development of the idea of the law's supremacy and the increase in direct dealings between governments and individuals which came with the breakdown of the medieval guilds and the growth of democracy.

We cannot, however, digress to expand these points. It must suffice to note the fact that in the Western social organization, which had individuals as its basic units, something was necessary to counteract the centrifugal, disruptive force of the conflict of individual desires. Step by step the West moved toward workable coherence by elevating the impersonal law above persons. Substantial success has been secured within the boundaries of the separate States, and the West quite properly counts equality before the law and the establishment of an independent judiciary among its most worth while achievements.

Law in the West is designed to protect the individual in the exercise of his rights, to protect the majority of the individuals against the assaults of the few, and to supply rules governing the increasingly complex relations between people so that these relations may run smoothly. Bills of rights in

constitutions and similar legal acts serve the first purpose, criminal law is designed to meet the second, and civil law the third. All three are built up primarily around the individual. Right, for the law, is that which is laid down in statutes or is recorded in decisions covering points not specifically dealt with in the statutes. The right and wrong in a particular case is determined, in the main, not by the circumstances of that case, but by statute and legal precedent. Justice is impersonal and abstract, in theory.

The strict application of this principle, however, failed to produce justice in certain kinds of cases, hence law was supplemented by equity. But the equity courts also were supposed to be strictly impersonal and equity rulings were based, in theory, on statute or precedent.

In a real sense, the older China had nothing corresponding to this Western law. It had criminal codes, administrative regulations for the officials, and edicts issued by the emperor or other high officials. But the field covered by civil law in the West lay almost entirely outside the purview of the government as such. Neither the criminal codes, the administrative regulations, nor the imperial edicts were drafted or thought of as crystallizations of abstract principles. Furthermore, such documents were not cited as precedents in any way corresponding to the citation of precedents in Western legal practices.

This did not mean, however, that China had no well established methods for settling disputes. Still less did it mean that there was no justice. It meant simply that both rules and methods functioned in terms of personal relations within the particular groups concerned or between groups, and that the purpose was not to apply abstract principles but to deal with particular situations in such a way as to secure a result which would be essentially fair to all the parties concerned. Using the Western phraseology, with due reservations: the Chinese were concerned with the equities of the situation and not with the technicalities of the law.

The rules of conduct—the “law”—on the basis of which disputes were to be settled were the local customs. These got their validity from the fact that things were done that way in that locality or within that group. The rights of land tenants, for example, were fixed in each local area not by statute or executive order but by the local practice. The rights of guilds over their members and in relation to outsiders were determined by the practice of the guild and the region. Marriage and divorce were family matters and not the concern of the government. Transfer of land holdings was arranged by the parties and, though the local magistrate was suppose to register the transfer, the definitive record was in private and not official hands. When a dispute or a question of rights arose, the settlement was based on local custom and circumstances rather than on general principles of law or “legal precedents.” When a magistrate had to deal with a criminal case, he gave great weight to the personal factors involved, including the character of the accused and his victim, in deciding how much mitigation should be allowed of the penalties provided in the code. The penalties laid down in the criminal codes, in fact, were intended to set the extremes to which punishments might go, not to lay down the punishment in usual cases. The actual sentences regularly were much milder than the code penalties.

This being the fundamental feeling about how disputes and crimes should be handled, no special judiciary was essential.

Justice was not something to be administered by some judge sitting high on a bench and from this remoteness acting as the upholder of an abstract Truth which could not concern itself with mere persons. It was something to be wrought out in the market place by the disputants and their neighbors in the light of the very personal and immediate circumstances.

From the Chinese point of view, obviously the best people to settle disputes fairly and to deal with crime reason-

ably were the people who knew most about the immediate circumstances, and who had to go on living with the disputants. These neighbors might know little or nothing about any "body of law," but they did know the local situation, and it was that local situation that mattered, not abstract principles of law or ancient court decisions or imperial edicts or provisions of more or less remote statutes or codes.

The official, as distinct from the leaders of the various groups, came into the picture as a judge, if at all, when the disputants and their neighbors were unable by themselves to settle their difficulties. The official's function, however, was to restore and maintain order rather than to interpret and apply the "law." To do this, he needed to have executive and legislative as well as judicial authority—to draw the Western distinction which has almost no meaning in terms of the Chinese conception of government and social regulation.

The Chinese, too, had their strongly knit group organizations to give coherence to the relations between individuals and to serve as the bulwarks against excessive governmental oppression. They did not need, therefore, to build up the conception of an abstract and impersonal law for protection or coherence, as the West did.

Normally, disputes were settled by what amounted to arbitration. The tremendous pressure of local public opinion, supporting long established custom, lay behind the insistence that the disputes should be settled out of court, that the arbitral decision should be essentially fair, and that the disputants should accept the decision. Only rarely, in these circumstances, did disputants take their cases before the officials. The one who appealed to the magistrate, furthermore, automatically created a presumption against the reasonableness of his claim, for if that claim were reasonable presumably his neighbors would have accepted it. The idea of a friendly suit or a test case to determine a point at law is utterly alien to Chinese thinking and feeling.

The Chinese idea of a contract also differs essentially from that of the West.

In Western law, the presumption is that a valid contract was essentially fair and reasonable when it was made. But the law also holds that the terms of the contract remain binding in their literal sense until they have been fulfilled or altered by mutual consent. "A contract is a contract," we say. The Chinese, like Westerners, begin with the assumption of mutual fairness in the original contract. But they assume, also, that both parties to the contract, being reasonable men, wish to continue to act fairly toward each other; that whether they do or not, essential fairness is necessary as the oil for the social machine, and that, consequently, the terms of any agreement may and should be changed if and when changes in circumstances make strict fulfillment of the original terms unfair. In contractual relations, the Chinese feel, it is much more important that fairness should continue throughout than that the strict "letter of the bond" should be upheld.

This fundamental difference between the Chinese and the Western conceptions of what an agreement should involve has been the cause of a large part of the misunderstanding and ill-feeling in the personal and international relations of Chinese and foreigners. It is notably true that, "a Chinaman's word is as good as his bond"—as long as the terms of the agreement are essentially fair. But any foreigner who has lived in China can cite examples of technical defaults on contracts when living up to the agreed terms would have meant serious losses because of market changes. The Chinese feeling is that such market changes should be met by changes in the terms of the contract. To them, therefore, the foreigner seems at fault when he refuses to adjust the contract, while no blame attaches to neglect of the letter of the agreement.

Similarly, most of the friction over the so-called "unequal treaties" has developed not because the Chinese fail to see

the desirability of temporary special arrangements as to the status of foreigners in China, nor because the principal foreign powers feel that no change in that status is desirable. Both the powers and the Chinese agree that treaties are contracts. The powers insist that the treaty terms should remain binding in full until the treaties are changed by mutual consent or in accordance with the treaty provisions. But the Chinese argue that changes in conditions since the treaties were signed several decades ago make the provisions essentially unjust and hence no longer reasonably applicable, so that no real obligation rests on China to fulfill the treaty terms.

From the Western point of view, the Chinese attitude is both illogical and dangerous, since it undermines the very foundations of orderly personal and international relations. From the Chinese point of view, the Western attitude shows that Westerners have so little confidence in human nature that they cannot trust themselves or any others to act reasonably and fairly, and that they throw doubt on the reasonableness of their own case by appealing to the courts or resorting to force. Both Westerners and Chinese, in the disputes over contracts or treaties, may be acting in entire good faith and be honestly eager to get the dispute settled fairly. But the attitudes are so different that the adjustment is far from easy.

V. THE NEW PROBLEMS

The older Chinese social structure, the feeling about the relation between the government and the people, and the methods of carrying on affairs are breaking down at important points in face of the new situation created by the introduction from the West not only of new ideas but also of new techniques and facilities. That failure is one of the primary causes of the confusion which has developed in China in recent decades.

Chinese economic life, for example, was lived largely on

a personal basis, on a relatively small scale, within a comparatively short radius, and in terms of short periods of time. The characteristically Chinese principles of business and personal relations worked within those limits. But now China is getting railroads, steamships and other means of quick and cheap transportation. She is developing factories with their capacity for mass production. Such facilities inevitably force business onto a large-scale, long-time basis and make much of it almost entirely impersonal. These new currents will not run smoothly in China's old channels.

The West had time to develop the modern corporation and banking systems to meet the needs of the situation created by modern transportation and machine industry. It had time to adjust its social and economic theory and structure to fit the demands of this new world which the West created for itself. Even the West, however, has been none too successful in building a new social or economic structure on these new foundations.

China, on the other hand, began to find herself, forty odd years ago, suddenly faced with these new techniques and facilities at an advanced stage of their development. Nothing in her long past had given her experience by which to deal with the problems they created. The adjustment could not be made step by step with the development of the new problem-creating facilities, as it had been in the West. Confusion was inevitable. The acquisition of a readjusted social technique and a remodelled social ethic is perhaps the fundamental and most difficult problem in the reconstruction in China.

The West also has problems for which it is unprepared by experience. These are being created by the rapid increase in population, and the growth of inter-dependence between nations, industries, and individuals, as a result of the development of swift and cheap transportation and communications. In earlier days in the West, a *laissez-faire* program which gave the freest possible range to individual initiative and energy was workable because the people were

comparatively few, the opportunities were many for expansion into unoccupied territories, and contacts were meager. These conditions no longer exist.

The West is finding that excessive expansion in any direction—by taking new territory or by over-production in industry—brings trouble. There still is room for more people in the West, but the shift definitely has taken place from a condition of a large surplus of room for expansion to one in which the pressure of population is a real problem—a problem as yet not serious in terms of food supply, but rather and very definitely in terms of opportunities for individuals to assert themselves against the group. Industrial expansion has over-reached itself. Mutual dependence between all parts of the West—and of the world—also has become very far-reaching.

Within national boundaries and between nations, the West is finding, as a result of these changes, that such matters as adjustment of rivalries, agreed division of opportunities, a policy of live and let live, a method for settling disputes by peaceful means have come down from the region of utopian dreams to that of hard necessity. The West, consequently, has begun to try to deal with these new problems through such devices as its arbitration treaties, its huge corporations, its international banking organizations, its state socialism, its industrial adjustment boards, its business arbitration committees, and its various other methods of eliminating destructive competition and conflict. Both within the nations and between nations, it already has moved far toward developing a give-and-take technique which does not rest on abstract and absolute principles but adjusts itself flexibly to provide continuing fairness in the midst of changing conditions. It still has far to go in this direction, however.

The West's experience has been with the kinds of problems which are new to China. China has had centuries of experience in dealing with problems of social adjustment which are new to the West. Each side can learn from the other.

MUTUAL ARROGANCE

(CHAPTER VI)

Trouble was inevitable when the modern Westerners and the Chinese met, because each felt so completely superior to the other. A few Chinese and Westerners did form lasting friendships; a few did come to have a real appreciation of the finer qualities of the other's civilization. But for four centuries, relations between the West and China were carried on in a poisonous fog of mutual arrogance and distrust. Inevitably, therefore, the record of those relations tells chiefly of antagonism and misunderstanding, and the pages of that record are spattered liberally with blood.

That record is black enough at best; but the blackness becomes comprehensible, even if it does not disappear, when the record is read in the light of the attitude of each side toward the other.

The Westerners, to the Chinese, were simply another lot of barbarians, rather more effective as fighters than some of China's neighbors, though less so, perhaps, than the other barbarians who had come down out of the north and conquered China. The Chinese, to the Westerners, were simply heathen, rather more civilized than some other heathen, but heathen none the less, since they lacked the guiding light of Christianity. Neither thought of the other as in any real sense an equal, or had toward the other any feeling of that obligation to respect rights which goes with the feeling of equality.

The Chinese authorities persistently acted on the assumption that China did not need anything which the West might have to offer; that to permit the Westerners to trade or preach in China was to extend to a less civilized people the

grace of allowing them to partake of the benefits of contact with the high civilization which was China's; that those to whom the privilege was granted should recognize that it *was* a privilege and not a right, and should submit to the obligations inherent in their position as inferior suitors for favors from China.

The Westerners acted on the assumption that they had the right to trade and preach where they chose. They refused to accept the position of inferior pleaders for privileges. In order to make trade easier, they negotiated with the Chinese authorities and tried to establish diplomatic relations like those between European powers. But they never questioned their right to trade, whether the Chinese wanted them or not. They used guns or negotiations, according to circumstances, to clear the way for the exercise of that right.

In brief, the Chinese tried to maintain intact the wall of racial and cultural superiority which they had built around their country. The Westerners denied both the fact of Chinese superiority, and the Chinese right to maintain the fiction.

The Westerners were by no means united in dealing with China, however. They shared a feeling of superiority toward all "heathen," among whom were the Chinese. But they carried into the Far East all the antagonisms which brought war so frequently in Europe during the sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Catholic Portuguese and Spaniards were arrayed against Protestant English and Dutch. The ancient rivalries of France and Britain continued in India, China, and the South Seas. When citizens of the new-born United States appeared, they and the British were constantly at loggerheads. Even the Catholic missionaries could not agree among themselves: Jesuits, Franciscans and Dominicans quarreled with each other, and those quarrels played a large part in causing the proscription of them all.

If the Westerners had been able to present a united front,

or to agree on a division of the trading and other opportunities, Western expansion would have moved forward much more smoothly and rapidly. Western jealousies gave the Chinese the chance to play one Western power off against the other—an art in which they had achieved skill in their dealings for centuries with threatening tribes to the north. That jealousy did much, in the end, to save China from being divided into colonies of the Western powers.

The crisis came nearly four centuries after the modern Westerners reached China. By the time it developed, however, a start had been made, both in China and the West, toward the changed mutual attitude which exists today. Nevertheless, even now, much of the old attitude remains on both sides: the mutual sense of superiority, the mutual distrust and disrespect, the mutual antagonism and lack of sympathetic understanding bred of basic differences in cultural background.

Today, because of this partially changed attitude, perhaps friendly relations can be established between China and the West. But when the modern West and China first met, friendly relations were practically impossible. The stage was set perfectly, in every detail, for conflict. Fundamentally, the bitterness, the misunderstanding, the stupidity, and the bloodshed which make the record of the first three and a half centuries of modern Western contact with China so dark a page in human history sprang from attitudes on each side inevitably productive of antagonism and conflict.

II. CONTEMPTUOUS TOLERANCE

The Chinese did not ask the Westerners to come, and they felt no need of anything the West had. As a matter of kindness to a less favored people, however, they were willing to let the barbarians bask in the sunshine of Chinese civilization—provided they were properly submissive. Sir George Leonard Staunton, who was secretary of the Macartney em-

bassy from the English king to the emperor of China in 1793, aptly describes the Chinese attitude:

The ancient prejudices against all foreigners . . . supported on the fullest confidence in the perfect state of their own civilization, suggested the precaution of making regulations to restrain the conduct of all Europeans frequenting their coasts, as if aware of the necessity of preventing contamination of bad examples among their own people. . . . There was little scruple in laying those restrictions on foreign trade, the Government of China not being impressed with any idea of its importance to a country including so many climates, and supplying within itself, all the necessities, if not all the luxuries of life. . . . The body of the people is taught to attribute the admission of it [foreign trade] entirely to the motives of humanity and benevolence towards other nations standing in need of the produce of China, agreeably to precepts inculcated by the great moralists of the empire; and not to any occasion or desire of deriving reciprocal advantage from it.

This Chinese attitude is strikingly reflected in a "mandate" which one of China's great emperors, Ch'ien Lung, issued to King George III of England in 1793.

The English felt that their trade with China was seriously handicapped because they had no direct contacts with the Chinese court. So King George sent his cousin, Lord Macartney, to China, to try to establish such contacts. Word was sent in advance that the English king was "desirous of cultivating the friendship of the Emperor of China" and "of increasing and extending the commerce between their respective subjects." The letter which Lord McCartney delivered to the emperor, said that

the natural disposition of a great and benevolent sovereign, such as his Imperial Majesty, whom Providence had seated upon the throne for the good of mankind, was to watch over the peace and security of his dominions; and to take pains for disseminating happiness, virtue, and knowledge among his subjects; extending the same beneficence, with all the peaceful arts, as far as he was able, to the whole race,

King George declared that he also was interested in helping humanity; that he was now "at peace with all the world"; and that he thought the "time propitious for proposing to communicate and receive benefits which must result from an unreserved and amicable intercourse between such great and civilized nations as China and Great Britain."

From the English point of view, the remarks about the emperor of China were simply rather flowery courtesies from one sovereign to another. But King George used an expression which, from the Chinese point of view, sounded very much as though he were asking the privilege of bringing Britain under the shelter of the Emperor Ch'ien Lung's all-embracing and civilizing sway. He said the emperor's disposition was not only to "disseminate happiness, virtue and knowledge among his subjects," but also to extend "the same beneficence . . . to the whole human race."

Ch'ien Lung replied on that basis. The letter must have caused something of a sensation at the English court. Yet, seen from the angle of the Chinese feeling of superiority over all other peoples, the letter shows a rather remarkable spirit of tolerance and readiness to extend a helping hand to an alien and remote people. The emperor, writing in the form of an imperial mandate, said, in part:

You, O King, live beyond the confines of many seas. Nevertheless, impelled by your humble desire to partake of the benefits of our civilization, you have despatched a mission respectfully bearing your memorial. . . . If I have commanded that the tribute offerings sent by you, O King, are to be accepted, this was solely in consideration for the spirit which prompted you to despatch them from afar. Our dynasty's majestic virtue has penetrated unto every country under Heaven, and Kings of all nations have offered their costly tribute by land and sea. . . . We possess all things. I set no value on objects strange and ingenious, and have no use for your country's manufacture. Our dynasty, swaying the myriad races of the globe, extends the same benevolence towards all. . . . I do not forget the lonely remoteness of your island, cut off from the world by intervening wastes of sea, nor do I overlook your excusable ignorance of the usages of our Celestial Empire. . . . Upon you who

live in a remote and inaccessible region, far across the spaces of the ocean, but who have shown your submissive loyalty by sending this tribute mission, I have heaped benefits far in excess of those accorded to other nations. But the demands presented by your Embassy are not only a contravention of dynastic tradition, but would be utterly unproductive of good results to yourself, besides being impracticable. . . . Should your vessels touch the shore [at other places than Canton, where trade was permitted], your merchants will assuredly never be permitted to land or to reside there, but will be subject to instant expulsion. . . . Tremble and obey and show no negligence.

Back of that letter lay two thousand years and more during which China had been the one great fountainhead of civilization in her part of the world. The superiority of her art, her philosophy, her literature, her political and social systems over those of all her neighbors had been as completely accepted as the superiority of the sun over the moon, to use an Oriental comparison. Not to the Chinese only, but to all the peoples of Asia, China stood for all that was splendid and civilized, and the Dragon Throne represented the ultimate in glory and power. Like a gorgeous jewel, it passed from one holder to another. But its possession always conferred new glory on, it did not acquire new glory from, any new possessor. Even so great a conqueror as Kublai Khan, for example, considered it the climax of his successes to ascend the Dragon Throne and exchange the title of Mongol Emperor for that of Son of Heaven.

Especially to the southwest, south and east, the supremacy of Chinese civilization and Chinese power had been unquestioned. From Burma all the way around to Korea, Chinese suzerainty, as well as her cultural preëminence, had been acknowledged. Of all China's neighbors, the Japanese, in their remote islands, alone had never submitted politically, but even they admitted without question their great cultural debt to the Chinese. No threat of conquest ever had appeared from the sea on the south and east, the direction from which the modern Westerners came. No challenge to

China's cultural supremacy ever had come from any direction. If ever a people were warranted by their actual relations with their neighbors in believing that their civilization was the only real one, the Chinese were so warranted.

This age-old Chinese supremacy in the Far East, besides breeding an absolute sureness of superiority, had also developed the sort of semi-contemptuous tolerance which goes with a consciousness of unquestioned and unquestionable power. The necessities of Chinese life, too, springing from the congestion of population, had compelled the Chinese to work out and apply a "live and let live" policy in their relations with each other. Variations of speech, dress and custom, and the tendency of the people to stay close to the tombs of their ancestors, furthermore, caused those who did move from one part of the vast country to another to seem almost if not quite as foreign as those who came from outside of China. To most of the common people, in fact, all the world was China, so that there could be no "outside."

All these factors contributed to create an atmosphere which made it relatively easy for foreigners to come and go in the country, so long as they fitted themselves into local ways and did not unduly attract attention by causing disturbance. It was entirely feasible, for example, for the Italian Jesuit missionary, Matteo Ricci, dressing first as a Buddhist monk and then as a Chinese scholar, to move about fairly freely in the seventeenth century, in spite of the official proscription of Christianity. Even today, Catholic priests in China, whose gowns are more or less like the conventional scholars' robes, attract little attention as they come and go.

Through the centuries, traders, preachers, and teachers of many races and creeds had come to China and moved about without any particular difficulty. Buddhists, Nestorians, Manicheans, Zoroastrians, Jans and Mohammedans, all had been welcomed at court by broad-minded emperors, and granted the opportunity to live and preach and make converts. Scholars from India and Persia had been given high

places in official circles, and their learning had been welcomed as a contribution to Chinese knowledge, as Jesuit scholars and their knowledge were welcomed in the eighteenth century. Arabians, Hindus, Persians, Siamese and other traders had done business along the coast and had been permitted to establish communities in China more or less completely under their own control. Long before the birth of Christ, Chinese emperors had reached out for knowledge of the outside world. T'ai Tsung, the great T'ang Dynasty emperor in the seventh century, took pains to make foreign religious and other teachers welcome to his court. Kublai Khan, the most powerful of all China's emperors, also was the most liberal in his encouragement and use of foreigners and their ability. The tradition of tolerance toward foreigners, their ways and ideas, was old and firmly established in China. The feeling was expressed by Confucius when he declared "all men within the four seas are brothers."

In accordance with this tradition, the Chinese saw no reason for rejecting Westerners or Western goods or ideas merely because they were foreign. If these particular foreigners had goods or ideas which would contribute to the comfort or convenience of living in China, let them come in and be used. If profits were to be made from trading with these foreigners, even if they were barbarians—well, profits always were worth while.

To the Chinese way of thinking, to take and to use these ideas, goods, or profits in no sense was an admission of inferiority. Chinese superiority was too complete and unquestionable to be undermined by small borrowings here and there. Similarly, to yield a point of etiquette or ceremony in dealing with ignorant barbarians was not a sign of weakness; it simply was evidence that one possessed that courteous consideration for others which characterizes the Confucian Superior Man.

So the Chinese let the Westerners come, did business with them, used their scholars at court in improving the Chinese

calendar, drew on their knowledge to acquire better cannon, played with their clocks and listened to their religious teachings, because, convinced of their own superiority, they saw no reason for shutting out Westerners, their goods and ideas.

The traditional tolerance towards foreigners depended, however, on good behavior. By an equally strong tradition, when aliens or their ideas caused trouble, they were ousted. Other foreigners, back through the centuries, had been killed off or driven out when they refused to submit to Chinese authority, or created disturbances. Other foreign religions had been proscribed and bloodily suppressed when their teachers or their teachings had shown signs of disturbing the stability of the throne or of Chinese society.

These new foreigners from the West were dealt with in the traditional way, both in being tolerated when they behaved and in being resisted when they made trouble. Probably no Chinese put his feeling about the Westerners in just these terms. But in substance, this was the way the Chinese felt—the officials, the merchants and the others who had anything to do with the new arrivals, as the records amply make clear.

The Westerners at first were lumped with all the other non-Chinese, toward whom the Chinese felt a tolerant superiority, which was so deeply rooted as to be almost instinctive. These particular barbarians came to be distinguished from others because they were more troublesome. Gradually the Chinese learned to distinguish Westerners of different nations, chiefly because some were more offensive. But Western superiority in fighting effectiveness, as this came to be demonstrated, in no sense proved Western superiority in civilization, to the Chinese. Quite the reverse, in fact. The Chinese were used to the idea of barbarians who could conquer, but these conquerors in the end always had succumbed to Chinese civilization. The superiority of that civilization remained intact.

Furthermore, the Chinese thought of these new barbarians

from the West—when they thought of them at all—as of only very minor importance, until comparatively recently. Reading Western books about China, one easily might get the impression that, beginning soon after the arrival of the first Portuguese, the Chinese court, merchants and other people spent most of their time worrying about what the Westerners were doing and how they could be stopped. This was very far from being the case.

At and near Canton, the officials and merchants were more or less continuously aware of the existence of Europeans—though even here the Westerners were very minor factors through the sixteenth, seventeenth and most of the eighteenth centuries. The Western ships came in with the monsoon once a year. They stayed for a few weeks, usually causing disturbance. They sailed away when the winds changed. Chinese affairs went on. At a few other ports, for a time, a Western ship arrived and the Westerners did business now and then, but the Chinese kept them away for several decades, when they became too troublesome.

Vague intimations of the activities of these new barbarians reached the imperial court from time to time. Some few Westerners finally secured the right to live in Peking, to preach their strange faith there, and even to have a place in the official hierarchy. On one occasion, when these people who called themselves Christians were quarreling among themselves about what certain Chinese words and customs meant, the emperor even condescended to enlighten them.

At intervals of several years, a Western embassy would turn up—Portuguese, Dutch, Russian or English—headed by men who wanted to get trading difficulties straightened out. These trade ambassadors, however, by talking primarily of commerce, simply proved their barbarian uncouthness, in a land where merchants were only next above the despised soldier at the bottom of the social scale. It was far beneath the dignity of scholar-officials, to say nothing of the emperor, to be concerned with commerce. Yet these rude West-

erners, seeking trade, actually talked, on the few occasions when they were allowed at court, as though they believed their sovereigns were the equals of the Son of Heaven!

The Western ambassadors were only a few among the many who came to the imperial court. Between their arrivals, and also while they were there, the capital was thronged constantly with representatives from lands nearer to China, and much better known, who brought tribute or petitions for aid. The Westerners were bits of flotsam in this stream of suppliants. Why should they be accorded better treatment than the rest?

Later on, Western guns demonstrated that the Westerners could not be ignored. But the Chinese did not really begin to take the West seriously until the latter half of the nineteenth century—after Western troops had blasted their way into the capital itself. The booming of the guns which opened the capital to those troops shook Chinese complacency to its foundations. Until 1860, however, Chinese interest in the West and Westerners was casual only, and incidental to the trouble which the Westerners made or the profits which could be derived from trade with them.

Contemptuous tolerance, understandable enough but no less galling to the Westerners, distrust and increasingly active dislike as the Westerners forced their way forward—this was the Chinese attitude for four centuries and more after they first came to know of the strange fair skinned people who arrived by sea.

III. DOMINEERING INSISTENCE

Even today, many people in the West feel sincerely that the "Christian nations" are on a somewhat higher level than those which still are "heathen." But the distinction means infinitely less than it did. During the sixteenth and later centuries, the heathen peoples, to whom God, it was said, had not extended the inestimable blessing of Christianity, seemed to be almost a different order of being, scarcely hu-

man, certainly not human in the fullest sense. Hence, it was not wrong to seize their lands or goods, or to enslave them.

Christendom was divided, to be sure. Catholic and Protestant had no love for one another. Spaniard, Frenchman, Englishman, Dutchman, Portuguese and the rest—all quarrelled and warred with each other on slight provocation. Europeans also recognized that there were distinctions among the heathen, some being more civilized than others. But the differences between Christian and heathen cut far deeper than any differences within Christendom or heathendom. Christians lived in the light of the knowledge and favor of the true God, as the Europeans saw it. Heathen peoples lived in darkness. Christian might war with Christian, and even on occasion seek heathen help against fellow Christians. But the distinction remained. Toward fellow Christians there were certain obligations, even in time of war; toward heathen there were none.

Thanks to Marco Polo, the Jesuit missionaries and others, Europeans knew that the Chinese, far from being mere savages, had a long history of orderly social existence and civilization. In this they differed from some of the heathen; but they were heathen nonetheless and therefore not really civilized. Therefore, too, they had no rights which Christians must respect.

Pope Alexander VI's famous bull dividing between Spain and Portugal all the lands not held by Christian princes was an early expression of this bland assumption that no one but Christians had any rights. That bull was given out in 1493, the year after Columbus' first trip. Portuguese had been coasting down Africa. Spain had sponsored Columbus on his westward trip. So the pope took it upon himself to draw a line down the Atlantic and to assign everything west of that line to Spain and everything of it to Portugal. Previous holdings of the Christian kings were to be respected, but the pope ignored any "heathen" claims as completely as

Admiral Byrd ignored any rights of the penguins of Little America when he recently claimed possession of that territory for the United States. The British and the Dutch denied that the pope could parcel out the earth in this way—not at all because they thought the heathen had any rights, but because they objected to the way in which the pope ignored the Protestants in favor of the Catholics.

In 1502, Pope Alexander issued another bull. This was four years after the Portuguese had reached India. He announced that hereafter the king of Portugal also was “lord of the navigation, conquests and trade of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia and India.” All these regions already had rulers of their own, to be sure; but that did not interest the pope, nor raise any doubt in his mind of his right to give their lands to the good Catholic king of Portugal.

The Protestant kings were quite as convinced as the Catholic that, because they were Christian, their subjects could go where they liked and take what they wanted—provided they got there before other Christians, and provided also they were able to defeat previous claimants in battle.

As late as 1635, Charles I, King of England, issued a commission to William Cobb, an English sea captain, which reflects typically the general Western attitude that heathen of all kinds, including specifically the Chinese, were legitimate prey. This commission, incidentally, is far more typical of the Western attitude than the letter of George III of England to the emperor Ch’ien Lung, written more than a century later, already mentioned.

Captain Cobb wanted to take two ships on a trip to the East, as a private venture, and not on an official mission. King Charles formally gave him authority

. . . to range the seas all the world over, especially from Cape Bone Esperance alongst the cost of Mallindia, the island of St. Laurence, and the cost of Ethiopia, the Red Seas, the cost of Arabia Felix, with the Gulf of Persia and the East Indies, otherwise called the cost of Cormandell, with the island of Sumatria, with the Straits

of Sundy, and the iland of Java Major, with the Molucco islands, and the cost of China and Japan, with all other ilands and continents, bayes, harbers, havens and creekes extending to Northwardes and Eastwardes from the said Cape Bone Esperance . . .

The authority given, it will be observed, covered a wide territory. No distinction is made between the uncivilized lands of the "cost of Ethiopia," the "iland of Java Major" and the countries of China and Japan. On this trip Captain Cobb was permitted by the king of England

. . . to make purchase and prise of all such the treasures, merchandises, goods and commodities, which to his best ability hee shall be able to take of infidels, or any other prince, potentate, or state, not in league with us, beyond the line equinoctiall . . .

In other words, Captain Cobb was specifically authorized by his sovereign to seize by force—"to make prise of"—any of the belongings of the "infidels" which he "shall be able to take," on the way to or in the Far East. The worthy captain might "make purchase" if he chose, but he had the king's full sanction for indulging in what we today would call outright piracy against all non-Christians.

That seems somewhat startling, today. But King Charles and Captain Cobb probably would have been amazed if anyone had questioned the propriety of that commission. The king authorized the captain to do no more than everyone else was doing—and had been doing for a century and more—in the Americas as well as in the East.

By the time of Charles I, the seizure of goods between Europeans had been brought under some control in accordance with the principles of what was called "international law." But this "law" applied only between Europeans, according to the common idea. People outside of Europe who were not Christians shared in neither its benefits nor its obligations.

The feeling went further than that, however. Not being Christians, the "infidels" were servants of Satan and hence enemies of God. Christians, therefore, not only had the

right to seize the goods of infidels; they also had the moral obligation to "spoil the heathen" as a means of weakening God's enemies. To enslave the infidel, furthermore, was to do him a great favor by bringing him where he might learn of Christ and be saved.

Even in Europe, when two nations were at war, private persons might do pretty much as they liked in the way of seizing enemy goods. They were regularly granted "privateering letters" which formally authorized them to help themselves to any enemy property they could find. In dealing with the "infidels" what the Europeans did, in effect, was to allow themselves the unlimited license to rob which went with a state of war. From their point of view, this was reasonable enough (though they did not reason it out in just this form), since all Christians automatically and continuously should be at war with God's enemies, the "infidels."

We find it a little hard, today, to share that feeling of the Europeans toward the "heathen"—though our attitude has changed much less than we would like to believe. Nevertheless, in all honesty and sincerity most Europeans in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (and a good many in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries) saw no wrong in simply taking the goods and territory of people who were neither European nor Christian.

The Europeans took goods and territory in the East, in exactly the same spirit that they did in the Americas. Cortez and his crew were not, in European eyes, pirates or bandits when they looted Montezuma's palaces and slaughtered the Mexicans—any more than the English and French who plundered and killed in India were unprincipled and ruthless robbers. Instead, those who robbed the heathen were thought of as highly moral people, engaged in the praiseworthy occupation of injuring God's enemies, and adding glory and riches to their sovereigns. The wealth which they acquired in the process was simply legitimate reward for especially meritorious and hazardous efforts in a noble cause.

Similarly, it was impossible to cheat a "heathen" because the latter were outside the circle within which the principles of morality applied. If a trader could get ivory or land or furs or something else of value in exchange for a few beads or a strip of cloth or a jug of rum, he was not dishonest; he was shrewd and clever. Thus the Dutch were very smart, to their way of thinking, when they "bought" Manhattan Island from the Indians for a handful of trinkets. Similarly, it occurred to only a very few to question the morality of the thousands of Western traders who used the same methods in the Americas, in Africa, in the East, and in the Pacific Islands.

From this Western point of view, too, the laws of "infidel" countries meant nothing. China, for example, proscribed Christianity, and, after bitter experience, prohibited the importation of opium. But Catholic and Protestant missionaries worked strenuously to smuggle Christianity into China in spite of Chinese laws—justifying themselves on the ground that they were obeying a "higher law." Most of the Western traders were equally ready and eager to smuggle opium into the country and to take the large profits which were to be made in the traffic. In due course, moreover, Western guns compelled the Chinese to legalize the importation of both Christianity and opium. The Westerners wanted that legalization. They had the power to enforce it with superior weapons of war, and they did.

The Westerners did nothing in their dealings with China essentially different from what they did in other parts of the world during the four centuries of expansion which followed Columbus' demonstration of the possibility of sailing over the horizon. They were, in fact, less baldly brutal in their contacts with the Chinese than in those with most other non-Christian peoples: the Indians in the Americas, for example, or the negroes in Africa. This may have been due partly to their realization that the Chinese had more civilization than the American Indians or the African negroes; but

it was principally because the Chinese showed a more effective capacity to resist than these other peoples. That resistance was not completely effective, but it did check Western expansion somewhat.

The Westerners did not, of course, use force exclusively in their dealings with China. The trader-adventurers and the British East India Company tried to negotiate with the local officials, particularly at Canton. Five years after they first reached Chinese waters, the Portuguese sent an embassy to the Chinese court. Queen Elizabeth of England despatched a mission to open relations with China—a mission which was overwhelmed by Spanish pirates and the sea before it got across the Atlantic. George III sent Lord Macartney in 1793, and Lord Amherst in 1816 for the same purpose. The Russians negotiated with China and, in 1689, signed a treaty on a basis of mutual equality. The Dutch sent several embassies.

But these missions were not successful—except in the doubtful case of Russia—because the Chinese could not conceive of granting to the Western barbarians the status of equality which the latter demanded. The Westerners were determined to trade, none the less. They used their guns to remove obstacles when negotiations failed, or when they seemed to be making too slow progress. In fact, the Westerners, whatever they might say in theory, acted on the assumption that they had the right to do business in China whether or not the Chinese wanted them. The idea that China belonged to the Chinese, and that the latter had the right to decide such things for themselves, seems scarcely to have occurred to the intruders.

In the nineteenth century, some Westerners did begin to have some prickings of conscience over what was being done in the East and in other "heathen" lands. But justification was worked out along two lines: one set of apologists contended categorically that the opportunities of all the world belonged to all the people of the world, and that conse-

quently the Chinese had no right to shut themselves off from trade with the West—an argument which the Japanese, shrewdly enough, have revived to support their protest against being excluded from thinly settled regions. Others in the West built up the “white man’s burden” doctrine, insisting that it was the duty of the enlightened, civilized nations of the West to carry what they called the blessings of their civilization to the “little brown brothers” who dwelt in darkness—an argument which cast the cloak of saintly self-righteousness over ruthless economic and political aggression.

The Christian feeling of vast superiority over all things heathen also kept the Westerners in China and the other parts of the East from fitting themselves into the life of the countries to which they went. They kept their own foods, their own clothes, their own houses, their own ideas of right and wrong. Some of the earlier missionaries did adopt Chinese dress and live as Chinese. But the attitude of the Englishmen in the “out stations” who dressed in full dinner regalia every evening was much more typical of the general attitude toward things “native.” This determined insistence on keeping up their own ways unquestionably did a good deal to help maintain the morale of the Westerners, but it was a morale of isolation, of arrogance, of contempt; a morale based on the attitude which made the phrase “going native” a bitterly scathing term of condemnation, and prevented any approach to real understanding.

Through these three centuries and more, some few Westerners spoke with admiration of some features of Chinese civilization. Western governments made some effort to establish diplomatic relations with China. But far more indicative than these words and gestures of the real attitude of most of the Westerners in the East toward the people of the East—Chinese along with the rest—is the fact that Westerners came to use the word “native” as a term of peculiarly contemptuous scorn.

IV. "THE ABOMINATIONS OF HEATHENISM"

The Western trader-adventurers who went to China wanted the cash from profitable trade. So long as they could get that cash, or could hold out the prospect of profits in the future, they did not need to concern themselves with what the people in the West thought about Chinese civilization.

The missionaries, on the other hand, wanted converts, and to carry on their work they were compelled to "sell" themselves and the need for what they were doing to the church constituencies at home—which meant to a large part of the people. Necessarily, therefore, the missionaries talked about their "fields" much more and much more widely than did the businessmen. Necessarily, too, they were under considerable pressure—unconsciously as well as consciously—to paint as dark a picture as possible of conditions in those "fields," both to justify their work to themselves and to convince those to whom they appealed for money that their work was needed.

Consequently most of what the West heard about China and the Far East generally, until the last few decades, came through missionary channels. Consequently, too, the picture of these regions which was built up in the minds of most of the people in the West was that the East abounded, as one preacher put it, in "the abominations of heathenism."

Nevertheless, it was fashionable in Europe, for a time in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, to express interest in things Chinese. A few of the missionaries, notably Matteo Ricci and some of the Jesuits, came to realize that Chinese civilization and philosophy contained much which Europe might study to its own advantage. Through the writings of these men, some Chinese ideas of the relation between ruler and ruled got into the thinking of Rousseau and other eighteenth century Europeans, particularly the idea that the ruler had obligations to the ruled. At one or two centers in Europe, collections were begun of Chinese manuscripts and other

material (in the eighteenth century, for example, Chinese scholars were employed in the Vatican caring for Chinese documents there). Examples of Chinese porcelain came to be cherished as *objets d'art*, and the manufacture of porcelain in Europe started in the efforts to copy the Chinese product. Chinese silk again became the most prized of fabrics for beauty and fashion. Chinese painting began to have some influence on Western art.

The interest in China, however, was of the faddist sort which voices enthusiasm for strange and exotic things—like the Chinese interest in Western clocks. Neither the interest in things Chinese nor the slight borrowing from Chinese culture indicated that in any sense Europeans had lost their feeling of the vast superiority of their own Christian civilization over any heathen civilization.

That Western sense of superiority was the background against which the West's picture of the East was painted, and most of the painting was done by missionaries, with traders and business men putting in some touches here and there. A few others who were neither specifically traders nor missionaries have gone to or been interested in their East: men who took the observer's attitude while serving in official or semi-official capacities; students of Eastern civilization past and present; reporters of current events; casual tourists. The importance of such persons in shaping public opinion in the West toward the East has increased enormously of late. But their numbers were few and their influence small until comparatively recently. Even now, the "general public" thinks about the East pretty much what the missionaries and the businessmen, but chiefly the missionaries, have told it to think.

Some of the missionary writing about China was exceedingly valuable, and some of the missionaries showed a free-minded scholarship of the finest quality. Missionaries or men with missionary connections, too, made a very large part of the translations into Western languages of the Chinese and

other Oriental religious and philosophical works. Other Western observers and scholars, in a slender but honorable succession through the last four centuries, regularly have devoted themselves to the sympathetic study of Eastern thought.

Only a very few in the West, however, ever saw these scholarly translations and writings, by missionaries and others. For every one in the West who read Legge's monumental translation of the Confucian classics, for example, a thousand—in church missionary meetings, at prayer meetings, in their sectarian religious papers—heard about the East and China in terms of the "abominations of heathenism," and ten thousand came to think of all Easterners as "benighted heathen" living in lands "where every prospect pleases and only man is vile."

The very impulse which sent the missionaries to pagan lands made it difficult for them to see good in pagan life. They went because they wanted to obey what they believed was God's command to "preach the gospel." Many were fired by a burning, unselfish, and wholly admirable desire to save their fellow men from eternal torment. But they were convinced that they had the one true religion, and the one way to salvation. Consequently, every good feature of the religion or of the social organization of the countries to which they went, was a challenge to their own certainty that Christianity and Christian society alone could be good. Every evil they saw confirmed their conviction. Inevitably, therefore, they saw evil easily and good with difficulty.

Furthermore, the most effective way to get and keep home support was to talk about the terrible conditions in pagan lands and the consequently urgent need for missionary work. To speak of good in paganism was to raise the question of why missionaries should go at all.

Two very deep-rooted needs of every man thus operated to keep the average missionary convinced of the evil of all things pagan: the need to justify himself to himself, and the

need to justify his work to those who provided his support.

The missionary, too, was and always remained an alien in the land where he worked. Constantly, therefore, even though sometimes unconsciously, he was influenced by the basic human impulse of antagonism toward the strange and different. Consequently, also, his alienness—an alienness which included a difference of skin color—created antagonism against him in his adopted country, no matter how long he might live there.

In these circumstances, it is not surprising that most men and women in missionary circles at home as well as abroad thought and spoke of everything pagan as essentially evil. It is surprising that there were some who had a different attitude.

But on one point the earlier missionaries agreed: heathenism of every kind was evil, utterly incapable of saving an innately wicked mankind, and completely without the power to regenerate human society dominated by the “powers of darkness.” Christianity alone could bring individual salvation and social regeneration. In the missionary records, until quite recent years, one finds only a very few hints that perhaps even the heathen and heathenism might have some good points. Today, the missionary attitude has changed considerably; the difference between Christendom and heathendom is described in terms of different shades of gray. Until a few decades ago, the difference was as sharply marked as that between black and white, or noon and midnight.

Two years after Ricci started his residence in Peking, for example, another somewhat distinguished Jesuit there wrote to a friend in Europe. This was in 1703. This missionary, Père de Chavagnac, was writing informally and so, perhaps, felt more free to speak his mind than he otherwise might have been. Père de Chavagnac refers to the number of churches which he found during a trip, and remarks that “the time for the conversion of this Empire seems to be come at last.” Yet he continues:

The contempt with which the Chinese look upon all other Nations is of the greatest, even among the Meaner People. Having so great a Conceit of their own Country, their Manners, their Customs, and their own Maxims, they cannot be perswaded that anything which is not of China deserves to be regarded. When we shew'd them the Folly of their adhering to Idols; when we have brought them to own, that the Christian religion has nothing in it but what is Great, Holy, and Solid, a Man would be apt to believe that they were ready to embrace it; but they are still far enough off. They answer us coldly: "Your religion is not to be found in our Books; it is a foreign religion; is there anything good out of China, or anything true, which we know not?"

Though they are far short of the Perfection to which Arts and Sciences have been advanc'd in Europe; yet will they never be perswaded to do anything in the European manner. It was absolutely necessary to make use of the Emperor's Authority to oblige the Chinese Architects to build our Church, which is within his Palace, after an European Model; and he was obliged to appoint Mandarins to take care to see his Orders obey'd.

Their Vessels are ill enough built; they admire the structure of ours; but when they are perswaded to build like them, they wonder that such a thing should be propos'd to them. "This is the Chinese Way of building," they say. "But it is good for nothing," reply'd I. "No matter," rejoyn they, "since it is the way of the Empire, that is enough for us, and it would be a crime to alter it."

As for the Language of the Country, I do assure no Man would take the Pains to learn it, on any other Account than the Service of God. . . . The Conversion of Great Men, and particularly of Mandarins, is most difficult. Most of them living by their Exactions and Unjust Dealings, and being besides allow'd to have as many Wives as they can maintain, those Bonds tye them down so fast that they can scarcely break loose. . . .

The Chinese do not find any less Opposition to Christianity in the Corruption and Depravedness of their Hearts; for provided they appear outwardly regular, they make no difficulty of committing the most enormous Crimes in private. . . .

Yet the man who said these things also—and equally typically—could end his letter thus:

I know not, whether you have heard that two Missioners of our Society have had the honor to dye in Cochinchina, loaded with

Irons, for the Sake of Jesus Christ. . . . I expect to have a settled Mission assigned to me very suddenly, as is promis'd me, and I am put in hopes that it will be hard, poor, laborious, and that there will be much to endure in it. . . .

The worthy Jesuit, it will be noticed, refers to the fact that the Emperor K'ang Hsi had given the Jesuits permission to build a church within the grounds of the palace itself. But K'ang Hsi went further. In 1705, he contributed a thousand ounces of silver toward the cost of building the church. In 1711, when the construction was nearing completion, he wrote with his own hand an inscription to be placed on a column in the church—thereby, according to Chinese ideas, conferring a very signal honor indeed on the foreigners and their religion. That inscription read:

TO THE TRUE ORIGINAL OF ALL THINGS

He is infinitely Good	He had no beginning
And infinitely Just.	And will have no end.
He gives light to, he supports,	He produced all things
He rules all things	From the beginning.
With supreme authority	He it is that governs them
And with sovereign justice.	And is their true Lord.

One wonders what European king would have given missionaries of an alien faith—especially of a faith which until only a short time before had been proscribed, as Christianity had been in China—permission to build a temple within his palace enclosure, though he himself was not an adherent of that faith. And where, in the words of European rulers, does one find a statement to parallel the inscription which K'ang Hsi gave to the Jesuits as an expression of his realization that underlying men's religious differences is a common reaching out toward the highest?

Certainly no such realization is apparent in the attitude of a distinguished English preacher, Dr. John Foster, who

addressed the Baptist Missionary Society in Bristol, England, in 1818. He urged that more missionaries be sent to the East. He took occasion to comment on the "principles of paganism." He wanted, he said, "to exhibit the system in its strength of pernicious operation," not to give a detailed description of the "prominent features of the heathenism of Central Asia." The system was not worth careful study, he assured his hearers,

. . . for the attainment of anything like a complete knowledge of it may defy all human faculty, which faculty, besides, if it might search the universe for a choice of subjects, could find nothing less worth its efforts of knowledge. The system . . . is the most remarkable exemplification of the possibility of making the grandest ideas contemptible, for that of infinity is here combined with the very abstract of worthlessness . . .

Dr. Foster wanted the system destroyed, for, he says, these "paltry conceits of a reptile invention," these "dreadful maladies of the moral world, the delusions and abominations of heathenism," these "mighty forms of darkness and iniquity," in the "scenes of which they have so long been the curse," this system which "would have seemed to require a super-human genius for shapes of degradation and absurdity to have invented but as a dream of fantasy," this "farrago of notions and fantasies . . . becomes a thing for detestation and earnest hostility when viewed in its practical light as the governing scheme of principles and rites to a large portion of our race." The "true religion [Christianity] . . . enjoins and promotes a perfect morality, the other essentially favors, and even formally sanctions, the worst vices."

Americans added their voices to the chorus of condemnation of all things heathen. The Reverend F. Wayland, pastor of the First Baptist Church in Boston, for example, spoke before the Boston Baptist Foreign Mission Society in 1823. He described in lurid language the terrible state of things in heathen lands, and then remarked:

We have turned to Asia and beheld how the demon of her idolatry has worse than debased, has brutalized the mind of man. Everywhere his despotism has been grievous; here, with merciless tyranny, he has exulted in the misery of his victims. . . . We have looked upon all this, and our object is, to purify the earth from these abominations. . . .

Where shall we find holy heathen? Where is the vestige of purity among unevangelized nations? It is vain to talk about the innocence of these children of nature. It is vain to tell us of their graceful mythology. Of their very religious services, it is a shame to speak. . . . What would be the character of that future state, if those principles of the heart which the whole history of the heathen world develops, were suffered to operate in their unrestrained malignity?

And in 1865, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, on behalf of the notably—some said heretically—liberal Congregational denomination in the United States, had this to say in asking for support of missionary work:

We must plead for Africa in all its debasement and wretchedness; for Western Asia, hallowed once by the footsteps of patriarchs and prophets, but mourning now "because of affliction" and "great servitude"; for India, panting and gasping beneath the system of error the most monstrous that the God of this world has ever devised; for China, teeming with idolatry and all unrighteousness; for the islands of the sea, that their barbarous and reckless impurity may come to an end."

But that's enough of such quotations. Typical, not exceptional, samples have been taken.

Underlying the entire missionary movement was the conviction that "without the light and guidance of Christianity . . . human nature has developed in the direction of moral disability and decadence, with no power in itself to escape from this downward trend," as Dr. James G. Dennis put it in his exhaustive study of "Christian Missions and Social Progress," published as recently as 1897.

The fundamental conditions under which the missionaries worked made such an attitude typical, rather than any special

narrow-mindedness or lack of intelligence in missionary circles—and the ordinary churchgoer in the West got his ideas of China and the East from the men and women who had this missionary attitude, even though the serious-minded few read what neutral observers had to say.

A few in the West appreciated the good qualities of Chinese civilization and were not unwilling to criticize their own people. The remarks of Sir George Leonard Staunton, secretary in Lord Macartney's mission, are typical of this kind of comment. In his report of the embassy, published in 1797, he says, for example, that

. . . in respect to its natural and artificial productions, the policy and uniformity of the people, their moral maxims, and civil institutions, and the general economy and tranquility of the state, it [China] is the grandest collective object that can be presented for human contemplation or research.

Sir George remarks that the English were so little known, and so despised in China, that they were called "by the contemptuous appellation of *Hoong-mouw-zhin*, which, as nearly as can be translated, may answer to that of *carrotty-pated-race*." But he puts the blame for Chinese distrust of the English partly on the English themselves, partly on

. . . the independent spirit and freedom of action, resulting from the nature of the British Government; and which might, however justifiable, have sometimes worn the appearance of presumption in the eyes of the supercilious and arbitrary magistrates of China, especially when observed in persons of a mercantile profession, which happens to be the lowest class in estimation there.

This British "rugged individualism" was not the only cause of trouble, however, for according to the same writer,

. . . its more frequent, and worse consequences proceeded from the abuse of liberty in the vulgar and uninstructed minds of British seamen, and other persons in inferior stations. Their passions and caprices, being in great measure unrestrained, they exhibited such scenes of excesses and irregularities as were peculiarly disgusting and of-

fensive to a people, whose minutest actions are controlled by specific regulations.

Sir George also remarks that

. . . notwithstanding a British factory has been established upwards of an hundred years, not the least approach was made towards the assimilation of manners, dress, sentiments, or habits, which, in similar institutions elsewhere, tends so much to facilitate the views of commerce, as well as to promote the comforts of those immediately engaged in it.

The English translator and editor of a volume of letters from Jesuit missionaries, published in 1714, gives another pertinent comment. He is speaking of the Hindu “horror for Europeans which it is impossible ever to correct in them,” but his remarks fit the situation in China:

When the Portugueses first came to India, they observ’d none of the Customs of the Country, they made no Distinctions of Races, they conversed indifferently with the Parias, they even took them into their service, and from that time the contempt which the Indians had for the Parias, communicated itself to the Portuguese, and has continu’d ever since.

“Tho’ the other Europeans were not ignorant of the Niceness of the Indians in that Particular, yet they regarded it no more than the Portuguese; they have always lived in India as they do in France, England and Holland, without confining or using themselves to the Customs of that Nation. To this may be added the liberty practic’d by many of them, their Excess in the use of Wine, and their familiar way of treating the Ministers of their Religion; all these things have had great influence upon a People who are naturally sober and stay’d, and who pay the most profound Respect to those who are their Doctors and Instructors.

Thus some Westerners did realize that there was good in Chinese civilizations, and that the Westerners themselves were in no small part responsible for the feeling of the Chinese that all Westerners were barbarians. Among these, even in the early days, were some of the missionaries. But this was not the typical Western attitude.

V. ARROGANCE AGAINST ARROGANCE

Cash or converts.

Most of the Westerners who went to China during the past four centuries wanted one or the other of these. Most—practically all—of the West's tangible holdings in or connected with the East have been built around profits or proselytizing. Most of the Western governments' dealings with the Eastern countries have been to open up for their nationals opportunities to spread sales or salvation, or to protect interests and footholds already secured.

Especially during the past century, while democratic influence in politics has been growing, the Western governments have done in the main what the business and missionary groups wanted in the Far East. They have followed these wishes as expressed directly or as filtered through the public opinion which itself was the child of missionary and business opinion and attitude.

The missionaries have been more active than the businessmen in shaping public opinion because they were compelled to reach as many people as possible with their appeals for support of their work. But the businessmen probably have been more directly influential with the governments because their interests were more tangible than those of the missionaries. The cash coming in from trade and investments was easier to see and seemed more clearly worth having and protecting than the merit stored up by making converts, or even than the possible good will secured by maintaining schools, hospitals and other philanthropic enterprises.

For more than three and a half centuries of expansion into China, neither traders nor missionaries nor governments of the West were troubled by uncertainty as to their own vast superiority over the Chinese. Nor were they hampered, in forcing their way into China, by doubts as to whether they, their trade or their religion were wanted. Nor were they disturbed by worries over whether the Chinese had rights which

they were under obligation to respect beyond the capacity of the Chinese to enforce their claims. Only a very few Westerners felt that there was some good in Chinese civilization.

Equally convinced of their own superiority and self-sufficiency, the Chinese met the Westerners and their ideas with the tolerance of indifference or curiosity, then with resentment aroused by the West's refusal to accept the position of inferior barbarians and submit to Chinese authority, and then by such use of force against force as they could command.

Superiority complex against superiority complex. Arrogance against arrogance. Contempt against contempt. Utter absence of any sense of common equality. Of course there was trouble, right from the start—trouble which grew as the contacts increased in number and variety.

IN A VALLEY OF CONFUSION

(CHAPTER VII)

CHINA's history is to be compared not to a level plain but to a long succession of mountain ranges and deep valleys. Heights of power, of cultural achievement, of order, have followed and been followed by depths of disorganization and weakness.

For the past century and more, China has been struggling across one of the widest and most difficult of these valleys of confusion. The vastly destructive T'ai P'ing (Great Peace) Rebellion, which lasted from 1850 to 1865, was an especially low point in this valley. Yet it happened that this came at exactly the time when the impact of Western civilization first really began to be felt, for it was in these middle years of the nineteenth century that steam and electricity began to break down the barriers of distance and difficulty between the West and China. Before that time, the movement of Western guns, goods and ideas to China had been a thin trickle; after it, that movement became a rushing flood.

By an exceptionally significant historical coincidence, the first regular steamship service between Europe and Shanghai was established in the very year that the devastating wave of the T'ai P'ing Rebellion reached close to the walls of Peking.

China was on the way down into a valley of confusion when the Westerners first arrived in 1516. The Ming Dynasty had passed the peak of its splendor and power. It disappeared a century and a quarter later, and for another fifty years disturbances continued.



During this period, one man after another, claiming to be the rightful heir to the Ming line, headed revolts. Some of these were of considerable proportions. The most protracted and destructive of these efforts to drive out the "usurping" and alien Manchus, and to put the Chinese Mings back on the throne, was the revolt associated with the name of the quixotic but loyally determined man whom the foreigners called Koxinga. His father had gone over to the Manchus, but the son fought valiantly on behalf of two successive claimants to the Ming rights. The revolt centered in Fukien Province but Koxinga made numerous raids into the interior and twice, in 1654 and 1659, almost reached Nanking. The fighting wrought havoc over a wide area. The Ming heir finally gave up in despair, but Koxinga, in spite of offers of rich emoluments from the Manchus, continued the struggle. In 1661, he withdrew from the mainland and established headquarters on the island of Formosa. Several thousand Chinese followed him, to get away from Manchu rule. Koxinga died in 1662, but his son carried on the anti-Manchu campaign until 1683.

For centuries, Formosa had been in effect a No Man's Land, occupied chiefly by primitive savages and used as a base of operations by a motley crew of Chinese, Malay and Japanese pirates who harried the neighboring coasts of China and took heavy toll of the merchant shipping. The Dutch established settlements on the island in 1624, only to be ousted in 1662 by Koxinga. When the Manchus finally suppressed Koxinga's son, they added Formosa to the empire—thereby planting the seeds of future trouble with Japan.

The crushing of Koxinga's revolt ended the last important rebellion on behalf of Ming heirs, though Ming claimants continued to appear from time to time even through the nineteenth century. The Manchus, however, had trouble from other sources. They were wise enough to seek Chinese help, especially in the civilian administration. But their troops were kept active suppressing revolts,

and not until about 1700 did China once more get definitely out of the period of interdynastic confusion which was beginning in 1516. Then, when Ch'ien Lung gave up the throne in 1796, the swift decline of the Manchu Dynasty began, and disorganization spread.

Thus, for not more than one of the four centuries during which China and the modern West have been in contact, has China been even approximately at peace within herself, or in a reasonably healthy social and political condition. Certainly she was not that when the steamship suddenly gave new impetus to the Western drive.

Between 1850 and 1880, in fact, China experienced not one, but three, great rebellions, any one of which by itself would have caused a serious setback in the economic and political development of the best organized and most prosperous country. During those same thirty years, China also suffered from one of the most disastrous floods of the Yellow River in all her history, and from one of the worst of her many famines. Yet this was precisely the period during which Western pressure became more intense and Western guns blasted the first great breach through China's wall of isolation.

II. GROWING REVOLT

When British guns, after three years of intermittent war, forced the Emperor of China, in 1842, to recognize the Queen of England as his equal, China was very far from being a peaceful land ruled by a powerful dynasty to which the people gave willing obedience and support.

Revolt against the alien Manchu Dynasty had, in fact, never been completely suppressed. For half a century and more after the Ming Dynasty was driven from the throne in 1644, heirs of that line had led sporadic outbursts of rebellion against the new rulers. Toward the end of the 1700's, the secret societies became active—those ancient organizations through which the people time and time again had asserted themselves against despotic or decadent rulers.

Even the powerful Ch'ien Lung had been able only partially to suppress several rebellious uprisings.

As the nineteenth century progressed, upheavals became more frequent. From the 1800's on, scarcely a year passed without rebellion in some part of the country so serious that men to deal with it had to be sent from the capital. Not infrequently, high Manchu or Chinese officers sent by the emperor were busy trying to suppress revolt in several parts of the country at once. Some of these men, with their armies, proved no match for the rebels whom they were sent to crush—and they were disgraced by the emperor for their failure. Others succeeded in patching up or imposing a temporary quiet, but rebellion flamed again almost as soon as the emperor's agent left to report his "success" to Peking.

The hot-blooded, part-Malay peoples of the south and southwest made most of the trouble. The mountain folk in far western Szechuan and the Mohammedans in the northwest contributed their full share. As the years went on and decadence gnawed its way more and more deeply into the governmental machinery, the contagion of revolt spread among the soberer inhabitants of the Yangtze Valley and even up among the phlegmatic folk of the north.

In spite of the spread of these revolts, however, for the first fifty years of the nineteenth century, no leader or purpose appeared great enough to draw into a single channel the scattered streams of rebellion. There were some who rose as leaders, took the name of emperor and assumed the imperial yellow. Some others claimed to be fighting for the restoration of the Mings—the last strictly Chinese dynasty. None rose to power, even to temporary power, over more than a province or two. Nevertheless, by the middle of the nineteenth century, the opposition to the Manchu rule had become so widespread, and the imperial authority had become so completely nothing but a shadow which reached scarcely beyond the walls of the palace at Peking, that, as H. B. Morse says:

In the years 1854 and 1855, as far as the records show, except possibly the provinces of Shensi and Kansu, the whole of the eighteen provinces, outside the Imperial camps, had thrown off the Imperial domination, and without setting up a civil administration in its place, had destroyed the existing fabric of government.

This slow gathering of an explosion of popular discontent with a decadent dynasty was no new thing in Chinese history. The fall of every line of rulers had been preceded by just such a time of sporadic outbursts. Sometimes streams of revolt ran quickly together into a single torrent and in a couple of decades swept away the old dynasty, replacing it with a new and vigorous one. Sometimes the confusion grew and grew for well over a century before order came again under the strong hand of the founder of a new dynasty.

III. THE GREAT CATASTROPHE

The great wave of rebellion against the Manchus which caught the lesser waves up into itself began to rise in 1850 in the south. By the end of 1853, it had swept across the Yangtze Valley and beyond across the North China plain to within a few score miles of the walls of Peking. Only a little better organization, only a little more coherence, only a little more driving power, and Heaven's mandate to rule would have passed from the Manchus to a new and Chinese dynasty. But just that little more was lacking. The drive north failed, and for another twelve years destruction swept the Yangtze Valley before the T'ai P'ing Rebellion was crushed, in 1865.

In the number of people killed and the amount of property destroyed, the fifteen years of that rebellion stand among the very few most appallingly disastrous periods in human history. The only periods comparable with it are the years in which the Mongol horsemen swept ravagingly across Central Asia and into Europe—and the fifty-one months of the World War.

There was little to distinguish, in sheer destructiveness,

between the T'ai P'ing rebels and their opponents, as they burned and killed and hacked their way back and forth through the richest part of China—the heart of the Yangtze Valley—and beyond into the mountains to the south and onto the plains to the north.

Twenty million people were killed, according to the usual estimates, not including the millions more who died in the years which followed because they were destitute in what had been their prosperous homes. No one even has tried to estimate the property damage. But when the rebellion finally was drowned in blood, wolves were ranging the empty streets of many cities whose inhabitants had numbered well over 100,000, and wild pigeons were nesting in the eaves of deserted houses in scores upon scores of towns where fifty to sixty thousand people had lived. The poor were dead. The moderately well off were destitute. The wealthy were poverty stricken. "Great Peace" came at last—the peace of death.

The Manchu Dynasty was saved, for the time being—but not by Manchu chieftains or Manchu soldiers. The power which in the end crushed the Rebellion was organized and led by Chinese, particularly by that superbly high principled and patriotic Chinese official from Hunan Province, Tseng Kuo-fan. He and other Chinese who joined him against the T'ai P'ing rebels had no faith in or love for the decadent Manchu line. But they had even less faith in and love for the man who called himself the T'ai P'ing emperor, and his associates. They fought the rebels, in order, they were convinced, to save China from a rule even worse than that of the Manchus.

Tseng, if he had chosen, very probably could have made himself the embodiment of the widespread spirit of revolt and so have seized the throne and inaugurated a new dynasty. He did not so choose. Real modesty, the fine old Confucian ideal of loyalty to the emperor, a feeling that by reaching out ambitiously he would stir up still more trouble—all

these held him back from seizing the supreme prize. Yet the very qualities of mind and character which made him truly great worked, in this case, to China's incalculable injury. Had he taken the throne, China would have had, when she most needed it, a new dynasty, powerful, popular and progressive, to lead the country with vigorous wisdom into world affairs.

At the start, the T'ai P'ings made no attempt to set up a civil administration where they conquered. That was one of their more important failures. Yet even they might have established a strong dynasty if the swift rush northward of the first three years had succeeded in sweeping through to Peking. The leader of the Rebellion was a religious fanatic, with delusions which lead him to talk of himself as Christ's brother. In the first years of his campaign he showed courage and organizing ability and no little energy. For the first years, too, he had around him not a few really able men. He and his associates lacked, however, just that "little bit more" which would have brought success—and in the long years of bloodshed and destruction which followed the ebb of the drive to Peking, the character of the T'ai P'ing rebels steadily deteriorated and their armies became increasingly simply hordes of lawless, landless, homeless men, utterly brutalized by years of pillage and slaughter.

At the start, the T'ai P'ing Rebellion held promise of good for China. Before half its course had run, it had degenerated into a disastrous scourge from which nothing but harm came or could be expected. Tseng Kuo-fan and his associates were right. Even the corrupt and utterly weak Manchu Dynasty was to be preferred to the T'ai P'ings in their later years.

When the catastrophe of the rebellion was over, nothing was left in the Yangtze to feed a new rebellion. There were outbursts elsewhere in the decades which followed, but no sweeping change can succeed in China without a secure foundation in the Yangtze Valley; and all through the last

half of the nineteenth century no revolt could get such a foundation in that Valley because the Valley lay waste. Not till sixty years had passed—three full generations as the Chinese count the march of time—did this very core of the country even begin really to recover from the T'ai P'ing ruin.

No possible collection of statistics of people killed and property destroyed could measure the injury which was done to China. The Yangtze Valley, through the centuries, has been the country's economic heart. Perhaps more importantly, though less tangibly, it also has been the home of China's most substantial citizenry. From it came, generation after generation, a full share of the brilliant geniuses and also much more than a full share of the sober, honorable, steady men who kept the wheels of government and business, of literature, art, and education, turning smoothly.

The T'ai P'ing Rebellion completely wiped out thousands upon thousands of families of these most worth while of China's people. That was its greatest damage—not the destruction of property. Not even yet have the people in this part of the land begun to contribute to their country, in the second as well as the first ranks, anything like the proportion of sound and dependable leaders which they furnished in earlier centuries.

For example: for six centuries, a single family in one of the Yangtze provinces had supplied, in each generation, four to six of the men who distinguished themselves on a national scale in official and mercantile life by their good judgment, high character and substantial ability. Before the T'ai P'ing Rebellion, that family counted over two thousand members. After the Rebellion, just seven of those two thousand were alive. The only one from that family who, since the Rebellion, has risen to leadership now is just past forty years of age. For over sixty years, that is to say, because of the almost complete destruction of this single family, China has been

deprived of the continuous services of half a dozen or more of precisely the kind of leaders she has most desperately needed—and only now is she getting the first fruits of a new crop from what for six centuries had been a richly productive vine.

Statistics cannot measure this sort of loss to China. Yet there can be no doubt that one of the chief reasons why China has remained so confused through the past sixty years and more was the wiping out, in the T'ai P'ing Rebellion, of scores of thousands of her most substantial families. The hugeness of the country, the lack of adequate communications, the excessive population: all these have retarded readjustment. But the general level of ability inevitably was materially lowered by that killing off of the country's best stock.

The very vastness of the destruction which the T'ai P'ing Rebellion and the efforts to suppress it caused, showed how deep-seated and widespread was the popular discontent with things as they were. The T'ai P'ing chief unquestionably possessed something of that appeal of the fanatic to simple and suffering folk which won so many followers for Peter the Hermit when he preached the crusades in Europe. Had the people in China been even moderately content, the Chinese preacher of a politico-religious rebellion might have secured a few thousand followers and stirred up a little local trouble. He could not have done more. But for three-quarters of a century the fire of increasingly bad conditions had been burning under the boiler of popular feeling, and the pressure of revolt had been rising. Through reckless ruthlessness in suppressing, or trying to suppress, the sporadic outbursts of rebellion, the Manchu Court sought to keep the boiler from leaking. The T'ai P'ing Rebellion was the inevitable explosion—inevitable as a result of the causes; inevitable in its wide destructiveness, since it failed to sweep quickly through to success. The T'ai P'ing leader did not

make the rebellion; he and his associates were caught up in the scalding torrent of long-suppressed popular feeling when the boiler finally burst.

IV. TWO OTHER CATASTROPHES

The T'ai P'ing Rebellion was a major incident in an inter-dynastic upheaval such as China has known many times. It carried China to the lowest depths of confusion through which she had been passing for a century and more. But it was neither the first nor the last of the outbursts of popular discontent which began with the degeneration of the Manchu Dynasty, and still continues. Other lesser disturbances preceded and followed the T'ai P'ing outbursts. Two of those that followed were on such a large scale, continued for so many years, and resulted in so much destruction, that each by itself was a major catastrophe, and would be so counted had not the T'ing P'ing Rebellion overshadowed them both.

Both of these great revolts were the outcome of long-standing antagonism between Mohammedan peoples resident in China and their Chinese overlords. The first occurred in the southwest; the second in the northwest. Mohammedan tribesmen out of Central Asia had drifted down into these regions, or had been brought in by Chinese emperors of earlier dynasties to help put down rebellions or resist attacks by barbarian hordes. Racially, these Mohammedans were mixed, but Turki rather than Mongol blood predominated. They were, and still are, fiercer, more self-assertive, and turbulent than the longer-settled folk of the Chinese plains. Culturally and religiously, they have kept a good deal of their separateness and have not been completely absorbed into the body of Chinese civilization. They have been in Chinese territory for so long that they are counted, and on the whole count themselves, one of the "five races" of China. Yet between them and the "Sons of Han," antagonism has been the rule for centuries—antagonism for which the

Chinese themselves are in no small part responsible because of the way they have dealt with the Mohammedans.

One of the two great Mohammedan uprisings began in the midst of the T'ai P'ing Rebellion. Old antagonisms flamed out in the southwestern province of Yunnan in 1856. At the time, Yunnan still was in the hands of the viceroy appointed from Peking, but it was cut off from the capital by the T'ai P'ing forces in the Yangtze Valley.

After a riot between Chinese and Mohammedan workers in the lead mines, the provincial governor and some of his associates plotted a massacre of all Mohammedans. The viceroy tried to intervene, and committed suicide in protest when he found himself helpless. The Mohammedans heard of the massacre plans, and made such defense as they could. Nevertheless, thousands were slaughtered on May 19th, 1856.

The Mohammedans organized, set up a separate state, and established connection with Burma, whence they got arms. In 1860 they took the provincial capital. Then one of the two chief Mohammedan leaders turned to the imperial side in return for being given a high commission in the Chinese army.

The war dragged on. Aboriginal tribes who had disliked Chinese rule, took advantage of the disorganization to kill and loot on their own account. A plague swept the province. Drought brought poor harvests in 1871 and 1872. The Mohammedan leader who had turned to the Chinese side tried to be merciful to those in the cities which the Chinese captured from their opponents, but the Chinese army commanders were utterly ruthless and unprincipled in the slaughtering of both those who did and those who did not surrender. The Mohammedans were equally ruthless. Finally, in 1873, the head of the Mohammedan state surrendered, though he took poison before going over to the Chinese camp. The imperial commander put through a wholesale slaughter in the Mohammedan capital, in spite of promises

that the people would be spared since the body of the Mohammedan commander had come into Chinese possession.

The revolt had been drowned in blood. Yunnan Province, considerably larger than England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland combined, had been laid waste. With its rich mining resources and its fertile valleys between the mountain, Yunnan might have developed, during the past fifty years, into a prosperous region well filled with contented people. It might have been a source of stability in China's southwest. Because of that great rebellion and its wholesale slaughtering and destruction, the inhabitants of Yunnan have lived in primitive impoverishment and the province has been a festering sore on China's border.

The Mohammedan revolt in the northwest was even more disastrous. This began in Chinese Turkestan in 1864, just as the final efforts to crush the T'ai P'ing Rebellion were piling destruction on destruction in the Yangtze Valley.

Under the flaming leadership of Yakub Beg, the Mohammedans in the huge dependency tried to throw off Chinese control. Within three years, the Mohammedan forces conquered all the northwestern parts of China and pushed down into the Yangtze province of Hupeh. Yakub carved out a vast empire in perennially disturbed Central Asia, chiefly at the expense of China. He was recognized by both Russia and Turkey.

His end came at the hands of one of the Chinese generals who had given powerful aid against the T'ai P'ings. This general, starting in 1867, pushed his way slowly northward, building roads for his artillery and stopping to plant and harvest crops for his troops. He slaughtered men, women and children in the cities he captured. He pushed across the desert into Yakub's home territory. He did not hurry; but, like one of the great dunes drifting across the desert, he moved steadily and irresistibly forward for eleven years. Finally, in 1878, the rebellion was crushed, and Chinese authority was restored in Chinese Turkestan.

Peace had been bought at a very high price in life and property—perhaps at a higher price, comparatively, than the peace of death which came in the Yangtze with the overthrow of the T'ai P'ings. A few Mohammedans submitted and survived. But they kept their bitterness alive through the decades which followed, while they slowly rebuilt their numbers and their economic strength. Some of the Chinese soldiers who helped crush the rebellion settled in the region. Some other Chinese moved in. But the old hatred between Chinese and Mohammedans has kept China's far northwest, for fifty years, a land where men go armed and women and children live in continuous terror. In the last few years, this antagonism has broken out in new mutual slaughterings.

These and subsequent outbursts in many parts of the country, like the T'ai P'ing Rebellion itself, were incidents in the long struggle of the people against oppression and misrule. The struggle was blind, in the main, with no sharp focus, no inner coherence, no single, unifying purpose. Developments in the long struggle seem like the slow upheavals of a tremendous natural cataclysm rather than like the conscious efforts of human beings. First here, then there, sometimes in wide streams, sometimes in minor trickles which soon hardened, the red lava of popular discontent forced its way up through the surface.

The Boxer uprising of 1900, of which the West has heard so much, was one of these incidents in the cosmic upheaval, but a distinctly minor and local incident. The revolt of 1911-12, which finally ousted the Manchus from the throne and overthrew the throne itself, was another. The Nationalist drive of 1926-28, which, for the first time in China's history, carried successfully to Peking a revolt which started in the south, essentially was another product of the century-old discontent and confusion. The marchings and counter-marchings of the warlords, the anti-foreign outbursts of the past two decades, and the present "Communist" uprising in

the Yangtze Valley, are other up-wellings of the subterranean lava.

V. FLOOD AND DROUGHT

As though men were not doing enough to spread destruction and impoverishment in China just when steamships and cables speeded up the West's drive against the country's defences, Nature took a hand, through flood and famine.

In 1853, the Yellow River, often called "China's Sorrow," because of its long record of disastrous overflowing, broke loose in one of the worst floods in Chinese history. Its waters poured over hundreds of square miles of good farming land on the North China Plain. Before the flood ended and farmers who were not drowned could go back to their sodden acres, the river had cut new channels for a good part of its journey across the plain, and had opened a new outlet to the sea, north, not south, of the Shantung Peninsula.

Incidentally, as it were, the flood played an important part in stopping the advance on Peking of the T'ai P'ing rebels. When the river began to rise, one of the rebel armies was besieging Kaifeng, an ancient capital, and still an important city toward the western side of the great plain. The water rose forty feet above the winter level, compelling the T'ai P'ings to withdraw. They moved west into the hills, and thence around to continue the drive on Peking. But the impetus of this northward thrust was gone, and other T'ai P'ing armies coming up from the Yangtze Valley could not cross the flooded plains. Had the flood not occurred, or had it come a year later, quite possibly the T'ai P'ings would have taken the capital in the autumn of 1853, a new dynasty would have been established, and China would have been spared the disaster of the next twelve years of ruthless conflict in the Yangtze Valley. As it was, the flood did less damage in North China than the fighting did further south, because it was over more quickly. But the flood of 1853

alone, without the three great rebellions, and the famine which came later, would have been a serious blow to China's stability.

Two decades after that flood, practically no rain fell for three full years in China's northwest, over an area half as large as that part of the United States which lies east of the Mississippi River. Crop failure for one year would have been serious, but it would not have meant large-scale famine. Drought in the second year over so large an area doomed hundreds of thousands to starvation. Famine on an appalling scale developed in the third year of drought. Millions died. Further millions lost all their vitality and all their possessions, though they managed to live through until rain came again. The scars of that famine of 1876-78 still were staringly apparent on the people, the land and the buildings when the great famine of 1928-30 visited the same region.

At the time of this 1928-30 famine, railways and motor cars were available to bring grain and other relief supplies from more favored regions to the stricken territory. The telegraph and the cable, newspapers and swiftly-borne letters, carried the news of the famine throughout China and the world. National and international organizations for relief already were in existence or were formed. Money from Chinese communities in and out of China, from generous givers of other nationalities, and from the Chinese government, enabled these organizations to use the transportation facilities, and to do something to mitigate the effects of three successive years of crop failure. Even so, the famine deaths in 1928-30 totalled between six and eight million, all told, not reckoning those whose deaths were very much hastened by the prolonged undernourishment of the famine years.

The drought which caused the famine in 1876-78, as in 1928-30, was widespread and prolonged. The facilities for giving relief, the organizations for using those facilities, and the money with which those organizations could work, all were very much less during the earlier period. The

effects of the earlier famine, therefore, were correspondingly more disastrous.

Governmental degeneracy also contributed directly to increasing the damage done by both the flood of 1853 and the famine of 1876-78.

There were officials whose special duty it was to keep the dikes of the Yellow River in condition, and to be prepared to deal swiftly and energetically with the threat of flood. They had neglected their duty for years. When the flood came, the dikes were in poor shape and almost none of the equipment for controlling high water was available. The people paid heavily for this degeneracy of the government.

They paid again in the famine. Granary buildings existed in the principal cities and the lesser towns, which the officials were supposed to keep well stocked with grain against famine emergencies. A few of the officials did have the granaries filled. But the heart of the Manchu Dynasty in Peking was thoroughly rotten and the arteries of officialdom were filled with the poisonous exhalations of greed and selfishness. Most of the officials, finding it more profitable, sold the grain which was collected for storage. When the famine came most of the granaries were empty and the people starved.

VI. CHINA'S MISFORTUNE

In their particular forms, the periodic outbursts of discontent in China's long history have changed from century to century. The forms have changed more strikingly in recent decades as the ideas and phraseology of democracy and republicanism, of socialism and the rights of the proletariat, of national self-determination and international equality, have penetrated the land.

Unquestionably, the fact that the lava of discontent now is forcing itself into the forms of these new political concepts and phrases is of great importance for the present and the future. More fundamentally significant, however, is the

fact that the disturbances of these last few years are not primarily the result of new causes. They are the present outlets of a century-old current of popular revolt against unbearably hard conditions of life.

The influx of Western ideas and ways has added to and prolonged, but it did not create, the disorganization. China was slipping down into a valley of confusion before the influence of the West began really to be felt. The destruction through the last century and a quarter, to which Nature as well as man contributed, would have caused this period of great chaos in China, even if the West and all its works had stayed at home.

Already the duration of this period of confusion and revolution puts it among the longer intervals of chaos in China's history. It began, roughly, with the end of Ch'ien Lung's reign in 1796, more than a century and a third ago, and not with the overthrow of the Manchus in 1912. How much longer it will continue, no one can say; but there is no reason to believe that it will extend indefinitely, that no mountain range of new power and stability and cultural advance lies ahead. Western ways and Western techniques will have a share in determining the particular paths up the mountainside which China will climb, but the energy to make the climb will be China's, as it has been in the past. Clear signs have appeared, as we shall see in later chapters, that the climb has begun.

It was exceedingly unfortunate for China, and for her relations with the West, that the Westerners began just when they did to put steam to work carrying goods across the sea and harnessed lightning to bear messages. A little over a century earlier, China had a dynasty which still was full of vigor and an emperor who was one of her most active, liberal-minded and progressive rulers.

The China which was called on to meet the surging tide of the accelerated Western expansion was a China bled white by the T'ai P'ing and the two great Mohammedan

Rebellions, and further weakened by two great natural catastrophes. She had lost millions of her most solid people, and scores upon scores of those who might have been able leaders. She was torn by continued rebellion, which possessed no center of political strength or leadership around which the forces of reconstruction could rally. She was strangled by a degenerate dynasty, whose only positive acts made her more rather than less helpless. This has been China's condition for the past three generations.

During these same three generations, the West, filled with buoyant vitality and using techniques which had brought the forces of nature to its aid, drove forward economically, politically, and socially, with astounding vigor. The vigor of this drive carried the West to world dominance, and then over the precipice of the World War. That war drained off much of the West's vitality. Since then, the West, and Europe particularly, has been struggling, not to achieve new expansion, but to keep itself going.

Would anyone who knew Europe only since 1914 think of its civilization as a towering success? Would anyone who knew only the Europe of these two troubled decades feel that anything very much worth while was to be expected from a part of the world which had so completely bungled its own affairs, and had shown so little ability to put its house in order? Would anyone who knew Europe through the first century of the Dark Ages have believed that out of such a Europe could come the pre-War West? Who, then, can say that because China has not been powerful, orderly, and peaceful for these past several decades, she cannot be so again, as she has been in the past?

Westerners of the last three generations have seen China only in collapse, a very much crippled China. They have known her only in the deep valley of her weakness. They know nothing of the China which in times past has surged up and out with just such vigor as they themselves have shown during these three generations. Inevitably, they find

it hard to conceive of such a resurgent China as a reality in the past or as a possibility for the future. Yet we of the West must see China in the longer perspective of many generations if we are not to go disastrously astray in mapping our own course.

It was China's misfortune that the West's period of renewed vitality coincided with that of her own weakness. It may be the West's misfortune, in the years ahead, that China's new period of vitality is beginning just when Western vitality is low. It will be the West's misfortune, and China's, if a newly vigorous China comes into world affairs, master of the West's techniques, driven forward by purposes which run counter not parallel to those of the West—or by a thirst for revenge. But if, by mutual understanding and respect, China and the West learn to work together, China resurgent can be of immeasurable aid in lifting world civilization to higher levels.

THE BREAK THROUGH

(CHAPTER VIII)

CHINA's relations with the modern West fall into well defined periods.

The first was one of slow advance, which lasted for three hundred and twenty-six years—1516 to 1842. It began with the arrival of the first modern Western adventurer and ended with the so-called "Opium War," in the signing of the treaty which gave Westerners the right to trade at other ports than Canton and the specific recognition of the equality of the British and Chinese sovereigns.

The second period was one of swift penetration, which lasted for eighteen years—1842 to 1860—from the first definite breach of the Chinese wall of self-sufficient superiority to the ratification by the Chinese emperor, after British and French troops had occupied his capital, of the treaties which were the foundation for the large-scale trading and other rights of Westerners in China.

The third definitely marked period lasted from 1860 to 1901—the period of territorial and political expansion, which ended when the European powers grudgingly asquiesced in the American re-affirmation of the "Open Door" doctrine and failed to partition China among themselves when they drafted the terms of settlement after the Boxer uprising.

The fourth period, which was one of economic rather than territorial expansion, ended with the Washington Conference of 1922.

The present period, which began in 1922, and still is not ended, has been one of progressive withdrawal. The tendency definitely has been toward the surrender or cancellation of the special Western privileges in China, as a result partly of the growing feeling in the West against imperialism and

its fruits, but even more because of the increasingly effective Chinese self-assertion against Western domination.

Perhaps a new period of foreign territorial, political and economic expansion into China began with the Japanese military moves in Manchuria in 1931. In this and in subsequent moves, Japan acted along the lines which the Western powers themselves followed in the preceding four centuries, but disregarded the new turn which the West has been trying to give to international relations since 1919.

Culturally, the West did not really begin to penetrate China until after 1860. The indirect cultural expansion, through the introduction of new kinds of goods, new machine techniques, new weapons, and similar means, has continued to increase steadily. The direct cultural expansion, through missionary preaching, schools, hospitals, and other non-commercial activities, has fallen into two clearly defined periods. The division point was the missionary conference at Shanghai in 1907. In the first period, the assumption was that Western Christianity and education should be introduced as nearly as possible without change. The second period has been marked by an increasing realization that the forms of both Christianity and education should be adapted to conditions in China and that the control of Christian religious work in the country, as well as of the affiliated schools and hospitals, should pass more and more into Chinese hands.

The developments during these periods of Western relations with China since 1860 will be discussed in later chapters. Here we are concerned with what happened as the Westerners gradually increased their pressure on the wall of Chinese separatism and finally, in 1860, established themselves firmly within that wall.

II. BY THE BACK DOOR

Russian contacts with China have been by land, and along the northern frontier. All the other Western movements

towards and into China have been by the way of the sea, and the approach has been from the south and east. Through most of China's history, however, the land frontier to the north was much more important than the sea frontier to the south and east. Even as recently as three centuries ago, China was conquered by invaders out of the north. The "original Chinese" came by land from the northwest, and, except for relatively brief if devastating raids off into Asia and towards Europe, Chinese expansion moved southward. China has been a continental, not a sea-going nation.

Thus the modern West went to China by a back street and entered through the rear door. As a result, that street has become the main highway between China and the outside world, and the back door has become the chief entrance. It still remains so, but the old front door, facing landward to the north, again is becoming important, now that Russia once more is taking an interest in the Far East and Japan is pushing ahead onto the Asiatic mainland.

The modern Westerners went by sea to China for the good and sufficient reason that there was no other way for them to go. In the fourteen hundreds, Mohammedans held the Near East, and even the desperate efforts of the crusaders failed to break through the Mohammedan barrier. Eastern silks, spices and other goods were finding their way across that barrier to Christian Europe. Venice and Genoa, Lisbon and even the Dutch cities of the Hanseatic League and the English and French trading ports, were making profits handling the Eastern luxuries which the Arabs brought to the Mediterranean. But Christian Europe wanted more.

The Christian merchants felt they could make larger profits if they dealt directly with the East instead of through the Arabs. Christian adventurers were dazzled by the tales of Eastern splendor told by Marco Polo and other Europeans who had been in China and India. Would-be missionaries of Christianity yearned for the opportunity to spread their faith among the millions of Eastern souls who dwelt in

heathen darkness. Christian kings saw the chance to acquire glory, and new territory, by Eastern conquests, to derive income from taxes on Eastern trade, to pile up wealth from the seizure of Eastern riches, and to acquire merit in Heaven by helping save souls. Traders, adventurers, missionaries and kings were blocked by the Mohammedan wall across the old land route of Central Asia and the old water route down the Red Sea. So Christian Europe went exploring for new routes.

The Portuguese reached India in 1498. Eighteen years later, they had pirated their way along the coast to China. During these eighteen years, they made a record of bloodshed, destruction, wanton cruelty and deliberate treachery which was quite an appropriate curtain raiser to the drama of Western penetration into the Far East that was to follow.

The record of this penetration, until quite recent decades, is an appalling one, when judged by our present day standards. Here and there, one catches a glimpse of real friendliness and mutual respect between individuals, of genuine unselfishness and a desire to help, of true appreciation of a common humanity underlying the profound differences of culture between the new arrivals and those who had been on the ground for thousands of years. But these glimpses serve merely to emphasize the mutual brutality, the mutual arrogance and contempt, the mutual and utter failure of either side to think of the other as an equal and to grant to the other the rights and respect due an equal.

Almost without qualification, in fact, one might say that the relations between China and the modern West were conceived in avarice, born and reared in violence, and fed for more than three centuries and a half on undiluted antagonism, arrogance and distrust.

We are not interested, here, in judging the rights and wrongs of what was done, or in attempting to assess the balance of blame. The initiative in creating the trouble,

however, lay with the Westerners, since they went out to the East and to China, uninvited and unwanted.

III. SUCCESSIVE CONTACTS

What happened when, one after another, the modern Western nations came into contact with China?

The Portuguese were the first on the scene.

When they reached India, the Moslem Arabs were already there. These Arabs, eager to keep the monopoly of trade with Europe which they had, told the Hindus that the newly-arrived Christians were savage barbarians and thoroughly undesirable people. But the Hindus were none too fond of the Moslems, who had given them trouble at various times. So Vasco da Gama and his men were well received. Since the Hindus were not Christian, however, the Portuguese acted on the assumption current in Europe that no heathen had any rights. They responded to their welcome, on their first trip, by kidnapping some Hindus and taking them to Europe as slaves. A little later, they seized some of the territory of the very king who had welcomed them, thus getting a base of operations, from which they proceeded, by bloodshed and slaughter, to extend their conquests. They met considerable opposition, part of it being stirred up by the Arab traders in India, but most of it due to their own brutalities. One outstanding example of their brutality was the sinking, out of hand, of a shipload of Moslem pilgrims on their way to Mecca, in spite of the offers of a number of wealthy merchants on board to pay heavy ransom, and in spite, too, of the pleas that at least the women and children should be saved.

In 1511, the Portuguese pushed on beyond India. The sultan of Malacca had not troubled them in any way; but Malacca was an important trading center which the Portuguese wanted. So they took it by force. Malacca at the time was under Chinese suzerainty. The sultan asked Peking for help.

That was China's first introduction to the modern West.

The Portuguese moved eastward along the coast. In 1516, one of their explorers, spying out the land, reached China. The next year the Portuguese sent a fleet of four of their own ships and four Malay junks, which anchored at the island of Shang Ch'uan (St. John, as the Europeans called it), not far from Canton. Two of the Portuguese ships went to Canton, with an envoy from the king of Portugal, who had instructions to open relations with the emperor of China. Thomé Pirez, the envoy, asked permission to go to Peking, and was told that Malacca should first be given back to its proper sultan. This the Portuguese ignored. Although most of the Portuguese sailors were extremely unruly, Pirez managed to keep his own men fairly well in hand, and in 1520 he was at last authorized to visit the Chinese capital. He arrived there in 1521. At about the same time a representative of the sultan of Bantam turned up, reporting Portuguese outrages in Java and asking for China's help. Pirez was dismissed and went back to Canton.

Meanwhile other Portuguese expeditions had reached the Chinese coast, in the vicinity of Canton. They proceeded to occupy and fortify the island of Shang Ch'uan, and otherwise to act in ways which entirely confirmed what the Arab merchants were telling the Chinese: that the Portuguese were interested only in conquest and not at all in peaceful trade. One expedition, arriving in 1519, was expelled the next year, the commander fleeing "with a large booty, including children carried off into slavery." Later expeditions were told to leave, and were forcibly driven away by the Chinese when they refused to go quietly. In 1522, a Portuguese fleet, trying to force a landing at Shang Ch'uan, was almost completely wiped out by the Chinese, and the Portuguese prisoners who were taken were executed as pirates.

Pirez, the envoy to Peking, and his staff were imprisoned

when they got back to Canton in 1522. All five died in prison.

Nevertheless, the Portuguese succeeded in establishing settlements up the coast at Ningpo and Ch'uanchow, which prospered for a time. But the Portuguese, by outrageous exactions and killings, brought Chinese indignation down on their heads again. In 1545, the settlement at Ningpo was wiped out by the Chinese, 12,000 Christians, including 800 Portuguese being killed in the process, it is said. This was after the Chinese emperor had issued a decree ordering the extermination of the Portuguese wherever they were found, because of their cruel and lawless conduct.

The Portuguese settlement at Ch'uanchow was not destroyed by the Chinese until 1549. A few Portuguese survived. They went to a small island near Macao, fifty odd miles from Canton. Somewhat later, they helped the Chinese put down some pirates and in return got permission, in 1557, to build a few drying sheds at Macao itself. The camel had his head in the tent. Macao is still in Portuguese hands.

The Spanish came next.

Just about the time that Pirez the Portuguese started from Canton to Peking, Magellan, for Spain, after rounding South America and feeling his way across the Pacific, reached the Philippines (1521). He found fairly large and flourishing Chinese communities there, though the Chinese did not claim the islands. The Spanish took the islands. Trade with China increased, but then (as now) most of it was in Chinese hands. The Chinese community in the islands grew. The Spaniards eventually became alarmed over stories of Chinese plots. So, in 1603, the 800 odd Spanish proceeded to massacre most of the 20,000 Chinese residents. Chinese immigration continued, however. In 1639 the Spanish again carried out a wholesale massacre, this time killing some 22,000 of the 33,000 Chinese in the islands.

That was China's introduction to the second Christian country to get a foothold in the East.

The Dutch were third on the scene.

In 1580, Philip II of Spain took over Portugal and, incidentally, the vast Portuguese holdings in the East, though the actual administration of these holdings continued to be in the hands of the Portuguese subjects of Spain. The Dutch were at war with Spain at the time. They could not, therefore, get spices from Lisbon after Spain took Portugal. They tried to reach the East by sailing around the north of Europe, and failed. So they decided to take from Spain what Portugal had taken in the East. They succeeded in getting the principal island holdings—which they still possess—even though the Portuguese did manage to keep them from establishing trade with China. In 1622 they tried to capture Macao, which the Portuguese held. Failing, they took the Pescadores Islands, which belonged to China. The Chinese refused to deal with them unless they gave up these islands, so they moved over to Formosa, which the Chinese did not then claim. They drove the Spanish from a settlement on that island, in 1624, and thirty-eight years later were themselves driven out by the picturesque “last stand” defender of the Ming Dynasty, Koxinga.

In the main, the Dutch got on peaceably with the Chinese, both in China and in the Dutch East Indies. But they also did their bit of killing. In 1740, for example, there was quite a large Chinese colony in Java. One of the several claimants to the throne of China, an heir to the Ming Dynasty which had been ousted by the Manchus, found his way there. An uprising of some of the Chinese in Java, led by this Ming claimant, was joined by a number of Javanese. Batavia was attacked, unsuccessfully. Some days later a fire broke out in the Chinese part of the city. Armed Chinese appeared on the streets—perhaps to protect their property from looters. The report was circulated that the Chinese were resisting efforts to put out the fire because, it was said, they wanted the whole town burned down so that they could take control during the confusion. The Dutch ordered that all

Chinese heads of families should be killed, and they called in European sailors from the ships in the harbor to help carry out the order, promising them free looting as a reward. "The unfortunate Chinese," remarks Sir George L. Staunton, in telling of the affair, "made not the least resistance."

The directors of the company in Holland thoroughly disapproved of what was done. They were alarmed, too, over the possibility that the emperor of China might become indignant. So they sent representatives to the court to apologize. They found the emperor undisturbed. He said that "he was little solicitous for the fate of unworthy subjects, who, in pursuit of lucre, had quitted their country, and abandoned the tombs of their ancestors"—a remark which was quite characteristic of the official Chinese attitude toward expatriate Chinese.

That attitude, incidentally, explains why the Chinese authorities were not especially disturbed over the massacres of Chinese in the Philippines, and why they found it so hard to understand the Western excitement when a Westerner was manhandled or killed in China.

The slaughter of Chinese in Java, however, was a rare exception in Dutch activities in the Far East. For the Dutch, expansion into that part of the world was almost exclusively a commercial undertaking. The seizure of the islands from the Portuguese was an attack on another European nation, not on an Eastern State. A good many Chinese were in the islands when they took them over, and in Formosa. The Dutch had no serious difficulties with them. In fact, the Dutch in the East consistently have concerned themselves with business almost entirely. They have not tried to spread their religion, or to introduce their ideas of government, and they have been ready to adjust themselves to local customs in developing their trade.

This attitude has brought down on the Dutch a good deal of criticism from other Europeans—especially from such

people as are fond of words like "pusillanimous." The French writer, Cordier, for example, gives this view of the Dutch attitude in the remark that: "Never do we see the directional counsel of the Dutch penetrated with a noble or disinterested idea; they sacrifice all, friend and enemy, even religion . . . for the sake of their profit. Dutch colonial history is a fine page in the history of European commercial development, but a villainous page in the history of humanity." However that may be, it remains true that the Dutch have on their hands very much less blood from slaughtered Easterners than have the Spanish, the Portuguese, the English, or the French; and, taken as a whole, the Dutch are the only ones who have made their dealings with the Far East consistently profitable.

Then came the English.

At first they tried to reach the East by going through or around the Americas. Drake got around the world in 1580. Thomas Cavendish, on his way around the world, captured a Spanish ship on which he found a map of China. In 1592, one of Walter Raleigh's captains found on another Spanish prize considerable information about the sea route to the East.

In 1596, an English captain, Benjamin Wood, started for China, taking with him a letter from Queen Elizabeth to the emperor. She asked the emperor to tell her how China had developed its commerce so successfully, and promised to protect any Chinese who might come to English ports. But the expedition, which started across the Atlantic, did not even get past the Americas. Illness killed most of the officers and crew, and Spanish pirates operating from Porto Rico disposed of all except one of the rest.

In 1600, the first of the British East India Companies was formed. Twelve years later, in spite of Portuguese opposition, this company had a trading center in India, and in 1637 it sent an expedition to open trade with China. Again the Portuguese objected. They refused to allow the

English to do business at Macao. So the English captain, John Weddell, pushed on to Canton. The Chinese stopped him at the mouth of the Canton River, saying he must have a permit to pass. He waited. The permit did not come within the promised six days. He started up the river. The Chinese forts fired on his ships. He replied, effectively, seized one of the forts and went on up the river to Canton. The Chinese imprisoned his supercargoes (business agents) when they went ashore. But Captain Weddell sold his cargo, bought ginger and sugar, got the release of his supercargoes, and departed.

That was China's first direct contact with the English.

Shortly after this, the Ming Dynasty fell (1644). It had been tottering for some time. All trade came to a standstill. During the next few years, the English tried several times to get a foothold in China. The Portuguese kept them away from Macao. The Chinese made what the English considered oppressive conditions for trade at Canton, so they turned elsewhere. They had a trading post at Amoy in 1671, while Koxinga held that port, but were compelled to give it up when the new Manchu rulers of China drove Koxinga off the mainland to Formosa. In 1684, the English succeeded in opening a temporary trading center at Canton, but they were ousted five years later, partly because the crew of an English ship got into a brawl which resulted in the killing of the ship's doctor, several sailors and a Chinese. In 1699 a British ship finally succeeded in doing business at Canton without having to fight with anyone. In 1715, the British East India Company set up a permanent trading center or "factory" at Canton, the chief representative of the company officially acting as English consul—thereby starting the monopoly of English trade with Canton which the company held until it was dissolved in 1834.

Meanwhile, the Russians had moved eastward.

Pushing across Siberia, they tried, unsuccessfully, to open relations with China in 1567. A little more than a century

later, trouble-making Russian colonists on the Amur River, in Chinese territory, refused to leave when the Chinese ordered them away. They were captured and taken to Peking as prisoners, where they settled down and intermarried with the Chinese. (Their blood still shows in the reddish tinge of hair and blue eyes of some of the Chinese living in the northwestern quarter of Peiping.) In 1689 Russia and China signed a trade agreement, on a basis of mutual equality. By 1727, the Russians had secured the right to have a church in Peking, and to keep a few Russian Orthodox priests there permanently for the benefit of the Russian prisoners. They also had permission for 200 Russian merchants to visit Peking every two years to trade.

The French were late in arriving. Their ships made occasional visits to China from 1660 on, but they did not establish a regular trading base at Canton until 1728. They did considerable fighting with the English, for control of India, but were very minor figures in the conflicts which centered around China during the early period.

The Americans appeared on the Chinese scene in 1784, while foreign trade still was confined to Canton but after the right to trade had been well established. They had no share in the earlier Western expansion into the East.

The Japanese began early.

Japanese are reported to have visited the Chinese imperial court shortly after the year 1 A.D. In the sixth and seventh centuries, they received from their great neighbors, chiefly via Korea, the writing, literature, art, philosophy, religion and conceptions of government which played so very fundamental a part in helping them to transform themselves at this time from a primitively crude to a highly civilized people. By 1500 they had become skilled seafarers—having started their armed excursions across the sea in 203 A.D. when the Empress Jingo led an expedition to Korea and secured the submission of a Korean king. When the Europeans began carrying bloodshed and trade goods and Chris-

tianity into the East, Japanese pirates were using their seafaring skill to raid the coast of China. Sometimes they raided on their own account. Now and then they joined in the attacks which the Mongols made on the Mings, or, later, the Ming supporters made on the Manchu rulers of China. On one occasion they captured and looted Soochow, halfway between Shanghai and Nanking.

In 1592 the military ruler of Japan sent a huge expedition to Korea, as the first move towards the conquest of all China. He captured half of Korea, but was stopped when the Chinese sent armies to the aid of their vassal State. Six years later, when the Japanese chieftain who had sent the expedition died, the Japanese forces withdrew to their own islands. An invention by a Korean admiral contributed very substantially to this defeat of Japan's first really serious effort to expand onto the mainland. He built an iron-clad junk (more than two and a half centuries before the Westerners produced their first iron-clad) and with it cut off the movement of supplies and reinforcements for the Japanese army in Korea.

Chinese pirates did their share in contributing to the slaughter and trouble; and, incidentally, they helped introduce the modern West to Japan. In 1542, a Chinese pirate junk was driven by storms onto the Japanese coast. On board were three Portuguese. The Japanese welcomed the Portuguese, and were especially interested in learning from them how to make guns and gunpowder. A Japanese murderer, fleeing from justice, stowed away on the ship in which the Portuguese left, was taken to Goa, was converted by St. Francis Xavier, and, in 1549, brought Xavier back to Japan to preach Christianity to his people.

That was Japan's introduction to the modern West and Christianity: through the agency of Chinese pirates and an escaped Japanese murderer. For more than three centuries, "firearms," "Christianity," "treason," and "the West" were almost synonymous terms to the ordinary Japanese.

IV. RELIGIOUS ARROGANCE

The Christian missionaries also brought trouble.

Xavier's trip to Japan was a digression for him. He wanted to preach in China, in spite of the fact that his religion and its missionaries had been proscribed in that country for two centuries—ever since the Mings had expelled Christianity and the Catholic missionaries along with the Mongol Dynasty. So, after working in Japan three years, during which time he made a number of converts, he went to the island of Shang Ch'uan, to prepare for the attack on what he thought of as the great citadel of heathenism. But he died on the island soon after reaching it late in 1552.

Jesuits, Franciscans, Dominicans and Augustinians "took up the torch which he had lit." In 1555 an Italian Jesuit was allowed to stay at Canton for a month—he being the first of the modern missionaries to set foot on the Chinese mainland. In 1577, two Spanish Franciscans, from the Philippines, tried to land along the coast at ports which were not open to foreign intercourse of any kind. They were imprisoned for their pains, but when they told the authorities that they had come by mistake, not being well acquainted with geography, they were released and sent to Macao. Before and after this, other Catholics had tried to get into China, only to be flatly refused permission to settle there, though permitted in a few cases to stay at Canton (where foreign trade was allowed) for short intervals.

Then, in 1683, the Italian Jesuit, Matteo Ricci, arrived. As it happened, he was born less than two months before Xavier died, and he was destined to accomplish what the "Apostle to the Indies" had attempted: the reëstablishment of Catholic Christianity in China. Dressed as a Buddhist monk, he succeeded in residing at the capital of the two southern provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi. But he was determined to reach the heart of the empire, and, if possible, the emperor himself. He spent seventeen years working

toward his goal, moving his headquarters northward from time to time; visiting Nanking in 1595 (after changing to the dress of a Chinese scholar) only to be turned away; living for a couple of years at Nanchang where he met and converted several members of the imperial family; visiting Peking in 1590 and being refused residence; trying again to get into the capital in the autumn of 1599; spending several months in prison in Tientsin; and finally, on January 4, 1601, entering Peking to begin what turned out to be nine years of residence before he died there in 1610. (The Ming Dynasty still held the throne.)

Ricci won his first hearing before the emperor by presents and by the display of curious and beautiful articles of various kinds: clocks, splendidly printed Bibles, oil paintings, prisms, mathematical instruments. But he secured a lasting place of influence by his scholarship, his knowledge of Chinese literature and philosophy, and, above all, by being the thoroughly cultured gentleman, able and willing to appreciate and assess at their proper value the high qualities of Chinese civilization. Among the other Jesuits who followed Ricci to Peking were a number of men of his type: men who, by their personal abilities, their breadth of view and their learning were qualified to meet the very best products of Chinese culture on terms of full equality; men who did not make the mistake of counting as utterly valueless everything which was not Christian; men who, consequently, secured and held high places in the esteem of the Chinese leaders as well as in official circles.

If Christianity had been presented in China entirely by such men as these, quite possibly it long since would have become as much the religion of the Chinese as the other faith which came from outside: Buddhism. But even while Ricci and his associates were at work, Western traders and adventurers were blackening by their outrageous conduct the name of Christian. Somewhat later, too, other Catholics came, of a stamp very different from that of Ricci. These

others preached a fanatically bigoted doctrine and looked with scorn on all things Chinese.

The good will which the Jesuits won at Peking led the first emperor of the Manchu Dynasty to make a qualified withdrawal of the proscription of Christianity which the Mings had proclaimed. In 1682, the emperor K'ang Hsi, under the same influence, ordered the protection of Christian churches throughout the country and threw the land wide open to Christian preaching.

Twenty-five years later, this same emperor, because of the acts of the missionaries, re-proscribed Christianity.

Franciscan and Dominican missionaries, arriving in the 1630's, had promptly begun to quarrel with the Jesuits over the proper Chinese term for God and over the question of whether Christian converts should be permitted to take part in Confucian ceremonies, especially in the ceremonies of paying respect to ancestors, which were fundamental to the Chinese family system. The Dominicans and Franciscans asserted, and the Jesuits denied, that these ceremonies were idolatrous. The controversy raged for nearly a century, the fires being kept burning in part by the Dominican and Franciscan jealousy of and opposition to the Jesuits in Europe as well as in China. The Jesuits finally asked the very learned Emperor K'ang Hsi for his view of the meaning of certain Chinese terms and rites. K'ang Hsi upheld the Jesuit interpretation. The Dominicans appealed to the pope at Rome. He formally ruled against the Jesuits in 1715, thereby asserting that he knew more about the Chinese language and Chinese customs than the emperor himself!

Meanwhile, the Dominicans and Franciscans had been stressing the doctrine of the temporal authority of the pope, thus openly inciting the people to rebellion, as the Chinese saw it. The quarrel within the Catholic ranks had become a shameful spectacle; and, by no means less important, Christian traders and governments were becoming more and more troublesome.

In 1717, K'ang Hsi proscribed Christianity once more, and ordered the deportation of the Dominicans. His successor, becoming emperor in 1723, renewed and made more vigorous the efforts to suppress Christianity. A few of the Jesuit scientists were kept at Peking, but the rest of the priests were driven out of the country, while Chinese converts were hunted down and Christian churches were taken for public use. Ch'ien Lung, coming to the throne in 1736, continued the enmity against Christianity.

A few missionaries, courting martyrdom, tried to carry on their work in secret, but when Ch'ien Lung gave up the throne in 1796, Christianity, for the third time in Chinese history, had been virtually destroyed in China, primarily because of the acts of the Christians themselves. It was re-introduced by Catholics and Protestants (the first Protestant missionary arrived in 1807), but the official ban was not completely lifted until the ratification by China, in 1860, of treaties which contain what came to be called the "toleration clauses." These treaties were forced on China by the threat or use of arms.

That was how China became acquainted with Christianity and Western civilization in the modern period. Men and governments, calling themselves Christian and civilized, first, last, and continuously used gun and sword to take what they wanted when they could not get it by negotiation, and to force themselves, their religion, and their merchandise in where they were not desired.

Of the avowed expounders of Christianity, a few were learned and cultivated men; many more were bigoted and uncouth fanatics. The teaching of these men, moreover, tended to undermine the very foundations of Chinese society by branding as immoral fundamental Chinese practices. By insisting on the temporal as well as the spiritual authority of the pope, they preached treason against the Chinese rulers. Of the adventurers, traders and diplomats, a few were men of culture and understanding. Most, however,

especially the crews of foreign ships, were ignorant, brutal, drunken and lawless in the extreme: men utterly without respect for anything except the crudest sort of force. From such men, and their shocking conduct, the Chinese got their ideas of Western civilization.

V. IN 1800

This was the situation on January 1, 1800:

The Portuguese controlled Macao, though they nominally admitted that the place belonged to China and was under Chinese authority. They tried to get and keep all the Western trade with China, but the British, Dutch, French, Germans, Danes, Swedes and Americans had made a joke of the Portuguese dream of a trade monopoly. These others traded at Canton, chiefly, and used Macao—when the Portuguese permitted, which was most of the time—as a secondary base of operations. Westerners were not allowed to trade at any other port in China.

The Westerners were permitted to occupy a few buildings, which they called “factories,” huddled together along the river and outside the city wall at Canton. These buildings belonged to the members of the Chinese merchants’ guild, called the co-hong, which had been organized to monopolize the trade with the Westerners. The Westerners were not permitted to live anywhere else at Canton. It was even illegal for them to leave the factory area for any purpose except to go directly to and from their ships. By specific regulation, they might not row on the river for pleasure, or walk along the river front, or enter the walled city—though as a special favor they were allowed, on three days a month, to stroll in a flower garden across the river from the factories, provided they went in small parties under the chaperonage of a Chinese interpreter, who was held strictly responsible for their conduct.

Even in this undesirable bit of river frontage, the Westerners might stay only during the trading season, in the

winter, which was limited to forty days a year. They were required, also, to get and pay for permission to leave as well as to come.

Other regulations were severe and humiliating: women and firearms might not be brought to the factories; no Chinese legally might work as a servant for any Westerner; Westerners, like the coolies and other low-class Chinese, were not allowed to use sedan chairs, as these were the means of conveyance reserved for the socially more honorable of the Chinese.

Westerners might not communicate directly with the Chinese officials, not even in the regular form of petition from inferior to superior. When they had complaints or suggestions to make, these must be sent through the co-hong which had the monopoly of trade with the Westerners, and which was responsible for their good conduct.

No Chinese legally could go into debt to a Westerner. (If this rule had been enforced, any "open account" trading with the Chinese would have been impossible and all transactions necessarily would have been on a cash basis, which would have handicapped trade seriously. This rule deprived the Westerners of any legal claim to collect debts in default. Bankruptcies of some of the co-hong merchants brought heavy losses to several of the Westerners. In some cases, the other members of the co-hong made good the debts as a matter of commercial good faith and on the Chinese principle of group responsibility. The British got repayment of some of their debts by including the amounts due in the indemnity which China was compelled to pay as a result of the war of 1839-42.)

Westerners were prohibited from learning the Chinese language or acquiring any Chinese books. Any Chinese who taught Westerners how to speak, read or write the language of the Celestial Empire, or helped them in preparing documents for submission to officials, was liable to severe penalties, up to and including death. (These penalties were enforced

in a number of cases.) All the transactions between Chinese and Westerners were supposed to be carried on through Chinese who had learned Western languages—and only people who were ready to sacrifice their self-respect for the sake of profit would so far demean themselves as to learn a barbarian tongue, according to Chinese ideas.

The Chinese authorities did not consistently enforce these rules; like the provisions in the Chinese legal codes, they were treated as statements of the extreme limit of control and punishment, rather than as specific prohibitions or penalties to be applied in full, persistently and in every case. But the regulations remained as part of the Chinese law for dealing with Westerners, and when the Chinese wanted to bring pressure on the Westerners they enforced the regulations. So any Chinese who did over-step the rules was liable at any time to be punished—or to see his family punished, if he happened to be out of reach himself. The Westerners themselves had no assurance from year to year, or even from week to week, that some humiliating or inconvenient rule would not be enforced against them.

Very emphatically, from the Chinese point of view and under Chinese law, the Westerners did business at Canton entirely on sufferance and not because they had any rights. Quite literally, in fact, the only right which the Westerners did have in China, according to Chinese law, when the nineteenth century opened, was the right to come there—and even that right was a concession which could be withdrawn at any time. The Westerners who did come were, in Chinese eyes, barbarians, and even low-class barbarians, since they were mostly merchants or soldiers—the two lowest of the social classes in China.

Three centuries had passed since the first modern Westerners had appeared in Chinese waters. In the interval, Britain had taken India, Spain had seized the Philippines, the Portuguese first and then the Dutch had occupied Java and Sumatra. The Western nations, in other words, already

had acquired very substantial territorial holdings in the Far East, and they had demonstrated that they possessed more effective fighting weapons than the Eastern peoples. At the imperial court in Peking, a few missionaries had won some small measure of respect and consideration, but the actions of the missionaries as a whole had convinced the Chinese that they had no real understanding of the essential qualities which, from the Chinese point of view, make up the truly civilized Superior Man. Official embassies from European countries had been received by the emperor, always as coming from tribute nations, with varying degrees of courtesy. Yet, after three centuries, the Westerners remained, in the eyes of Chinese law, and to a considerable extent of Chinese practice, simply upstart, bumptious, unwanted, troublesome barbarians.

Quite properly, therefore, according to the Chinese way of thinking, they were allowed to trade at only one port far removed from the capital. Even there, they were herded together onto a small bit of land on the river in the most undesirable part of Canton, with the socially disreputable and contemptible river folk and other human jetsam. The Siamese and others from along the coast, who showed themselves properly appreciative of the superiority of Chinese civilization and humbly submissive to Chinese authority, were permitted to move about and even to live inside the walls of the city. The Arabs, who had been doing business at Canton for more than a thousand years, were allowed to have a mosque inside the city, in which to carry on their religious worship. But these newly arrived barbarians, with their fair skin and their strange and lawless ways, were kept cooped up in a ghetto by themselves, and allowed to deal only with such low class persons as merchants.

The uncertainty, humiliation and discomfort of the situation were irritating to the Westerners, as the records of their dealings show. Yet business would have gone joltingly along had there been no other cause of friction. Another and more

serious disagreement developed, however. This arose over the question of who was to try the Westerners accused of crimes, especially crimes of violence, and to punish the guilty.

The Europeans, especially the English, did not object particularly to the Chinese law itself. It was, as a matter of fact, less harsh than the English law of the time in that it imposed the death penalty only for far more serious offences than many of those punishable by death in England. Their quarrel was with the way the Chinese applied the law.

Because the Western sailors on the ships at Canton were a hard and lawless lot, and were able to get plenty of a peculiarly vile liquor at the grog shops, there were frequent brawls, in which men were sometimes killed, Europeans and Chinese. Accidents also occurred resulting in death. The Chinese authorities demanded the right to try and punish all Europeans who had caused death, whether the one killed was a Chinese or a European. The usual, though not invariable, result, when the European officers did turn over to the Chinese one of their nationals who was accused of a killing, was the execution of the accused, even if the killing was accidental. The Europeans, especially the English, considered that the trials were unfair. They objected specifically to the Chinese application of the principle of group responsibility, by which all the foreigners were held responsible for the acts of any one of them. A strong feeling developed among the Europeans that Westerners should keep jurisdiction over Westerners.

As H. G. Morse points out, however, Chinese experience with the Westerners had been such as to lead them to adopt "as the fundamental Chinese maxim in dealing with foreigners, the phrase of one of their writers of an earlier age":

"The barbarians are like beasts, and not to be ruled on the same principles as Chinese. Were one to attempt controlling them by the great maxims of reason, it would tend to nothing but the greatest con-

fusion. The ancient sovereigns well understood this, and accordingly ruled barbarians by misrule. To rule barbarians by misrule is the true and best way of ruling them."

Here again, therefore, the root of the difficulties appears: the Chinese sense of superiority and the Western refusal to accept an inferior position.

The Americans, at first, assumed the position that they should conform to Chinese law—though it is at least possible that they took this attitude partly because they thought it would win Chinese good will and so help business. The British East India Company's official stand was that Chinese laws and regulations should be obeyed. The Dutch, also with an eye on good business relations, agreed formally that Chinese authority should predominate in China. No European nation, in fact, openly avowed anything else, at this stage.

In practice, however, the Westerners, particularly the British, grew steadily more resentful against the humiliations and uncertainty under which they lived and traded at Canton. They tended more and more to insist that they, rather than the Chinese, should determine the conditions of their life and trade in China.

When the eighteenth century turned into the nineteenth, Europe was busy with the French revolution and the Napoleonic wars. The infant republic of the United States along the Atlantic seaboard had only a small interest in what took place on the other side of the world. Russia was beginning to move eastward across Siberia. Britain was reaching into India. No other European power gave more than very casual attention to China.

China, on the other hand, more completely overshadowed the Far East than it had for centuries. From Korea and the Liuchiu Islands off the eastern coast, to the Pamirs far westward in Central Asia, from close up toward the Arctic Circle in Siberia southward to the tip of the Malay Peninsula and southwestward over Burma and Nepal, the people ac-

knowledgeed suzerainty and paid tribute to the Son of Heaven. A few score barbarians were trading at Canton and residing at Macao, under control of the Chinese officials. England was less important to the emperor of China than was Siam. Holland was listed as a vassal state. "China was supreme on a pinnacle of power, the center of the world. The Far East as a whole was at peace, and looked to the Celestial Empire as the fount of culture and the source of authority," as Harley F. McNair puts it.

But the Manchu Dynasty was rotten at the core, and China's descent into the valley of confusion already had begun. British trade, which was considerably more important at Canton than that of any other European power, was growing, and the British were becoming increasingly restive under the treatment to which they were subjected by the smugly self-complacent Chinese officials. Thirty-nine years after 1800, the war started which resulted in the first important break in China's wall.

VI. THE FIRST THRUST

In June, 1839, about \$11,000,000 worth of opium was destroyed near Canton. Chinese coolies, under Chinese officials, started work on June 3, mixing lime and sea water with a huge pile of black, rubbery, sweet-smelling crude opium. They worked for weeks under the tropical sun. When they had finished, the last of 2,500,000 pounds of crude opium, reduced to a slimy muck, had trickled toward the ocean near the mouth of the Canton River.

British merchants had paid for the opium, and had brought it to the neighborhood of Canton, in their own ships or through American and other agents, in what they thought of as the ordinary course of business. They were well aware that Chinese laws strictly prohibited the importation of opium. But they and other Westerners had found that rich profits were to be made by bringing the drug from Turkey, India and Persia, and selling it to the Chinese, often with the

purchased connivance of the Chinese officials who were supposed to stop the traffic. So the Westerners broke the Chinese law. The destruction of the opium in 1839 was a move on the part of the Chinese government to enforce the law.

Developments just before and after that destruction led to the war of 1839-42 between Great Britain and China, which was the first effective thrust through China's wall of isolation.

The Chinese had known opium as a medicine since the seventh century A.D. Its use took on the proportions of a "drug evil," however, only after the Western traders began to bring it in as a substitute for silver bullion, early in the 1700's. In 1729, the Emperor Yung Cheng ordered severe penalties for the sale of opium to smokers, but said nothing about the importation of the drug. Other imperial edicts on the subject followed. Prohibition of the importation of opium was ordered in 1800. Until then, the drug had come in as medicine, paying a rather high import duty: \$3.60 a pound, in 1753, for example. Meanwhile, the amount imported yearly had increased from the 200 chests which the Portuguese brought in in 1729 to over 4,000 chests at the end of the century.

Prohibition did not stop the traffic. "Business as usual" continued to be the order of the day for twenty years after 1800, with opium shipments from India and Turkey to China staying close to the twenty-year average of 4,215 cases a year. Then some of the Chinese officials at Macao quarreled over the division of the profits to be derived from not seeing too much. The viceroy felt called on to act. He put pressure on the hong merchants, who were legally responsible for what the foreigner traders did. He told the British, Portuguese and American traders that the import prohibition would be enforced. The Westerners countered by anchoring some ships near Canton, but outside of Chinese jurisdiction, and using them for warehouses in which the opium was unloaded as it arrived from India and Turkey,

and from which it was sold. There continued to be plenty of buyers, and smuggling up the coast grew apace. The chief effect of the viceroy's threat to stop the traffic was to increase it. The opium shipments to China from India and Turkey jumped from 4,959 chests in the trading year 1821-22 to 12,434 chests in the year 1824-25, and averaged 9,708 chests a year for the seven years 1821-28.

A new order by the viceroy for rigorous enforcement of the opium import prohibition, in 1828, was followed by another jump in the amount taken to China. An English ship tried the experiment of sailing up the east coast, peddling a load of opium—thereby defying both the anti-opium laws and the laws requiring Westerners to trade only at Canton and Macao. The trip was a big success, financially. Other ships followed, and in a year or two, warehouse ships like those off Canton were anchored at several points along the coast. The opium traffic boomed: 13,868 chests were shipped to China in 1828-29, and 21,985 in 1832-33, with a seven year average for 1828-35 of 18,712, or about 2,340,000 pounds, a year. Foreign profits from this illegal traffic in the drug were huge. So were the contributions which the Chinese officials exacted for keeping their eyes closed.

High dignitaries at Peking and elsewhere became alarmed at the spread of opium smoking, and indignant at the flagrant violation of Chinese regulations by the Westerners. Chinese efforts to stop the traffic were intensified in 1836. Nevertheless, the traffic grew. In 1835-36, the opium shipments to China were 30,202 chests. In 1838-39, the year the war broke out, the amount was 40,445 chests, or about 4,420,000 pounds.

Because the British were the most important Western trading group at Canton, the Chinese authorities felt that they properly should be held accountable for the acts of all the rest of the Westerners, in accordance with the principle of group responsibility. The British officials, of course, had no authority over the other Westerners. The Chinese grew

angry because they thought the British superintendent of trade was trying to evade responsibility which was properly his. The Chinese believed that the Westerners, being barbarians, should be treated as such. The Westerners, sure of their own superiority, were extremely resentful of anything that could be construed as an "insult."

Altogether, the situation was packed with dynamite. In November, 1839, the dynamite exploded.

The fuse was lit in March of that year. The emperor sent a special commissioner down to Canton, as his personal representative to stop the opium traffic. The commissioner notified the Chinese co-hong merchants and the Westerners that all the opium they had on hand must be surrendered. He imprisoned the Westerners in the narrow quarters of the "factory" compound on the river, to enforce this demand. The British superintendent stopped all British trade with Canton by ordering the British ships to leave for the nearby island of Hongkong, and to prepare "to resist every act of aggression of the Chinese government." The Chinese high commissioner tightened up the isolation of the factories, calling out the Chinese servants, stopping all communication, and shutting off supplies of food and water for the 300 odd foreigners in the small compound. Under this pressure, the British superintendent of trade promised that the opium would be surrendered (all of it in Canton belonged to Britishers, though some was in the hands of American and other agents). This was done. The guards around the factories were withdrawn. The opium was destroyed. The British residents all went to Macao at the end of May. The Chinese, who wanted the trading profits, demanded that the British resume their legitimate trading at Canton, but the British superintendent refused to permit this "till full justice be done, and till the whole trade and intercourse be placed upon a footing honorable and secure to this empire [China] and to England."

Trouble continued through the long summer. In July

a Chinese was killed in a drunken brawl of foreign seamen at Hongkong. The British superintendent set up a court which inflicted heavy sentences of fine and imprisonment on five British seamen. But no one directly responsible for the killing could be found. The Chinese authorities denied that the British had jurisdiction and demanded that all those found guilty of participation in the brawl be turned over for trial, one of whom should be kept to answer for the killing. The British superintendent refused.

Late in August, the Portuguese governor at Macao, under Chinese pressure, told the British who had taken shelter there, that he could no longer guarantee their safety. Men, women, and children went to the barren little island of Hongkong. The Chinese authorities shut off food and water from the island because they wanted to compel the British to turn over someone who could be punished for the killing of the Chinese in the July brawl, to force the British to resume trade, and also to make good the demand that the British take the responsibility for stopping all the opium smuggling along the coast (including that by others than Britishers).

Until the beginning of September, no British warships were on hand to sustain the British superintendent of trade. Then two arrived. The inevitable clash occurred on November 3, 1839. The British warships, vastly better armed than the Chinese junks, came through unscathed, while four of the twenty-nine Chinese junks were sunk and a number more were damaged. War was on, the first open and avowed war between any modern Western nation and China.

What caused this war, which began officially on November 3, 1839, dragged along in spasmodic outbursts for nearly three years, and finally ended with the Treaty of Nanking, on August 29, 1842?

To the Chinese, the causes of the war were simple. Uncivilized barbarians, who had been graciously permitted to come to China to trade, refused to submit to Chinese

authority. They persisted in outrageous violation of Chinese laws. They bribed, flouted, ignored, and flagrantly disobeyed Chinese officials who were enforcing Chinese law in Chinese territory. For the sake of profits made through the debauchery of the Chinese people, they forced opium on the country. Quite properly, the emperor sent his agents to stamp out the evil traffic, but the barbarians, greedy for gain by any means, however immoral, not only resisted, they used the Chinese efforts to protect the Chinese people as an excuse for attacking the country in order to get more opportunities for carrying on their nefarious trade. The facts of the case, the barbarism and wickedness of the Westerners in general and the British in particular, and the reasonableness and rightness of the Chinese course of action, all seemed entirely obvious to the Chinese. In its larger background, the war was a barbarous and completely unjustified attack on Chinese civilization, they felt. More immediately, it was an opium war, pure and simple.

To the British, on the other hand, the real cause of the war was Chinese arrogance, showing itself in countless and irritating ways, but especially in the determined and persistent refusal of the Chinese to deal with the British as anything but low inferiors, without rights of any kind, and consequently without any security of life and property or trading opportunities in China. The difficulties over opium, they maintained, were only a very minor and incidental part of the reason for fighting.

The British East India Company, while it had the monopoly of British trade with China, rigidly refused to carry opium to that country in its own ships after opium importation had been prohibited, though it had no scruples whatever about selling Indian opium to others who, the company was well aware, would take it to China. The British government officials, when, in 1834, they took charge of British affairs in China, regularly refused to extend armed protection to British vessels engaged in the illicit trade,

though they felt no obligation to use British armed force to stop the opium smuggling by British or other ships.

The British went to war with China, as they saw it, not over opium, but to compel the Chinese to deal with them as equals and to allow them to trade under conditions satisfactory to the British.

At least twice, they had tried by negotiations to get relations between England and China on a basis more to their liking. Lord Macartney had been sent out in 1793. Though he was received with suitable ceremony by the emperor, he accomplished nothing, as we have seen. Lord Amherst went on a similar mission in 1816, and fared even worse. He was treated as a "tribute bearer" on his way from Tientsin to Peking. He refused to perform the ceremony of the kowtow before the emperor, because he felt that this would be to acknowledge the inferiority of the English king. This refusal angered the court authorities, and Lord Amherst was treated with serious discourtesy when he reached the capital. This discourtesy in turn angered Lord Amherst, and the upshot of it all was that he left the capital without having had an audience with the emperor.

The British became convinced that they must either give up their trade, or submit to any rules the Chinese cared to impose, or fight to get satisfactory conditions. They would not give up the trade. They also would not submit to being treated as inferiors. Inevitably, war came.

The British government prepared and sent out its demands soon after the war started. Negotiations and displays of force by the British alternated. Uniformly, the Chinese were defeated in the fighting. Finally, a treaty of peace was signed. This opened five "treaty ports," instead of Canton alone, where the British might reside and trade. The most important of these was Shanghai, at the mouth of the Yangtze River. The treaty also ceded Hongkong to Britain, and abolished the co-hong trade monopoly at Canton. It gave Great Britain an indemnity, which paid for the opium which

had been destroyed, settled various outstanding Chinese merchants' debts to British traders, and covered the entire cost of the war itself. It said nothing about opium. A supplementary agreement specified that British law was to be applied by the British consuls in punishing British criminals in China, thus writing extraterritoriality into the treaties.

The special importance of this treaty as marking a definite breach of the Chinese wall of superiority, lay in its recognition by the Chinese government of British equality. This was stated in the text. More significantly, from the Chinese point of view, it was embedded in the form in which the Chinese text was written. Each of the two countries was called "great," a term hitherto reserved in Chinese documents for China alone. The written characters for "Great England" and "Great China" were raised one space above the top row of characters in the text, and those for "queen" and "emperor" were raised two spaces, in accordance with the Chinese practice of showing honor to names or titles by raising them above the level of the ordinary characters on the page. Britain and China, the queen and emperor, were honored in absolute equality. Equality was maintained even in the signing of the treaty, the English names being placed first in the English text, the Chinese first in the Chinese text.

Trivial points, these may seem to us today. But they were of the utmost significance in China. When the Chinese emperor formally ratified the treaty, written out in that form, he definitely gave up the age-old claim that the Son of Heaven was the peerless ruler of mankind. A whole section of the Chinese wall crumbled.

In that war of 1839-42, Britain laid the foundations for the anti-British feeling which has been so noticeable among the Chinese ever since. Yet the British argue—and not a few Westerners agree with them—that Britain fought the battle of the whole West, not of herself alone, in compelling China to accept Western equality.

Britain did not try to keep the new trading opportunities

for her own nationals exclusively. Lord Palmerston, in his first instructions to the British plenipotentiary, Captain Eliot, sent on February 20, 1840, told him that, in negotiating with the Chinese on Britain's behalf "you will bear in mind that Her Majesty's Government do not desire to obtain for British subjects any exclusive privileges of trade, which should not be equally extended to the subjects of every other Power." There, it is interesting to observe, is the clear expression of the principles underlying the "Open Door" policy, stated by the British foreign secretary in dealing with China on the first occasion which arose for laying down that policy in formal terms. This was fifty-nine years before Secretary of State Hay coined the phrase "open door."

The "most favored nation" principle, which has figured so prominently in Western treaty relations with China, also was brought forward by the British at this time. China was permitted to choose between ceding Hongkong to Great Britain, or of granting the British various trading and other rights, and of pledging herself, under a "most favored nation" treaty provision, to give British subjects all the rights which she gave to others. She chose to cede Hongkong, but the "most favored nation" clauses were written into the treaties anyway, not in 1842, but in 1843 and subsequent years—treaties with France, the United States, and other powers, as well as Britain.

The treaty of 1842 broke through the wall. Other treaties signed in the next two or three years widened the breach. Other wars also occurred, brief ones, ending in complete victory for the better armed Westerners.

But the Chinese authorities at Peking were not yet ready really to deal with the Westerners as equals.

VII. THE CRUSHING BLOW

Four treaties were signed at Tientsin, in June of 1858. These were between China on one side, in each case, and Britain, France, Russia, and the United States, on the other.

Each of these treaties contained a "most favored nation" clause, so that all four of the countries secured all the rights and privileges granted in all the treaties. Taken together these 1858 treaties, with supplementary agreements signed in 1860, were the Magna Carta of foreign rights and interests in China for the next sixty years and more.

Foreign guns cast their shadows over Tientsin while these treaties were being negotiated. British, French, Russian, and American warships were there. Neither the American nor the Russian negotiators had the authority to use force in case the Chinese refused to give what they wanted in the treaties. The French and British plenipotentiaries had that authority, and they made it quite clear that they were prepared to turn loose the dogs of war if the Chinese were recalcitrant. In these circumstances, and after their bitter experience with foreign arms since 1839, the Chinese signed.

Imperial ratification of the Russian treaty was given in May, and of the American treaty in August, 1859. The French and British received no word that their treaties would be ratified, though they pressed for this ratification of the agreements. So they sent an ultimatum to Peking on March 8, 1860. This brought no result. They started troops moving toward the capital. A British diplomatic agent was sent on ahead, with a flag of truce. The Chinese seized him and his staff, and kept them in prison under such conditions that several died. The British and French soldiers occupied the capital. The emperor fled. The British agent was released, but in retaliation for this insult to the British crown, and with the avowed purpose of inflicting a personal humiliation on the Chinese emperor, the British commander, Lord Elgin, ordered that the emperor's magnificent summer palace, just north of Peking, be burned. This act had no military significance, since French and British troops held Peking itself in a tight grip and the ratification of the 1858 treaties was assured. Lord Elgin, and the French commander, who had given the soldiers permission to loot the palace before it was

burned, simply wanted to "teach the Chinese a lesson." They succeeded in teaching the Chinese a lesson in Western vandalism and barbarism which the Chinese still remember with bitterness. The British treaty was ratified on October 24, 1860. The French secured ratification of theirs the next day. The allied troops withdrew from Peking.

The American treaty of 1858 included the first of the so-called "toleration clauses" by which security against persecution for being a Christian was made a matter of treaty specification. An imperial rescript removing the ban on Christianity had been issued in 1844, so the Chinese authorities had no particular objection to this "toleration clause." Nor were they disturbed by the other provisions in the Russian and American treaties.

They did object strenuously to three provisions on which the British insisted.

One of these gave the right to have an envoy permanently located at the capital, who would deal directly with the highest ministers of the Chinese government. The British and others, from before the time of Lord Macartney's visit, had been trying to get this right. The Chinese persistently refused to give any such recognition to the importance of the Westerners. To grant it in 1858, they felt, would be especially dangerous because the throne already was tottering from the blows of the T'ai P'ing rebels.

Another British demand which the Chinese strongly opposed was that British ships be allowed to trade along the coast and up the Yangtze River as far as Hankow. This would permit foreigners to penetrate far into the interior. They had made trouble enough at Canton, the Chinese felt. They became even more troublesome when they secured the right to live and trade at four more ports along the coast. The danger to China would be enormously increased if the Westerners were allowed to move freely up and down the greatest waterway of the country, penetrating to the very heart of the land.

Some of the foreign representatives themselves questioned the wisdom of this demand, even from the foreign point of view. The American minister to China, for example, pointed out that the United States did not permit foreign vessels to engage in coastwise trade, or to navigate the interior rivers. Dr. S. Wells Williams, another American, long resident in China and associated with the minister, wrote in his journal of the danger to China. He says:

"I have no doubt, the more I see the entire bearing of the demand, that the Chinese may just about as well abdicate their independence as to allow free navigation of the Yangtze River. . . . They will have to yield, I suppose, and with the liberty let go forever the integrity of their territory to the lust of gain and power on the part of those who ought to consider something of the results of their policy."

The British consul at Shanghai, writing to the British plenipotentiary, Lord Elgin, pointed out that foreign interests would suffer because of the "worthless character" of foreigners who would "convert privileges of access and trade into means of fraud and violence." Nevertheless, Lord Elgin forced through the demand that the Yangtze and the coastwise trade be opened.

The third particularly objectionable provision, from the Chinese point of view, was in both the British and French treaties. This permitted the foreign merchants to travel for purposes of trade beyond the treaty ports. Before this, they had been permitted to do business only in the ports themselves. Under this treaty provision, once a merchant was equipped with a passport from his consul, he could go anywhere he chose throughout the length and breadth of the land, though he still had no right to reside or lease land outside of the treaty ports. This might not have been so bad, if the foreigners had been under Chinese law and could be punished by the Chinese for crimes. Instead, because they had extraterritorial rights under the treaties, they were subject only to their own authorities. If a foreigner committed

a crime while traveling in the interior, the Chinese authorities could do no more than arrest him and take him to the nearest consul of his own nationality—perhaps a thousand miles away. What chance was there, in such circumstances, that the victim of the crime could get justice, or that the foreign travelers in the interior could be properly held to account for their acts?

Objections to this provision were pointed out by the American minister, by other Americans, and by Britishers. Nevertheless, the provision went into the treaties, because Lord Elgin insisted, and backed up his insistence with guns.

The four treaties of 1858, and the supplementary British agreement of 1860, opened eleven new places to foreign trade. Four of these were on the Yangtze: Hankow, Kiukiang, Nanking, and Chinkiang. Two were on the island of Formosa, and one on the island of Hainan (just off the coast south of Canton). Manchuria and Shantung each contained one; and one was on the southeast coast: Swatow. Tientsin, the main port of North China, and the gateway to Peking, was declared open to foreign trade and residence.

When the British and French treaties were ratified, therefore, all the Westerners whose countries had "most favored nation" treaties with China were free to live far in the interior and at all the important ports along the coast, from the extreme south to the far north. They were at liberty to travel and trade anywhere in the country. Missionaries could live and lease property, as well as preach, anywhere. Western ships could sail far up the Yangtze and do business from one Chinese port to another along the coast. Finally, at a tariff conference following the confirmation of these treaties, the importation of opium was legalized.

These treaties of 1858 and the circumstances of their ratification are aptly described by Dr. Tyler Dennett:

"It cannot be denied, however, that the American treaty of Tientsin did lay the basis for the friendship between China and the United States which grew rapidly in the next decade. Yet from the smash-

ing blow which had been dealt to China in the British treaty of 1858, no friend could rescue her. . . . The Empire had brought the calamity upon itself. . . . This fact, however, mitigates the responsibility neither of Great Britain which had acted with so little regard for the evil consequences of such an opening up of the Empire, nor of the United States which had sent an envoy to play the part of Saul holding the coats of those who committed the assault. That China in later years received benefits from the breaking of her walls of pride and exclusion is undeniable, but it is equally undeniable that much of the evil that followed in its train might have been avoided had Lord Elgin been less possessed of the determination to chastise an ancient Empire and to establish once for all the priority of Great Britain in the Far East."

The guns which forced the ratification of the British and French treaties of 1858 blew away the last serious obstacle to Western trade and cultural expansion into China—the last obstacle, that is, except the huge one of Chinese preference for Chinese ways, and Chinese resentment against being forced to submit to Western dictation. The wars and treaties which followed cleared away a minor obstruction here or opened up a new sluice there, down which the flood from the West might run. China was open, for good or ill, in 1860.

The collapse of the burning walls of the emperor's summer palace near Peking, however, symbolized much more than the fall of the last Chinese barrier to foreign penetration.

It would be hard to overemphasize the significance of the forced recognition of Western equality which was secured by two decades of military pressure, culminating in 1860, when the capital itself was occupied. Outright seizure of the throne would have been less disturbing to fundamental Chinese conceptions. Before this, foreigners had taken that throne. Always, however, the belief that the Dragon Throne towered above all other thrones and that the Son of Heaven was the legitimate lord of all other rulers, had remained the very keystone of the Chinese political system. When

Western troops forced the recognition of equality between the emperor of China and Western sovereigns, they unsettled this keystone in its place and started the collapse of the whole imperial system.

The military actions beginning in 1839 and concluding in the occupation of Peking in 1860 were as far-reaching in their consequences as the Protestant repudiation of the pope's authority, or the eighteenth century denial of the divine right of kings in Europe—though neither the Chinese nor the Westerners at the time realized the profound political significance for China of those military moves.

The China on which those treaties of 1858–60 were forced was a China deeply wounded by rebellion, ravaged by destructive hordes of soldiers, by floods and famines, carrying on her shoulders the heavy burden of an utterly corrupt and degenerate ruling dynasty. Onto this crippled China, the Westerners forced their demands. Into this disorganized and devitalized China, steam and electricity carried with rapidly accelerating speed a swelling tide of new goods, new ways and new ideas. There would have been confusion even if China had been on the peak of full vigor and power. She was not. There was chaos, due, however, more to conditions in China than to the impact of Western civilization.

VIII. JAPAN JOINS THE AGGRESSORS

In the three decades following 1860, the leading European powers advanced toward or in the Far East, but somewhat spasmodically. Britain and France cut China's ties of suzerainty in Burma, Indo-China and the Malay Peninsula, and themselves took control of parts of this territory. Russia sent a railway and colonists eastward to consolidate her hold on Siberia, and felt out the possibilities of advance into Central Asia and India, while Nicholas II and his advisers began to meddle in Korean affairs and to discuss the steps to be taken in getting a hold in Manchuria and an ice-

free port in Far Eastern waters. Wilhelm II, after he shook off Bismarck's guiding hand, began to dream grandiose dreams of German holdings in China. The interest in the Far East, however, was only incidental. This was the period of the unification of Italy, the Austro-German and Franco-German wars, the shift from the Third Empire to the Third Republic in France, the scramble to divide Africa and the Near East, the consolidation of British interests on the way to and in India. The Europeans were concerned chiefly with their internal and external readjustments at home and in nearby regions.

Americans, too, were busy with their own affairs, fighting the Civil War, and then clearing up the confusion which that caused, and also pushing westward to develop the continent. The Far East was not entirely forgotten, but interest in it was at a low ebb.

During this period, however, a new power joined the ranks of those pressing on China, and forged rapidly to the front. This was Japan. Korea, unimportant in herself, became important as the focus of a three-cornered conflict between China, Japan, and Russia, which Japan finally won.

After reopening her doors to the world in 1854, Japan made her first move to secure a place in the game of expansion in the Far East, when the shogun's government offered, in 1867 (the year before the power was restored to the emperor) to mediate in the efforts of the United States to secure a treaty which would open Korea's long closed doors. Korea was and had been for many centuries, tributary to China, however, and Japan had no technical basis for the right to intervene. Japan's offer was not accepted by the United States.

Then Japan turned her eyes to China. In 1871, the year in which the first Japanese cabinet under the new régime was established, she secured a reciprocal treaty which gave her some, but not all, of the special privileges that Westerners had in China. This treaty did not contain a "most favored

nation" clause, but it did secure for Japan a considerably better diplomatic position in her relation to China than she had in relation to the Western powers. The treaty was unpopular in Japan because it did not secure full equality with the Western powers. It was disliked by the reactionary officials at Peking because it extended the recognition of something like equality to the Japanese, on whom the Chinese for many centuries had looked with contempt and dislike.

The treaty, incidentally, was negotiated on China's side by the man who was to play the principal rôle in China's foreign relations until his death in 1901: the great viceroy, Li Hung-chang. The burden of trying to counter Japan's subsequent aggressive moves fell chiefly on him, and in that task he turned to Russia for the help which the latter was more than ready to give.

Japan's first actual territorial expansion came to the south of the empire, in the Liuchiu Islands. The kings of Liuchiu had paid tribute to China since 1372. They also had made a similar acknowledgment of Japanese authority since 1451, and one of the Japanese feudal states had conquered the islands in 1600. In those days, however, the Eastern countries did not concern themselves with the modern niceties of sovereign rights and responsibilities, so this Liuchiu acknowledgment of allegiance to both China and Japan caused no particular difficulties.

Then, in 1871, some Liuchiu islanders, wrecked on Formosa, were killed by the savage aborigines of that island. Japan promptly asked China what she proposed to do to redress the wrongs of the Liuchiu-ese. Thereby Japan, by implication, claimed that the Liuchiu islanders were Japanese subjects. Instead of telling Japan that the affair was no concern of hers since all those involved on both sides were Chinese and not Japanese subjects, the Peking government said that it could not be responsible for what savages did because no one could protect those who were so foolish as to go into the regions where they lived.

According to the technicalities of modern international law, the Chinese authorities, in taking this stand, acknowledged Japan's guardianship over the Liuchiu islanders by granting her claim to the right to protect their interests. This incident also went far to undermine China's claim to sovereignty over Formosa. Japan promptly stepped into the loophole which the Chinese had opened. She pressed her demand for a settlement, on behalf of her injured "subjects," but accomplished nothing. Then, in 1874, she sent troops to Formosa, took severe vengeance on the savages, and occupied part of the island.

The Chinese protested. Japan insisted. A settlement was made on practically the basis demanded by Japan. China reasserted her claim to Formosa, but she acknowledged Japan's jurisdiction over the Liuchiu Islands by paying an indemnity of 100,000 taels (about U. S. \$75,000) for the families of the Liuchiu-ese who had been killed. She paid another 400,000 taels (about U. S. \$300,000) to recompense Japan for the expenses of the punitive expedition to Formosa. Five years later Japan formally annexed the Liuchiu Islands, making them a province of the empire. China protested. Ex-President Grant of the United States, in the East on a world tour at the time, supported China. But Japan went ahead with the annexation anyway.

Thus Japan started her career of expansion, and China both paid the cash expenses and lost the territory which Japan took. But in this entire affair, Japan acted strictly in accordance with the most approved Western methods of the time.

Korea, meanwhile, persistently rejected Japan's requests for a treaty. Japanese ambition had looked Korea-ward for centuries. In the early 1870's, the question of relations with Korea became the source of strong feeling in Japan. Korea's refusal to negotiate angered the more conservative of the feudal leaders. In 1873, a strong group demanded that Japan send an expedition to punish Korea for this insolence. The

emperor and his more statesmenlike advisers, however, felt that Japan was not ready for a move of this kind, which might precipitate a war with China or Russia, or both. They refused to send troops to Korea. The conservative samurai leaders felt so bitterly over what they called weak submission to an intolerable insult to Japan's honor, that they started an armed rebellion—not against the emperor, but against the “pusillanimous” ministers whose advice he had accepted. The revolt was crushed, but the seeds of future demands for expansion into Korea remained.

In 1875, following an incident in which a Japanese ship was fired on in Korean waters, Japan adopted the tactics which Commodore Perry had used. She sent to Korea a fair-sized naval force to make a show of strength while presenting a demand for a treaty. The treaty was signed in 1876. Korea's doors were opened.

This treaty touched China's interests. Korea was under Chinese suzerainty. Earlier American efforts to get a treaty with Korea had been carried on with the knowledge and consent of Peking. Japan not only ignored the Chinese government, she also went so far as to insist that the treaty include a specific statement of Korea's full independence. The Korean king ratified the treaty, but he continued to pay tribute to China. Japanese representatives were admitted to the capital, but they and their fellow countrymen who came were treated with scant courtesy. The conservative samurai in Japan were much displeased by the treaty because, they said, dealing with Korea on a basis of equality put Japan herself on a level with the states vassal to China.

So the fuse was laid for the explosion which came in 1894.

Conditions in Korea were bad. The ruling dynasty had become completely degenerate. Rebellion broke out sporadically. Rival parties at court schemed and assassinated to get power. Russia was intriguing at the Korean court to extend her influence southward from Siberia. In 1883, China made Yuan Shih-kai minister-resident at the Korean

capital. By his brutal tactlessness and domineering attitude he added to the confusion. Li Hung-chang, his responsible superior, encouraged him, rather than otherwise. Russian activity increased. Pro-Chinese, pro-Japanese, and pro-Russian factions became aggressively quarrelsome at court. The story of bribery, intrigue and assassination is a sordid one in outline and in detail.

In 1885, Japan got a new foothold as a result of an armed clash between Chinese and Japanese guards in the Korean capital. China was busy with a war with France over Annam. Japan demanded and China submitted to a new agreement which pledged each country not to send troops into Korea without notifying the other.

Then a rebellion broke out in 1894. The Korean king asked China for troops to help suppress it. China sent some, notifying Japan, as agreed. Japan, without any request from the king of Korea, promptly sent six times as many soldiers as China had despatched. China had told Japan she was sending troops to help a tributary state. Japan insisted that Korea was independent, but suggested that China and Japan coöperate to reorganize the Korean government. China refused. She also remarked that if Korea was independent as Japan claimed, then neither Japan nor China properly could interfere in her internal affairs. Meanwhile, the Korean king had suppressed the rebellion without the help of either the Chinese or the Japanese.

War came. Japan was ready, this time. There was much talk about Japan's special interests in Korea, created by propinquity, and about the need for preserving the "peace and tranquillity of the Orient." Japan, the Japanese said, could not permit such unstable, disorderly conditions to continue in a territory so near. The Japanese spokesmen demonstrated conclusively that they had become masters of all the patter of polite phrases which the Western powers used to cloak their aggression. Many Japanese were honestly fearful of what might happen to Japan if Russian penetration

into Korea continued. Others thought that this was a good time to give the world a demonstration of Japan's newly acquired military power. Still others were fired by the age-old dream of expansion onto the mainland.

The first clash came at sea on July 25, 1894. Both countries declared war on August 1. The Japanese drove the Chinese back rapidly, through Korea, across the Yalu River and into Manchuria. On September 17, the Japanese navy smashed the feeble Chinese war fleet. Shortly thereafter, Japanese troops landed at Port Arthur and captured the forts in a day. By spring, all of South Manchuria was in Japanese hands, and the way was open to Peking.

China sued for peace. Li Hung-chang went to Shimonoseki to negotiate. A Japanese fanatic attacked and wounded him. This unchivalrous conduct aroused a good deal of feeling in Japan and put the government in a mood to give China much better terms than she otherwise would have received. The peace treaty was signed on April 17, 1895.

This was not the end of the matter, however. In the treaty, China ceded the Liaotung Peninsula (South Manchuria) to Japan. Japan had conquered that region. According to current Western ideas, therefore, she was entitled to it as the spoils of war. But Russia had her eye on the same territory. She persuaded France and Germany, but failed to persuade Britain, to join her in telling Japan that "the possession of the Peninsula of Liaotung, claimed by Japan, would be a constant menace to the capital of China, would at the same time render illusory the independence of Korea, and would henceforth be a perpetual obstacle to the peace of the Far East." Therefore, Japan must not take this territory, they said. Japan was not prepared to fight the three European powers. The point finally was settled by Japan's agreement to give up her territorial claim in Manchuria in return for an increase of 30,000,000 taels in the indemnity which China was to pay. But this "triple interference" wounded Japanese pride deeply—especially since Russia, France, Germany

and Britain, within three years, each took territory in China. That sense of injury has rankled deeply in Japan ever since.

Japan gained both tangibly and intangibly from this war. Tangibly, she got from China an indemnity of 230,000,000 taels (about U. S. \$172,500,500), which paid for the entire Japanese costs of the war. She also got Formosa and the Pescadores Islands. Less tangibly, she secured China's acknowledgment of Korea's independence and full "most favored nation" status in China. This latter put her completely on a par with the Western powers. She gained for herself, and for others through the "most favored nation" clauses, the opening of four new treaty ports and, which was more important for the future, the right to build factories in China. Finally, and least tangibly, but by no means least significantly, by defeating so swiftly and so decisively the great empire of China, she convinced the Western powers that she was entitled to recognition and treatment as an equal. Moreover her military party could, and did, point to the results of the war to prove that the policy of arms and armed expansion paid.

Ten years later, Japan fought out her quarrel with Russia. She won, defeating the largest empire in the West. She received no cash indemnity, this time, but she did secure the rights which Russia had acquired from China in South Manchuria. She was firmly entrenched on the continent of Asia. She took a new and more honored place among the world powers. War and armed expansion apparently had paid again. She solemnly pledged herself to respect the independence of Korea, but in 1910 she annexed the country, thereby demonstrating the correctness of the three-power statement in 1895 that Japan's presence in Manchuria would "render illusory the independence of Korea." Subsequent Japanese acts have proved the correctness of the rest of that prophecy.

Thus the tiny island kingdom off the coast of huge China became the most powerful military nation of the Far East

and added her guns to those of the West which were battering China's wall.

IX. THE CLIMAX

In spite of their own victories over China, the European Governments still had a lingering feeling that the vast empire somehow was a power with which to reckon. But they took Japan's swift victory over her huge neighbor as conclusive evidence of China's complete impotence. They started at once to mark out "spheres of influence" for themselves, and to extort from China leaseholds, railway concessions and other grants which would put them in strategically advantageous positions to get what they wanted when the apparently inevitable partitioning of China came.

Russia was interested in Manchuria. Britain had an eye on the North China coast, the Yangtze Valley and the mainland opposite Hongkong. France wanted to extend her influence into the southwest, from the neighborhood of Indo-China where she already was entrenched, and to get into the back country north of the Yangtze River. Germany picked out the Shantung Peninsula as a good place from which to start her penetration of China. Each watched the other jealously.

The grants extorted from China were of three principal kinds: leaseholds on bits of territory which would serve as doorways for trade and, if desirable, military penetration into the interior; concessions to build railways which, besides being profitable in themselves, would be useful for trade expansion and other purposes; loans to China which would give the foundation of a claim for territory in case China should be dismembered, and also provide an excuse for interference in China's internal affairs if continued disorganization caused the loans to fall into default. All the leaseholds were for ninety-nine years, except the one Russia took on the tip of the Liaotung Peninsula with its two splendid harbors of Port Arthur and Dalny (now Dairen). This

was for twenty-five years originally, but no one expected the Russian bear to get out at the end of a quarter of a century. The railway concessions were so drawn that the foreign interests concerned furnished practically all of the money, in the form of loans, and had practically complete control of the construction and operation of the lines until the loans were repaid, though the lines themselves were nominally part of the Chinese government railway system.

The principal loans, other than those for railway construction, insured the continuation for a considerable period of foreign control of the customs administration. These loans of 1896-98 were floated by Russia, Germany, France and England, to enable China to pay off promptly the indemnity exacted by Japan in 1895. They were secured on the customs revenue. This revenue had become the principal and most dependable source of income of the Chinese government, thanks to the honesty and efficiency of the customs administration which had been organized shortly after the T'ai P'ing Rebellion as a Chinese government service under foreign, primarily British, control. By advancing the money to pay Japan, the European powers deprived Japan of the chance to use China's financial obligations as a lever in exerting influence in Chinese affairs, and got that lever in their own hands. By putting the loans on the customs revenue, they increased the effectiveness of the lever.

The scramble of the powers, and of private Western interests, to get what they could before China completely disappeared as an independent nation was not accompanied by any new armed attack on China. Quite appropriately, however, the scramble itself, which went on between 1896 and 1899, came to be called the "battle of the concessions." When the smoke of this battle subsided, the four chief European powers were well entrenched in the positions they coveted.

Russia had secured a leasehold on the Dalny-Port Arthur region with its ice-free port and railway construction rights

which gave her a strangle hold on Manchuria. Britain got the port of Weihaiwei on the north side of the Shantung Peninsula, from which she could keep an eye on Russia at Port Arthur, the right to build a railway from Peking up into Manchuria, and other less important railway concessions, an extension of the Kowloon territory opposite Hong-kong, and a promise that so long as her trade with China was larger than that of any other country, a Britisher would be head of the customs administration. The snarls of the British lion when other European powers cast their eyes toward the Yangtze Valley also had made it clear that Britain would brook no interference with what she considered her special trade prerogatives there. France took a lease on Kwanchouwan, on the southwest coast, and secured the right to build two important railways, one up into Yunnan Province from Indo-China, and one between Peking and Hankow through the western part of the North China Plain. Germany leased the beautiful and easily fortified harbor of Tsingtao, near the tip of Shantung, and secured mining and railway rights in the province which made her mastery certain whenever she wanted to take full control.

Italy tried to get a leasehold or other important concessions, but was refused. Japan, in the "triple interference" of 1895, had been told to keep her hands off, but she watched with growing indignation while the Western powers proceeded to do precisely what they had told her she must not do. The American government kept out of the scramble, but private American interests secured somewhat vague but extensive rights for railway building south and west from the Central Yangtze city of Hangkow.

Month by month, almost week by week, the expectation grew that something would happen which would precipitate an armed clash and the actual partitioning of China. Without much doubt, this would have occurred if the four chief powers of Europe had been able to agree among themselves as to who was to get what part of the melon when it was

cut. They could not so agree. Neither did they want to get into a war among themselves over the division of China; the situation in Europe was too delicately balanced, and the returns would not be worth the possible losses. So the explosion which would dismember China hung fire.

An explosion did occur, however, in 1898, which changed the picture. This was the blast which sunk the American warship, the *Maine*, in Havana harbor and led to the war between the United States and Spain. The American squadron in the Pacific rushed to the Philippines, which Spain held. Admiral Dewey took his ships into Manila Bay to attack the Spanish ships there. But British and German ships also were in the harbor. The German commander surlily intimated that if the Americans did attack he might feel called upon to interfere on the Spanish side. The British commander thereupon moved his ships so as to place them between the German and American vessels. The German admiral did not want to precipitate a war between his country and Britain—so the Americans had a free hand to deal with the weak Spanish defences. Thereby the United States acquired territorial holdings which gave her a new and important interest in the Far East, especially since the Hawaiian Islands had been annexed a short time earlier. The American victory over Spain also convinced the European powers that the United States must be taken seriously as a world power.

Promptly after getting this new position in the Far East, the American Government took a hand in the "battle of the concessions" in China. All the talk of "spheres of influence," and the grabbing of special holdings and rights here and there made it look as though Americans might be shut out of trade with China. So Secretary of State Hay, on September 6, 1899, sent the first of his famous "Open Door" notes to the chief European powers. He asked simply that the powers pledge themselves to treat alike all trade, of whatever nationality, in any ports or "spheres of influence," over which they might have or acquire control. Nothing was said

specifically about preserving the integrity of China, but Secretary Hay did call for declarations that the customs duties should continue to be collected by China, which implied that China would be left intact at least to the extent of retaining the right to collect taxes.

Britain responded promptly and in agreement. The other powers were slower and more grudging in giving the pledge requested. By the spring of 1900, however, Secretary Hay felt justified in announcing that he considered that all the powers, including Italy and Japan, had given "final and definitive" declarations by reason of which the open door would be maintained and China would be permitted to go on collecting the customs duties.

The "Open Door" was not a new principle. It was embodied in the first instructions which Lord Palmerston sent to Captain Eliot in transmitting the demands which were to be made on China in the settlement of the war which started in 1839, as we have seen. It was specifically implied in all the "most favored nation" treaty clauses. Secretary Hay's reaffirmation of the principle at this particular time, however, helped to stave off the dismemberment of China—though there is little doubt that mutual jealousy, rather than any deep respect for the United States or China, was the chief influence in leading the continental European powers to accept the American proposal.

However that may be, the real test as to whether China would be broken up came in the negotiations which followed the Boxer uprising in the summer of 1900.

Resentment against foreign aggression, hatred of the degenerate Manchu Dynasty, antagonism toward the missionaries, more or less blind revolt springing from exceptional hardship and poverty among the masses of the people—all these played their part in causing that outbreak. It began as an uprising of a secret society against the Manchus, but was cleverly turned by them against the Westerners. Enlightened viceroys and provincial governors in most of the

provinces prevented attacks on foreigners in their regions, so that the actual killings were confined to a comparatively small part of the country, near the capital. But the Empress Dowager and her bigoted advisors—of whom more will be said later—were so grossly stupid as to send government troops to take part in the siege of the foreign legations in Peking.

In due course allied foreign forces raised the siege. But the government of China had committed the unpardonable wrong of attacking the official diplomatic representatives of the foreign powers; China must be made to suffer for that indignity—so it was said.

The negotiations began in the autumn of 1900, with the astute old Li Hung-chang speaking for China and doing what he could to mitigate the penalties. At the start, it was assumed that large portions of China's territory would be taken by each of the several powers, even if a remnant of China were left nominally independent. The American representatives refused to agree to any such action. They were aided in their struggle to preserve the integrity of China by the mutual jealousy of the European powers and by Li's skill in playing one power off against another. The negotiations dragged on. Finally, on September 7, 1901, an agreement was reached. China was left intact, territorially, but a staggeringly heavy indemnity of 450,000,000 taels (about U. S. \$333,000,000) was imposed. This was to be paid in installments on the customs revenues over a period of thirty-nine years. Principal and interest together, the total amount to be paid was approximately 900,000,000 taels. This indemnity seriously crippled the Chinese Government financially, because after the payments were met, very little would be left out of the customs revenues for the government's use.

This settlement marked the definite turn from territorial to economic expansion, in the Western pressure on China. Since 1901, no new territory in the Far East has been taken

by any Western power. But Westerners have gone vigorously ahead with their economic penetration, through loans for railway construction and other purposes, through the development of trade connections, and in other ways. Western cultural penetration, directly through missionary activities and indirectly through the introduction of new goods and new ways of doing things, also has developed apace.

As far as the West was concerned, however, the danger of the dismemberment of China ended when the Western powers did not utilize the opportunity which the Boxer Uprising gave them. But Japan's territorial expansion continued.

THE DYNASTIC COLLAPSE

(CHAPTER IX)

WHEN the Emperor Hsien Feng, frightened to the very depths of his timid soul by the advance of the British and French troops, fled from Peking in 1860, there went with him the twenty-five year old mother of his only son. Forty years later, this same woman dressed herself in the cheap blue cotton clothes of a peasant, climbed into a rough Peking cart, and in her turn slipped out of Peking because Western troops were nearing the gates of the capital.

The young woman of 1860 went by the euphonious name of the minor clan from which she had come to be one of the emperor's concubines: Yehonala. The woman of 1860 had become known to the world as the masterful ruler of China: the Empress Dowager Tze Hsi.

Yehonala had taken the first long step toward mastery when, in 1856, she presented the emperor with his first and only son. Using to the full the advantage of her position as the mother of the emperor's only direct descendant, she soon secured more influence at court than the weak and dissipated emperor himself. She made many enemies, including the emperor, but she also won a number of devoted adherents.

She seized the opportunity of the flight from Peking in 1860 to get custody of the imperial seal. When the emperor died in 1861 she took control. The emperor on his deathbed had written a document ordering that she be put to death. This document disappeared. He had designated his and Yehonala's son as the next emperor, but, in a final imperial edict, named two princes and an imperial clansman as regents for the infant. Yehonala refused to surrender the imperial

seal for authenticating this document. The three would-be regents planned her assassination on the way back to Peking for the emperor's funeral, but she was saved by a childhood friend who was now commander of a detachment in the imperial guard. Yehonala promptly arranged for the execution of the three would-be regents. She had herself, the emperor's chief consort, and one of his brothers named as regents in their stead. She ruled.

So Yehonala, daughter of a minor bannerman, became the "Western Empress Dowager" and acquired the first of many honorific titles: "Tze Hsi" or "Motherly and Auspicious." Technically, she ranked second to the first consort, who was called the "Eastern Empress Dowager," and had the title of "Tze An," or "Motherly and Peaceful." Practically, she was master of the court.

She kept that mastery until her death in 1908. Her son, the Emperor T'ung Chih, reached his majority and nominally took over the reins of government in 1873. Tze Hsi continued to control affairs. In 1875, the emperor died, giving death bed instructions that his mother's power should be broken. The emperor's chief consort was pregnant when he died, but before the child could be born, the expectant mother "committed suicide." Tze Hsi wanted no direct heir around to trouble her. She had another infant named as next emperor, Kuang Hsü, so that her regency might continue. This child was her own illegitimate son by a handsome restaurant waiter, according to current gossip. In 1881, the senior empress dowager died with suspicious suddenness. Eight years later, the young Kuang Hsü reached the age to rule in his own right, but Tze Hsi kept her tight grip. In 1898 he tried to put the "Old Buddha," as Tze Hsi was being called, into compulsory retirement, but she turned the tables on him with the helpful treachery of Yuan Shih-kai, who later became first president of the Chinese Republic, and kept him a neglected and bemocked prisoner for the rest of his life. When her own final illness came, in

the autumn of 1908, the emperor also fell ill. Conveniently for her dreams of extending her power beyond the grave, the emperor died the day before she did, Tze Hsi having assisted him to mount the Dragon Chariot to Heaven, according to reports. She was able to keep a long-standing promise to make the son of an old friend the next emperor of China, by naming a four-year-old child as successor to the throne under the regency of his father.

That infant passed through many vicissitudes, among others that of being deposed in 1912 when Yuan Shih-kai forced the abdication of the Manchus. He never succeeded in realizing the wish which grew steadily stronger in him as the years passed, to escape altogether from the harassments of high place and become an ordinary citizen of China. Instead, on March 1, 1934, he was lifted, by no desire of his own, onto the throne which Japanese bayonets had set up in Manchuria and, as the Emperor Kang Teh, began a puppet reign in the land of his Manchu ancestors.

That Tze Hsi was the shrewdest and most masterful of them all at the imperial court, there is no doubt. That she was completely unscrupulous and utterly ruthless in removing from her path any who might actually or in prospect trespass on her power, is equally unquestionable. That she had certain great qualities is demonstrated by the fact that she won and kept the loyalty of some of the ablest men of China; men who would not have given loyalty through fear alone.

But the record shows, with devastatingly deadly clarity, that she completely failed to understand the real significance of the presence in Peking of those French and British troops from which her timorous husband had fled in 1860, or to see the vitally urgent need for reorganizing the whole structure of the government so that an efficient, honest and forward-looking administration might lead an orderly China into her proper place among the nations of the world. She hated the Westerners with a deep hatred throughout her

life, and despised them utterly as the most contemptible of barbarians. This hatred and contempt led her to make the colossal blunder of trying to wipe out all the Westerners in the land, and brought on her second disastrous experience with Western troops when they entered the capital to put down the Boxer uprising in 1900. That lesson opened her eyes a little to the need of reforms which would strengthen China, and she made some moves in that direction. By that time, however, the opportunity had passed.

Tze Hsi was a Queen Elizabeth in some respects. But she utterly lacked the Virgin Queen's devotion to her country, and possessed none of her breadth of vision. She took control of the Chinese court seven years before the Meiji Emperor became the leader of Japan. She had none of his far-sighted statesmanship and wisdom. Had she been of the calibre of either of these great rulers, she might have left, at the end of her forty-seven years of dominance, a peaceful and prosperous China, able to deal more effectively with the West. She could have found plenty of able men to help her make such a China, had she chosen to give to them, instead of to bigoted clansmen and scheming eunuchs, places of power. As it was, she drove China swiftly deeper into her valley of confusion.

Four centuries earlier, Nurhachi, the Manchu conqueror who started his clan on the road to the throne of China, had had one of his bitterest struggles in subduing the Yehonala clan on the Mongolian borders. After the Manchus reached the Dragon Throne, a whisper started that a damsel from this clan would cause the downfall of the dynasty. That prophecy was fulfilled by the Yehonala girl who became the Empress Dowager Tze Hsi.

II. MISUSED MASTERY

From the dynastic point of view, the most urgent need of the Peking government, when the Yehonala girl became the mother of the emperor's only son in 1856, was to crush

the T'ai P'ing Rebellion. The drive of the rebels northward in the summer of 1853 had failed to reach the capital, but the Yangtze Valley was in their grip and the menace to the throne was very far from ended. Chinese leaders were in the field on behalf of the dynasty, but the emperor was much more interested in his escapades with ladies of an ancient profession outside the palace walls than in the titanic struggle which was going on. Most of his intimates at court were concerned only with sordid intrigues by which they might gain riches and power. Yehonala seems to have had a better understanding of the needs of the situation. She did what she could to make the court a source of strength rather than of weakness to those who were fighting on its behalf. When, with the death of the emperor in 1861, she became empress dowager and secured virtually complete mastery, she continued vigorously to back the anti-rebel drive.

During this period and in the following years, she demonstrated her power to win the loyalty of able men. Tseng Kuo-fan, who played the principal part in crushing the T'ai P'ings; Tso Ts'ung-tang, who helped Tseng and then led the campaign in the northwest which ended in crushing Yakub Beg and his Mohammedan rebellion; Chang Chih-tung, who initiated and led a strong campaign for studying what the West might have to teach that would make China strong; Li Hung-chang, who first came into prominence as one of Tseng's ablest aides, and later, as viceroy at Tientsin, handled China's foreign relations and brought about the first use by the Chinese themselves of modern factories, modern railways, modern steamships, and modern equipped and trained soldiers; Liu K'un-yi, whose stern rectitude became a household word in China—with these great viceroys and others whose names are less well known, Tze Hsi established and kept close working relations in matters which concerned the internal affairs of China. She and they succeeded in bringing back to the government at Peking, for a time, something of its old authority.

But Tze Hsi thoroughly disagreed even with these leaders on questions which involved Chinese needs in dealing with the West. The Westerners pushed forward steadily, even after 1860, taking from China outlying bits of territory here and there, and pushing their economic penetration deeper and deeper into the heart of the country. The Westerners always remained to her simply loutish barbarians, who were a nuisance to be sure, but who certainly were not a serious menace or a people who possessed anything which China needed. Even Japan's victory over China did not change her attitude. She would not heed the advice of men like Tseng and Tso, Chang, and Li and Liu, in whose ability and loyalty she had confidence, when they told her that China must prepare to meet the danger from the West by learning the secrets of Western power and using them on her own behalf. Still less did she have any sympathy with those who urged the reorganization of the Chinese government and of Chinese education on Western lines.

On their own initiative, and sometimes with elaborate precautions to disguise or hide from Tze Hsi what they were doing, Tseng, Chang and Li built arsenals to make modern guns, started military schools and hired Western army men to train Chinese soldiers in modern fighting technique, and otherwise tried to prepare China to meet the West with its own weapons. They memorialized the throne, urging the study of Western mathematics and science as a means of learning and appropriating the secrets of Western power. They advocated a change in the official examinations so as to open the honorable career of scholarship and government service to young men trained in Western knowledge.

In such moves, Tze Hsi gave these leaders no support. Shut up in the palace, and making no effort to inform herself of what was going on outside of China, she utterly failed to see the need for a thoroughgoing governmental house-cleaning in China. She completely disagreed with those who urged that the despised Western barbarians were a real

menace—so completely, for example, that when, in 1891, she got her hands on about \$16,000,000 which had been allocated to improve China's navy, she used it to construct an elaborate new summer palace near Peking.

Diplomatic relations with other countries, she left to the officials of the foreign office and to Li Hung-chang. On questions which concerned the Westerners actually in China, she sided with the bigoted reactionaries at court and gave no heed to the recommendations either of the great Chinese officials who had kept her dynasty on the throne or of the wiser members of her own immediate circle. Prince K'ung, for example, elder brother of her husband the Emperor Hsien Feng, possessed considerable statesmanship and tried, but without success, to get his masterful sister-in-law to take a more intelligent view of the Western world and its relations with China. Jung Lu, one of her own clansmen, whom she had known and trusted from childhood, who had saved her from assassination during the return to Peking in 1861, who through all the years was almost the only one whose personal loyalty she never doubted and whose judgment she sought on every important occasion—even he could not get her to see that the Westerners differed in any important respect from half-civilized border tribesmen.

Nor could Prince K'ung and Jung Lu together persuade her not to embark on the monumental stupidity of the attempt in 1900 to kill or drive into the sea all the Westerners in China, though they and others, at considerable personal risk, did succeed in preventing the flame of that insanity from spreading beyond a couple of provinces in the north.

When events were moving to a crisis in the late spring of that year, Tze Hsi sent out a secret order to all the viceroys and provincial governors to slay the Westerners. But two foreign office officials, a Manchu and a Chinese, substituted "protect" for "exterminate" in the telegram, thereby making certain of their own execution, but saving hundreds of foreign and thousands of Chinese lives, and keeping

China from an infinitely worse catastrophe than that which did come. Jung Lu openly and emphatically condemned the attack on the foreign legations in Peking which Tze Hsi ordered, and privately urged the authorities in the provinces to ignore the order for the massacre of the foreigners. Chang Chih-tung and Liu K'un-yi, the two powerful Yangtze viceroys, and Li Hung-chang, viceroy at Canton, threw all their tremendous influence on the side of preserving order. They were able, in coöperation with Jung Lu, to persuade most of the provincial authorities to follow their lead. At the very time that the foreign diplomatic representatives were being besieged by the Chinese government troops at Peking, these men negotiated directly with the foreign authorities, promising full protection for foreign lives and property, and securing an agreement that foreign troops would not be sent into the provinces where this protection was given.

Such conduct, obviously, was unqualified treason. Chang, Li, Liu and the others who kept the peace, not only refused to obey the specific orders of the ruler, they acted directly contrary to these orders. A few of the lesser figures in Peking who opposed Tze Hsi's mad actions paid for their temerity with their heads. Jung Lu was too old a friend of the empress dowager, and too powerful on his own account, to be executed, though Tze Hsi did turn on him with bitter anger. Chang, Li, Liu, and the lesser viceroys and governors were too far away to be punished promptly while the madness was still on. But it shows something of the great courage of these men that they did thus openly range themselves against the mighty Tze Hsi when they saw her making a disastrous mistake. In doing that, they risked not only their official careers, but their own lives and the lives and fortunes of their families.

Tze Hsi had plenty of time to ponder over her mistakes and to realize that these men had been right and she had been wrong, during the seventeen months she was away from

Peking after fleeing from the city the night of the day that foreign troops raised the siege of the legations. She had told Jung Lu angrily that "ever since the days of Tao Kuang [emperor from 1821 to 1850] this uproarious guest within our borders has been maltreating his hosts, and it is time that all should know who is the real master of the house." She found out who the real master was, in the summer of 1900 and in the long negotiations which followed: not herself, not the reactionary officials who shared her fanatical hatred and contempt for the Westerners, but the Westerners with their guns, just as far as they cared to assert mastery.

She found, too, that even in domestic affairs she must yield to the Chinese viceroys who understood better than she did that the world had changed and that China must change with it. Even before she got back to Peking, she had forgiven the treachery of those who had defied her orders, and made the first moves to put into effect some of the reforms which they advocated.

But she was an old, weary, petulant woman of sixty-seven when she reached Peking in January, 1902. The vigor and mental flexibility of her youth were gone. For forty years she had obstructed all reforms while the governmental machinery crumbled through corruption and the country slipped down hill. She lingered on for nearly seven years, still as scornfully contemptuous as ever of the Westerners, but recognizing that some concessions must be made to the demand for reforms in China, and still keeping with her withering hands a tight grip on the threads of intrigue and power in the court. It was impossible for anyone to believe that she or her court or her dynasty could suddenly acquire the will or the capacity to lead China out of the morass into which the country had sunk.

She made gestures toward the establishment of constitutional government, and finally, in the summer of 1908, definitely promised that a constitution would be granted in

nine years, "at once importing the excellencies of the governmental system of other countries and preserving in its entirety the civilization of China." Less than three months later, she was dead. Her very last act showed that she had no real appreciation of the need for a vigorously constructive change in the government. She passed on the throne to an infant instead of to any one of the several able adults who were eligible, and named as regent the narrow and stupidly petty-minded Prince Ch'un, father of the infant and brother of the emperor who so conveniently had died the day before Tze Hsi herself ascended on high.

Before Tze Hsi died, all the able leaders of the last half of the nineteenth century had passed off the scene: men who might have lifted China back to some position of dignity had they received her whole-hearted coöperation instead of her persistent indifference or opposition in reconstruction. Tseng Kuo-fan, Chang Chih-tung, Li Hung-chang, Liu K'un-yi, Jung Lu—neither they nor men of their calibre remained to help guide the government on a new course. Only one strong man from Tze Hsi's days of great power was left, the completely unscrupulous, entirely selfish, treacherous, but exceedingly able, Yuan Shih-kai.

With typical stupidity, the regent promptly sent Yuan into retirement, thereby losing his support and making certain that Yuan would take revenge when the opportunity came.

Yuan had his chance when the republican flurry broke out in the Yangtze Valley in the autumn of 1911. Circumstances compelled the regent to call him back and give him practically dictatorial powers. Yuan used these to force the Manchus off the throne—so that it might be clear for himself when the time came.

On February 12, 1912, imperial edicts of abdication were issued, handing over "the sovereignty to be the possession of the whole people," and declaring that "the constitution shall henceforth be Republican." By this same edict, Yuan

Shih-kai was entrusted "with full powers" to unite the North and the South and "to organize a provisional Republican Government, conferring thereon with the representatives of the Army of the People, that peace may be assured to the People whilst the complete integrity of the territories, Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Mohammedans and Tibetans, is at the same time maintained, making altogether a great state under the title of the Republic of China."

Thus the Manchu Dynasty ended and the experiment began of a government copied from the West, with whose concepts, forms, and methods the people of China were utterly unfamiliar.

That masterful, childish, brilliant, unscrupulous, proud, frequently petty and always fascinating woman from the Yehonala clan was not on hand to put her signature to the final decree of abdication. But for forty-seven years, while the pressure steadily increased on the outside of China's wall of isolation, and the breaches in that wall constantly widened, unintentionally but very effectively she had been tearing down the wall from inside and nullifying the efforts of those who sought to adapt China to the conditions which the progressive collapse of that wall were creating.

THE NEW CURRENTS

(CHAPTER X)

WESTERN guns made the breaches in China's wall through which Western goods and ideas could flow. But Western arms, Western forceful imposition of special privileges for foreigners in China, Western seizure of Chinese territory were not in themselves of much importance in the disruption and re-making of Chinese civilization which has been going on, with so much confusion, in the past two generations. The potent influences have been the Western goods and ideas which passed through the gateways opened up by the guns. The potent agencies have been the means of swift and cheap transportation and communication. The ponderable things manufactured in the West and carried to China or made in China on Western models, and the imponderable ideas and attitudes toward life which have accompanied the penetration of these new things, both moving with unprecedented speed in the new channels, have found their way into the farthest corners of the land. They are destroying the old China and laying foundations for the new.

In any tiny village in China today, for example, from the bleak borders of the Gobi desert in Mongolia to the hot mud flats of the Canton River, from the rocky tip of Shantung thrust out into the China Sea to the shores of the salty lake, Kokonor, lying blue and deep far toward Central Asia, cigarettes are on sale—even half a cigarette may be purchased, if one has but a few copper “cash” to spend on this luxury. The fathers of the present day cigarette smokers, in their youth, never heard of cigarettes. For their smoking, they used, and still do in many cases, the old water pipes, or the cumbersome long stemmed pipes with a tiny bowl at the end big enough to hold only a pinch of tobacco.

New ideas also have come. Today the young men in these villages, gossiping with their friends, use phrases whose meaning would have been utterly incomprehensible to their fathers: such phrases as *min kuo* or *min sheng*, or *tze pen chu i*, or *kung ch'an chu i*, which slip with the casualness of the commonplace into the talk of the *people's country*, the *people's livelihood*, *capitalism*, *communism*.

Kerosene, similarly, furnishes light everywhere. Tiny village shops or itinerant peddlars sell it, a spoonful or two at a time, if desired, for the housewives to use in small tin lamps with glass chimneys. These lamps do not give a brilliant light, to be sure, but their illumination is vastly better than that from the smoky flame of a wick floating in a clay bowl of bean or sesamum seed oil—the kind of lamp used by the peasants of a generation ago.

While the village women may speak in scandalized horror of the way girls in Shanghai or Peiping bob their hair, dance in public places with young men, and even choose their own husbands, they know that such things are becoming more and more common, and not a few of them are thinking that this new freedom for women would be pleasant.

For those who feel that the old way of determining time by glancing at the sun no longer meets their needs, wrist watches are to be had in every small market town. The farmer from the village, in town to sell his crops, may buy a shiny white enameled-ware basin to take the place of the old copper or iron vessel which he and his family have used for several generations—a basin which, though he may not know it, is exactly like those sold in country stores all over the United States. Perhaps he will buy, too, a felt hat like those which probably half the men in his village wear, instead of the awkward old head covering of straw—though he may be quite unaware that most of the men on New York's Fifth Avenue or London's Oxford Street wear hats of the same general shape and material.

If the town barber, while shaving the villager's head—

even the old father has cut off his queue—begins to talk about the new bus line, the villager will not need to ask what he means when he mentions a *ch'i ch'eh*, because he knows already about these new *gas carts*, even if he has never seen one. If an old shopkeeper begins to sigh regretfully for the "good old days" when things went along in the decent and established ancient ways under the *huang ti*, instead of being all upset as they are since China got this newfangled *kuo min cheng fu*, the young man from the village will listen tolerantly, since he knows that all old men always think the world is much worse than it used to be, even though he himself may feel that it was a good thing to get rid of the *emperor* and try a *people's government*.

Thus new things and new ideas have trickled back into the most remote hamlets of China. The ponderables and imponderables cannot be separated. New goods create new desires and new ways of living, which create new ways of thinking. New ideas and attitudes in turn create the demand for new things and techniques.

Every ship which has sailed from the West to China has carried, with its visible cargo of goods, its invisible cargo of ideas. Every yard of factory-made cloth, whether from the West or from a modern mill in China, wraps its wearer around with a new way of thinking. Every cheap glass mirror hanging on the mud wall of a peasant's hut in the far hinterland, reflects a bit of the thoughts of the world, so different from those of the peasant's ancestors who had no mirror at all, or only a dim bronze plate. Every click of the wheels of a railway train on its way across the China plains, every explosion in the cylinders of an autobus stuttering along a dirt road, is a voice crying new thoughts in an old land.

We can measure the movement of the ponderables. Statistics can tell us how much China's foreign trade has increased and in what ways its character has changed; how many modern banks have been organized and what the vol-

ume of their business is; how many spindles there are in how many modern cotton mills; how many miles of railways and motor roads are at work carrying the people and their goods out of the older narrow circles of their lives; how many children go to how many and what kinds of schools. It is true that statistics on China are painfully meagre and undependable. But from such as there are, we can learn a little about the extent to which the people are using new goods and techniques.

Such information is important, but not in itself. For our purposes, the information which statistics can give us of the ponderable, visible, measurable changes is valuable only as it helps to an understanding of what these changes mean in terms of the imponderable, invisible, statistically unmeasurable reshaping of a civilization. Changes in political, economic and social forms and practices interest us because they are the outward and visible evidence of the growth of new ways of thinking. Behind the débris of the wall which has crumbled, a new China is in the making. We need to understand the ideas of those who are building that new China; for, after all, the ideas in men's minds, not the things in their hands, determine the course of history.

II. DISCRIMINATION BEGINS

Chinese reaction to contacts with the modern West has developed through three stages.

The first stage began with the early contacts and continued until the occupation of Peking by the British and French troops in 1860. This stage was marked by an indiscriminating assumption that everything Western was inferior to everything Chinese and, on the whole, undesirable. The end of this stage came when the Westerners proved their superior fighting ability.

The reaction in the second stage was equally indiscriminating, but in the opposite direction. At first in arms and mechanical devices, later in political forms, and still later

in social customs and ideals, Western superiority and Chinese inferiority were assumed. It was taken for granted that China could equal and surpass the West simply by copying Western ways, machines and methods. The question of whether these ways and methods fitted China's needs was ignored, almost completely.

The most obvious demonstration of Western superiority had been in arms. So the copying began with efforts to learn Western fighting technique and to get Western fighting equipment. Then the superior effectiveness of Western steamships and machinery became clear. (The nine up-to-date American steamships on the Yangtze in 1865, for example, were rapidly taking trade away from the Chinese junks. The handicraft cotton weavers were being ruined by the flood of cheap cotton goods made on machines in England.) But a few guns, some steamships, several factories, some miles of railways and telegraphs—these did not bring China strength to resist the West.

Then the feeling grew that the West's power perhaps sprang from other than purely mechanical sources; forms of government, systems of education, social and political ideas—perhaps the power of the West rooted in such things. So the copying from Western models began in these fields. Elaborate plans for reform were drafted, on paper, and embodied in imperial decrees or republican constitutions. Deliberately, these were made close copies of Western models. The millennium would arrive, ardent and inexperienced reformers thought, the day after a constitution such as Western countries had was voted, or a Western style legal code was promulgated, or a Western educational system was decreed. A few urged that these things from the West did not suit Chinese conditions and could not solve her problems. Others argued that China's salvation lay along the road back to her own past. These voices were drowned out by the cry that China could be strong only by copying the West.

The millennium did not arrive, of course. In fact, it

seemed farther away than ever after the first few years of the Republic. Then the West itself gave an overwhelming demonstration, in the World War, of the unsoundness of its own civilization.

The third stage in the reaction was reached—the stage of discriminating selection. This is the present stage.

From small beginnings, the conviction has grown steadily, since the War, that China must select wisely from both the modern West and her own past in building the new China. Borrow from the West? Yes, such ideas as may be useful, but adapt whatever is borrowed to Chinese conditions. Return to old China? Yes, for such materials for the new China as may be found on the long road of Chinese history, but re-shape these to the requirements of China today.

To adapt to present needs, however, it is necessary to know what those needs are. The Chinese have found themselves distressingly ignorant of China. In these recent years, therefore, there has been a truly amazing growth of serious, detailed study of China by the Chinese. The government, the bankers, the merchants, the scholars in and out of the universities and colleges, more and more are turning their thoughts and energies away from drafting grandiose paper schemes for what China might be toward specific and toilsome study of what she is.

Much more needs to be done along these lines, but the results already are beginning to show. Within the past decade—but not much earlier—there has come to be real hope that the Chinese will find their way out of their present disorganization within a reasonable time. That hope springs from the fact that the old indiscriminating condemnation of things Western and acceptance of things Chinese, and the equally indiscriminating scramble after things Western and rejection of things Chinese, have ended. Discriminative selection both from the West and from China's past has begun.

Quite possibly, when the new China begins to function,

it will contain little obviously recognizable as taken from the old. But much of the old, radically recarved perhaps, will be there, none the less.

III. BIRTH PANGS

Meanwhile China is passing through the travail of a new birth.

The life of a nation adjusted to centuries-old conditions of living cannot be turned into new paths without far-reaching and long-drawn disorganization. One-fourth of the people of the earth cannot in so brief a time as three-quarters of a century make even a start toward changing their whole attitude toward life and their entire conception of their relation to their country and to each other, without grave dislocations of the social structure.

Especially is this true for China, in which for so many centuries action has been based on the assumption that the people should manage their own affairs, not have them managed for them. Neither the social and political structure, nor the precedent and tradition of the centuries, provided for direction from above. Reorganization and reconstruction could come only by the slow percolation of ideas through to the masses and by the disturbing upthrust of new demands from the masses. China, unlike Japan, could not be remade from above downward.

Even so, able and patriotic leadership would have helped. It was China's misfortune that when she was called on to pass through the fires of reconstruction, those at the head of the government were woefully decadent or selfish, and that the advocates of change too frequently were men young in experience or judgment, or both, who rushed forward with ill-conceived enthusiasm, expecting that the adoption of a few high-sounding resolutions and the promulgation of a few patly worded laws would usher in a miraculously prompt New Day.

It was China's misfortune, too, that she was so vast in ter-

ritory and population. Her problems would have been incalculably simplified had her people been numbered by the tens instead of the hundreds of millions, and if her area had been only as many acres as it was square miles. China possessed enough statesmanlike leaders to deal with the problems of a country no bigger than Japan, whose area was one twenty-ninth and whose population was one-tenth of China's. But a continent cannot promptly achieve the coherence which is possible in a small island empire, especially when for generations the people of the continent have been accustomed to managing their own affairs, while those of the island empire have been rigidly controlled from above. A score of able men, controlling a tightly knit administrative system such as Japan had, could plan for, guide and drive forward Japan's score and a half million people. Many score of able men would have found it difficult to do these things for China's twenty score million people, especially since the Chinese have not been accustomed to being driven.

REBUILDING THE GOVERNMENT

(CHAPTER XI)

BACK in 1873, a seven-year-old boy started going to school in a small village near Macao. His father was a peasant. His uncle was his first school teacher, in the little class which met in the village temple. His first school book was the "Trimetrical Classic," the primer which practically every educated Chinese for generations had used in taking his first steps on the difficult road to learning. His first task was to begin committing the Classic to memory, by rote, without explanations, in the traditional way. The very first phrases he learned, were (reading from the upper right corner down):

習性性人

相相本之

遠近善初

Hsi
hsiang
yuan

Hsiñg
hsiang
chin

Hsiñg
peñ
shan

Jeñ
chih
ch'u

which expressed a conception of human nature that has been fundamental in Chinese thought since very ancient times: the conception that

Men at birth (are)

In nature fundamentally good.

In nature (they are) mutually near.

In activity (they are) mutually far apart.

Thus the boy Sun Wen began his education, conventionally enough—the boy who was later to become the world figure Sun Yat-sen, the inspirer and leader of the most important section of the political division of the revolution which has been moving forward in China during these past forty years.

But this boy's environment was far from conventional, even at this early stage in his career. His father, as a young man, had gone adventuring to the Portuguese settlement at Macao where he worked for a time as a tailor. His uncle-teacher had fought in the ranks of the T'ai P'ing rebels, and fired the boy's imagination with tales which glorified the deeds of the least respected members of Chinese society, the soldiers. So inspired, the boy took more delight in war games than in occupations better suited to one who wished to occupy the honored place of the scholar. He dismayed his parents, but doubtless pleased his uncle, by proclaiming that when he grew up he was going to be a soldier and fight against the Manchus until he made himself the Rebel Emperor.

The boy Sun Wen had six years of this normal Chinese schooling in this partially abnormal environment. Then, at the age of thirteen, because his rebellious talk and his flaunting of tradition already had made him a source of trouble in the village, he was shipped off to an older brother in Honolulu. There he spent five years in Americanized schools.

In Honolulu, not only was he out of China, but he was among people who, unlike the Chinese, were predominantly political minded. All around him surged talk of how man

could make his most rapid progress and achieve his highest good by political means, by establishing "government of the people, by the people and for the people." "The greatest happiness of the greatest number," he heard and read and was taught, was the goal to be striven for, and the direct road to that goal was the road of political action. Loyalty was due, not to personal rulers, but to the politically organized group called the nation to which the citizen belonged. Every good citizen was patriotically devoted to the service of his nation and jealous of its honor as an independent and sovereign equal among the nations. Peace and good will among all men was to be achieved through the coöperation along political lines of these politically organized, sovereign and equal nations. Such ideas as these filled the very air which the boy Sun Wen breathed, there in Honolulu between 1879 and 1883.

These were the years, the first five of his teens, when the boy's conceptions of the world in which he lived, and of his own part in it, and of how its problems might be solved, were settling into their permanent forms. The ideas and attitudes of those to whom he looked for guidance were utterly un-Chinese, but they so powerfully influenced the growing boy's exceptionally keen mind and ardent spirit, that his brother sent him back to the home village lest he become too completely Westernized.

A few weeks of him, with what seemed to them his wild talk of the need for political change, was quite enough for the villagers. The climax and the need for prompt action came when he smashed the chief figure in the village temple as a gesture of defiance of all the old mores. His family, in alarm, packed him off again.

This time he was sent to an English school, Queen's College, in Hongkong. Two years there, then a year in a missionary medical school at Canton, then five years in the new British medical college at Hongkong, and, in 1892, at the age of twenty-six, Sun Wen had finished his formal educa-

tion, acquiring a "Certificate of Proficiency in Medicine and Surgery." Already he had acquired something of a reputation as a revolutionary agitator.

For the first six of his nineteen years of schooling, Sun Yat-sen had followed the conventional Chinese routine, though in a distinctly unconventional family environment. For the remaining thirteen of his student years, the dominant influences of his school environment were Western, not Chinese. During the five most formative of these thirteen years he was away from China altogether, attending American missionary schools in the Americanized city of Honolulu. In these schools, devotion to the service of one's fellows was stressed. That attitude took deep root in the boy's spirit. In and out of these schools, too, it was taken completely for granted that, since man was primarily a political animal, the sure way to the solution of the problems of men in society was the political way. That conception became the foundation of his thinking. For seven years he was under British influence in the colony of Hongkong. His teachers there also were devoted to human service, but the young man's mind and temperament already were too definitely turned to politics for him to acquire an abiding interest in the study and practice of medicine.

Sun Yat-sen came out of these school years with a superbly unselfish determination to save China. Through the long years of struggle and danger and disappointment which followed, he never lost his fine and dynamic patriotism. This quality of his spirit, this moral excellence, won for him the influence which came to be his, not his political shrewdness, nor his military capacity, nor his administrative genius. In these he was weak. In character he was strong.

Sun Yat-sen made many mistakes, and his judgment of men and methods often was seriously at fault. Yet, deservedly, he came to be honored and revered throughout the land. Today his body rests in a mausoleum on the side of Purple Mountain, near Nanking and overlooking the tombs

of China's last Chinese rulers, the Ming emperors. That mausoleum is among the most impressive monuments which men anywhere have erected to honor their dead. It is fitting that this should be so in a land whose people hold that moral worth is the sole proper foundation for honor.

II. BORING FROM WITHIN

Before Sun Yat-sen was born, the great viceroys of the last half of the nineteenth century had begun their efforts to get for China what they thought she most needed: strength to resist the West. They realized, after the disastrous experiences with the Westerners culminating in 1860, that the world had changed and that China was pitifully weak in this new world. They had no idea, however, that China needed to learn anything from the West except its efficiency in the barbarian business of fighting.

The first actual use which the Chinese authorities made of modern machinery, in fact, was to build arsenals for the manufacture of modern weapons. The first additions to Chinese education which they introduced were Western military tactics and mathematics as specifically applicable to military problems. Even before 1860 the Chinese had used Western arms and military skill, on occasion. Now, Tseng Kuo-fan, Li Hung-chang, and some of the other viceroys, deliberately set out to make the Chinese armies effective enough to resist the West. In this, they had the support of some of the more statesmanlike men at the court, but not of the Empress Dowager Tze Hsi. In spite of her indifference or positive antagonism, however, they did get something done.

Li built an arsenal at Shanghai. Tso put one up at Foo-chow. Both hired Westerners to teach courses in science and mathematics, especially geometry, at the arsenals. Tseng sponsored the translation of the second part of Euclid's geometry—Matteo Ricci had translated the first part toward the close of the Ming Dynasty, 250 years earlier—and pub-

lished the whole with the avowed purpose of encouraging the study of mathematics for military purposes. These men and others repeatedly memorialized the throne recommending changes in the official examination system and other steps to encourage the study of modern science and languages in order to acquire the military strength and mechanical efficiency of the Western nations.

Steps also were taken to provide better facilities for dealing directly with the Western powers. In 1867, for example, Anson Burlingame, who had just resigned as American minister to China, was made head of a mission to go to the United States and Europe in order to explain China's case. Between 1872 and 1875, a total of 120 boys were sent to the United States by the imperial government to study; but they were recalled soon after because it was thought they might acquire ideas that were too revolutionary. Other students, on their own initiative, or sent by the provincial governments, went to the West or to Japan, in the hope of learning something of Western civilization. A school also was started to train young Chinese in Western languages, law and diplomatic procedure.

At first, the belief was that the secret of Western superiority in force lay solely in Western arms and Western military methods. All China needed to do, according to the beliefs of those who favored the changes at this time, was to get modern arms and a knowledge of how to use them. With these she could stop the Western advance.

Then Western trade penetration began to develop, in addition to the military pressure. So these viceroys and their associates, especially Li Hung-chang, began urging the building of steamships, of factories, of railroads, of telegraphs. They wanted these for peaceful purposes. But the driving force behind all the efforts to get these Western mechanical devices was still the desire to make China strong so that she could resist Western penetration. They were completely sure of the superiority of Chinese civilization in its moral

and cultural fundamentals. They wanted to supplement this inner strength and superiority with the outer and cruder strength which they thought was all the West had to teach China. Arms first, of course; then steamships, factories, railroads, telegraphs, and the rest, because these directly helped military strength and indirectly were useful in resisting the West. Education from the West, of course; but education only in the practical things because it was these only that China needed to learn.

That was the spirit which dominated the men who tried, in the last four decades of the nineteenth century, to start the modernization of China. Germany was hailed as the Western nation most worth studying because she had proved herself so good a fighter in her wars with Austria and France. Japan was studied and copied as an admirable model, because Japan so successfully had learned the mechanics of Western civilization that, in 1895, she was able to defeat China herself. The Chinese did not think with pleasure of that defeat, but they felt no particular antagonism toward the Japanese; instead they rushed all the more eagerly to Japan to learn how she had made herself so powerful in so short a time.

Power these men wanted from the West, not culture, not moral values, not religion, not civilization, not improvement in the lot of the common people of China. Power, to meet the barbarian West with barbarian effectiveness, since it seemed that barbarian methods alone could influence the West.

Chang Chih-tung summed up this attitude in a collection of essays which he sponsored in 1898. Three things must be done, he said. "The first is to maintain the reigning dynasty; the second is to conserve the holy religion [Confucianism]; and the third is to protect the Chinese race. These are inseparably connected; in fact, they constitute one." And in a summary of these essays, he laid down "Five Objects of Knowledge":

1. Know the shame of not being like Japan, Turkey, Siam and Cuba.
2. Know the fear that we will become as India, Annam, Burma, Korea, Egypt and Poland.
3. Know that if we do not change our customs we cannot reform our methods, and if we do not reform our methods we cannot utilize the modern implements of war.
4. Know what is important. The study of the old is not urgent; the call for men of attainments in useful knowledge is pressing.
5. Know what is fundamental. When abroad, do not forget your own native country; when you see strange customs, do not forget your parents; and let not much wisdom and ingenuity make you forget the holy sages.

To Chang Chih-tung also is attributed an epigram which gained wide circulation: "Chinese learning is for guidance; Western learning is for practical use."

Something was accomplished, under the pressure which these men exerted and through their patronage of reform movements. But the development was spasmodic, disjointed, uncoördinated. Tze Hsi, dominant at court, saw no need for a broadly conceived program of reconstruction, so none could be developed.

Then, in 1898, came the "hundred days" which furnished the first of many examples of how much harm could be done when patriotic and enthusiastic but utterly inexperienced young men get their hands on the reins of government and tried over night to remake the world according to their hearts' desire.

This attempt at reform came in Peking, and, quite unlike Sun Yat-sen who had just begun his open revolutionary activity in the Canton area, the reformers tried to work through the Manchu emperor rather than to overthrow the dynasty. Tze Hsi's regency nominally had ended nine years earlier, when the Emperor Kuang Hsü reached his majority at the age of sixteen. But she retained practically complete control. Now a group of young enthusiasts, most of whom had studied in Japan rather than in any Western country,

secured the ear of the young emperor and persuaded him to strike out boldly on his own account.

Between June 11 and September 22, 1898, imperial edicts flowed from the palace in a swift stream. They called for sweeping changes in the official system, in the army, in education, in institutions of all kinds. As exercises in the theoretical statement of political ideals, these edicts were excellent. As instructions to be carried out in actual practice, they were worse than futile. They touched all classes of Chinese society from the peasants to the highest officials. Sponsored by "a visionary enthusiast and an inexperienced weakling," they aroused nation-wide opposition. The only open support came from Cantonese, who were distrusted as revolutionaries. Chang Chih-tung was mildly approving; others were strictly neutral. Li Hung-chang was definitely in opposition. The Manchu clansmen saw themselves pushed aside and the empress dowager felt that even her life was in danger.

One of the chief reasons for the opposition was that the would-be reformers of China wanted to do their re-making along Western lines, not only in mechanical things, but even in government and education. An edict of September 13, 1898, shows how indiscriminating these young men were in their admiration for the West—and how completely the attitude had changed since Ch'ien Lung sent his famous letter to George III, which is quoted in an earlier chapter. Part of this 1898 edict reads:

The Westerners are our superiors in that they possess more zeal and perseverance in their pursuit of knowledge . . . Westerners are wise and far-seeing; they bring wealth to their families and comfort to their bodies; they have that which brightens the intellect and improves the person; they have even longevity at command. All these things have been given them by their system of education . . . We have considered and studied the benefit of Western learning and morning and night our heart is filled with the desire to introduce these reforms into our country . . . We indeed yearn to nourish and better our people so that they may have and enjoy of the best

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that modern times can give. Moreover there is also the fact that the nations around us are gathering about us; they have come to take away what we cannot keep.

It is easy to imagine how such talk must have sounded to the shrewd, masterful Tze Hsi, to the thousands of officials battenning on the country, to the men of the old scholar and gentry class who believed that all wisdom was distilled in the Confucian classics, and even to the peasants and merchants who had lost all faith in the Manchu dynasty and who wanted simply to be let alone.

Chang Chih-tung put his finger on the difficulty, in the essay already referred to:

The Conservatives evidently are off their food from inability to swallow, whilst Liberals are like a flock of sheep who have arrived at a road of many forks and do not know which to follow. The former do not understand what international intercourse means, the latter are ignorant of what is fundamental in Chinese affairs. The Conservatives fail to see the utility of modern military methods and the benefits of successful change, while the Progressives, zealous without knowledge, look with contempt upon our widespread doctrines of Confucius . . .

The present condition of things is not due to outside nations but to China herself.

The reformers soon realized what a storm of indignation they were arousing. In particular, they feared the empress dowager, watching from her retirement. They approached one of Li Hung-chang's protégés, Yuan Shih-kai, who had built up a small but effective "model army" at Tientsin. He promised to support them and to keep Tze Hsi from making trouble. He brought his troops up to the capital. But he had no sympathy with the reformers, and he believed that he personally would profit much more by working with the Old Buddha than by turning against her to join these inexperienced youngsters. So he got in touch with her. When she gave the signal, he turned on those whom he had promised to aid. The young emperor was practically imprisoned. Those of the reformers who could be caught were

beheaded. Tze Hsi resumed her regency. The "hundred days" were over.

Exactly thirty years earlier a sixteen year old boy had become emperor of Japan and, surrounded by a group of young men, had started to modernize his country. He and his associates had the tremendous advantage of Japan's small size and her long tradition of unquestioning obedience to a strong central authority. The young emperor of China and his associates utterly lacked these advantages. But they lacked more. They lacked the statesmanship to see that changes must be made slowly, and that an attempt to reweave too suddenly the political and social fabric could end only in disaster. They were patriotic, sincere, enthusiastic. They tried to help China. They succeeded only in stirring up reaction against reform of any kind; and it was this reaction that made it possible for Tze Hsi to plunge China over the precipice in the Boxer year of 1900.

When the wreckage of that folly was cleared away, the last of the great viceroys of the nineteenth century had passed off the stage. Sun Yat-sen definitely had launched his campaign to overthrow the dynasty, though he still seems to have been uncertain whether he wanted a constitutional monarchy or a republic, in its place. The Old Buddha had had her eyes opened to the need for reorganization in the government. And Yuan Shih-kai, who was to be the "strong man" of China until his death in 1916, had committed his first act of treachery.

III. ATTACKING FROM OUTSIDE

Four years before the "hundred days" of 1898, Sun Yat-sen had organized his first secret revolutionary society, the Hsin Chung Hui, or Regenerate China Society. The announced purpose of this society was not to overthrow the Manchus; still less was it to do away altogether with the monarchical system of government. It was simply to secure the introduction of a constitutional system.

The first open clash with the authorities came in 1895 when Sun and his associates plotted an attack on the viceroy's yamen at Canton. The plot was discovered. Some of the plotters were caught and executed, but Sun escaped. The Manchu authorities, however, showed how dangerous they considered him even then by putting the extraordinarily high price of 200,000 taels (about \$150,000) on his head, dead or alive. Thereafter, as one of Sun's apologists says, "the Chinese Revolution in Sun's mind was identified with the establishment of the Republic."

Sun himself went to Hongkong and then through Japan to Hawaii, the United States, and Europe, carrying his revolutionary agitation to the Chinese students and businessmen in these regions, and raising such money as he could for the cause.

This trip broadened the scope of Sun's thinking. He met the Henry George "single taxers" in the United States, and during the two years he spent in Europe he was closely in touch with the leaders in the labor and socialist movements. When he got back to Japan in 1898 he still was convinced that the chief need for China was a complete political change to create a strong and internationally independent nationalistic state. But he had also begun to think of democratic freedom and improvement in the living conditions of the people as necessary parts of the revolution. He remained, however, essentially Western rather than Chinese in his thinking.

On the positive side of his program, Sun went far beyond the purposes of what proved to be for years his principal support in China itself: the old revolutionary secret societies.

From very ancient times, the common people in China had had secret societies as the means by which they expressed their opposition to those in authority. Because they were secret, little about these organizations is to be found in the records. There is no doubt, however, that, through the centuries, they had great influence on political developments. They grew in membership and extent of operations during periods of

political and economic disturbance. They died down when peace and prosperity returned. Some of these societies were large and aimed at the overthrow of a dynasty. Others were small and sought only to get rid of a local official or to oust oppressive local landlords. The programs and size of the societies varied widely. But the organizations were essentially similar in being the organs of united popular action against intolerable oppression.

Societies of this kind supplied the founder of the Ming Dynasty with the power which enabled him to oust Kublai Khan's successors from the throne. Similar bodies, under various names, were the driving force behind the T'ai P'ing Rebellion. In spite of vigorous official efforts to suppress them, a number of these societies still were very much alive in opposition to the Manchus at the end of the nineteenth century. They have continued to play an important part in the troubled years since then. Today they are the quills in the Manchurian porcupine, for Japan.

When Sun Yat-sen began his revolutionary career, therefore, it was natural enough for him to turn to these already existing anti-Manchu societies for support. He joined one of the largest and most powerful of them, the Ko Lao Hui (Brothers and Elders Society), even before he organized his own first secret society. Until his movement succeeded, with the establishment of the Republic, he continued to use the ancient technique of the secret societies and to receive a good deal of support from them. As a matter of fact, these older and purely Chinese secret societies furnished the real power which carried Sun's movement forward.

But the secret societies were made up almost entirely of men from the mass of the people. They were motivated by a blind revolt against the established authorities. As had been the case through the centuries, however, their object was negative, not positive. They wanted to overthrow the Manchus, and they were ready to work with Sun or anyone else who also had this purpose. Beyond that they had no

object. They neither understood nor cared about the positive side of Sun's program, the part which called for a reorganization of the whole governmental system.

For the very reason that they supported him when he was struggling against the Manchus, however, these societies and the mass feeling which they represented turned against Sun and his associates when they came into power. Had the dream of a millennium of peace and prosperity been realized promptly after the overthrow of the Manchus, the organizations of political discontent with hard conditions of life might have been satisfied to let the new authorities alone to play with the machinery of government as they chose. After all, the mass of the people cared nothing whatever about the form of government; all they wanted was to be left in peace so that they could earn a modest living. In this respect, conditions for the people did not change with the establishment of the Republic. Popular feeling against the established authorities just because they were in authority, therefore, turned against Sun and his associates the moment they secured control of the machinery of government. Sun Yat-sen with a price on his head as a dangerous rebel, was a hero struggling to shake off the yoke of oppression. That same Sun Yat-sen, in authority with the poverty and suffering of the people unchanged, was simply another oppressor.

This persistent opposition of the mass of the people to those in authority, whom they blamed for the hard conditions of their lives, has been a seriously disturbing factor all through the years of the Republic. The movement for the Republic had the support of the secret societies—until it succeeded. Sun and his immediate associates were ousted from authority in the Republic very soon after its establishment. As outsiders, they regained secret society support. But when, in 1922, for example, Sun again came into power as the head of the administration at Canton, within a few months the feeling turned against him and it was possible for a politico-military adventurer to drive him out.

The peasants knew only that they were having a hard time. The widespread distress kept alive the blind spirit of revolt against things as they were, revolt which struck out wildly with persistent and often great power, but behind which lay no capacity to see beyond the immediate object of overthrowing the man who was conspicuous because he happened to sit in the seat of authority. Having no ballots, the peasant used bullets—or swords, or scythes or pitchforks or boycotts or whatever other weapon might be handy.

Because he was against the Manchus, Sun could and did get support from the old secret societies. But from them he received none of the stabilizing, constructive criticism of the positive side of his program, which he needed.

Nor did he receive this kind of contribution to his work from the responsible gentry, literati and merchant classes in China. They would have nothing to do with him and what they considered his wild ideas. Behind closed doors they might whisper about the desirability of getting rid of the Manchus. Some of the men from these classes were active in pressing for the constitutional reforms toward which the empress dowager began to move in 1905. A considerable number were ready to support, somewhat passively, the demand that these reforms be carried forward when the Old Buddha seemed to hesitate. But as for the Republic for which Sun was working—to the solid middle class in China, that seemed simply the hairbrained and dangerous idea of a man who knew nothing about China and who had no respect for China's great traditions.

So it came about that for support on the positive side of his program, with its political concepts and its emphasis on political action, Sun was compelled to turn to those who, like himself, had learned to think more or less completely in Western terms. In the years before the establishment of the Republic made republicanism safe in China, he found these chiefly among the students who had gone to Japan or to Western countries to study the secrets of Western power. Conse-

quently, with very few exceptions, all of those who shared with him in the formulation of the revolutionary program were very young men, many not more than boys. They were filled with a splendid patriotism. They wanted to make China strong and great among the nations. In their youthful enthusiasm, they were convinced that this could be done by Westernizing China as Japan was being Westernized. But they were utterly without practical administrative experience, they knew none too much about China herself, and in their youthful ardor they were impatient of the slower processes of reform by successive steps in the constitutionalizing of the government. In any case, they were convinced that no good possibly could come through or from the Manchu Dynasty which had proved itself so utterly decadent.

Uneducated peasants revolting blindly, and ardent youngsters with no administrative experience and little, if any, real understanding either of their own country or of the history of the countries whose ways they so eagerly wanted to copy—such were the two sources from which came the support of that part of the revolutionary movement with which Sun Yat-sen was particularly associated. Such sources could not produce an organization with the judgment, the cohesiveness, or the constructive power to control and direct affairs in the vast, loosely knit land of China, even if it had been called on simply to keep the wheels of government running smoothly in the old channels. Still less could there come from such sources the capacity to carry through smoothly the scrapping of the ancient machinery and the creation in its place of so radically new a system.

The demonstration of that fundamental incapacity came promptly after a series of events, which had no direct connection with Sun's revolutionary movement, had cleared the way for the downfall of the Manchus in 1912.

Following the return of two imperial commissions which went abroad in 1905 to study Western political systems, the

empress dowager had moved toward the introduction of constitutional government. An edict of 1906 called for gradual preparation. In 1907 elections were held for certain municipal councils. Provincial assemblies were elected in 1908. They met in the autumn of 1909 and made an excellent impression by the dignity with which they undertook their work. A year later, a national assembly met, with half the members appointed by the regent and half elected by the provincial assemblies. None of these bodies, however, had been given any authority; they were consultative only. Nevertheless, they made their influence strongly felt. Even many of the members of the national assembly who had been appointed by the regent joined in the demand that the introduction of real constitutional government be hastened. In 1908 the empress dowager had said the process would be completed in nine years. In 1910, the regent was compelled by the national assembly to promise that the time would be cut to five years, so that a real parliament would meet in 1913. The sessions of the assembly were stormy in the demand for a real share in the control of the government. The assembly adjourned at the beginning of 1911, but met again in the autumn, when it forced its views still more effectively on the regent.

Another series of events which helped to hasten the Manchu downfall had to do with the development of railways. From the signing of the first foreign railway loan agreement (with the British in 1898), the Peking government's policy had been to keep all railways in its own hands. Local groups in various parts of the country were refused permission to build private lines. Nevertheless, private interests centering in the upper Yangtze provinces, particularly Szechuan, Hunan and Hupeh, had raised money for building railways in this region. The railways had not actually been built, when, on May 20, 1911, the government at Peking reasserted its centralization policy by signing the Hukwang railway loan agreement. This gave to foreigners (a syndicate

including Americans, British, French and Germans) the right to build railways in precisely the territory which these local interests had mapped out for themselves.

The local leaders were furiously indignant against what they considered an unjustifiable interference with local rights. Trouble started immediately. The intense feeling burst forth in the support of the republican cause when it was proclaimed on October 10, 1911, following an accidental bomb explosion at Hankow—not because the local leaders wanted a Republic particularly, but because they saw a chance to make trouble for the Manchu rulers.

A single event, which occurred in 1908, also vitally influenced the course of events in 1911–12. This was the regent's dismissal of Yuan Shih-kai. The regent fancied he had been slighted by Yuan before Tze Hsi died. Promptly after he came into power, therefore, he relieved Yuan of all his responsibilities at court, explaining to Yuan that since he was suffering from a sore foot, he ought to take a long rest so that his foot might recover. Yuan retired, determined to take revenge.

When the republican uprising started in October, 1911, the regent in alarm appointed Yuan viceroy at Hankow, where the first outbreak occurred, with instructions to suppress the revolt. Yuan replied that his foot was not yet healed and so he could do nothing. As the trouble spread the regent offered Yuan successively more important posts if he would come back. Yuan refused to move until the regent agreed to give him practically dictatorial powers at Peking, including the right to decide what should be done about the position of the Manchu Dynasty itself. Then, miraculously, Yuan's foot suddenly healed and he returned to Peking.

The national assembly, meanwhile, had been called into session. In a desperate effort to head off the republican demand, the regent promised this body one after another of the constitutional reforms which it demanded. But it had no con-

fidence in him. It called for Yuan Shih-kai to head the government.

Thus the shrewd, powerful, and completely unscrupulous Yuan Shih-kai secured control of the government at Peking and of the destiny of the Manchu dynasty. This was the man who had betrayed the reformers of 1898 to hold the favor of Tze Hsi, and who now had his chance to take revenge upon Tze Hsi's successor.

Meanwhile the republican cause had swept like a wild fire down the Yangtze Valley and to the south. Young students by the thousands flocked to the republican ranks. The peasants and the common folk in the cities turned on the hated Manchus, and there were appalling incidents of wholesale slaughter.

Sun and his immediate group were not prepared for this outburst (Sun himself was not even in China at the time) but his group moved quickly into the leadership of affairs. Sun came back to China at the end of 1911, and was elected provisional president of the Republic by the republican national assembly which hastily met.

On January 1, 1912, he took office, proclaiming that date as the first day of the first year of the Republic of China. It has been so counted ever since.

There is little doubt that if Yuan Shih-kai had moved quickly and vigorously when the regent first turned to him, he could have crushed the rebellion in its early stages. Sun's group had engineered numerous armed uprisings in the preceding years (Sun himself had been involved in fourteen of these), but none had caused more than a local flurry. The republicans were ill prepared and worse organized in the autumn of 1911. Even after the delay until the regent gave him complete control at Peking, Yuan probably could have put down the republican uprising, had he so desired.

Instead, he opened negotiations with the republicans at Nanking. On securing the promise that he would be elected president, he forced the Manchus to abdicate. Sun duly re-

signed his provisional presidency, in an honest desire to secure peace quickly, but feeling justifiable doubts of Yuan's good faith. Yuan was elected president.

Formally, all of China had become a republic. Practically, the hope of slower but more sure progress toward an orderly constitutional régime had been destroyed by the hurried imposition of a form of government for which the people were in no sense ready. Practically, too, the power had passed into the hands of a man with no real sympathy for the ideals for which Sun had been struggling, and with no object except to advance his own personal fortunes.

IV. BACK TO CHINESE WAYS

The provisional constitution of the Republic of China, first adopted at Nanking in February, 1912, had in it all the latest political devices which the West had developed: a bill of rights, a parliament of two houses to be duly elected directly or indirectly by the people, a cabinet responsible to the parliament, a president who was a figurehead—all in strict accordance with the latest practices in Europe. If the millennium could have been ushered in by a nicely phrased document carefully written out on a piece of paper, that constitution, or any one of the several which were drafted along the same lines in later years, would have brought it.

There were, however, several difficulties. One was that the provisions of the constitution were completely alien to Chinese tradition, experience and technique in handling affairs in and out of the government. Another was that the republicans who produced the constitution were split up into numerous small factional groups, unable to agree among themselves on just what should be done or, which was perhaps fully as important, on just who should get what post. Sun Yat-sen, by reason of his age and his long and distinguished revolutionary career, was the only possible man to be chosen as the first president. Disagreement over the rest of the prospective spoils, which had attracted many flies to

the honey, kept the factions apart, then and through the months which followed. As Sun remarked in 1924:

In former days our failure was not so much due to the fact that we had powerful enemies, as to our mind and discernment being immature. This caused senseless misunderstandings between ourselves, scattering the whole power of our Party, and resulting in the failure of the revolution. We were not destroyed by our enemies. We destroyed ourselves.

The republicans at Nanking in the first months of 1912, however, fully realized that they had a very powerful enemy in Yuan Shih-kai. Circumstances forced them to choose between offering him the presidency or trying to resist what very possibly would have been his successful efforts to crush the whole republican movement. They chose to make the offer—and sunk their own differences sufficiently to agree on a constitution which made the president impotent. They hoped, thereby, to tie Yuan's hands. But submitting control of the Republic's destinies to him was like entrusting a helpless infant to a hungry tiger. The parents of the infant tried to bit and bridle the tiger and harness him to the infant's perambulator. The tiger promptly ate the baby, though it left pieces of the perambulator and bits of the baby's clothing lying about.

Yuan was dictator. He wanted the imperial title. By the autumn of 1915 he thought the time was ripe to make the final move. He engineered a "popular demand" that he take the throne, announced that much against his own will he would yield to the people's wish, and made elaborate preparations for the ceremony.

No one since the time of the Emperor Ch'ien Lung, not even Tze Hsi, came as near having complete control of China as Yuan Shih-kai did in the autumn of 1915. Strong, experienced, domineering, he had a political and military machine which covered the country in a fine-meshed and apparently unbreakable net. But he lacked the one absolutely essential qualification for continuing power in China: popu-

lar confidence in his moral integrity. He had betrayed the reformers in 1898. He betrayed the Republic step by step. When he tried to carry through the final betrayal by seating himself on the throne at the top of a towering structure of power which he had erected, the whole structure collapsed, because it was built on the sand of distrust which his own acts had created, and not on the solid rock of earned popular confidence that he was working for the people's welfare instead of his own advancement.

Disorganized as the republicans were, considerable feeling against a return to the monarchical system had taken root. Another kind of man, however, a man who combined Yuan's power with some of Sun's disinterested patriotism, quite possibly would have been accepted as emperor. But self-seeking Yuan, for all his power, could not pass the triple barrier of distrust, of memories of the Manchu reign, and of the demand for popular government.

In the face of a flood of protest, and of preparations for armed revolt, Yuan announced that he had changed his mind. In June, 1916, he died—perhaps of disappointment, perhaps of apoplexy caused by anger against the subordinates who, he thought, had misled him; the gossip varied as to the causes. The one man who, in 1912, had any chance at all of making himself the “man on horseback” to bring effective political unity in China, had failed.

Yuan's death left the field open for his lieutenants to quarrel among themselves for predominance. One after another they eliminated each other. New warlords rose to the surface, strutted for a time in this area or that, and were pulled down by still newer would-be masters—and by the continuing revolt of the people against the men in political authority. At last, in 1927, the ex-bandit warlord of Manchuria, Chang Tso-lin, frankly scrapped the pretense of a republican government at Peking and proclaimed himself dictator. A few days less than a year later he was dead, killed by a bomb which destroyed the train on which

he was returning to Mukden, as Nationalist armies from the south marched into Peking.

Those armies marched under the banner of a reorganized Kuomintang, which had come into being at Canton in January, 1924.

Sun turned from active political agitation when he left the provisional presidency to make way for Yuan in 1912. The reorganized revolutionary society he had formed in 1905 merged with a number of other political groups in the summer of 1912 in an attempt to establish a unified front against Yuan. This new body was called the Kuomintang, (literally the National People's Party. The name was continued in the present Nationalist Party, but the organization was completely reconstructed in 1924). When Yuan destroyed all but the name of republican government, Sun formed a new secret society. A number of those who had been closest to him for years refused to join this society, however, because of Sun's demand that all the members swear personal loyalty and unquestioning obedience to him.

The demand for this oath was the first open sign of the growth in Sun Yat-sen of what was probably his most serious weakness as a leader: his inability to coöperate with other men in a common enterprise. Even at the beginning of his career, he tended strongly to act as though he were a master issuing orders rather than as a leader among his peers. This tendency to domineer grew on him as he saw one after another of his hopes disappointed by what seemed to him the disloyalty of co-workers. By 1924 he had reached the point, according to well authenticated but suppressed reports, of declaring to the Kuomintang congress at Canton that anyone who questioned his judgment in the slightest, or who offered alternative suggestions, thereby proved himself a traitor to the party and to the cause.

Because of this dictatorial attitude, Sun had driven away a number of able men who at one time or another had joined him in the sincere desire to help in the reconstruc-

tion of China. Yet his personal prestige, deservedly earned by his long devotion to the revolutionary cause, made it impossible for anyone else to lead a group with which he was associated, or for any group to which he did not belong to gain wide confidence. Consequently, neither Sun's own group nor any other with similar purposes could become really a powerful force in the nation until after he died.

This characteristic of Sun's quite obviously made him especially receptive to the idea of rigid party discipline and control from the top when Borodin and other Soviet representatives proposed, in the autumn of 1923, that the old Kuomintang and various other lesser groups should be reorganized on the lines of the Communist Party in Russia.

Sun had been interested in Socialistic ideas since his first trip to the United States and Europe in 1896. One of the three "Principles of the People" which had been embodied in his program since 1905—the Principle of Livelihood—included the application of essentially socialistic measures. Nevertheless Sun was not a Communist in any Marxian sense.

He wanted, however, to get help in his revolutionary campaign. When the Soviets first offered it, he was none too responsive. He tried elsewhere. He made tentative approaches to both the Japanese and the British, but nothing came of these efforts. He turned to the United States with the proposal that the American government take the lead in organizing an international commission which would assume control of the government of China for five years to bring order and to teach the Chinese people how to keep it. Sun promised that if the United States would do this, he would devote the rest of his life to what he admitted would be the difficult task of winning Chinese support for the undertaking.

This was a startling proposal, especially coming from one who had preached so emphatically against foreign domination in China. All through his career, however, Sun had felt

particularly friendly toward the United States and expressed confidence in American disinterestedness. But the plan was utterly impractical and, wisely, the American government ignored the proposal. The fact that the proposal was made is well authenticated, however, although mention of it has been carefully suppressed by the Kuomintang authorities in order to keep the record clear of any reference to such a glaring departure from the orthodox doctrine that every effort should be made to shake off foreign influence in China.

Having been refused help in every other quarter to which he turned, Sun was ready to listen when Borodin, on behalf of Moscow, came with his offer of coöperation. This was in the autumn of 1923. Borodin quickly won Sun's confidence, and exercised a powerful influence over his thinking. He and his associates also were very close to the center of power in the Nationalist drive north which started in 1926 and occupied the Yangtze Valley by the late spring of 1927.

Thus what had been in the older times China's front door to the outside world—the land frontier to the north—once more was opened to the entrance of a strong tide of new influences.

By a process of hand picking, some two hundred men who had been associated more or less actively with the revolutionary movement and with the struggle against Yuan were assembled at Canton in January, 1924, for what was called a national congress of the Kuomintang. Among these were most of Sun's old associates who had withdrawn when he had required the pledge of personal loyalty and obedience, as well as others of the "old guard," who had continued to work more or less actively with him.

The congress officially opened on January 21, 1924. A draft constitution was laid before it. Sun and others emphasized the need for close unity and strict party discipline, as provided in the proposed constitution. The constitution was adopted. The various officers and committees were

elected. A manifesto was issued. The "First National Congress of the Kuomintang" adjourned.

A "cleansing of the party" was achieved by ruling that memberships from earlier bodies could not be carried over; all would-be members of the new Kuomintang must register anew and pledge obedience to its rules. Party unity and discipline were provided by the rule that all authority rested in the national congress, with its power exercised by the central executive committee between sessions of the congress. Party members might discuss questions of policy, but once the decisions had been made, by the congress or the executive committee or other appropriate organization, discussion must stop and all must obey. A central supervising committee was set up to watch the conduct of party officers and members. Sun was made absolute dictator of the party. He was named as permanent *tsungli*, or leader, with the chairmanship of the congress and the central executive committee and even a veto over the decisions of the congress itself.

Copying from the Russian Communist Party is obvious enough here, especially in the names given to the various organs of the Kuomintang, and in the provisions for rigid party discipline. But the return to older Chinese practices also is clear. Sun, as dictatorial head, occupied virtually the position of the chiefs of the old secret societies. In true Chinese tradition, too, Sun was given that position primarily on moral grounds. The system of committees, stretching from the top down into the smaller "cells" also was quite characteristically Chinese; the older secret societies were organized much in this fashion, and the Chinese had been using committees to manage their affairs of all kinds since long before the time of Christ.

Very definitely, the new party organization marked a sharp rejection of the republican political forms which had been copied with such high hopes in 1912 and had proved so utterly unsuited to China's needs. As the new machinery was put into use, the more strictly Russian features of rigid

regimentation of the party members were sloughed off in practice.

Three years after this constitution was adopted, old Chang Tso-lin, in Peking, scrapped the last remnants of republican forms there, as has been said. By that time, however, the Kuomintang was well on the way to achieving, nominally at least, the long-sought goal of the unification of China.

Sun Yat-sen died in Peking on March 12, 1925. His death deprived the party of considerable moral force, but it also removed the fettering influence of his personal dictatorial attitude toward his associates. With him out of the way, the party could move forward through the coöperation of a group of leaders. It began to move, quickly, at Canton. The drive north started in 1926—propagandists first, soldiers next. The Russians supplied most of the propaganda technique and material, a good share of the military skill, and some—probably not very much—of the money and arms.

There is no need to review here the story of that drive; the incidents have been told and re-told; the bearing of some of these incidents on the present Communist situation in China will be discussed later. The break between the Lefts and Rights, and the expulsion of the Russians came in 1927. In June, 1928, the Nationalist armies were in Peking. The Nationalist party dictatorship was formally announced on October 3, 1928, at Nanking. The "organic law" of the new government was promulgated on October 10, the seventeenth anniversary of the proclamation of the Republic at Hankow in 1911.

Most of the phraseology and some of the forms of the party dictatorship which was set up in Nanking in the name of the Kuomintang were borrowed from Soviet Russia. Both the dictatorship and the form of government established under it clearly were sharp departures from anything which savored of conventional republicanism. But neither the new structure nor its avowed purposes were derived primarily from Russian sources. Conventional Western models

were followed more than Russian, in the government itself, and the whole system was a return to Chinese practices more than a borrowing from any outside source.

One important departure from Russian precedent, for example, was in the provisions covering the character and duration of the dictatorship. Sun Yat-sen had begun to talk, long before the establishment of the Republic, about the need for what he called a "period of tutelage," during which the people were to be taught how to operate popular government. The Kuomintang dictatorship, as announced in 1928, was to be only for this period of tutelage. As soon as the people were ready, they were to adopt a constitution, the dictatorship was to end, and full constitutional government was to begin. Nothing was said of a class dictatorship, even during this transition period; there was no hint of a permanent dictatorship by the proletariat which was so much stressed in Russia.

The political government, set up under the party dictatorship, was an interesting blending of standard Western, not Russian, and old Chinese features.

At the top was a "state council," which had final authority, subject to the party itself. The chairman of this council was the titular head of the government, for receiving foreign diplomats and similar purposes. But, theoretically, the chairmanship was supposed to pass in turn from one to another of several men, and the authority was supposed to be with the council itself. The provisions covering the procedure of the council and the functioning of the chairman, however, were vague, so that the actual operation would depend largely on the play of personalities. Here was the age-old Chinese technique, complete, both in the assignment of authority to a group rather than to an individual, and in the flexibility of structure and functioning of the committee.

Under this state council were to be five *yuan* (literally, "court-yards"; in effect, "councils," though the meaning of the English word corresponds only approximately to that

of the Chinese). These were the executive, the legislative, the judicial, the examination and the control *yuan*.

The creation of the first three was a clear adoption of the standard Western division of powers and a departure from the older Chinese practice of combining these three functions.

The examination *yuan* was a revival of the old Chinese board of examiners whose duty it was to supervise the examinations which were in effect the means by which the civil servants were selected and promoted. Western countries have civil service boards, but they are not given any such prominent place in the government as they were in old China or in this 1928 new government.

The control *yuan* brought into the government an institution which also had its roots far back in Chinese history, but does not exist in the West. In the old days, a board of censors was a regular part of the government. It was the duty of the members to criticize the conduct of officials, including the emperor himself. The theory back of the institution was that while the authority of those in office should be complete, within their respective spheres, there also should be definite provision for watching what the officials did so that the interests of the people might be protected. This control *yuan* is supposed to perform that function in the present government. It is responsible for auditing government accounts. It brings impeachments. In order to insure impartiality, no member of the control *yuan* is permitted to hold any other post concurrently. The control *yuan* is working out as a convenient retiring place for respected party members. This is to be expected. The actual effectiveness of this part of the government as a check to any corruption and mismanagement in other parts has not been great, as yet; how effective it will be will depend largely on personal factors. But it is of more than passing interest that this ancient and often exceedingly useful and peculiarly Chinese institution should have been revived in the new government.

Over the government as such is the party, with its congress, its central executive committee, its central supervisory committee, its central political council, its central military council, and various other more or less authoritative bodies.

The system as a whole looks hopelessly cumbersome and confused. The paper division between the party and the government, and this splitting up into so many different committees, councils, *yuan*s and what not, seems somewhat absurd since the actual control is concentrated, by interlocking memberships, in the hands of comparatively few men. Yet the system is almost ideally adapted to the Chinese way of doing things; far better adapted than a system which theoretically might seem better because simpler and more logical.

Taken as a whole, the party-and-government structure is exceedingly flexible. The slack left by the withdrawal of one man or several can be taken up readily. A place for someone who needs to be taken in can be found without difficulty. Adjustments can be made easily as shifting personal relations require—and personal relations are the essence of government and all other affairs in China.

The system admirably suits, too, the Chinese practice of working through groups and avoiding individual responsibility. A strong man may exercise great influence, but it is quite un-Chinese for him to want to assert himself outwardly as the leader or to take the corresponding responsibility. This method of working through groups makes it difficult to “pin down” responsibility. The system does not make for swift efficiency. But it is the Chinese way of doing things.

Since their original adoption, both the constitution of the Kuomintang and the “organic law” under which the government is organized have been amended fairly frequently. In the spring of 1934, the stage was reached of drafting what was called a “permanent constitution,” which was to be submitted to the people for their approval as the basic law when the present “period of tutelage” comes to an end and “constitutional government” is inaugurated. (This, accord-

ing to the plans in the summer of 1934, will be in 1935.) With the details of these amendments, and of the present structure of the government and the party, we are not here concerned. What is significant for our purposes is that the political organization nominally now in authority over all China, and much more nearly in actual authority than any other, is built essentially on Chinese lines rather than copied from any outside model.

It is interesting to observe, too, that principles which Sun Yat-sen laid down in his writing long before the establishment of the Republic now are being applied, nominally at least. Sun unquestionably made many political mistakes, but in justice to him it should be said that he did not approve of the attempt in 1912 to introduce democratic government full fledged. He insisted that there must be a "period of tutelage." And the outline of the "five power government" is in his earlier pronouncements.

Finally, we should remind ourselves that all the currents and cross-currents of politics in China run very shallowly on the surface of the people's life.

SOME POTENT INFLUENCES

(CHAPTER XII)

WESTERNERS introduced to the Chinese the conception of China as a nation among nations. One result of this has been the increasingly vehement demand by the Western-minded among the Chinese for "international equality," and the removal of the restrictions on Chinese sovereignty which Westerners forced on the country in the nineteenth century. Another result, also springing from a sense of humiliation, but more significant in its effects on developments in China itself, has been the external mindedness of those who have been active in trying to make changes. To a marked degree they have tended to see everything in terms of China's relations with other nations rather than of China's own needs, to make the ultimate goal of their efforts not the improvement of conditions in China, but the achievement of a better international position, and to make reconstruction in China a means for reaching this goal rather than an end in itself.

Until the politically minded West introduced the idea, the Chinese knew nothing of that abstract political entity called a "nation." Not conceiving of China in any such sense, and being by tradition markedly un-political in their customs and social ideas, the mass of the Chinese never thought about whether China's international position was equal or unequal to that of other nations. To them, China simply *was*, and she was all of the world that mattered.

Even without the introduction of these strange new political concepts, Western aggression in China would have aroused some Chinese resentment and fear, but it would not have produced the morbidly sensitive feeling of humiliation

and inferiority which have so complicated both domestic reconstruction and international readjustment. The Chinese of earlier generations were arrogantly proud of the civilization which to them and to their neighbors seemed so much superior to any other civilization. But they did not think of it in political terms, and their superiority, as they felt it, rested on quite other than political grounds. Even in the strictly political field, the Dragon Throne remained the pinnacle of authority and grandeur in the world they knew, no matter who occupied it, alien or Chinese. Submission to non-Chinese political authority, therefore, might be unpleasant, but it carried no particular sting of humiliation because Chinese superiority, as the Chinese and their neighbors and even their conquerors conceived it, remained intact in its essentials.

Then the Westerners came, talking about "nations" and pressing their demand for "equality." They explained what a nation is. They fed the eager minds of the students who came to their schools with the doctrine that each citizen somehow should identify himself in a fervid patriotism with his "nation," that each patriotic citizen should feel a personal sense of shame and disgrace if his "nation" did not possess complete freedom to exercise the "sovereign" right to do precisely as it pleased.

More and more of the Chinese learned these Western political lessons. More and more of them began to think in Western political terms and to feel, as Westerners said they should, shamed and disgraced because the "sovereignty" of the "nation" China was infringed by special privileges which the Western nations had forced the Chinese government to grant. These Chinese, whose thinking was Westernized, not the great body of the Chinese merchants and gentry, nor the mass of the Chinese people, were the ones who felt a peculiarly stinging sense of humiliation over China's "international inferiority."

These were the ones, too, who took the lead in introducing

reforms, especially in the political field. As the number and influence of those who thought and felt in Western ways grew, this tendency to see everything in terms of China's relations with other nations rather than of China's own needs grew stronger.

II. EXTERNAL MINDEDNESS

In the last thirty years, the control of revolutionary and reform movements has been very largely in the hands of the younger Chinese whose thinking was Westernized. Political reconstruction, both in China's internal affairs and in her international relations, therefore, has received a good deal more attention than is normally Chinese. Therefore, too, the tendency to think first of China's international position has appeared most strongly in the political field. There particularly, but also in education, in business, and in other activities which necessarily had to do with China's internal affairs rather than with her international position, it led to a scramble to adopt Western forms, whether they suited China's needs or not.

This external mindedness first began to appear in the actions of the leading viceroys of the nineteenth century. They, like the T'ai P'ings, wanted to make changes in China, but they, unlike the T'ai P'ings, thought of these changes as ways to alter China's relations with other countries. Their ultimate goal lay outside of China; the changes were means to the end of achieving that goal, not the goal itself. They wanted Western guns, Western machines, Western education, not primarily for what these could do to better conditions in China, but because they would make China strong to resist Western aggression. Chang Chih-tung put the new attitude into clear-cut words in 1898 when he declared that the first two of the "Five Objects of Knowledge" were to know the shame of not being fully independent and equal among the nations, and to know the fear of being conquered by Western powers.

On this fundamental point, too, Sun Yat-sen and the small group which he gathered in his first revolutionary society were at one with both the viceroys and the reformers of the "hundred days," though he wanted to overthrow the Manchu Dynasty and they sought to keep it on the throne. From the very start, Sun's primary object was to save China from the Westerners. As time went on, the forms in which that fundamental purpose expressed itself changed somewhat. After Western armed aggression stopped, Sun and his associates—and other would-be reformers—talked about freeing China from the effects of that aggression and of getting equality for her among the nations. But though the form of expression changed, the record shows clearly that the need which bit most deeply into the minds and emotions of Sun Yat-sen himself, of his associates, and of the growing number of those who were definitely Westernized in their thinking, was the feeling of humiliation that China had been placed in an inferior position, rather than a sense of the tragedy of the continuing disorganization in China itself.

Sun thought about the welfare of the people of China. It would be seriously unjust to imply that he did not feel their sufferings deeply or desire to improve their condition (though that cannot be said with equal truth of a good many of those who associated themselves with him, or who now give eloquent lip service to his ideals). Thus two of the "Three Principles," which Sun formulated in 1905 and continued to stress as fundamental in many later writings and speeches, have to do with reconstruction within the country: the "principle of democracy" and the "principle of livelihood." Yet it is significant that the principle which he regularly put first, in listing the three, was the "principle of nationalism," by the application of which China was to be built up into a strong national state so that she might take a place of international equality. Significantly, too, the specific program outlined in the manifesto issued by the

first national congress of the reorganized Kuomintang, in 1924, begins with the statement of "External Policy," and the very first point of that policy is declared to be the abolition of the "unequal treaties."

The preparation and content of Sun's deathbed statement still further illustrates how this thought of China's relations with the other nations dominated the minds and feelings of Sun and his associates. That "will" was drafted by men who had worked with Sun for years. It was designed as a propaganda document, giving in brief form the most important purpose of the revolutionary movement and the means which were to be most stressed in achieving that purpose. Sun himself went over the document carefully three weeks before he died, though he signed it only the day before his death. Since that time, the "will" has become the official creed of the Kuomintang party which, in 1928, assumed a dictatorship over Chinese affairs. Every possible device has been used to drill it into the minds of the Chinese people, and it is quite safe to say that more Chinese have committed it to memory than have similarly learned any other political, philosophical, or religious statement in a single generation. Both officially and in fact, this "will" thus stands today as the quintessential expression of the purpose of all the reform efforts of the dominant political group in China. As such, it is an extraordinary document. The official translation reads, in full:

For forty years I have devoted myself to the cause of National Revolution, the aim of which is to secure for China a place of independence and equality among nations. The accumulated experience of these forty years has fully convinced me that to attain this goal it is necessary to awaken the mass of our own people and associate ourselves with those peoples of the world who treat us on a footing of equality in the common struggle.

The revolution is not yet achieved. Let all my comrades follow my writings, "Plans for National Reconstruction," "Fundamentals of National Reconstruction," "Three Principles of the People," and the Manifesto issued by the First National Congress of the Party,

and work unceasingly for their consummation. Above all, the convocation of a People's Convention and the abolition of unequal treaties, which I have recently advocated, should be accomplished with the least possible delay. This is my will and behest.

There are the philosophy and the purpose of the "Father of the Chinese Republic," and his associates, epitomized in a few words—a philosophy and a purpose derived most obviously from the West, not from China's own great past.

The one great aim, it will be observed, is "to secure for China a place of independence and equality among the nations," not to better conditions in China. The essential means to reach this aim is to "awaken the people," not to improve their hard lot, and "to associate ourselves with those peoples of the world who treat us on a footing of equality in the common struggle," not to secure in China a united, coöperative drive to lessen the long-drawn sufferings of the common people.

The second paragraph refers to more detailed discussions of the specific steps which are to be taken. But through all these writings, through all the fabric of actions, runs the pattern of thought and feeling so clearly drawn in the first paragraph of this last message—a pattern which pictures China as needing above all else a more honorable place in international political society; a pattern into which internal political, economic, and social betterment is woven as the means to be used in achieving the supremely desirable goal, not as the goal itself.

In thus externalizing the ultimate goal Sun showed the Western-mindedness which resulted from his early training. Furthermore, the movements for which he was the principal inspiration and spokesman gained strength in proportion to the increase in the number and influence of those who, like himself, thought and felt more in Western than in Chinese terms.

This external-mindedness, coupled with the humiliating sense of international inferiority, produced a very much

exaggerated sensitiveness to foreign opinion. This frequently showed itself in acts and statements which indicated clearly that those responsible had been thinking not primarily of the actual conditions in China, but of what foreigners would think, or what they wanted them to think, about those conditions. Unpleasant facts were glossed over or ignored in official and unofficial statements. Laws were passed which were intended to look well to foreign eyes, but which the drafters knew were completely unenforceable or were utterly unsuited to Chinese needs, or both. Huge sums were spent for public works and municipal improvements which were quite unnecessary, at least on any such scale, while other and much more urgent needs were neglected. Elaborate, costly and widely publicized gestures were made in the way of employing foreign advisers to draw up elaborate plans for reform without any real preparation for putting the plans into effect when they were drawn, and then the plans were quietly shelved in whole or in substantial part after the gesture had been made. Altogether, while there has been a good deal of real reconstruction during these past thirty years, a distressing amount of time, effort and money also has been spent on trying to make a good impression on foreign nations, which might better have gone into dealing fundamentally with China's problems in terms of China.

The desire to make a good impression has arisen in part, of course, from the normal human impulse to put the best foot forward or, to use the Chinese expression, to "make face." Part of the cause for promulgating laws which were drafted to express an ideal rather than to be enforced in detail, was the long-standing Chinese belief that that was precisely the purpose of laws. The too-often-repeated proclamation of elaborately outlined plans which could not be carried out was due in part to an honest if ill founded feeling that the desired results would follow automatically on the proclamation. Giving full weight to all these qualifications, however, it remains true that the marked tendency to think of China's

external relations rather than of her domestic problems led to a distinctly harmful degree of sensitiveness to foreign opinion.

The foreigners themselves are in no small part responsible for this. They insisted that the limitations on China's sovereignty which they had imposed were justified because the Chinese would not or could not maintain conditions of living and doing business which they thought were necessary. They said they would give up these privileges when the Chinese changed conditions in China to suit Western ideas. Extraterritoriality would be surrendered, for example, when China had laws and legal administration of which the Westerners approved. Control of the settlements would be given up when the Chinese showed that they could run cities the way the foreigners thought they ought to be run. More generally, the foreign powers very definitely showed by their attitude and their actions that their willingness to deal with China as an international equal was in proportion to China's success in making herself over on foreign lines. Naturally enough, the Chinese, who wanted to get rid of the limitations on China's sovereignty and to secure international equality, made the political and other gestures which they thought would please the foreigners.

Outside of the political field, Westerners also put pressure on the Chinese to consider what the Westerners would think rather than what China needed. This was especially so in education, Christian propaganda, famine and flood relief, and other philanthropic activities. Westerners, particularly Americans, contributed a good deal of money for these purposes. They did this to help China. But those who distributed the money inevitably set the conditions of its use, deliberately or otherwise. The Westerners might talk in all sincerity about leaving the decision as to how the money was to be used entirely to the Chinese—as they have been doing in recent years—but the fact remained that the activities of which the Westerners approved got money and

those of which they disapproved did not. Therefore, the Chinese who were getting this money, or who wanted some of it, were compelled constantly to think of what the Westerners who gave it would think of what they were doing. They still are.

The awareness of China as a "nation," on which this external mindedness rests, however, still has not penetrated much below the surface of Chinese thought and feeling. It has been a powerful political influence. It has caused most of the political and many of the social and economic changes during the past thirty years. But it remains on the surface, in the foreground of the thought of those who have it. It has not become so deeply imbedded in unconscious emotion that reactions to developments which affect China as a "nation" come almost instinctively as they do in Westerners. Most Chinese, even the Westernized Chinese, and including many of those who talk most about "international equality," still react most of the time in the age-old Chinese way. They still tend strongly to accept a situation as they find it and to make the most of that situation, not letting themselves be seriously inconvenienced by abstract theories or disturbed by events which seemingly have no immediate effect on their lives. Western influence still has not succeeded in transforming into Western rigid logicalness the infinite adaptability to circumstances which has been bred into the Chinese for so many generations.

Consequently the Chinese frequently act in ways which seem curiously inconsistent or quite incomprehensible to Westerners. Students in the midst of a most vociferous anti-foreign demonstration, will stop their shouts of "Down with Imperialism," "Down with the Unequal Treaties" and "Drive out the Foreigners," to open their ranks in perfect good humor to let a foreigner go through from one side of the street to another. Railway construction coolies, sitting around eating their supper an hour after they have finished a demonstration against "foreign imperialism" will

talk and laugh genially with a foreigner and even offer to share a bowl of food with him. Students and coolies both are sincere enough in their excitement about foreign aggression. But that aggression is something abstract, a long way off; it has nothing to do with a particular individual foreigner who happens along. If he is overbearing or "superior," then of course they show resentment. But if he is casually friendly and courteous, they respond in kind.

This same deeply ingrained habit of taking and using circumstances as they come along shows itself, to cite a more broadly significant example, in the way the Chinese of all classes use the foreign-controlled settlements. These settlements in the cities of Shanghai, Tientsin, Hankow, and other ports have paved streets, good sewers and water supplies, regular if not especially moderate taxes, reasonably good policing, and somewhat more security of life and property in times of military disturbance than the neighboring Chinese-controlled areas. They also offer many business opportunities.

They are under foreign control. Nevertheless, they are crowded with Chinese: businessmen, warlords and officials in office or retired, students, intellectuals, writers, people of every class and occupation.

Obviously the use of these areas by the Chinese is logically quite incompatible with any deep feeling over the infringement of China's "national sovereignty" which the foreign control represents. That use is entirely in harmony, however, with the normal Chinese practice of making the most of whatever here-and-now advantages are available. From the point of view of the ordinary Chinese, who is not much interested in politics anyway, the advantages of the settlement are tangible realities. So, if he ever thinks about the matter at all, he sees no reason for letting something so vague and abstract and remote from the affairs of daily living as "national sovereignty" keep him from enjoying those advantages.

Yet "ordinary Chinese" are not the only ones who use the settlements. Even Sun Yat-sen himself, who insisted that China's greatest need was to shake off what he called the foreign shackles, lived in the settlements whenever it was convenient. Scores of others who have been prominent in demanding the abolition of foreign special privileges and who, like Sun, are sincere in their desire to see these privileges abolished, have used the settlements frequently.

The logical incongruity between the words and the acts of these men has been the subject of a good deal of sarcastic comment by the "die hard" Westerners. Logically, the incongruity is real enough, and most Westerners would be troubled by it, but the incongruity either does not occur at all to the Chinese who speak and act incongruously, or it seems of very trivial importance to them. Speaking from the surface of their conscious thinking, they denounce Western imperialism in the language which they learned from Westerners. Acting in accordance with their deeply rooted impulses, they use the advantages which that imperialism has created. With self-conscious deliberation, they talk like Westerners; with unconscious directness, they act like Chinese.

That the consciousness of China as a nation has not yet penetrated very much below the surface, is also demonstrated by the reaction to the Japanese acts in the past three years. Any Western people would have risen in practically instantaneous and unanimous action if their country had been invaded in any such way. No army of Western soldiers would have obeyed orders to make no resistance against direct aggression within the country itself, such as were issued to and obeyed by the Chinese soldiers in Manchuria.

Japan's aggression did produce a flare-up of feeling, chiefly among the students, but spreading considerably beyond their ranks. Successive Japanese advances revived that feeling. The Japanese attack at Shanghai called out a

desperate armed resistance which brought plaudits from all over the world and aroused national pride in China. The reaction was considerably more widespread and vigorous than it would have been a quarter of a century ago. Nevertheless, the actual developments showed that the Chinese still are far from being anything like as nationally self-conscious as most Western peoples.

A certain type of Westerner seems to take delight in citing this failure to hit back as proof of Chinese cowardice. Chinese soldiers and others have demonstrated on many occasions, however—as the coolies on the Western front demonstrated during the World War—that they are not afraid to die. The explanation of what actually took place is to be found in the fact that the Chinese still fundamentally are unnationalized, in their consequent failure to identify themselves and their individual interests with the “nation” and its welfare, and in their age-old habit of taking things as they come and not becoming disturbed over anything that happens a long way away. While the students at Canton or Shanghai or Peking who read the newspapers daily and had drunk deep of Western political conceptions became indignant to the point of violent protest at Japan’s invasion of Manchuria, it was extremely difficult for the ricksha men on the streets of these cities or the peasants on the nearby farms to see how something so far off had anything to do with them.

These same fundamental Chinese characteristics are showing themselves, even among the students and others who were most furiously indignant against Japan a year or two ago. Japan still holds Manchuria. She has given not the slightest sign of intending to get out, nor has she intimated that she might make some compensation for the damage which her troops did at Shanghai. Less spectacularly than by the use of troops, but steadily nevertheless, she is pushing forward her influence in Chinese affairs. Yet the anti-Japanese boycott is dying down. Student demonstrations

have stopped; and to judge from surface signs only, the indications are that the Chinese as a whole, even most of the Westernized Chinese, have resigned themselves to accepting the results of the *fait accompli*, at least for the time being. The feeling against Japan is still strong, but it is less on the surface. The attitude is: we cannot do anything now; we will deal with Japan later. The old habit of acceptance and adaptation is asserting itself.

This Japanese invasion is accomplishing one result of great importance, however. It is driving home to the Chinese the lesson that they cannot count on Western help in protecting their country, and that China can be saved only by internal reconstruction which will make her strong. In one sense, this still leaves the primary goal outside of China; but it shifts the emphasis to the need for improving conditions in the country.

This is in line with the tendency away from the earlier sort of external mindedness which has been developing in the last few years. The realization has been growing that only a strong, orderly and coherent China can secure a place of honor, respect and power among the nations; that, consequently, even from the point of view of China's international position, the primary need is to clear up the confusion in China—to say nothing of the urgent need for doing something effective to improve the lot of the great mass of the Chinese people.

This new tendency to concentrate on China's domestic needs, however, is in no sense permanently undermining concern over China's international status. National self-consciousness is penetrating steadily more deeply, inevitably carrying with it the desire for international respect and honor. This shift of emphasis back to China means simply that the Chinese are realizing more clearly what the most urgent problems are. They are seeing that international strength and equality will come as incidental results of the creation of a strong, orderly, prosperous country, but that

these things cannot be secured in reality, whatever may be achieved nominally, until such a China is created.

The Chinese are talking less about foreign aggression and its present day remains than they did. But as national self-consciousness spreads among the people, the feeling that China has been and is the victim of injustice is also spreading and becoming more deep—a feeling which, so long as the injustices remain, becomes year by year more menacing as its driving power instead of being wasted in spasmodic and futile anti-foreign protests or attempts indiscriminately to copy the West, is turned to the regeneration and strengthening of China so that she will be able to deal effectively with the other nations.

III. AGENCIES OF CHANGE

Steam, electricity and gasoline, providing swift and cheap transportation and communication over long distances, are wrecking the old economic and social structure of China, as they wrecked that of the West; and in China, as in the West, they are creating a new kind of integration on a much broader basis.

The people of old China, through the centuries, lived their lives within what today seem very small areas. Even the larger cities were conglomerations of small village-like communities rather than integrated wholes in any modern sense. Outside of the cities, each village was the center of a circle whose radius was the distance a man could walk conveniently to and from his work in the fields. The length of this radius determined the distance of one village from the next. The smaller market towns, with their inns for travelers, were spaced a day's journey by cart or foot. Geographical and military considerations determined the location of most of the larger cities. Officials, couriers, carters and carrier coolies, strolling troupes of actors, members of wealthy families travelling on business, and others, moved about on the surface of the life of the people. But the knots in

the web of that life were the small villages, the market towns and the little communities within the cities. This life itself was lived, in large part, within a circle whose radius was less than ten miles—frequently considerably less.

Much the same conditions existed in the West, until a little over a century ago. Then steam, electricity and, in more recent years, gasoline were harnessed, making it possible for people, goods, information and ideas to move swiftly and cheaply from place to place. The old limits of contact and interest were destroyed and the end of the earth itself became the boundary of the regions on which even the ordinary man could and did draw for the food he ate, the clothes he wore, and the information he received. In the West, this change is compelling us to develop a kind of political, social, economic, intellectual and even physical life, such as man never before has known. We are still far from having adjusted our thought and acts to the needs of this new situation, but modern transportation and communication already have wrought tremendous changes in the West.

The disruption which swift and cheap transportation and communication are causing in China is more fundamental there than it has been in the West, because the older Chinese society was more closely knit into small groups. The old system of family, village, guild, and similar organizations was produced and conditioned largely by the ten-mile-radius way of life. The system worked reasonably well, within that life. It is breaking down now that railways, motor buses, steamships and airplanes, the telegraph and the radio are enlarging the circle of contact and mutual dependence.

China still is far behind most Western countries in the development of these modern means of rapid transportation and communication, especially when one considers the size of her territory. Any number of comparisons showing this

"backwardness" might be made—such as that China has only one mile of railway for every 45,000 people, while the United States has a mile for every 500 and Britain for every 2,200. But limited as this development has been, it already has produced far-reaching social, economic and political changes, in spite of the political and other disturbances.

Perhaps the most significant effects, present and prospective, are on the group-based social structure. Quite literally, the new means of transportation are tearing the old village, family, and guild groups to shreds by setting the people moving from place to place in hitherto undreamed of numbers.

A good deal has been written and said, for example, about the "mass migration" in recent years from the North China provinces to Manchuria. Something over seven million people have gone from the two provinces of Shantung and Hopei in the past ten years—a movement of people on a scale almost unprecedented in human history. A large proportion of the seven million were seasonal workers who went in the spring and returned to their home villages at the end of the harvests. Yet the permanent migration from these two provinces of the three million or so who stayed in Manchuria is a socially disrupting and recreating phenomenon of the first magnitude. Moreover, those who did not stay, those who came back autumn after autumn and spent the winters in the home villages, probably did more than those who remained in Manchuria to break down the old ten-mile-radius ways of thinking and acting. The seasonal trips into Manchuria inevitably broadened the outlook of these people and bred in them an impatience with the old and rigid restraints. The fact that they could go to Manchuria gave them an economic and psychological independence of the village and family which destroyed the very foundation of the older controls.

There likewise have been large-scale migrations through

the ports on the southeastern coast to Siam, the Straits Settlements, Indo-China, and other South Seas countries. In the last ten years, roughly three million people have taken part in that migration, of whom about half have remained in their new homes. This in itself is a major movement, though it is considerably less than that in the north. These southeastern migrants, however, formed a larger proportion of the total population of the region from which they came than did the northern. Comparatively large-scale migration from this southeastern region also has been going on for decades longer than in the north. (Most of the Chinese outside of China come from this relatively small section of the country.) The disrupting social effects, therefore, are proportionately greater there than they have been as yet in the northern provinces; and it is no accident that this southeastern coast region has been the breeding ground of a large part of the revolutionary disturbances.

These two population movements deservedly have attracted a good deal of attention. Yet they shrink into minor importance when compared with the amazing movement of people by train, motor bus and steamer within China itself. Some railway statistics are available; none are to be had showing the number of passengers on the buses and on the steamers. Consequently it is completely impossible to estimate more than in the most general way how many people actually use these new means of transportation in a year. There is no doubt, however, that the number is very large.

The third class cars of every train that runs from anywhere to anywhere else, on schedule or not, are packed. Even the freight trains are alive with passengers, jammed into empty box or open cars, or clinging precariously wherever else they can find place for themselves and their bundles. Westerners who have not actually seen the trains go by and ridden on them find it almost impossible to realize how they are crowded. Americans, for example,

think they are railway conscious. Yet even if the rides which the commuters take between their homes and offices be included, the American railways carry less than one-sixth as many passengers per operating mile as the Chinese. (The record for 1932, of the lines for which statistics are available, shows that 19,236 passengers rode for every mile of railway operated in China, while in the United States the number of passengers was only 2,843 per mile.) It almost seems as though no matter where or when two or three cars are put together and an engine attached, the train would be jammed to capacity before it could start.

The buses also are crowded. Anything on four wheels that can crawl along a road anywhere is sure, before it has gone very far, to be loaded with all it can carry—and a good deal more than its makers intended it to carry. The fares are low, but so many people crowd on that the profits from operating the buses are large; or they would be if the military let the bus owners keep all the money they took in. So profitable is this business, in fact, that the bus companies find it worth while to build new roads on which they can extend operations; and a good part of the present motor roads in China have been built at private expense for precisely this purpose. Nothing but a vague guess can be made at the number who ride on buses in a year, but the total must run into the millions. All this moving about on buses has developed in only a little over ten years; it was only in 1921 that the American Red Cross built the first road outside of a city specifically designed for motor traffic. Now there are nearly 50,000 miles of motor roads. Thirteen years ago, no regular bus services operated from Peking. In the spring of 1934, well over a hundred buses a day, on the average, left the city, going in all directions, and all crowded. So it has gone more or less all over the country.

The steamers running on the rivers and along the coast are just as crowded with low-fare passengers as the trains and buses. It never is a question of filling what few cabins

there may be for these travellers; at practically every stop the problem is to keep off those who want to get on even after every available inch of deck space is filled.

Where do all these users of trains, buses, and steamers come from? Apparently not from among those who previously used the older means of transportation. There has been no apparent decrease in the amount of cart, wheelbarrow, or foot traffic on the roads—even on the roads running directly parallel to the railways, or on those on which buses operate. Such meagre records as are available, in fact, indicate that the movement of people and goods by the old means actually has increased rather than decreased in recent years. Eventually, in all probability, the old facilities for getting about will disappear, as they have to a considerable extent in Western countries. But it is clear enough that this time still is a long way off.

What this vast movement of people in China means in the undermining of the old social organization is obvious. A railway or a bus line through or within get-at-able distance of a village inevitably destroys the old isolation and self-sufficiency. New goods and new ideas come in; new outlets for village products and new ways of getting a living develop. Perhaps more significantly, new people come and the villagers have new opportunities to get away. The grip which the old groups had on the individual because he could not make a living except within the family or village circle, is broken. He *can* get away now; and in increasing numbers the Chinese are getting away, especially the younger Chinese, literally and figuratively.

The new means of transportation are producing an entirely new kind of fluidity in Chinese society, not by crushing, but by dissolving the hard, small crystals of the older groups. In time, a new sort of crystallization, into both smaller and larger units, will come. As yet, however, the evidences of such re-integration are much less apparent in the social than in the economic or political field.

Modern transportation and communication are radically altering the economic life of China, destroying the old local isolation with its necessarily low standards of living and spinning threads of common interest which are binding even the remoter villages into a new kind of nation- and world-wide economic interdependence. Some of the peasants are getting access to new sources of income and are being furnished with a greater variety of goods of all kinds. These changes are taking place far beyond the points to which the modern facilities for moving goods have penetrated. Ways and standards of living are changing; most Westerners would say that the standards are rising.

The dependence of foreign trade on cheap transportation not only to and from the ports, but also into and out of the interior is too obvious to need much discussion. Only luxury goods could carry the costs of transportation for more than a comparatively short distance, under the old conditions. Now that railways, steamships and motor trucks are available, goods of ordinary usage can be and are being sent to or brought from the remoter regions—and the penetration of the “invisible cargoes” is proportionately greater than it formerly could be.

Similarly, the development of modern industry obviously depends on cheap transportation both in getting raw materials and in distributing manufactured goods. Modern banking is impossible without the rapid transmission of information by telegraph, cable and radio. China's natural resources are being opened up, now that railways are available.

At whatever point one examines the economic life of China, in fact, one sees the changes which modern transportation and communication already have brought, and the certainty of far greater changes. The development of these facilities revolutionized the economic life of the West; it is beginning to transform Chinese economic life in the same way. Those who have studied economic developments in China will recall at once many examples of the changes

which are taking place. Those who have not made such a study need only look back over the record of what happened in the Western countries to see what is happening in China. The precise details are not being duplicated, but the general trend is very closely parallel.

To take a very homely illustration of the way in which threads of economic interest and dependence are being spun: the pigs in certain districts of far off Szechuan Province grow an especially good quality of bristle. In the old days, the peasant owners benefited not at all from this porcine proclivity. Then steamers came on the Yangtze, cutting the cost of transportation low enough to make it worth while for Western traders to buy those bristles for use in making toothbrushes in the United States. The steamers also made it possible to deliver kerosene from the United States in the Szechuan villages where the pigs were raised, at a cost which the peasants could afford to pay, now that they had the new bristle money. So steam on the Yangtze has given these peasants a new source of income and supplied them with material for a better lighted life.

It has also caught a great many people in a new web of common interest which covers the peasant in Szechuan, the user of good quality toothbrushes in the United States, the owner of an interest in an American oil well, and all the thousands of others who in one way or another are concerned with producing, preparing for market, shipping and using bristles and kerosene. Most of these people are quite unconscious of the web which has been woven around them, but it is there nonetheless.

To take an illustration of how modern industry in conjunction with foreign trade are changing peasant standards of living: practically every peasant household in China keeps a few chickens, which get their living more or less as they can find it. The few eggs which these chickens laid were of little use except to furnish an occasional feast meal.

Then someone in the West developed a process for preserving eggs by drying them. Someone else thought of all those eggs in China. He set up a modern egg products plant on the Yangtze, and hired coolies to go through the countryside with their shoulder poles and baskets to pick up eggs from the peasants—one here, two there, half a dozen at another place. The eggs were brought to the factory. The dried egg products were sent to the United States. Makers of cake, ice cream, custard, and other products in which eggs are used found they could save a great deal of money by using these dried eggs from China. The upshot of it all was that the export of egg products has come to be one of the more important items in China's foreign trade.

But that is not the end of the story. The coolies who gathered the eggs turned peddlers. They filled their baskets with all manner of things: pieces of factory-made cloth, bottles of kerosene, mirrors, cigarettes, rouge, needles, thread, shoes—anything and everything that the peasants might be persuaded to buy now that they had a small bit of money from the eggs. So the ice cream cone which little Jimmie eats on the sidewalks of New York, or the bakery cake which Mrs. Babbitt buys in a chain store in Zenith City, may be lighting a kerosene lamp in Wang Lung's mud house in a Yangtze Valley village.

In agriculture, by far the most important economic activity in China, modern transportation also is beginning to produce important changes.

Under the old conditions, each little section was compelled to grow its own food, and to live on such food as it produced. Transportation costs were so high that it was impossible to move grain more than a short distance. In any case, the men and animals that moved the grain would need to eat, before they had gone very far, more than they could carry at the start. Consequently, the people in one section quite often starved because of drought or flood while those in another, only a comparatively short distance away, were

suffering because they had more grain than they could consume or sell.

During the great famine of 1876-78 in the northwest, for example, it was literally impossible to get large supplies of relief grain more than a little way into the famine area. During the equally great famine of 1928-30, in the same region, grain could be and was brought by rail from far-off Manchuria and trucked to distributing centers deep in the famine area where railways did not reach. Millions of famine victims were saved, and the peasants in Manchuria also benefited.

Because these modern means of transportation are available, too, it now is worth while to put in large irrigation works which will transform certain parts of the northwest from semi-arid, thinly populated regions into vast granaries from which the people in other parts of the country can be fed. No such works would have been justified formerly, because the grain could not be moved beyond the immediate vicinity.

Modern transportation thus is making it reasonable, for the first time since early Chinese history, to look forward to a day when all the people of China will have something like enough to eat, getting food from newly developed farming areas in China and from lands across the seas.

For the first time, too, it is becoming possible for the peasants to make use of special soil or climate advantage of particular districts. Agricultural specialization except on a very small scale was impossible in the old days because the agricultural products of one region, especially the more perishable kinds, could not be exchanged for those from another. With modern transportation, exchange and hence specialization are possible.

In these and other ways, even the meagre modern transportation facilities which China has already are transforming the economic life of the people, back in the interior as well as near the coast. The fact that the changes have not yet

gone as far in China as they have in Western countries does not lessen the importance of the further fact that changes have definitely begun, and that the new facilities for moving people and goods are both destroying the old economic order and laying the foundations for a new.

Socially and economically, the cheapness of modern transportation and communication probably is more important than the speed. Politically, however, speed is more significant: the speed of telegraphs flashing information from end to end of the country; the speed of trains and motor cars carrying mail and newspapers and troops; the speed of armed airplanes, cutting to hours the weeks formerly needed to get to a center of potential revolt.

Through China's long history, anything like really centralized authority was utterly impossible. Agents of the central government—special officers, messengers and troops—moved so slowly that the provincial authorities necessarily were left to themselves to deal with local affairs practically as they chose, and revolts could get well started before the Peking government even heard that anything was wrong.

Conditions are changing, now that speed has shrunk the distances. Development through many years and the construction of many more thousands of miles of railways, motor roads and telegraph lines than now exist, will be needed before China can be politically as unified even as the United States is today. Any such rigid centralization as has been established in the relatively small countries of Italy or Germany or Japan seems quite beyond practical possibility. But the forces tending toward unification, and toward more directly effective popular control are at work.

Public opinion, vague and inchoate as it inevitably was, always has been powerful in China. An entirely new kind of nation-wide, swiftly reacting and unified public opinion is developing, now that telegraphs have come to serve as the sensitive nerve fibres running through the body politic. The people in all the principal centers now know in a very few

hours when any important incident occurs, whereas in earlier times months might pass before the news reached the whole country. Those in each center know at once, what the people in other centers are thinking and saying about an incident. That knowledge tends to create a similar reaction. Sudden flare-ups of popular feeling, sweeping across the entire country were utterly impossible in the old days. Today they are almost inevitable.

As long ago as 1911, the effects of this swift transmission of news began to show in the speed with which the students and others all up and down the Yangtze Valley rose to the republican cause after the bomb explosion in Hankow and the proclamation of the Republic on October 10 of that year. Similarly, when the students in Peking clashed with the police on May 4, 1919, their fellows in Shanghai, Canton, Hankow, and such interior cities as Chengtu in Szechuan and Taiyuan in Shansi, knew in less than a day what had happened, and were marching the streets in sympathy within less than a week. News of the demonstrations in other cities encouraged the Peking students to keep up their agitation. Sentiment blowing on sentiment through the telegraph and newspapers fanned into a great flame the feeling all over the country, even outside of student circles. The student movement, starting then in Peking, could not possibly have had either the kind of political influence it did, or as much influence, if China had had no telegraphs.

The many subsequent suddenly rising waves of feeling likewise could not have developed so quickly or to such heights without modern means of communication. The series of boycotts, which have been so conspicuous a feature of Chinese dealings with other countries in recent years, were fully as much the creation of the telegraph and the newspapers which printed the telegraphed news, as of purely spontaneous feeling.

More slowly and less spectacularly, but more significantly,

these new facilities are forcing the people of China to think and feel in terms of the country as a whole rather than simply of their immediate neighborhoods. The teachers in the universities and colleges for example must keep in touch with each other's work in a week-by-week fashion which was quite beyond the needs of scholars of the old régime. The businessmen must keep their fingers on the pulse of events far beyond the city or even the province in which they have their headquarters. Even the peasants in the remoter regions feel the effects of disturbances far over the horizon, now that they have been brought into touch with distant markets for some of their goods and remote sources of some of the things they use. The new facilities are doing more than making it possible for the people to think and feel nationally; they are compelling them to do so whether they want to or not, just as they are compelling them to expand the social and economic circles of their lives.

This nation-wide public opinion, immature and vaguely defined as it still is, already has become a powerful factor in China's foreign affairs, as the success of the efforts to shake off foreign dominance has demonstrated. It is less obviously influential in domestic affairs, but here too it is far from negligible. The Nationalist drive northward in 1926-28, for example, succeeded far more because the Nationalists then had the support of public opinion than because they had better military equipment or skill than their opponents. Today, too, the most serious threat to the stability of the régime at Nanking is not the armed force of the so-called Communists, or any other group, but the feeling of dissatisfaction with what those in authority have done and are doing. That feeling is widespread, but in the main quiescent, at the moment. It may continue so for some time; the people are weary of disturbances. But some new development may blow it into a storm which will overwhelm the Nanking régime.

Through the centuries, as has been said in an earlier chapter, the only sure foundation of political power in China has been popular approval. This remains true today. But that opinion can crystallize far more quickly and over a much wider area than it could formerly. Hence it can be far more directly effective than ever before.

More immediately obvious, however, is the pressure toward centralization of authority which comes from the actual existence of railways, telegraph lines and other modern facilities of this kind which must function over relatively long distances if they are to function satisfactorily. When communication was by messenger and transport by cart, each province could remain practically independent and could control communication and transport within itself without seriously disturbing its own or any other interests. But railways and telegraph lines which stretch across several provinces can be operated successfully only by a centralized administration. "Provincial autonomy" in the management of sections of a single railway wrecks the usefulness of the railway even to the province itself, as the interference with the railways by local military chieftains in these past twenty years has conclusively demonstrated.

These new facilities, by which troops can be moved quickly, also make it possible for the central authority to exercise military control over a much larger area than in the old days, as is obvious. The specific politico-military effects of the successive introduction of railways and steamships, then motor cars, and now airplanes, however, are sufficiently significant and interesting to be considered briefly.

Before railways were built and steamships became available, the civil wars moved slowly and across wide stretches of country. The amount of damage done was great, if the revolt spread beyond a small district. Railways and steamships speeded up the movement of troops and so brought decisive engagements much more quickly. They also canalized the fighting because the outcome of the conflict

depended far more on the ability to move swiftly along a railway than to push slowly across the countryside. So the long series of squabbles between the warlords, from 1917 on, was fought out very largely within comparatively narrow belts along the railroads. This was unfortunate for the foreign investors in Chinese railways, but it did very materially limit the damage to the country as a whole.

Then, along in the middle 1920's, the warlords woke up to the possibility of motor trucks. Especially on the North China plains, dirt roads good enough for trucking troops and military supplies can be built quickly and easily. They were built. Once more, the fighting spread across the countryside. But the tide of the "civil wars" still flowed quickly.

Now military airplanes are changing the whole politico-military picture even more radically than railways and motor trucks did. Half a dozen efficient modern fighting planes can do more to smash a revolt promptly and thoroughly than a whole "banner" of the old Manchu army, or a dozen regiments of the soldiers of today who must stay on the ground. Military planes, too, can nip in the bud any sign of revolt which appears anywhere in a wide area. A central government which has at its disposal a reasonably large, well equipped air force, distributed at strategic centers throughout the country, can exercise centralized military control utterly beyond the dreams of even the most efficient fighting man of old.

Military airplanes, too, are making it reasonable, for the first time in two decades, to talk of getting rid of the hordes of soldiers that infest the land. Every military man in China, from the petty chieftain of a raggamuffin army of ten thousand up, has talked about the need for disbandment. At the numerous conferences which have been held on the subject, all the principal commanders favored measures for reducing the armies—of the other fellow. Actually, nothing was done. The number of "armed coolies"

went on increasing year by year because, even with the railways and motor trucks, distance and difficulty of transport remained barriers to swift compulsion. The airplane surmounts those barriers. A government armed in the air can compel disbandment.

Railways, steamships and motor trucks speeded up the fighting. Airplanes may end it. The more or less continuous "civil wars" between rival warlords which went on so destructively between 1917 and 1930 are as little likely to be repeated as is the slow, devastating boiling up of the T'ai P'ing Rebellion. Armed revolt may break out. But it will either rise quickly to success or be crushed quickly. The West's latest device for getting about with speed is carrying the decisive fighting into the air—and there is a reasonable prospect that the peasants and other common folk may, in due course, be able to go peacefully about their affairs on the land.

This still is a hope for the future rather than a fact of the present, however. Meanwhile, it is easy to overestimate the extent to which the new means of transportation and communication, and the new goods and ideas which flow along with them, actually have undermined the earlier structure of Chinese society throughout the whole country. The changes are most apparent, of course, in the port cities and in the actions and words of those who have come directly under Western influences. Beyond the ports, beyond the railways, outside of these Westernized circles, the old *mores* still are powerful.

Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the old social, economic, and political structure is crumbling steadily, and that definite signs of reconstruction are appearing. But, in trying to appraise the situation as it actually is, it is just as erroneous to magnify the beginnings of a new order while overlooking the remains of the old and the confusion of the change, as it is to see only the dust of the crumbling. The dust is there, and extremely in evidence. Parts of the old

structure remain, though they are disintegrating and the disintegration cannot be stopped. But just as surely as these are facts, the fact also remains that in the midst of the disintegration, re-integration is beginning.

IV. EAGER YOUTH

The injection of Western ideas into the blood stream of China, already poisoned with the toxin of decades of misrule and disorder, produced a reaction in the body politic which has shown itself in the typical symptoms of high fever. Foreigners and Chinese alike have suffered from this fever—Chinese a good deal more than foreigners. But the very vigor of the reaction has proved China's vitality; had only the last flickerings of life remained in the "sick man of Asia," China would have submitted passively to the exactions of the Westerners. The very violence of the reaction which has come has been the sure sign not of China's decadence but of her continuing vigor.

This vigor, naturally enough, has found its most marked expression through China's youth, particularly that part of her youth which was most exposed to Western influences: the young men and women who studied in Western controlled or Westernized schools in China, or who went to Japan and Western countries for their education. School generation by school generation, much of the driving energy behind the efforts to bring reforms has come from these students. On many occasions they have been youthfully hasty in their actions, youthfully arrogant in demanding the immediate adoption of their ill-thought-out panaceas for China's ills, youthfully sharp in their uncritical condemnation of others who wished to move forward more slowly. They have followed unwise leaders to harmful extremes and have let themselves be used for selfish purposes. Their efforts have run in waves of enthusiasm and indifference rather than in a steady, persistent drive. Nevertheless, the students of China, by their acts in these recent

decades, have demonstrated conclusively that China possesses in her youth a powerful fountain of energy.

Inevitably, some of the students turned completely from their ideals in later life. Many of them lost much of the fine fervor of their youth as they passed from school and shouldered the burden of making a living. But many, also, have carried over into maturity not a little of the unselfish devotion of their youth to the welfare of China. Each new school generation, too, has proved that the springs of vitality and patriotism continue to flow freely.

The record of these students' generations shows many mistakes of judgment. But dominating the pages of that record is the story of as splendid devotion to impersonal ideals as the account of any people anywhere gives—a story underscored in the blood of literally tens of thousands of young Chinese who gave their lives for causes which they believed would serve China, or who died because they would not remain silent before those who, they were convinced, were betraying the country.

Sun Yat-sen began his agitation for the overthrow of the Manchus when he was still a student at Canton. He continued it, and secured his first associates among his fellow students, in the Hongkong Medical College. All those executed when the first plot of Sun's group against the authorities at Canton was discovered were students or young men just out of school. Most of the reformers of the "hundred days" in 1898 were young men just back from studying in Japan or just out of modernized schools in China, and of them a number paid with their heads for their attempts to regenerate the government. Students were active again in 1900—against, not supporting the Boxers—and a good proportion of the 20,000 Chinese who died rather than give up their Christian faith in that year were boys and girls in or recently graduated from missionary schools.

Youths by the thousand flocked to Japan and the West

to study Western ideas and methods at the turn of the century. Many went in the face of great difficulties. Nearly half of those in Japan and nearly as large a proportion in the United States and Europe were paying their expenses out of money they themselves had earned.

In 1905, when Sun Yat-sen organized the Tung Meng Hui with its headquarters in Tokyo and branches in the United States, France, England and Germany, he drew most of his membership from among the students in these countries. At that time, Japan was the center of Chinese student activity outside of China, with something over 4,000 students there and another 1,000 or more in Western schools. Most of these 5,000 were vigorously outspoken in their demands for a revolution in China, though not all agreed with Sun's program.

The Chinese students, in Japan especially, kept up a constant barrage of attacks on the Manchu régime. These attacks became so troublesome that, in 1906, the Peking government requested the Tokyo authorities to put a curb on the Chinese students in Japan. The Japanese authorities complied—and bitterness entered into the Chinese antagonism toward Japan as it had not through the defeat in 1895. Nearly half of the Chinese students in Japan promptly returned to China. Some for a time kept quiet when they came home; more kept on with the anti-Manchu agitation. The students who had been driven back to China from Japan by Peking's request rushed to the fore when the republican outburst came.

The rising of the students to support the republican cause in the autumn of 1911 was "like the blowing of the wind and the gushing of water, like the rolling of thunder," as a manifesto of the time picturesquely but with reasonable accuracy describes it. All up and down the Yangtze Valley, in far-western Szechuan Province, at Canton and through the South, in the cities along the coast, the boys and girls from the modernized government and missionary

schools swarmed beneath the new five-barred flag of the Republic. Hundreds rushed home from abroad to join the ranks in the fight for what the manifesto of the students' army which was organized, called "the brave and beautiful Republic of China." When the Manchus abdicated and success apparently was achieved, the bright hopes of these enthusiastic youths were voiced in the new national anthem which spoke of China as a pioneer sent to lead all the nations of the Orient into paths of new civilization, of "the ancient fatherland born anew" in a "fair republic fresh as the dew"; of the "rainbow flag" waving in the "tranquil air"; of rejoicing in China's culture; of raising the nation's voice for world peace.

It is worth noting, in passing, how frequently the pronouncements of this period, especially those of the students, mention the promotion of world peace as one of the important objects of the revolution in China. Time after time, this note is struck. China regenerate, in the dreams of her young enthusiasts, would go forth to lead the world to peace. She would, too, give to the other nations freely from the stores of her own great wisdom, so that East and West might move forward toward a perfect world. It was a splendid and beautiful and unselfish dream which these youths had. The students today have no such dreams; they are thinking grimly of an armed China in an armed world.

The students who rushed forward so eagerly to support the republican cause were immature and inexperienced, of course. They had no training. They lacked judgment. Some of them, especially of those who hurried back from abroad, were seeking primarily opportunities to secure places and perquisites in the new régime. But between the froth and scum at the top and the dregs at the bottom, the outpouring of young ardor was a clean and limpidly clear libation of idealism.

Then came the great disillusionment. Yuan Shih-kai

pricked the iridescent bubble of the students' bright dreams. The worst influences from the heritage of China's past seemed to be unshakably dominant. Many of the young men who had been so enthusiastic in 1911 committed suicide. Others gave up in despair, echoing the sentiments of a man who had been a leading publicist for political reform: "Our ideal schemes will have to be buried and unearched by future generations."

In 1914, the West, to whose civilization Young China had turned with such eagerness for guidance, hurled itself into the savagery of the World War, thereby destroying another of the cherished beliefs of the young Chinese republicans: that Western civilization was worth copying. Neither in the West, nor in China itself, they cried despairingly, did there seem to be a glimmer of hope.

Sun Yat-sen and his associates—chiefly "returned students" who had studied abroad during the pre-Republic period—continued the struggle in the political field. But a new movement away from politics developed among the somewhat younger men who had been studying in the United States and Europe when the World War broke out. Not through political action, they believed, but through the remaking of China's education, her literature, her business, her industry, would China be regenerated.

A number of the more significant of these new activities were started in 1917. In that year, for example, Tsai Yuanpei, an older "returned student" from France, was made chancellor of the National University at Peking. He gathered on his faculty a group of brilliant and aggressively reconstructionist young men, and began the revitalizing of the school which was to make it the fountainhead of a far-reaching literary and cultural renaissance. In 1917, Hu Shih, studying at Columbia University, fired the opening gun in the campaign to replace the ancient classical written language by the common spoken language as a literary medium—a change comparable in significance to that started

by Chaucer and Wycliffe in England and Dante in Italy when they used the "vulgar" tongue of the people instead of Latin in their writings. In 1917, James Y. C. Yen, of Yale University, working with the Chinese laborers in France, began the experiments which were to develop into the "Mass Education Movement" that has opened the way to literacy for the common people of China. In 1917, also, Chang Kia-ngau, back from studying in Japan, became vice-governor of the Bank of China and, with other young bankers at Shanghai and Peking, began the readjustment of banking in China to China's needs which has freed Chinese industry and the Chinese government from dependence on foreign sources for working funds.

Among the students still in school in China, a new flare-up of protest came in 1919, when word reached China that the masters of the Peace Conference had decided to let Japan keep the former holdings of Germany in Shantung Province which Japan had seized over China's protests in 1914. Feeling was strong, too, against the men then in control of the government at Peking—the Anfu clique, which the students and others believed had been betraying China to Japan in return for the Nishihara loans.

The students of the National University in Peking organized a monster demonstration on May 4, 1919, to protest against the decision at Paris. Some of the demonstrators took this occasion to vent their hatred of the "traitorous" government by violent physical attacks on three of the most distrusted members of the Anfu Party. A number of the students were arrested. When others of the students protested these arrests, the police stupidly began to arrest the students wholesale, thus arousing more protests.

Feeling was intense throughout the country. From among the merchants, gentry, educators, the professional groups, and leaders outside of the government came vigorous demands that China should not sign the peace treaty with

Germany. Popular feeling against the pro-Japanese Anfu clique was strong, though less outspoken than in student circles. On both counts, therefore, the students had public opinion behind them.

The immediate results were the resignation of the three particularly disliked "traitors" in the government and the refusal of the Chinese delegates to sign the Versailles Treaty. The resignations were a clear victory for the students. They could not claim undivided credit for the refusal to sign at Paris, but they felt, with a considerable measure of justice, that their agitation had been the most important cause of that refusal.

As an explosion of popular feeling, the "student movement" of 1919 was fully comparable to the student swarming to the republican cause in 1911. The events of 1919, however, gave the students a sense of solidarity and power which previously they had lacked. Unfortunately, this went to their heads, and they began to insist that they and they alone were the saviors of China. They declared that since their elders had failed to accomplish anything toward reforming the government and improving conditions in the country, the students now would formulate demands and see that they were met. They got into the habit of demonstrating on every possible occasion, not infrequently using the holding of a demonstration as an excuse for getting out of school examinations or other tasks. Then they demanded a voice in the management of the schools. As a result, school work throughout the country was seriously disorganized.

About the same time, too, the national and provincial governments began to fall far behind in the payment of educational grants. For all practical purposes, the government schools of the country went bankrupt. They were kept open only because the teachers were ready to make great sacrifices so that the work of education might not completely cease.

The upshot of all this was that the boys and girls who

in the years 1920 to 1927 normally would have been attending government schools from the middle school grade up had practically no consecutive education. The missionary and private Chinese schools did somewhat better than those supported by the government, but their work too was seriously disturbed by student restlessness. The students of these years were gravely injured both negatively and positively; negatively, in being deprived of regular school work; positively, in developing the habits of defiance of all constituted authority, of disrespect for the judgment of maturity, of contempt for the accepted *mores*.

China now is beginning to pay for that interruption of education. The young men and women of 1920 to 1927 now are the ones coming into the responsible junior positions in the government, in business, in education, in the life of the country generally. They have diplomas and other paper evidences that they are "educated." But during their formative years they received painfully little really constructive education and a great deal that was destructive. Europe threw away a generation of young men in the World War. The educational disorganization in China during the years 1920 to 1927 went far to ruin a generation of the country's future leaders.

Supplementing the break-up of education, numerous influences also were powerfully at work destroying Young China's respect for the old ways. Probably the most important of these was the spread of Western ideas of individual rights and freedom. By no means unimportant, however, was the wide dissemination of the literature of revolt which the West had produced in recent decades: Ibsen's and Shaw's plays; some of the Russian revolutionary novels and dramas; more specifically, the "revolt of youth" literature which has poured so freely from Western presses. A not inconsiderable volume of such literature also was produced in China. Young China devoured this literature eagerly. It also watched and copied, especially in the port

cities, the example of free relations between Western men and women, in their dances, tea parties, and similar affairs, and in the Hollywood type of motion pictures in the hundreds of cinema theatres throughout the land.

Taken together, these various influences have caused a striking wave of repudiation of the older standards. In some respects, this has been like the post-war revolt of youth in the West; but the defiance of convention in China has been more spectacular because the conventions were more rigid.

The flat defiance of family authority by the students is socially perhaps the most significant of the many departures from tradition. Marriage, in the old days, was arranged by the families, and the prospective bride and groom were not consulted. In the last few years, literally thousands of young men and women have taken upon themselves the choice of a partner, often without even consulting their parents. The "marriage" in hundreds of cases, has consisted of starting to live together as man and wife, the new relationship being announced by an advertisement in a newspaper or a note to a few friends. Most have not gone to such extremes. But for all practical purposes, a very considerable part of those who have been students in modernized schools during the past ten or fifteen years, including the girls, have taken the business of marrying into their own hands.

There were a few pioneers in this revolt before 1920. But anything like what might be called a swing *en masse* away from the old moorings came only during and after those years of chaos in the schools. When it did come, it went to extremes, resulting in everything from bobbed hair for the girls to open and boastfully public "free love" menages maintained by the young men and women students in many of the colleges and universities. In a word, Chinese student youth, after it got the bit in its teeth in 1919, went wild in following Western ideas of individual freedom with

much the same sort of enthusiastic lack of discrimination that it had showed earlier in reacting to Western political ideas.

Signs of returning student stability began to appear in 1927 and 1928. Experience had shown one generation of students that they, like their elders whom they had condemned as futile, could not bring order in China over night. The next generation has been more ready to listen to the advice of older folk who told them to stop wasting their time and energy on the excitements of useless political agitation and to concentrate on study in order better to prepare themselves for constructive service to their country later on. The idea spread slowly, but it did spread.

Another interruption occurred, however, when what they believed was a new call to help their country led a good many of the students to leave their desks and join the Nationalist forces in the drive up from Canton.

They were settling down again when the tremendous provocation of the Japanese invasion came in 1931 and 1932. But even when the student agitation and excitement over this new danger to China were at their height, the proclamations by the students showed how the new student generation had become more realistic than that of 1919. These statements reiterated time and again the thought that China, unable to resist Japan at the present moment because of her weakness, must devote all her energies to preparing for effective defence and retaliation in the future.

In the school years 1933-35, the students have kept to their books, according to reports from the school authorities.

These past ten years have seen an appalling wastage of China's youth. Tens of thousands of the students were killed in fighting, first on the Nationalist side and then against the Nationalists when the young men felt that their faith had been betrayed.

Many other thousands were wiped out in the "white terror" of 1927-29. Arguments to justify what was done to

the students, young women as well as young men, in that "terror" have been put forward. But it is hard to listen calmly to these arguments when one thinks of the ruthless slaughter of youths whose chief fault was that they were too eager to see their country well served, and whose very patriotic ardor was one of their nation's most valuable assets.

The "white terror" temporarily destroyed open opposition within the Nationalist-controlled territory. But, as always happens when such measures are used, it sowed the seeds of far more serious opposition later. The so-called Communist armies which have formed so powerful an opposition to the Nanking authorities are the creation in large part of young men and women, students chiefly, who were driven to desperate resistance by that "white terror." And the memories of how they once looked to the present Nationalist leaders as the saviors of China now rankle bitterly in the hearts of tens of thousands of Chinese students, in school or just out, who feel that the Nationalist leaders, in order to secure the approval of the foreigners and the Chinese bankers, turned traitors to China.

One finds in the present generation of students virtually none of the despair which brought an end to the active interest in politics after 1911-13. Neither, however, does one find among them echoes of the joyous talk of 1911 that a rejuvenated China would lead the world in the paths of peace. Instead, there is a bitterness, a cynical disbelief in the sincerity of those who talk about international justice, a harsh contempt for the suggestion that the ancient Chinese way of trust in the essential reasonableness of men was a good way.

The new quietness of the students would be wholly encouraging were it not for the ominous signs of how deeply the youth of China has come to feel that China must turn to the savagery of arms to protect herself in a still militarized world. Ten years ago, to cite only one illustration, the students in many of the colleges held mass meetings to

protest against a proposal to introduce voluntary military training. They felt, quite sincerely, greatly insulted by even the suggestion that they, of the honored and honorable scholar class, should disgrace themselves by practising the arts of the despised soldier. Today, practically all of the middle school and college students, girls as well as boys, are taking military training, avowedly because they want to prepare themselves to fight for China—against a foreign foe or against their own government if need be.

China's youth is less likely than in the past to waste its driving power in chasing will o' the wisp dreams of an overnight millennium. By just so much more is its new grim cherishing of hatreds a menace to world peace if the conditions which bred those hatreds remain unchanged.

THE NEW REVOLT

(CHAPTER XIII)

THE "Capitalist" Westerners introduced revolutionizing ideas into China, but they did not specifically preach revolution. Still less did they take active and open part in avowedly revolutionary uprisings.

The Communist Russians did both; secretly from 1921 to 1923; openly and under the Nationalist banner from 1923 to 1927. Yet less than four years after their aid was openly accepted in a revolt against the established authorities, the very men whom they had helped, now become authorities, turned against them, drove them from China, and tried desperately to stamp out the ideas which they had implanted.

The Russians did not create revolution in China, or the conditions for revolution. While the Nationalists were struggling to get control, the Russians set the current of blind revolt running in channels which made it a power to advance the Nationalist cause. It has continued to run in those channels, but now it is aiding others who in their turn are rebelling against established authority.

That current has run most powerfully in the Central Yangtze provinces because conditions were worst there, but it penetrates through the whole country. It has been running strongly for nearly a decade now, since the Russian-trained propagandists began to cut the channels. Will it continue to run in these channels, gaining power year by year? If so, this revolt will be something new in Chinese history, revealing that the Russian influence was profound indeed. Or will it, as all previous peasant uprisings have done, gradually lose its impetus?

Whatever answer time may give to these questions, the currents set going by the Russian participation in the Nationalist advance are among the more potent influences in China today. It is worth while, therefore, to sketch briefly the record of that participation.

II. GEOGRAPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY

Imagine a huge, roughly drawn rectangle, stretching for a thousand miles inland from the southeastern coast to the foothills of the Himalayas and covering the six hundred miles between the Yangtze River and the southern coast. In the center of this rectangle, occupying fully three-fourths of the area, is a mass of mountains. Around the border, except at the southwestern corner, is a strip of reasonably flat arable land which varies in width from a score to a hundred and fifty or more miles. At the northeast corner of the rectangle is the plain of central Hunan Province, fairly wide from east to west as well as from north to south. Eastward from this, through Kiangsi and Anhwei Provinces and on into Chekiang, the border of tillable land runs in a comparatively narrow strip between the central mountains and the Yangtze River. At the northeast corner, is the Yangtze Delta plain south of the river, where the border widens out considerably as it swings around through Chekiang and Kiangsu Provinces to the eastern end of the rectangle. Down along the coast, through Chekiang and Fukien Provinces and into Kwantung, the border is extremely narrow. Along the southern side, the border of plains widens out again. Nowhere, however, does this border contain anything like the great Yellow River Plain of North China. Any point on the border is fairly near to the mountains.

The mountains in the central part of this vast rectangle, and those beyond the Hunan plain to the west, have from time immemorial been the home of men who were in rebellion. Cut up by narrow valleys as they are, they form a virtually impregnable fastness to which disgruntled or des-

perate folk from the bordering plains can escape and from which they can raid down onto the flat land. Pre-Chinese tribes, driven from these bordering plains by the early Chinese, withdrew into these mountains and have continued their ancient tribal life there, unconquered and unconquerable. Time after time, armies sent from the plains in pursuit of raiders from the mountains have lost themselves in the tortuous passes and been annihilated. Dynasty after dynasty has established its authority on the plains, but none has been able to carry that authority effectively back into the hills.

Conditions even on the plains which form the borders of this huge rectangle have been such as to breed revolts, especially in the last few decades. The farmable land is more thickly settled than almost any other part of the earth's surface. The population is so dense that there is less than half an acre of land for each person, and a family owning as much as twenty acres is counted among the distinctly wealthy. Most of the people most of the time are only one hard-earned and carefully hoarded crop ahead of starvation. Many have fallen, by reason of accidents or natural calamities or seizures by soldiers, into the clutches of money lenders, who exact thirty, forty, fifty per cent or more a year as interest on their loans, or of landlords who demand half or more of the crops from land worked in tenancy. These exorbitant demands, of course, simply drive the victims further into debt. As a result of such conditions, coupled with the steady fall in the price of farm products in recent years, the depredations of the military in the "civil wars," and the staggering taxes which the petty warloads have levied, most of the arable land in these border plains has passed into the ownership of a very small part of the population. In Kwantung Province, for example, two per cent of the people own more than half of the farmable land and three-fourths of the people own only one-fifth of the land which is cultivated. In other parts of these plains, conditions are almost as bad. Large numbers of the people own no land at all;

others may own small bits, but are compelled to rent additional pieces and work them as tenants to get enough food even to keep them from sheer starvation.

Go among people so situated; tell them that the land belongs of right to the people who work it, not to the landlords who live in idle debauchery on the proceeds of the people's toil; say to them that wealth belongs to those who create it, not to money lenders who suck the blood of the people; promise them that when the old officials are driven out by the new friends of the people, landlords and money lenders and all those who live without toil will be suppressed and that control will then be taken from hands grown soft through idleness and put into hands made hard by labor—do that, and what happens, inevitably? Exactly what happened when the Nationalists, with their soldier and propagandist armies spread from Canton over the Kwantung plain, then crossed the mountains into the Hunan plain, then pushed on down the Yangtze Valley. The peasants rose to welcome those who promised to be their deliverers. And here, there and elsewhere, they took vengeance on those who had been grinding them down.

Rouse the people with such talk; make them such promises; then, from conviction or otherwise, not only refuse to keep the promises, but crush savagely those who still take the talk and the promises seriously—do that, and, again what happens? New revolt springs up, of course.

Do all this in a region where nearby mountains are a safe haven to those who know them and a trap to those who do not, then continue for years to try to crush the revolt by ruthless suppression, and how can any result be expected but that the revolt will grow—especially if it be shrewdly led and if the rebels actually do carry out at least some of the promises of better conditions for the people which were made?

The Nationalist drive northward succeeded for the same reasons that this Communist revolt has developed. In broad

outline, these reasons are obvious enough, when one stops for a moment to study the conditions of the people and the geography of the territory where these successes are won. Equally obvious are the causes of the excesses committed by those fighting the established authorities. The barbarity used in trying to put down the revolts is less easy to understand however, even from the point of view of purely selfish interest, and quite apart from any question of an honest desire to improve the lot of the people. It would have been much better tactics, and in the end much cheaper, to have put through a redistribution of the land and other fundamental reforms, than to try to stamp out the fire of revolt which was being kept alive by conditions.

III. RUSSIA ENTERS

The Communist Russians began feeling their way into China in 1919, when Moscow issued a declaration renouncing all the special rights which the Czarist government had forced China to yield. In 1921, Lenin sent a special representative to China who secretly organized (or re-organized and revived; the records are not clear) the small Chinese Communist Party whose members were almost entirely intellectuals adhering to Marxian doctrines, not members of the proletariat. The next year official representatives from Moscow arrived in Peking and started negotiations which finally led, in May, 1924, to a treaty establishing diplomatic relations between China and Soviet Russia.

While these negotiations were in progress, Soviet agents were working to establish connection with individuals who might be useful. In 1922 and 1923 they tried to persuade the strongest warlord in the North, General Wu Pei-fu, to accept Russian help in his efforts to make himself master of China. But Wu, a scholar as well as a soldier, who believed that China's salvation lay along the road of a return to Confucian principles, would have none of such connec-

tions. Failing here, they turned to Sun Yat-sen at Canton. Though Sun was not a Communist, he had sent Lenin, in 1918, a message of congratulation on the success of the Soviet Revolution. Late in 1922, the official Soviet envoy to China, Adolph Joffe, met Dr. Sun in Shanghai and, after a series of conferences, the two issued a joint statement on January 26, 1923. In this, the Russian pledge to surrender imperialistically acquired rights was renewed. The two men also agreed that China was not ready for Communism. The first paragraph of this statement begins:

Dr. Sun Yat-sen holds that the Communist order or even the Soviet System cannot actually be introduced into China, because there do not exist here the conditions for the successful establishment of either Communism or Sovietism. This view is entirely shared by Mr. Joffe.

In the autumn of 1923, when Sun was back as the head of a "government" at Canton, after having been driven out in 1922, he invited the Russians to help in his revolutionary campaign—having failed in his efforts to get help from other foreign countries. Michael Borodin came in as the principal Russian representative. He won Sun's confidence, and before long acquired a dominating influence in the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party). This influence shows in the form given to the Kuomintang when it was reorganized early in 1924. Borodin continued to be the dominant political and propaganda strategist in the Nationalist organization until the break came in the spring of 1927.

Beginning in 1922, Communist agitators kept busy among the students, the industrial and other workers in the cities, and the peasants. This underground agitation was planned and directed by Russian Communists, but necessarily most of the actual work was done by Chinese. Among these were many students who were not converts to the Marxian economic theories, but who wanted to do something to help China and thought they could do it by working with the non-imperialist Russians.

The revolutionary propaganda was skillfully handled. The students were told of Russia's disinterested friendliness and desire to help China shake off the shackles of imperialism and to get rid of the vampire warlords who were fattening themselves on the blood of the people. The city workers were urged to organize themselves for the class struggle so that they might get their rights as proletarians. The peasants were reminded that the officials, the landlords and the wealthy always had ground them down, and that the land really should belong to those who tilled it.

This campaign of propaganda spread steadily, in spite of vigorous efforts of the authorities in the North and the Yangtze Valley to suppress it. Labor unions of a sort were formed. "Peasants and workers unions" were organized in many districts outside of the cities. Then, when the Kuomintang was reorganized at the beginning of 1924, the Chinese Communist Party was given a chance to come out into the open, at least in Nationalist territory. Communists were given formal permission to join the Kuomintang while remaining members of their own organization, though the understanding was that in the Kuomintang they would be under the same party regulation and control as other members. The basis of the coöperation was supposed to be the principles laid down in the Sun-Joffe declaration of 1923: that China was not ready for Communism, but that Communists would help in the struggle for national independence and unification.

Soon after this, the government at Peking signed its new treaty with Soviet Russia. This did not, however, remove the official ban on Communist propaganda, and the northern warlords continued their efforts to suppress it.

The most notable opportunity for the Russians came during the Nationalist drive north from Canton. Preparations for this began in 1924. They took the form of training two armies, one of soldiers, the other of propagandists. Chiang Kai-shek, back from a trip to Russia, was put in

charge of the military side, with Russian officers as his aides. Borodin directed the training of the propagandists. Young women and girls joined both the fighting and the propaganda corps in considerable numbers.

The plan—which was carried out—was to send the propagandists ahead of the army to tell the people that when the Nationalists came their troubles would be over; that the power of the rapacious landlords would be broken; that the money lenders no longer would be allowed to grind down the poor; that employers would be compelled to give the workers a fair share of the profits. These propagandists also were to teach the city workers and the peasants how to organize in order to get their rights. Then the soldiers would come. Peasants and workers would be organized into unions. People's governments would be set up. Forced levies would be made on the wealthy, but the poor would be helped.

The plan was tried out in expeditions from Canton to get control of Kwantung Province. It worked. Then the drive north started, early in 1926. By the end of March, 1927, the Nationalists were in control of the Yangtze Valley, from Hankow down to Shanghai. The propagandists certainly had as much to do with aiding the advance as the soldiers; probably more.

Inevitably there were serious excesses. The peasants and the city workers, told that they had a right to their share of the land and the wealth, and suddenly given authority in the committees of government which were set up, broke loose in bloody extermination of hated landlords and others who had property. Rabble soldiers who had attached themselves to the Nationalist army indulged in orgies of looting. The dislike of wealthy people generally, coupled with the effects of the propagandists' talk about the "imperialists" who were bleeding China to death, produced attacks on foreign missionary and other property and on foreign settlements in more important cities. The details of all this

have been told too often to need repetition here. The wind was sown; the whirlwind began to be reaped.

IV. THE BREAK

The alliance between the Communists and the Kuomintangites, however, was unnatural. The Kuomintang leaders were essentially what the Russians called "bourgeois minded." They had turned to the Russians for help because they could get it nowhere else. The Russians had given the help because by this means they secured a chance to spread their doctrines in China. The chiefs on each side fully intended to break the alliance and take entire control at the first opportunity.

This opportunity came with the capture of Shanghai, which gave access to the sea and control of the large tax and other revenues of the city. For the first time, the Nationalists were in a position to settle down and consolidate their gains.

Occupation of Shanghai also forced the issue between the Kuomintangites and the Communists in the Nationalist ranks. The excesses accompanying the Nationalist advance had created a good deal of uneasiness among the "solid citizens" generally. Foreign opinion, too, had become emphatically outspoken, not against the Nationalists as such, but against their association with the Communists. Chiang Kai-shek and the other right-wing leaders were forced to choose between breaking with the Communists and giving up hope of getting support from the Shanghai bankers and merchants and of securing foreign recognition. The Communist leaders also saw that unless they quickly secured complete control of the Nationalist organization they would be ousted altogether.

The Communists made the first move, in the "Nanking incident" of March 27, 1927—an affair in which the foreigners were used as pawns in the Communist-Kuomintang conflict. The plan of the Communists was to provoke a

bombardment of the city by the foreign warships lying in the river and "strong" demands by the foreign governments. They counted on these foreign reactions to arouse a storm of anti-foreign feeling in the country, on which they could ride to control. Partly because both the American and British naval officers at Nanking and the foreign governments kept their heads and acted with notably wise restraint, however, the feeling turned against the Communists instead of against the foreigners.

This was the beginning of the end for the Russians.

Chiang broke with the left-wing Kuomintangites and their Communist associates who held the forms of the Kuomintang party organization at Hankow. (The Kuomintang capital had been moved there from Canton.) He set up a government of his own at Nanking, calling it the only legitimate Kuomintang authority, and started in ruthlessly to stamp out Communist agitation and agitators, real, semi- or imaginary. He did this, in part at least, to win the favor of the Shanghai bankers and the foreign governments by showing them that he was not even faintly pink.

The Hankow group also turned against the Communists, emphatically so after its members learned, early in June, that the Moscow Bureau of the Third International had sent instructions that the Chinese Communists were to build up an army of their own to use against the Kuomintang and to take other steps which would give them control of the party organization. Formal expulsion of the Communists from the Kuomintang was voted at Hankow on July 15, 1927. Twelve days later Borodin and the other Russians left for Moscow, going via Mongolia.

The first of the long series of avowedly Communist revolts against Nationalist authority came on July 30, 1927, when Chinese Communist troops seized the capital of Kiangsi Province (Nanchang). After a few days, they were driven back into the mountains. But the Communists had made their first independent military move.

The Kuomintang group at Hankow promptly outlawed the Communist Party and started the same kind of ruthless suppression of any and every kind of Communist activity that Chiang Kai-shek was carrying on in the lower Yangtze areas. Like him, they in effect repudiated the whole of the labor and peasant reform program which had been proclaimed in the name of the Nationalists while they advanced into and down the Yangtze Valley. Anyone who advocated any of the program now was branded as a "Communist," and, unless he was too prominent, exterminated. The anti-Communist pogrom in the central Yangtze region was even more hysterically ruthless than in the lower Yangtze, if that were possible.

After a few months of jockeying for position, Kuomintang unity was restored, with Chiang and the Rights in control and with headquarters at Nanking, where a Kuomintang government was set up in February, 1928. The leaders called the attention of the Shanghai bankers and the foreigners to their lily whiteness, as demonstrated by their suppression of Communists and the expulsion of the last Russian consular officials in December, 1927.

They secured the support of the bankers, and foreign commendation. They still had back of them, too, considerable feeling among the "middle class" Chinese against the Communists, which had been aroused by the excesses during the northward drive. Before 1928 ended, they took Peking, made the government at Nanking technically the government of all China, and secured foreign recognition for it. They were now in authority and definitely free of any Communist taint.

But they themselves had prepared the way for the new revolt which has grown increasingly more serious in the years since 1928. They helped to scatter the highly inflammable material of the Communistic propaganda during the two years and a half of association with the Russians. Then they lit the flames of revolt by the break with the Commu-

nists. Finally, by their appalling "white terror," inaugurated though that officially was to crush the "red menace," they fanned the flames.

V. THE RED TIDE

The Communists, as we have seen, made their first military move at the end of July, 1927. They were "defeated" promptly, but the move had served its purpose. In money, in arms and in other supplies, the Communist troops were much better equipped when they left Nanchang than they had been when they entered it. And the message went out to the peasants on the plains all around the rectangle that the beacon of armed rebellion had been lit on their behalf, against the Nationalists who had betrayed them.

For three and a half years after this, the central Nationalist authorities made no large scale military drive against the Communist armies. Chiang Kai-shek and the orthodox Nationalist commanders were busy taking Peking in 1928, and in 1929 and 1930 Chiang had on his hands revolts by various of his former non-Communist associates who disliked Chiang's efforts to make himself master. These kept him occupied. Then, at the end of 1930, he launched, in the name of the Nanking government, the first specifically anti-Communist campaign.

This was the first large scale offensive to stem the rising "red" tide. But in the preceding three years and a half the efforts to prevent the spread of Communism had been continued by the officials, from Chiang Kai-shek down. In spite of this—perhaps it would be more accurate to say because of the methods used—the Communist forces steadily grew, especially in the area of the great rectangle. Thousands flocked from all over the country to join the Communist ranks. Hundreds upon hundreds of these were students, young men and women who had thrown themselves into the Nationalist cause because they believed they were serving

China, but who now, in bitter disappointment at what was being done in the name of Nationalism, turned against their former heroes.

The Communist leaders built up their organization. They trained their hand-picked corps of propagandists and fighters. They set up little "Communist Republics" here and there, which served as examples of what they would do when their power extended over wider areas. They acquired money by taking it from the rich, and arms and ammunition by capture from the "regular" troops. Their fighting forces were more or less shut up in the mountains of the huge rectangle, but their propagandists swarmed over the plains and down into the cities. Because it was dangerous to be a Communist, those who were seeking primarily to further selfish interests kept away and those who did join could be counted on for a devotion quite without parallel in the ranks of the opposing Nationalist armies.

Finally, in December, 1930, in a blare of publicity, the first big anti-Communist campaign was launched. In a few days, jubilant reports went out that Kian (in Kiangsi Province) had been captured—but nothing was said of the way the division which won this "victory" was lured into the mountains and virtually annihilated. Tungku was taken in another much publicized victory—but official silence covered the fact that the Nationalist division concerned was crushed and disarmed by a night attack when the victors were too overcome by the effects of their celebration to be properly watchful. So it went. By companies and regiments and sometimes whole divisions, the Nationalist soldiers were manœuvred into traps and slaughtered or captured and disarmed. Thousands of the Nationalist soldiers deserted to the Communists, taking their arms with them. The peasants kept the Communists informed of every move which their enemies made, deliberately misled the Nationalists, and did their full share in picking off Nationalist soldiers whenever the opportunity offered. Over 100,000 men had been sent

into the field by Nanking. By the end of February, 1931, the campaign was given up in despair.

Two official Nationalist comments on this first campaign apply with equal pertinence to those which followed in 1931, 1932 and 1933. The official Nationalist observer declared that: "The result of this campaign was very disappointing. . . . The rising tide of Communist-bandits instead of being staved off, rose higher." One of the Nationalist brigadier generals, after citing various reasons for the military failure, including the lack of knowledge of the terrain and the lack of coöperation in the Nationalist ranks, put his finger on the fundamental causes for the Communist revolt. He said:

The mismanagement and incompetence of the hsien [county] magistrates, the inefficiency of the police who disturbed the people instead of protecting them, and the oppression by the local gentry who fattened themselves on the people, combined to drive the people into the arms of the Communists . . .

The bankrupt condition of the peasantry, unemployment among the artisans and workers, and the general economic distress among the people, supply inexhaustible fuel to the growth of Communism.

The first campaign having failed, another was launched in the early spring of 1931. That failed. So did the third, and the fourth and the fifth campaigns, which kept the attacks on the Communists going more or less constantly until late in the spring of 1933. Steadily increasing forces were used in these campaigns, and all the advantages of numbers and equipment were with the Nationalists. The Communists, however, possessed the even greater advantages of the good will of the people, of devotion to the cause, of knowledge of the terrain, of mobility. The Communists regularly used the same tactics: a show of resistance; retreat, luring the Nationalists into the mountains; swift marches through the passes which the Communists knew and the Nationalists did not; devastating flank attacks. The Reds armed themselves and clothed their forces largely with weapons and supplies captured from the Nationalists or brought over by the

thousands of deserting soldiers. The barbarity with which the Nationalist soldiers treated the people in the regions they took from the Communists helped the latter even more than the captured arms.

The net result of all these campaigns was an increase in the territory under Communist control and a great strengthening of their armies. Their ranks were joined not only by many thousands of Nationalist deserters, but also by other thousands who took the field against the Nationalists because of Nanking's refusal to fight Japan when the Japanese invaded Chinese territory. Fear of the Communists grew steadily among the bourgeois and the foreigners, while among the peasants, the workers and the students throughout the country, feeling turned more and more away from the Nationalists.

The sixth campaign, launched in October, 1933, and continuing on into the spring and summer of 1934, is being handled quite differently from its predecessors. The earlier campaigns had been designed as quick thrusts which would end the Communist menace by wiping out the Communists. This time, the advance is being made more slowly, and the positions conquered are being consolidated. Block houses are being built across the countryside, where detachments of soldiers will be stationed to hold what has been captured. Chiang has ordered the "complete suppression of the Communists within three years."

While the main reliance still is placed on military force, the need for removing the fundamental causes of the continuing revolt also is coming to be recognized. Beginning as early as 1930, the Nationalist authorities made some gestures toward easing the burden of taxes, rents and debts which rested on the peasants, and toward re-distributing the land. Since then, further steps have been taken in this direction. So far, however, most of Nanking's moves to improve the lot of the peasants have not developed much beyond the stage of paper decrees. Furthermore, neither the former land-

owners nor the peasants are satisfied with the proposals. The landowners want to be given back all their old rights, or at least paid for the land which they have lost and compensated for the money which has been seized. The peasants, in the areas controlled by the Communists, already have gone much further than the half-way measures proposed by Nanking, and those outside of these regions have had their appetites whetted both by the promises which the Nationalists and then the Communists made and by the reports of what the Communists have done. The peasants have suffered severely, too, from the movement of troops and the fighting during these past four years of anti-Communist campaigns—and the Communists have been able to claim that they were simply defending the mass of the people against the attacks of those who, after breaking their promises, were trying to bring back the old intolerable conditions.

The rigid censorship on all reports about Communist activities except those emanating from official Nanking sources makes it difficult to know exactly how far the Communist movement has progressed, how much territory is Communist-controlled, or what the Communists actually are doing.

It seems reasonably clear, however, that where there is any government at all in the mountains which occupy the center of the great rectangle south of the Yangtze, it is of a so-called Communist sort. A good proportion of the plains which border the rectangle is also in the hands of Sovietized groups. The Communists also are in control of areas in northern Szechuan and southern Shensi Provinces—both fairly mountainous regions which are difficult of access. The Communist influence is spreading among the peasants on the Yellow River plain in North China, and in the northwest, though here relatively little has been done in setting up avowedly Soviet governments.

Including the large mountain areas which the Communists have used as bases of operation—regions which have been in effect no man's land for centuries—the "Communist"

territory, at the beginning of 1934, probably was somewhere between a quarter and a third of all China south of the Great Wall. Counting only the relatively flat areas where the people live in considerable numbers, and where the Nationalist authorities could use their superior military strength effectively, the Sovietized territory of course was very much less than this—probably not a third of the farming area in and south of the Yangtze Valley. This total Communist area, however, was not held as a unit; it lay in more or less effectively separated patches. The Nationalists controlled all the important cities along the Yangtze River and the coast.

As the anti-Communist campaign which was started late in 1933 developed through 1934, the more important plains regions along the Yangtze River passed almost completely under Nationalist control. The Nationalist forces also penetrated short distances into the mountains. But the Communist armies, withdrawing from one section in the face of Nationalist pressure, in large part simply moved over into other areas—from the northern side of the mountains down toward the southern; from the Hunan area in the northwestern corner of the rectangle over further westward into the mountains of Szechuan Province. The Nationalist reports continued to claim victories, and there was much talk about the steps which were being taken to improve the condition of the peasants. The Communist-controlled area was somewhat reduced, but the Communist armies remained, at the beginning of 1935, still far from completely suppressed. Perhaps this campaign, since it is being carried out along different lines from those which preceded it, will be more successful than the others. Perhaps not. It still is much too early to judge definitely what the result will be.

VI. STONY GROUND

It is impossible to say how much of real Marxian Communism this revolt will bring in China. The official

statements of the "All China Soviet Republic" (which was formed in December, 1931) are flatly Marxian enough; the "Constitution" of this Republic, for example, gives as the first of the seventeen "principal aims," "to guarantee the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry in the Soviet districts and to secure the triumph of the dictatorship throughout the whole of China." The orthodox Soviet Russian ideas about the collectivization of the land also are being applied, on paper, in parts of the Sovietized territory. And without doubt a good proportion of the leaders in the movement are fully as much convinced Marxians as are the leaders in Russia.

But Communism, with its concepts of the individual as a unit in the large group of the community as a whole, and of property as rightfully belonging to that community rather than to individuals, is fundamentally antipathetical to the exceedingly deep rooted Chinese feeling for private ownership of property of all kinds as the bed rock of family coherence and continuity. As a social and economic system, in fact, Communism is the direct antithesis of the system of small groups—villages, guilds, families—which has been the foundation of Chinese society; and it is most antagonistic to the most fundamental of those groups: the family. Western individualism and the economic system of capitalism are far less out of line with the deep-running currents of Chinese life than is Communism.

Moreover, China has not had for many centuries the social institutions which prepared the way for the Bolshevik revolution in Russia: an aristocracy holding complete power by inheritance from one generation to the next without reference to capacity; a long tradition of gross oppression of the people; vast landed estates worked by serfs who had no property or other rights. To an extraordinary degree the Chinese peasants have been free, and they have reasserted that fundamental freedom time and again by rising against oppression when it became intolerable—as they are rising

now—not in response to philosophically formulated political theories but directly, almost instinctively, as the occasion required. Having risen, having destroyed the oppressors, they have in times past settled back into the round of daily living. To a remarkable degree, too, Chinese society has been fluid in the sense that individual ability determined the rise and fall of the individual in the social scale. The highest position was open to the peasant's son who had the ability to take it—and the premier's son might become a beggar if that were the level of his ability.

The old Russian system denied to the mass of the people the freedom to manage their own affairs as they chose and held out to them no prospect but that of continued suffering and hardship. In that soil, the seeds of Russian Communism could take root and flourish. The Chinese system offers only very stony ground for such seeds.

The peasant revolt now going on in China, and the crystallization of labor feeling in the cities which also is in process, may continue to bear the name of Communist. But it is hard to believe that the results of these changes, when a new settling down comes after the present disturbances, will be recognizable as derived from Marx in more than superficial respects.

Nevertheless, the influences which came from Russia, and have continued to flow from that source, have been and are potent in shaping the course of events. Operating directly and indirectly, through positive propaganda and through the advertising of attempts at suppression, they are giving the peasants and other workers of the country a sense of their own importance, and a feeling of solidarity which are both new and potentially of the utmost significance. The peasants have been, through the centuries, the solid foundation of Chinese society and civilization, and the condition of the country has been determined by the condition of the peasants. Chinese philosophers stressed the importance of caring for the welfare of the people. But in practice, to themselves

and to most others, the peasants as such remained consciously little more significant in the whole scheme of things than the soil they tilled. A new realization is developing.

The particular economic and social forms of orthodox Communism probably will not sink deeply into Chinese life, at least for many years. But the "Communist" movement is fundamentally revolutionizing that life none the less by making the peasants and workers self-conscious.

CRUMBLING WESTERN PRIVILEGES

(CHAPTER XIV)

THE penetration of the new ways of thinking and acting, together with a change in attitude in Western countries, has resulted in a crumbling of the structure of Western rights and privileges, of Western prestige and of Western dominance in the economic and social modernization of China.

The nineteenth century body of treaties and agreements of various kinds supporting the Western special rights and privileges have been in large part either formally cancelled or virtually nullified in practice. The Chinese almost completely have lost the older feeling that Westerners and Western civilization possessed some sort of magic quality and capacity which made them worthy of admiration and imitation. In banking and finance, in industry, in the operation of railroads and other means of communication, in the handling of foreign imports and exports to foreign countries, in education, in religious propaganda, the Chinese have taken control away from the foreigners either completely or in large part. In international councils, China has secured a place of very much greater influence than she had when the century began, in spite of the continued political weakness of the country.

Altogether, in both the official and private relations between Chinese and Westerners, China, as 1935 begins, is in a very much stronger position than she was in 1901, and very much more in control of her own affairs.

The indications are, too, that the development in this direction will continue. It is clear enough that, in spite of all the general international pledges to keep the peace and the specific promises to respect the integrity of China, the West-

ern powers are not prepared to take positive steps to protect China against an aggressor. Some of them apparently are more than half inclined to condone whatever aggressive moves Japan may want to make, in return for a Japanese pledge to stop troubling them economically elsewhere, or to give them special economic opportunities. But no Western power, now, seems to be contemplating new territorial expansion on its own account at China's expense, and all the Western powers seem to have made up their minds to a progressive abandonment of what little remains of the old treaty prerogatives, doing this as gracefully as possible, since ultimately these prerogatives must be surrendered anyway.

China's position in relation to Japan also has changed very greatly since 1901. In fact, the transformation of Japan during this past generation from a small island empire to by far the most powerful Oriental nation, industrially as well as in a military way, probably is potentially the most important change which has taken place in China's international environment. This development has transferred from half way around the world to China's very doorstep the center and source of the menace of foreign territorial aggression and economic dominance.

Because of Japan's rise to power, and especially because of her recent actions, it should be noted, a clear distinction now must be made between China's relations with the Western powers and her dealings with Japan. Until Japan's victory over Russia in 1905, "foreign" and "Western" could be used as practically synonymous terms in discussing China's international relations. The two words cannot be so used, now. Japan is "foreign," but her interests and her position have become radically different from those of the Western powers. Differences exist, of course, between the concerns of Russia, the United States, Britain and France in and in relation to China. But these differences between the Western powers are much less significant than those between the Western powers as a group and Japan.

Japan's holdings, interests and tangible influence in China have been growing during the past three decades; those of the West have been crumbling.

This deterioration of Western dominance in China has been due primarily to the growth of Chinese national self-consciousness. The Chinese, learning from the West what complete national sovereignty meant and how desirable it was, have demanded that the old treaty-based special foreign rights and privileges be cancelled, and have backed these demands with action which has done much to convince the Westerners that holding on to the privileges costs more than the privileges are worth. The Western powers on their own initiative conceivably might have taken some small steps toward the completely voluntary surrender of these rights, but Chinese pressure unquestionably has lengthened the strides considerably. Nationalistic feeling also has been powerful among the incentives which have driven the Chinese to take into their own hands a steadily increasing share of the control of modernizing activities of all kinds.

II. A CHANGED ATTITUDE

Changes in public opinion in the West have helped to remove obstacles from the path of Chinese nationalistic self-assertion. Quite definitely, a good deal—but not all—of the old feeling about the Chinese has disappeared: the feeling which centered around the thought of the Chinese as “heathen” who were outside the circle of Christian nations which had rights as well as duties in relation to each other. This change in attitude is reflected, on the official side, in such gestures toward the acceptance of China as a full-fledged member of the society of nations as admitting her to regular membership in the League of Nations and electing her to the League Council. On the private side, the changed attitude shows itself, among other ways, in the very great increase in the serious attention which is given to the study of Chinese

culture, Chinese art, Chinese philosophy, Chinese civilization generally—not as much study yet as there should be, but very much more than thirty years ago. Western business interests, too, very definitely are taking the position that in doing business in China they must conform to Chinese ways and laws; the type of businessman who used to boast that though he had lived in China many years he knew not one word of “the filthy language” is rapidly disappearing.

The missionary attitude also has changed very substantially from what it was through the nineteenth century. The missionaries have not given up the belief that Christianity is the supremely worth while religion, of course, and there still are many missionaries who feel that “heathenism” contains little or nothing of good. But the more forward looking missionary elements—probably well in the majority now—are themselves taking the lead in the efforts to study and emphasize the good elements in the non-Christian religions. It is illuminating, for example, to set beside Dr. Foster’s diatribes on the “abominations of heathenism” (already quoted), such a statement as this in the report of the laymen’s commission which made a careful study of missionary work in 1930–31 on behalf of the leading American missionary boards:

The mission of today should make a positive effort, first of all to know and understand the religions around it, then to recognize and associate itself with whatever kindred elements there are. . . . It is clearly not the duty of the Christian missionary to attack the non-Christian systems of religion. . . . The Christian will therefore regard himself as a co-worker with the forces within each such religious system which are making for righteousness.

That exceedingly broad and constructive minded conception of the work of the Christian missionary is presented as one of the ten principal conclusions of the laymen’s commission, in *Re-Thinking Missions*. The changed attitude of the missionaries also shows itself in the increasing transfer of con-

trol of Christian work of all kinds in China to the Chinese themselves.

Obviously there is a glaring incongruity between this new attitude of the Western governments and Westerners generally and the maintenance of the forms of Western dominance which have been carried over from the earlier period. It is absurdly illogical, for example, for the Western governments to insist on keeping the special privileges in China which clearly infringe Chinese sovereignty and at the same time to make China a member of the League Council and give her a place on the World Court. Equally incongruous are the recognition of Chinese philosophy and culture as among the greatest which mankind has produced and the older Western feeling that the West must "take up the white man's burden" and "save the heathen" Chinese. These incongruities are being felt, unconsciously as well as consciously, in the West.

Furthermore, the disapproval in the West of the methods and results of imperialism and war is real, in spite of the recent tendency toward cynical surrender to the idea that all talk of peace and reasonable relations between nations is futile. Such documents as the League of Nations Covenant and the Kellogg Pact have behind them more than mere "wishful thinking"; they are the products of a real if as yet too nearly impotent determination to have peace. The use of force in dealing with China, and the maintenance against the wishes of the Chinese people of rights secured by force, are incompatible with that determination.

Westerners, too, have found by experience with Chinese coöperation as well as Chinese anti-foreign agitation, that Chinese good will is a necessary condition of profitable trade, investments and loans. They have discovered that when gunpowder is mixed with the ink used in making entries in business accounts, the writing always turns red, no matter how black it may look at first, but that if the gunpowder be left out the black quite probably will stay black.

From the Western side, therefore, both the desire to make money and the desire to promote international justice are undermining the foundations of Western privileges in China.

III. TARIFF BLUNDERING

Only vestigial remnants are left of the special rights and privileges which Westerners secured for themselves in China by the mid-nineteenth century treaties, by subsequent treaties and other agreements, or by the technically unauthorized expansion of their influence and interests from these documentary bases. Some of the Westerners already have lost all special rights and have come to occupy in China a position like that which foreigners hold in any Western country: a position of complete subordination to the law of the land. The Western powers which still have technical claims to a special position for their nationals cannot expect to maintain those claims, even in their present attenuated form, simply by diplomatic notes and grumblings against surrender. There is no doubt that the time is near when the Western powers will be compelled to choose between giving up the last of their special rights and privileges or reestablishing them by the vigorous use of force.

To judge from their actions during the past thirty years, especially since the World War, the Western powers will not fight to keep the remnants of their special treaty rights in China. Whether they will profit by their experience in the surrender of one after another of these in recent years, remains to be seen. In most cases, they have held on until the right or privilege was taken away, more or less forcibly. In a few instances they have been wise enough to make a friendly gesture of good will out of the surrender of a right which they were certain to lose before long in any case. The attempt to hold on has only exacerbated Chinese feeling, broadened the scope of the demand, and created unnecessary unpleasantness all around. Surrender with a gracious gesture, when this procedure has been followed, has calmed things

down and made it possible to keep what might be a really valuable part of the former right or privilege.

The tariff situation presents an excellent example of tactical blundering.

The earlier treaties fixed the duties to be collected on imports into China at a flat rate of five per cent of the value of the goods imported. This was reasonable enough in the middle of the nineteenth century. But as time went on, as the Chinese Government came to need more revenue to pay foreign loans and to meet home expenses, and as industry began to develop in the country, a mere five per cent levied on everything without discrimination, came to be utterly unsatisfactory as a tariff charge. Because of the "most favored nation" clauses in the treaties, however, the rate could not be changed without the unanimous consent of some nineteen foreign powers. Shortly after 1900, the Chinese began to demand that the tariff arrangements be changed. The demand grew. Vague promises that something might be done were made by some of the foreign powers.

Finally, at the Washington Conference in 1922, the principal powers agreed to hold a conference in China to take up the whole question of China's tariff. The agreement specified that this conference was to meet within three months of its ratification by all the signers. The general assumption was that ratification would be completed and the conference held before the end of 1922.

The Chinese felt that they had scored a considerable victory. They were prepared to ask, at the forthcoming customs conference, not complete tariff autonomy, but a more or less scientifically graded schedule of rates which would yield more revenue and perhaps do a little something to protect growing industry in China.

If the conference had met as planned, and had agreed to reasonable changes along the lines asked by China, the sting would have been taken out of the Chinese feeling about the tariff situation, the whole subject could have been put on the

shelf for a number of years, and a great deal of the uncertainty and ill-feeling which has been so troublesome to business in and with China would have been avoided.

But the conference did not meet. France was having an argument with China over the question of whether certain payments in francs which she was due to receive should be paid in the old gold francs or in the new depreciated francs which were worth about one-fifth as much as the old. France insisted on getting the old francs, even though she herself was paying her debts in the new. She refused to ratify the agreement for the customs conference until China agreed to her demand on this point. All the other signers had ratified promptly. France used ratification as a club to try to force China's acceptance of a very questionable claim which had nothing whatever to do with the tariff question. The other Western powers neither put pressure on France nor went ahead with the customs conference without her. So the customs conference did not meet until late in 1925.

Meanwhile the Chinese had been growing steadily more indignant against all the Western powers, as well as against France. Technically, the action of the other powers in refusing to hold the customs conference until France had ratified the agreement was correct enough. Practically, it seemed to the Chinese—and to a good many others—simply subservience to a strong nation without regard for international fairness. There is little doubt that France would have fallen into line quickly enough if the other powers had gone ahead with a conference without waiting for her ratification. Certainly such action would have been in accordance with the essential equities of the situation.

When the conference finally did meet, the Chinese demanded not simply a revision of the rates, but complete tariff autonomy—much more than would have satisfied them in 1922. The representatives of the powers still mumbled talk about a slight readjustment only. But they did agree that a statement should be included in the new treaty (which the customs conference was to produce) that all treaty limita-

tions in Chinese tariff autonomy should be ended on January 1, 1929. No treaty was drawn up, in the end, and even this informal agreement never was formally ratified by any of the foreign powers. Technically, therefore, the treaty situation remained unchanged.

The Chinese, however, made it perfectly clear that they were going to take tariff autonomy on January 1, 1929, treaties or no treaties. So, in the summer and autumn of 1928, all the powers which had treaties with China involving tariff matters, except Japan, put the best face they could on things and made new agreements formally authorizing China to do what she was going to do anyway.

But their action came six years too late. The foreign powers got no credit for good will in signing those 1928 treaties—except the United States, which started the ball rolling in July. They forestalled a technical unilateral repudiation of the old tariff provisions by China, but they confirmed the Chinese in the belief that pleasant promises by the powers meant nothing when they conflicted with the wishes of even a single powerful nation, and that the only way to get anything was to take it forcibly.

The new tariff went into effect on February 1, 1929. Japan had refused to agree to the change, but the other powers were wise enough, at last, not to try to stand on the technicalities of the "most favored nation" clauses. Japanese goods also paid the new duties; otherwise they would not have been admitted. Shortly after, however, an arrangement was made with the Japanese by which China agreed to keep the low rates on certain imports in which Japan was especially interested, chiefly cotton goods, for three years, in return for Japan's formal agreement to the principle of tariff autonomy. But Japan paid for this. The very day that the three years were up, the Chinese put new rates into effect which very substantially discriminated against Japanese goods.

Meanwhile, some of the large Western firms, especially those dealing in oil and tobacco products, had been wiser

than their governments, and had profited accordingly. The theory, as provided by the treaties, was that there were to be no extra taxes in the interior on goods which had once paid the duties at the ports of entry. The fact was that the local authorities collected taxes of their own anyway, and those who wanted to ship goods into the interior had to pay those local *likin* charges. No one could tell in advance, however, how much these irregular and technically illegal taxes would be. Several of the business concerns, violating the spirit as well as the letter of the treaties, and going over the heads of their legations, made agreements directly with the central Chinese authorities by which they circumvented the difficulty of this uncertainty. They agreed to pay a flat amount in addition to the regular import charges, in return for which the central authorities would refund whatever the companies might have to pay to meet irregular local taxes. Consequently, the concerns which had such agreements knew exactly what their total payments to the government would be. The firms which did not have such agreements, on the other hand, did not and could not know their total costs in advance, no matter how much they talked about technical rights under the treaties, and blustered because these were not enforced.

The companies which made these arrangements handled the situation in the regular Chinese way of avoiding technicalities and making a mutually satisfactory adjustment based on the realities of the situation. Knowing in advance just how much they were going to have to pay was a big advantage; and the total amounts which they paid were still considerably lower than the import charges in most other countries on the goods they handled.

IV. EXTRATERRITORIAL INEPTNESS

The extraterritoriality situation is more complicated—but it has been even more badly bungled than that of the tariff.

The mid-nineteenth century treaties provided that when foreigners were accused of having committed a crime, or when demands for debts or other civil claims were presented against them, they should be tried by foreign officials of their own nationality and according to their own law. This still is the substance of the extraterritoriality system, according to the strict letter of the law.

The fundamental question, of course, was (and still is) whether foreigners should be in China at all if they are unwilling to submit themselves to Chinese law and authority. The foreigners answered that question with their guns.

The problem then became one of making the best of an awkward situation. Chinese and Western laws, customs, ideas of individual rights and legal procedure were basically different. There was, too, a good deal of irregularity in the administration of Chinese law by Chinese officials. If the foreigners were to be under Chinese law, and subject to these irregularities in legal administration, inevitably there would be constant irritation and trouble; precisely such difficulties, in fact, were among the principal causes of the "Opium War" of 1839-42. A good deal was to be said, in the circumstances, for side-stepping such trouble by arranging that foreign officials should handle criminal and civil cases in which foreigners were defendants, and that where there were important differences between Chinese and foreign law, especially differences which involved essential injustice or undue harshness from the foreign point of view, the foreign law should apply.

Very little can be said, however, for the abuses by the foreigners of the extraterritorial system which grew up. Because the foreign officials assumed the right to protect their nationals, an especially heavy responsibility rested on them to see that these same nationals did not take unjust advantage of their position. Both the foreigners and their officials talked a good deal about their exemption from Chinese authority, but forgot almost entirely the corresponding re-

sponsibility. There was nothing in the extraterritoriality provisions, for example, which freed the foreigners from the obligation to pay the regular Chinese taxes. Quite without technical justification, however, foreigners regularly have not paid even the ordinary taxes in China.

This tax situation is only one of many illustrations of the way in which the extraterritoriality system was stretched far beyond the strict letter of the treaty provisions. Being exempt from Chinese law in some respects, all too many of the foreigners took it for granted that they were exempt from any sort of obligation to the country in which they lived so comfortably and did business, and that short of committing the most flagrant crimes, they were at liberty to do anything they pleased. In far too many instances, too, the foreign officials, sometimes quite unconsciously, tended to lean unduly toward the side of the foreigner in hearing criminal and civil cases. In brief, foreign extraterritorial rights, backed up by foreign guns, came to be interpreted, in practice, as meaning that the foreigner could do no wrong.

From the start, the Chinese officials objected to foreign jurisdiction over foreigners, because it was a direct rejection of their own authority and a reflection on their own willingness and ability to deal justly. The objection spread beyond official circles as more and more Chinese became familiar with Western ideas of national sovereignty and learned that foreigners in Western countries were subject to the laws of those countries whether they liked them or not.

The Western governments officially took the position that they would give up extraterritorial rights when the Chinese had brought their laws and legal administration up to Western standards—they to decide when this had been accomplished. Partly to meet this condition, and partly because they themselves were not satisfied with the older Chinese laws, Chinese with Western legal training began working on new codes. The first moves of this kind were made under the nineteenth century viceroys. The work was revived and

pushed as part of the reform program which the Empress Dowager Tze Hsi sponsored after her experience in the Boxer year. It went on more or less spasmodically under the Republic. A number of new codes were drafted and officially promulgated.

Like the Republican constitutions, these were, in the main, excellent copies of European models, but they had little or no relation to the life of China, or to the Chinese methods of handling disputes. The Westerners maintained, however, that they wanted Westernesque law in China, and the men who worked on the new codes knew a good deal about Western code law.

So the codes were drafted and promulgated. A system of courts, also based on European models, was set up to apply the codes; and within the rather narrow limits where they could use the new laws, the new courts worked quite reasonably well. But through most of the country conditions were not materially changed either by the new codes or the new courts, and a considerable part remained of whatever justification there originally might have been for the extraterritoriality system.

Here was a situation that might have been utilized to improve very materially the relations between Chinese and foreigners. Instead, it was so handled that more fuel was added to the fire of anti-foreign feeling in China.

The extraterritorial system originally had been held to be justified on two counts: that Chinese law was incompatible with Western standards; and that serious irregularities occurred in the administration of law in the Chinese courts. With the promulgation of the new codes as the official law of the land, the ground was cut away from the justification on the first count, even if a considerable measure of support remained for the second.

In these circumstances, the Western powers, individually or by collective agreements, could have made a superbly constructive gesture. Without undue technical difficulty, with-

out in any way lessening whatever defense against injustice the foreign extraterritorial courts furnished in the administration of the law, without any risk of jeopardizing their business or other interests, they could have ordered that the law to be administered in their extraterritorial courts should be the law of the new Chinese codes instead of the law of the home lands. Thus Chinese law would have applied in China, even if for the time being it was administered in foreign courts.

What actually happened?

At the Washington conference, in 1922, it was agreed that a commission should go to China to study the extraterritoriality situation and make recommendations for changes. The commission was held up for the same reason that caused the delay in the customs conference. Finally, it was organized and started work, in 1926, under the chairmanship of a noted but completely technical-minded American lawyer who knew nothing about China and whose whole attitude was a modernistic version of the old conception of China and the Chinese as "heathen" or "backward." The commission met. It traveled to various parts of the country. Finally, it turned in a report which in substance declared emphatically that the administration of law in China still was such that the whole extraterritorial system must be maintained, though it did speak favorably of the codes which had been promulgated.

The suggestion was made to the commission that the new Chinese codes should be used by the foreign extraterritorial courts. It was pointed out to the commission that, among other benefits, this would clear up the many difficulties which arose from the fact that the extraterritorial courts of each foreign nation were administering a different set of laws from that of all the others—difficulties of which the commission itself spoke. The psychological gain from creating Chinese good will and giving a demonstration of Western willingness and ability to act in terms of the equity of the

situation instead of the letter of the law also was suggested to the commission.

Neither the chairman, nor the other members of the commission, nor the governments behind them had enough imagination to see beyond the pettifogging technicalities, however. The work of the extraterritoriality commission, like that of the customs conference, simply intensified Chinese conviction that no faith could be put in Western assurances of good will, and that if China were to get rid of the infringements on her sovereignty, she must throw them off herself.

Since then, extraterritoriality has been one of the principal points of attack in the anti-foreign agitation in China.

Five of the Western powers, in the treaties which they scrambled to sign in 1928, resorted to the old trick of seeming to give something with one hand while keeping tight hold of it with the other, by making new promises to give up extraterritorial rights when all the other powers did. In some of these treaties, a date, January 1, 1930, was mentioned. This only aggravated Chinese feeling. In 1929, the Chinese government at Nanking tried to get all the governments to agree to give up their extraterritorial rights. The powers were polite and expressed great friendship for China, but refused to consider the matter.

The Westerners, in the official notes and in private statements, indulged in a good deal of alarmed and indignant talk about the sanctity of treaties and the wickedness of unilateral denunciation of agreements. But Chinese feeling had risen to such a point that the government, in spite of the eager desire of many of those in authority to keep the good opinion of Westerners, was forced to act. In 1929, it issued a mandate declaring that as from January 1, 1930, all foreigners enjoying extraterritorial privileges must abide by Chinese laws, though for the time being the enforcement of the new edict would be held in abeyance.

This was not outright denunciation of extraterritorial treaty

provisions. In fact, it offered the foreign powers another opportunity to make the wise gesture of declaring that Chinese law should apply in the extraterritorial courts. Instead of doing this, the powers ignored the pronouncement, or protested more or less informally. Chinese feeling grew. On May 4, 1931, the Chinese government flatly declared that all foreigners and foreign interests (other than official representatives, of course) would come under Chinese jurisdiction on January 1, 1932. That new order also was ignored or mildly protested by the foreign governments; in practice, it has remained in pristine unenforced purity in the record. Meanwhile, as treaties with foreign powers have expired or come to specified periods of revision, the Chinese government has refused to make new agreements which contain extraterritorial provisions.

Some of the business houses and most of the missionaries have been wiser than their governments. One of the largest of the foreign firms doing business in China, for example, has consistently refused, since it started business in 1891, to take advantage of the extraterritorial privileges. When difficulties have arisen with the Chinese in the ordinary course of business, they have been settled in the Chinese way—not by going into court, but by friendly adjustment. Most of the larger companies have followed this line, in recent years, for the simple reason that they, like the company which has followed it from the start, find that it is easier and more profitable to do business this way.

In recent years, too, most of the leading missionaries and missionary organizations, both Catholic and Protestant, have declared that they did not want the so-called protection of extraterritoriality. They now take the position that they are in China as guests, and that if the Chinese do not want them there enough to furnish whatever protection they need, they will leave. The public declaration of this new attitude by the missionaries, and their actions showing that they meant what they said, have done a good deal to remove

Chinese antagonism to Christian propaganda—antagonism developed during the days when the emissaries of the Prince of Peace preached their doctrine of universal love under protection of the “toleration clauses” in treaties forced on China with Western guns.

For all practical purposes, extraterritoriality already is a thing of the past throughout most of China. It still lingers on feebly in the regions over which foreign warships can send their shells. But even here, the number of foreign powers which still technically have territorial jurisdiction is considerably less than it was a few years ago.

Germany, Austria and Russia lost their special rights through developments during the World War. When diplomatic relations were resumed with these countries, it was on a strict basis of mutual equality. The new treaties which China has been making with the various smaller countries, such as Bolivia, Czecho-Slovakia, Finland, Greece, Mexico, Persia, and Poland, are all on a basis of mutual equality and reciprocity. In 1929, the Chinese government took the position that certain basic treaties with Japan had expired, and with them the extraterritorial and other rights of the Japanese. The Japanese government, however, insisted that the old treaties remained in force pending new agreements. The question still remains unsettled, technically, but Japan is acting on her contention. Similarly, in January and July, 1934, two basic American treaties came to the end of the ten-year periods when revision could be discussed. The Chinese government asked for revision, but the negotiations have not yet started. Meanwhile, the American position is that the old treaties remain in force.

By treaty expiration or the negotiation of new treaties, some of the other countries have lost the special rights they formerly had. The basic British treaty comes to the end of a ten-year period and will be up for revision in 1935.

The official Chinese position is that all extraterritorial rights of foreigners were cancelled by the unilateral declara-

tion of the Chinese government in 1931. Having taken this official position, however, the government, with characteristic Chinese readiness to settle disputes by amicable adjustment, is leaving the declaration on the records, but is not trying to enforce it.

At the moment, public agitation for the abolition of extraterritoriality is quiescent, but feeling on the subject may flare up at any time. There is no doubt, however, that in the not very distant future the Chinese will throw off the remnants of this special foreign right. Meanwhile, the chief effect of trying to keep extraterritoriality in any form is to poison the relations between Chinese and Westerners. The Westerners themselves, now and in the future, would be very much better off if their governments had enough imagination and intelligence to make the gesture of withdrawing as though of their own free will the last ragged shreds of this infringement on Chinese sovereignty.

There is no need to discuss here, even briefly, the numerous other illustrations of what has been happening to the special rights and interests which the powers exacted from China in formal agreements or by the informal establishment of precedents. In the territorial leaseholds, concessions and settlements, in the customs and administration and the salt gabelle, in the railways, in the loan services—in all these and other places and activities where Westerners formerly were in practically complete if not always technical control, the Chinese have been edging the foreigners out. In some instances, as in that of the tariff, the Chinese have regained complete control. In some others, the foreigners are still able to make their control function to some extent, though much less so than formerly. Details of the developments in all these cases are available in other books. To cite them here would serve no purpose except to furnish additional illustrations of the point brought out in the discussion of the tariff and extraterritoriality situations.

Western special rights in China are melting away in the

flame of Chinese feeling about them, which was kindled and is being fed by Western ideas.

Furthermore, the unimaginative blundering of the Western governments and their failure to understand what the situation really was, rather than a determination to hold on to the treaty rights, is largely responsible for the growing Chinese conviction that the method of force alone gets results in international relations. Instead of yielding to the inevitable with a boldly friendly gesture, while there was still time to do so, the Western governments have held on with timid stupidity until Chinese pressure virtually compelled a surrender, thereby confirming the Chinese in their belief that no appeal to reason or justice would move the Westerners to act fairly.

V. ECONOMIC SETBACKS

Fifty, twenty-five, even ten years ago, Westerners led in the Westernization of China. They still play an important part directly and indirectly. For some time to come, there will be a place for them in the development of China, as employes, as subordinate partners in business, as technical advisers. But the day has ended in which Western prestige or fear of the West sufficed to impose Western desires or religion or goods on China. The Chinese definitely have taken control of affairs in their own country.

At the turn of the century, China, in her economic relations with the rest of the world, for example, was thought to be, and was, primarily a field for foreign exploitation. Railways were to be built, with foreign money and to the profit of the foreigners. Sources of raw materials were to be tapped and markets for foreign manufactured goods opened up, by foreigners and for foreign benefit and profit. Factories might be built by foreigners in China so that they could secure more direct access to both the raw materials and the markets for manufactured goods. Foreign trade would develop, but this would be chiefly in the

hands of foreigners, who would buy and sell in China through offices managed by foreigners, with the Chinese serving simply as less important agents. Foreign banks would finance this foreign trade, and foreign ships would carry the goods both up and down the coast and across the seas.

The possibility that the Chinese might themselves create modern economic and financial institutions through which they would take into their own hands the control of modern economic and industrial development in China was mentioned occasionally as a possibility for the remote future. But he would have been called hopelessly unrealistic who said that within a single generation the Chinese would be well on the way to dominance in modern industry, modern transportation, and modern finance in China—to a dominance which would make it inescapably clear that within only a few more years the Chinese would become notably successful competitors of the foreigners in the very fields where foreigners had been supreme.

Yet precisely that has happened. In spite of prolonged political disturbances, in spite of civil wars, floods, and famines, the development of modern industrial, financial and transportation facilities in China by the Chinese themselves has moved forward with such rapidity that already the foreigners are well on their way to lose even the last shreds of the dominance in these fields which was once theirs.

Even two decades ago, just before the World War, almost the only economic rivalries with which the foreigners were concerned in and in relation to China were between the foreign business groups, and the rivalries were for shares of the feast of profits derivable from the exploitation of China's raw materials and markets. Today, the situation has radically changed. The economic rivalry is now between the Chinese on one side and the foreigners on the other, with the foreigners none too successfully struggling to retain seats at the table where the feast is spread. Just as the Chinese have successfully pushed their demand for can-

cellation of the special political privileges which the foreigners enjoyed in China, so they have, with even more striking success and in very effective fashion, moved ahead to take from the foreigners, not by force but by successful competition, special economic opportunities and privileges.

That change is easily one of the most significant that has come in China in recent years. The political changes have been striking and of much importance, and they have captured many more headlines in the Western newspapers than have the economic changes. But the Chinese have made astounding progress toward complete economic control within China and toward the development of Chinese finance and industry. They have, in fact, gone far to reverse completely China's economic position in relation to the rest of the world, and particularly to the rest of the Far East. This change will have much more far-reaching effects, both in China and in her international relations, than could any political change in the country.

The railway situation offers an illustration.

Railway building in China falls into two definite periods: that before and that after the establishing of the Republic. During the earlier period, most, though not all, of the railway construction was done with foreign money, and the new lines were built under agreements which gave the foreigners either entire or substantial control of operations. During the second period, the Chinese not only did proportionately much more railway building with their own money than they had done earlier—especially in Manchuria—but in various ways they steadily increased their influence in the operation of the lines which foreigners had built.

No statistics are available to show the extent of this increase in control by Chinese over the lines built primarily with foreign money. But anyone who has been in touch with developments knows that it is large. For all practical purposes, when the Republic started, the Chinese controlled only a relatively small part of the railways in China, even

of the so-called government lines. Today, they control all the railways, except a couple of short "concession" lines entirely under British and French control—and except the lines in Manchuria which Japan dominates through the "independent" state of "Manchukuo."

The record of finance shows a similar development of Chinese activity in direct and successful competition with the foreigners.

When the Chinese government first felt the need for large amounts of money at one time (for war indemnities and railways construction at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries) it had no alternative but to borrow from foreign sources. When they made loans, however, the foreigners insisted on conditions which gave them substantial control over important sources of revenue. At least they thought they were getting such control, though, as in the case of the railways, the Chinese in recent years have taken that control away from the foreigners.

Increasingly, the Chinese objected even to nominal new foreign domination in financial affairs. They stopped seeking foreign loans because they knew they could not get the money except on terms which would give the foreigners new influence in China. This has not meant, however, that the Chinese governments stopped borrowing money. Far from it. They have floated domestic loans to a total of something over \$1,200 million in Chinese currency, of which the Nationalist government at Nanking has accounted for nearly \$1,000 million during and since 1928. For our purposes here, the amount of these domestic borrowings is much less significant than the fact that the successive Chinese governments were able to borrow money at home and hence could refuse to submit to the conditions which the foreign lenders would impose.

Thirty years ago, China had to accept whatever conditions the foreigners might lay down. Today the situation is reversed; the foreigners get repayments on their loans when

the Chinese are ready to make them. And if the foreigners want to loan money to China, they must agree to Chinese conditions. This was what the American government did in 1933 in arranging for a large loan for the purchase of wheat and cotton by China against no security except the general credit of the Chinese government.

This reversal has been possible in no small part because of the remarkable development of modern-style Chinese banks. When the Republic began, there were only thirteen such banks, with a total combined capital of \$57,762,000 (Chinese currency). Of the many new banks that were started in the following years, the survivors, at the beginning of 1933, numbered 178, with a combined capital of \$283,610,000. During the interval, foreigners, especially the Japanese, had been increasing their banking activities in China, but the increase was nothing like as proportionately large as this.

The increase in the number and capital of the modern Chinese banks, however, has been only part of the reason for the success with which the Chinese have moved toward freeing China from the reality or the danger of foreign financial control. Another important contributing cause has been the effective development of coöperation between the government's financial department and the organized Chinese bankers. There has been and is plenty of money in China to meet any but extremely sudden and very large demands for cash. Before that money could become available as loans to the government, however, either for current expenses or for large-scale constructive enterprises like railway building, it was necessary to establish contacts between the government and the Chinese bankers and merchants who had the money.

A great deal has been done in this direction in the last six years. The organized bankers have secured direct control over important sources of government revenue, with the right to take from that revenue amounts needed for

repayment of the loans which have been made, before a surplus goes to the government. Formerly, the foreigners, through the customs and salt administration, exercised such a control over these most important government revenues. Now the control of both of these sources of revenue, as well as of others, has passed in effect not from the foreigners to the Chinese government as such, but to the Chinese bankers.

The Chinese are developing much the same kind of independence of foreign financing in the field of foreign trade. Only one of the purely Chinese banks so far has set up a branch of its own in a Western country, but practically all of the important modern-style Chinese banks and groups of banks have established correspondence relations with banks in the United States, Great Britain and other countries, through which they finance an increasingly large proportion of China's foreign trade. Until a decade or so ago, the foreign banks operating in China had practically a monopoly of this trade financing. They still do probably more than half of it. But the Chinese banks very definitely have broken the foreign monopoly, and the Chinese themselves are steadily taking an increasing share of the business.

Another significant shift has taken place in foreign trade. The "good old days"—for the foreigner—when the lordly tyman sat in his office for a few hours a day and issued orders to his Chinese compradore for buying and selling Chinese goods, ended some years ago. In those days, the Chinese sold their goods to foreigners in China and bought their foreign goods after these had arrived at Chinese ports. Now, there are a number of fairly large, and many small, importing and exporting firms which deal directly with the sellers and buyers in foreign countries.

VI. THE COTTON CYCLE

The development of modern industry in China also already has gone far to break foreign domination in supplying machine-made goods. The record of cotton goods in

the trade between the West and China is fascinating in itself. It also furnishes the most striking illustration of the changes which have taken place in that trade, and the consequences of those changes in China's economic international relations.

The West first learned of cotton cloth from the East. A century and a half ago, cloth woven from cotton fibres was known in Europe only as a somewhat exotic product of the Far East—chiefly of India and China. British traders were especially active in carrying cotton goods from the East to Europe. Gradually the demand for cotton goods began to grow. Then, when Englishmen began to experiment with steam as a source of power, one of the first things they did was to set it to work on looms for weaving cotton thread into cloth resembling that which came from the East. Quite soon, they found they could make cotton cloth cheaply enough to undersell the product of the Eastern hand looms, not only in Europe, but in India and China as well. The export trade in cotton goods from England to the East grew rapidly. Lancashire and Manchester prospered. So did the cotton mill owners in the United States, who got into the game early. So did the American cotton growers.

It is quite safe to say, in fact, that the cotton goods trade with the Far East was one of the principal causes of the start and rapid development of the Industrial Revolution in Britain in the first half of the nineteenth century. The manufacture of cotton goods for export to the Orient continued to be one of the chief foundations of British prosperity all through the nineteenth century. But Nemesis was waiting.

The flood of cheap, machine-made cotton goods from England very seriously undermined the hand-loom cotton industry in India and China. Widespread suffering followed. Then, toward the end of the nineteenth century, capitalists in Japan, China and India began building modern cotton mills of their own. The British, Americans and Germans sold them machinery for these mills, and taught them how

to use the machinery. The industrialization of the East began.

During the World War, Japan's cotton industry boomed. Her cotton goods drove those from England out of the Chinese market; they made large inroads into the markets of India and the South Seas countries; they sold in considerable quantities in Africa and South America—at the expense chiefly of the British cotton weavers. In the years following the War, Britain recaptured these markets in part. But extremely efficient organization in both buying and selling, and price advantages due to currency exchange, in these last three years have made it possible for the Japanese to take the lead from Britain in the production and sale throughout the world of cotton goods, especially of the cheaper qualities which are sold on a price rather than a quality basis. In 1934, the British began to take drastic steps to protect and improve their position.

The swing back to the original source of cotton goods was not completed with the development of the cotton industry in Japan, however. In the last few years, both the Chinese and the Indians have developed cotton manufacturing so successfully that Japan's leadership in these markets is seriously threatened. In China, she already very definitely has lost that leadership to the Chinese themselves.

The figures for China's imports of manufactured cotton goods show what has happened. For decades, cotton goods had been one of the principal items in China's imports. In 1913, they were nearly a third (31.1 per cent) of the total imports. In 1920, they were less than a fourth (24.0 per cent) of the total. In 1930, the proportion had dropped to a little more than one-tenth (11.4 per cent), though the total value had increased somewhat. In 1933, the proportion was down to less than one-twentieth (4.3 per cent) and the value had fallen considerably. In the first half of 1934, it had dropped still further: to a little over one-fortieth (2.8 per cent).

Within these two decades, in other words, China has ceased to be a large market for manufactured cotton goods from outside the country—not because the Chinese are using less, but because they have developed their own industry to a point where it is able to supply most of the home demand for machine-made piece goods. The Chinese have taken the market away from the Japanese, as the Japanese earlier took it away from the British.

The dramatic cotton goods cycle is nearly complete. From India and China to the West, back to Japan in the East, and now from Japan back to China and India, the center of the manufacture of cotton goods has moved. Ruin stares Japan's cotton industry in the face unless she can penetrate the markets of the West, using Western machinery, as China and India resume the lead in cotton manufacture which they lost a century and more ago.

Economically, as well as politically, the Chinese, whose old civilization has been crumbling under the impact of Western ideas and techniques, are using these very contributions from the West to gain control in their own country. They already have gone far, and the end is not yet.

In the cultural field the Chinese also have taken control.

Western education, for example, though introduced from the West, is now in Chinese hands. Even the missionary schools which are supported chiefly by foreign money must submit to Chinese governmental regulation of what shall be taught and of how the teaching shall be done. The Chinese themselves, too, have built up modernized schools of all grades to the point where the missionary schools form only a small fraction of the total. Precise figures are not to be had, but such information as is available indicates that approximately 13,000,000 students were attending modernized schools in China in 1934, of whom only one-twentieth were in missionary schools.

The story of how the Chinese have taken or are taking complete control of the modernizing of China might be

continued indefinitely. That story has been and is being told in numerous books, in the trade statistics, in the missionary reports, in governmental and other documents of all kinds. There is no need to review it here.

Potentially the most significant developments in this direction, from the point of view of China's relations with the rest of the world, are those in the economic field. China is regaining national sovereignty in the international political sphere, as we have seen. But neither this nor the resumption of control of cultural development by the Chinese would have been possible, or would mean much for the future, except for the development by the Chinese of the determination and capacity to reestablish complete economic sovereignty.

It would be utterly incorrect, of course, to assume that this reassertion of Chinese control has brought order and stability in China, or created bright prospects for the immediate future in the economic or any other field. It has not. Business, trade, finance, industry, education—all of them, like politics, are very much disturbed and in a state of flux, as they are today in the West. At best, it will be some years before order is reestablished out of the present confusion, though it would be seriously incorrect to overlook the progress toward renewed stability which has been made. At worst, a new turn may bring new chaos which will develop until there is complete economic and social collapse. The vital point, however, is that whether up or down, the Chinese, not the Westerners, will drive China.

VII. ON CHINESE TERMS

It is fatally easy to make the mistake of thinking of Westerners and their interests and influences as vastly more important in China than they really are. After all, the life of China is primarily Chinese, as it has been through the centuries.

Even when foreign economic influence was strongest, much the largest part of China's business, trade, transportation,

financing and other economic activities were entirely Chinese. All the foreign investments put together, even all the joint foreign and Chinese investments in railways, factories and other enterprises developed along Western lines, form only a small fraction of the total invested wealth of the country. All the foreign trade, and all the Westernesque goods make up but a very minor part of the total buying and selling in the country. All the agricultural production is Chinese. Most of the goods which the people use still are made by the old methods; even the largest part of the cotton cloth which they wear (probably three-quarters at least) still is woven on the old hand looms, of thread spun by hand in the ancient way.

It is true, however, that Western ways of doing things in the economic field, and goods made on Western models, are penetrating steadily more deeply through the country. Had the control of this economic Westernization remained in Western hands, inevitably China in the end would have passed completely under Western political as well as cultural influence. They have not so remained. Within the past couple of decades, in spite of all the internal disturbances about which so much has been said by the West and by Japan, the Chinese conclusively have demonstrated that, for good or ill, they and not the Westerners can and will direct the future economic development of their country.

Westerners are increasingly realizing this fundamental change which has come in their position in and in relation to China. The Western governments are moving steadily, even if somewhat grudgingly and with stupidly bungling hesitation, toward a surrender of special privileges in China and toward the acceptance of China as an equal in the family of nations. Even the most die-hard of the Western businessmen in China are at last beginning to learn what the more far-seeing learned some time ago: that if they want to do business in China they must do it on the terms which the Chinese lay down. The missionaries and others concerned

with the introduction of ideas rather than of goods, definitely have swung over to the attitude that it is for the Chinese to decide what they want of Western religion, education and other cultural contributions, not for the Westerners to impose on China what they think the Chinese ought to have.

All this does not mean that the more progressive and broad-minded of the Chinese are coming to repudiate either Western goods and techniques or Western ideas or Western assistance in the modernizing of their country. The more fanatically nationalistic are doing just that, and are insisting, at the moment, that China wants nothing from the West. But railways, motor cars, airplanes, modern factories and other mechanical devices from the West have come to stay. Moreover, they will continue to develop, and in that development they will go on undermining, as they have been doing, the basic social structure of Chinese life. However much the fanatics may rant, China will not go back to the wheelbarrow, the hand loom, the old family system, or the old ten-mile-radius way of life.

The more responsible leaders realize this. They want what the West still has to offer. They want Western financial aid. But they will not have Western control. Experience has taught the Chinese the dangers of seeking help from any one nation, or even from international groups specially formed, like the financial consortiums, to do business with China. Experience has shown, too, that foreign controlled schools easily, if quite unintentionally, may introduce ideas and ways of thinking which run counter to what seems best for China, and that business firms not under Chinese control often act in violation of Chinese laws and interests.

Therefore they are turning, for foreign technical assistance, to the League of Nations instead of to individual foreign powers. Therefore, they have taken control of the foreign schools. Therefore, too, they have required that all foreign business firms doing business in China must register with the Chinese government and submit to Chinese regulations.

There is and will be an important place for Westerners and Western financial and other aid in the further development of China—provided the Westerners are ready to accept and act on the assumption, in its various implications, that China belongs to the Chinese. In so far as they are not ready to do this, they will be shut out of China.

THE NEW MENACE

(CHAPTER XV)

WHILE the position of the Western powers has been crumbling during these past thirty years, another menace to China's independence has arisen in the Far East. Japan, during this time, has moved steadily toward the goal of which her military chieftains and many of her people have dreamed for centuries: complete mastery over Asia.

Japan as well as China was struck by the tidal wave of Western expansion which came with the use of steam and electricity. She was excellently well prepared to meet this crisis. Furthermore, the historical accidents turned in her favor and against China in all the circumstances on which depended the nation's capacity to deal immediately and successfully with the new menace from outside.

It is interesting, in passing, to note the close synchronization of important events in the two countries. On March 19, 1853, the T'ai P'ing rebels captured Nanking. On July 5, 1853, the Yellow River, during the disastrous flood of that year, cut its new outlet to the sea north, instead of south, of the Shantung mountains. On July 19, 1853—exactly four months to the day after the capture of Nanking and exactly two weeks after the Yellow River found its new outlet—Commodore Perry led his squadron of American warships into Yedo Bay to end Japan's two centuries of seclusion. Thus two crucial developments in the progressive weakening of China and the crucial first push against the closed doors of Japan came at very nearly the same time.

II. PREPARED

Japan was ready for the change, behind her doors. She had been getting ready, in a general way, all through the

so-called period of seclusion. She had been preparing, more specifically, for half a century.

The Tokugawa shoguns (the military rulers), to save their country from the Westerners, had closed Japan's doors shortly before the middle of the seventeenth century. But they kept a window open, through which they watched what was going on in Europe and the Far East. This window was the harbor of Nagasaki, where the Dutch were allowed to have a small settlement to which one ship a year might come, and where a few Chinese vessels might trade each year.

Through the Dutch, ideas from the West entered Japan to a greater extent than usually has been supposed. The Dutch ship doctors, for example, made a fairly regular practice of teaching medicine to Japanese students. Through them, a considerable school of Western medicine developed in Japan and an understanding of the Western scientific method spread among the scholars. Reports of developments outside the scientific field came through the Dutch ship captains. These men brought books and pamphlets which the authorities and the scholars studied. It became the regular custom, almost the specific requirement, for the Dutch captains to present to the Shogun a digest of European events since the last visit of a Dutch ship. This continued for a good part of the time during which, according to ideas prevalent then and subsequently in the West, Japan was strictly cut off from all outside influence.

The importation of Western goods was small, but that of Western ideas was considerable, especially among the scholars. These scholars kept in touch with the development of the political ideas which were behind the American and French revolutions, the economic theories of Adam Smith, the social concepts which found expression in the British parliamentary and labor reforms in the 1830's, and the other movements of thought in Europe. They studied and discussed these ideas fairly soon after the Europeans and

Americans themselves expressed them. In these discussions, the Western ideas were given a special turn, but the ideas and discussions were important influences in preparing for the great change when Japan opened her doors.

As early as half way through the Tokugawa period, in fact, a distinguished Japanese scholar, who also was a powerful figure in the government, had begun to advocate the re-opening of Japan and the establishing of relations with the West. As part of this campaign, he published a book on European history and conditions which is very much more accurate and comprehensive than anything Europeans were writing about Japan at the time. This was a century and a quarter before Perry reached Japan.

The seeds of Japan's modernization were planted, not by Perry's arrival in 1853, but by these contacts with Western ideas during the previous century and more. The speed and smoothness with which the whole current of Japanese life was turned to modernization were astonishing enough as it was. Political conditions and traditions in Japan helped to make the change easy, but the fundamental political revolution which came in 1868—only a brief fifteen years after Perry's first visit—and the far-reaching transformation of the nation's social and economic structure and outlook which followed, would have been an utterly impossible miracle if Japan had been living for two centuries behind hermetically sealed doors.

Preparation for the change also had been going on in another direction than that of the absorption of ideas from the West. Beginning shortly before the end of the eighteenth century, a group of Japanese scholars deliberately set out to reënforce a vague tradition of the proper place of the emperor in the nation's life. They did this to clear the ground for a more direct attack on the authority of the Tokugawa shogunate.

They turned to Japan's own past and to the Chinese classics for arguments to support the contention that the shogunate

system was undesirable and that the country should have a single government, headed by an emperor who ruled in fact as well as in theory, instead of a double government with a military chief exercising the real power and an emperor who was a helpless figurehead. These scholars revived ancient Japanese folk tales and made them the foundation of learned histories of Japan designed to prove that the emperor was descended in an unbroken line from the Sun Goddess and that all of Japan's troubles in the past had come during the times when ignoble men treasonably usurped the power rightfully belonging to the emperor. They stressed the point that it was the privilege as well as the duty of every Japanese to obey implicitly his divine ruler and those who were his spokesmen. They taught that it was a high honor, not a sacrifice, to be allowed to lay down one's life to defend or increase the imperial glory. They urged that it was Japan's noble destiny to extend her sway over Asia and eventually over all the world in order to bring to mankind the blessing of being ruled by divinity itself as embodied in the Japanese emperor. (This last incentive to and justification of armed Japanese expansion was put forward particularly by Yoshida Shoen, who taught and strongly influenced several of the men who became powerful in the remolding of Japan after the Restoration.)

These scholars worked so successfully on the thoughts and feelings of the people, including the Tokugawas themselves and the feudal chieftains, that the complete political revolution which put the emperor back into power and reversed more than a thousand years of political precedent, went through with only a very little fighting. No political change of so completely revolutionary a character has come in any other country so quickly and with anything like so little violence—or has demonstrated so conclusively the power of ideas.

The tradition of the emperor's divine descent, of the rightness of unquestioning loyalty to him, of the legitimacy

of the emperor's supreme and absolute authority, has been the most powerful single force making possible Japan's astounding rise from a small island empire to one of the world's great powers, economically, as well as in a military way. That tradition still is powerful. So is the parallel feeling that it is Japan's divinely-appointed destiny, in furthering which no sacrifices are too great, to extend the god-emperor's rule over Asia and the world. Such a feeling as this is strangely anachronistic in this day and age. Nevertheless, it has been a very important part of the urge behind the military and economic expansion of Japan in the past half century, as well as in the past three years.

These traditions of the emperor's divinity, of the privilege of implicit obedience to him and self-sacrifice for him, and of Japan's call to save mankind by ruling it, have their roots far back in Japanese history. But the formulation of these traditions in clear cut form, their elevation to fundamental articles of national faith, and, more significantly, their grip on the minds and emotions of the Japanese people, are in substantial part the results of the work of the Japanese scholars during the first half of the nineteenth century—scholars whose chief purpose was to undermine the authority of the Tokugawa Shogunate in preparation for its overthrow. A revolution would have come before long in Japan, and in all probability the country would have been re-opened even if Perry had not arrived when he did.

When her crisis came, Japan had a people who were dominated by that powerfully unifying tradition. Her population also was relatively small—only about twenty-five million. The people, too, for many centuries had been taught and had practiced unquestioning obedience to those above them in authority. The members of the feudal aristocracy, as well as the common people, were accustomed to and understood strict regimentation. Therefore the nation's life could be turned into radically new channels, and could be carried forward smoothly after the turn, at the

will of a small group dominant at the center of a strongly centralized government. Therefore, also, the people today can be swung relatively easily and unitedly behind any program which those who appear to have the confidence of the emperor may formulate.

Japan was territorially small and closely knit. The area of Japan Proper is only about two-thirds of that of the single Chinese province of Szechuan. As a means of keeping a tight grip on the country, the Tokugawa shoguns had built broad highways linking the provincial centers to their capital at Yedo (Tokyo). They had required the principal feudal chiefs to spend half of each year at the capital. Consequently, there was a constant movement of people back and forth over these highways. This continued for the two and a half centuries of the Tokugawa rule. The customs and language, as well as the political authority, of the capital, penetrated into every corner of the land; nor were any of these corners far removed, in time or distance, from the center. When Perry arrived, Japan was extraordinarily homogeneous, racially and culturally. This homogeneity has been and still is a vital factor in the development of Japan.

Japan possessed, when the crucial need arose, a group of extremely able, patriotically devoted young men. One of these was the last shogun. Although he had sat in his seat of great power and splendor only a few years when the call came to step aside so that Japan might have a really unified government, he voluntarily resigned because he was convinced that this would be for the good of his country. Another was the boy who attained his majority and ascended the throne to which, with the beginning of his reign, the power was restored. This was the Meiji Emperor. Possessing qualities of mind and spirit which rank him among the world's great rulers, he more than fully met the extremely difficult test of justifying the noble conception of what an emperor should be and do which had been instilled

in the minds of the people. Finally, associated with him in the difficult task of modernizing Japan, the emperor had a group of young men of rare ability. Few countries anywhere, at any time, have had a governing group which included so large a proportion of men of such great capacity and such unselfish, devoted patriotism.

To an amazing extent, youth came into the saddle in Japan at the time of the Restoration. The emperor was only sixteen. The oldest man in the new governing group was still under forty. The average age of that group was under thirty. Because they were young, these men could plan in decades instead of years or months. Because they were able and farseeing, they did so plan. Because the country they ruled was small, homogeneous, closely knit and dominated by a powerfully centralizing and unifying tradition, they could turn Japan into her new course and keep her steadily on it as they drove her forward with such astonishing speed.

Japan, also, had had a long peace. Before the Tokugawa period, she had her full share of bloody and ruinous civil and foreign wars. The nation's vitality was at a low ebb when Tokugawa Iyeyasu became shogun at the beginning of the seventeenth century. His successors, by the most rigid sort of control, gave the country peace for two centuries and a half. Japan had time to recover her vitality. She came to her crisis filled with abounding vigor.

Thus, when Japan and China, at practically the same time, were called upon to face the expanding West, internal conditions and historical accidents at every point favored Japan and worked against China.

But the very developments and traditions which made Japan uniquely capable of meeting the crisis which she faced in the middle of the nineteenth century, made her also potentially a grave menace to China. The unity of the country, the thousand-year-old tradition of military control, the centuries-old and recently revived belief in Japan's

mission to dominate, the long-continued regimentation of the people, the example of Western imperialism—all those worked together to drive Japan not toward peaceful and friendly coöperation with her huge neighbor, but toward the attempt to dominate her.

III. "MANIFEST DESTINY"

During the period of seclusion, Japan's leaders had kept themselves informed of the progress of Western armed expansion in the Far East. They also could and did recall Japan's own experience with the aggressive Westerners in the sixteenth century. When Japan's doors were opened, therefore, the new rulers felt that the most pressing need was to make their country strong enough to save her from going the way of India, the Philippines and other Far Eastern lands. To prepare her for defence, they also felt, would be to get ready for the expansion which was Japan's "manifest destiny." But they were wise enough to see that Japan must be strong within before she could be powerful in dealing with the other powers. So they concentrated most of their energy, at the start, on internal reconstruction.

Taking the longer view, they believed that if Japan were to be permanently secure and achieve a high place among the nations, she must have a strong army and navy. With these, she could talk to the Western powers in the language of force—the only language they seemed to understand. With these, too, she could expand onto the continent of Asia.

The leaders realized, furthermore, that modern industry was necessary, to support that army and navy. But to develop and maintain a large-scale industrialization, Japan required raw materials: coal, iron, oil, cotton, from outside her own territory. Nor could a large-scale industry be supported on the markets available with Japan. Japan's whole foreign and domestic program, therefore, centered, and has continued to center, around these two desires: to make the

nation powerful in arms, and to get access to raw materials and markets outside of her boundaries.

Japan's army and navy have become powerful—and the dream of international prestige has been realized in proportion to the growth of that strength. In the fifty years between 1868, when the emperor was restored to power, and 1918, when the World War ended, Japan rose from the position of a minor agricultural island empire to that of one of the five great powers. During that same period she had taken more than 100,000 square miles of new territory—over two-thirds of the amount of her original island area—and she had secured an apparently firm grip on the economic resources and development of South Manchuria. Truly, the record seemed to show the wisdom of Japan's leaders in turning to arms.

But to support those arms, raw materials and new markets were necessary. Japan's leaders realized at the start that China, far more conveniently than any other part of the world, contained the raw materials and the markets which were required. The conquest of China also was the centuries-old dream of many Japanese. So military-dominated Japan set out to get access to those materials and markets, and to realize that dream, by extending Japan's control in China.

The moves began in 1870, in relation to the Liuchiu Islands and Korea. The war with China in 1894–5, the war with Russia in 1904–5, the steady pressure for control by financial and more direct means of railway and mining rights in Manchuria from 1907 on, the annexation of Korea in 1910, the seizure of the former German holdings in Shantung Province in 1914, the presentation of the "Twenty-one Demands" on China in 1915, the attempts to buy control in China through the so-called Nishihara loans in 1917–18, the maintenance from 1918–22 of a much larger armed force in Siberia and northern Manchuria than the agreement with the United States and the Allies warranted, the despatch of

troops into Shantung during the Nationalist advance northward in 1927 and 1928, the occupation of Manchuria beginning in 1931, the attack on Shanghai in 1932, the rejection of the Lytton commission's report, the withdrawal from the League of Nations, the blunt statement to the Western powers in the spring of 1934 that they must keep their hands off China, the demand for naval equality—these and other similar moves through the past four decades and more have been deliberately designed to extend Japan's control and assert her dominance on the Asiatic mainland. This extension has been sought partly to increase the size and glory of the Japanese empire, but partly, also, to get sure access to by securing control of Chinese raw materials and markets.

Chinese resentment against this Japanese encroachment has grown steadily, however. The Chinese have used the boycott against Japan—a weapon with which they have become thoroughly familiar through centuries of practice in using it against their own officials. Japan's trade has suffered in consequence. The Chinese also have deliberately set out to close the Chinese markets to Japan by developing their own industries, and to a considerable extent they have succeeded. In Manchuria, beginning in 1926, they started building railways and making other moves with the deliberate and avowed purpose of ousting Japan from that region by bankrupting her interests there. They were well on the way to success when Japanese troops moved in 1931.

This reaction in China to Japan's efforts to secure control caused a growing number of Japanese, especially among the industrialists, to feel that perhaps the policy of force and domination was wrong because it closed rather than opened access to Chinese markets and materials. Liberal sentiment also developed in Japan. The advocates of what came to be called the "policy of conciliation," in contrast to the "strong policy," increased in number and influence in the government. These conciliationists thoroughly agreed

with the advocates of control that Japan must have access to Chinese raw materials and markets, but they insisted that such access could be kept permanently open only by friendly coöperation with the Chinese, and that the direct or indirect use of force inevitably would arouse Chinese opposition and in the end would be ruinous for Japan.

The rivalry between the "friendship with China" and the "control over China" groups in Japan has developed steadily. For short periods in recent years, the conciliationists have been able to dominate the government and carry Japan forward on what seemed to be a liberal course. The liberals took Japan into the League of Nations in 1919, for example, in spite of considerable opposition from those who believed that if Japan joined she would be compelled to choose between breaking her international pledges and foregoing her development as the dominant nation in the Far East. At the Washington Conference in 1922, the liberals, again in face of strong opposition at home, pledged Japan to the Nine Power Treaty, the Four Power Treaty and the naval limitation agreements. They also acquiesced in the cancellation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, agreed to join with other nations in withdrawing foreign post offices from China, dropped part of the "twenty-one demands" and promised that Japan would hand back to China the former German holdings in Shantung. Later in the year, they were able to carry out that pledge and to return Shantung, in spite of vigorous protests from those who believed that Japan should hold on to what she had. In 1927 and 1928, the "strong policy" group, under Tanaka, dominated the Tokyo government, but the flare-up of anti-Japanese boycotts in China as a result of the despatch of troops to Shantung, turned feeling against them in Japan. In 1929-31, the "conciliationists," led by Foreign Minister Shidehara, again were in control, at least of the foreign office, and were moving steadily forward, working out agreements for readjusting the relations with China, particularly in Manchuria, which

would have gone far to put those relations on a basis of friendly economic coöperation.

The military, however, held the whip hand. The Japanese constitution, promulgated in 1889, carried over from old Japan the tradition of a dual government, in which the military authorities were independent of the civil. Even to-day, the old tradition of military dominance still is strong—the tradition developed during the thousand years of the shogunates when the actual power was in the hands of the feudal chiefs while the emperor and his civil officers were puppets only. Furthermore, the lesser politicians in Japan have made a discreditable record of personal lack of integrity and of political chicanery and selfishness which is in sharp contrast to that of the personally honorable and disinterestedly patriotic, if narrow minded, officers of the army and navy. Technically, under the constitution, the Japanese military group has been independent of civilian control through the cabinet or parliament, and the people have felt a confidence in the integrity and unselfishness of the military which they did not extend to the politicians. Consequently, when the military chose to assert themselves, they could commit the government to a course of action, whether the civilians approved or not, and without references to pledges which the civilians might have made.

These were the conditions which made it possible for the “strong policy” leaders to act as they did in the autumn of 1931 in moving in Manchuria. They felt that the success of the conciliation policy which Foreign Minister Shidehara was pursuing would mean ruin for Japan. They also felt that such success would mean the end of their own dominating influence in the government. They saw that success approaching. They moved in Manchuria—not primarily to clear up difficulties there, though the difficulties were real enough, but to create a situation which would give them back control at home. The move succeeded.

Having made this move, however, the Japanese “strong

policy" advocates have been compelled to press steadily forward. They promised peace and prosperity and large new opportunities. Not having been able to get these, it has been necessary for them to keep repeating that the stumbling block lay further afield. They also have been compelled to deny as completely unwarranted the charge that they have broken treaties or done anything else to bring disgrace on their country and emperor, since to admit that they have brought disgrace would be, under the old code of the samurai, to sign their political death warrant.

The group which started this latest move in Japan's long record of expansion toward and onto the continent cannot back down, even if it would. To do so would be to admit that not only these latest moves in Manchuria and the other parts of China but also all the aggressive moves in the last four decades have been mistakes. The men now in control are thoroughly convinced that this course has been wise, and they will continue on it as long as they remain in power in Japan.

They moved in Manchuria to regain control in Japan so that the nation might advance on what they believed to be the road both of economic necessity and of the fulfillment of Japan's divine and glorious mission. It does not trouble them that Japan's actions have spread distrust throughout the world. In characteristically samurai fashion, feeling justified in their own minds for what they have done and are doing, they withdraw from association with those who do not share that feeling. They believe that any possible economic difficulties which may be created by the antagonism which their acts arouse in China and other countries can be overcome. So they have advanced and will continue to advance.

Behind them, those at present in control of the Japanese government have a people fundamentally docile and ready to follow where they are led, a people who will rise to great heights of fanatical self-sacrifice if they are convinced that the honor and destiny of the nation are at stake—seventy

million such people. Queen Elizabeth had no such backing when she launched England on the career of expansion which has made the foggy little islands of the North Atlantic the center of the far flung British Empire. Genghis Khan had only a handful of savage horsemen when he started the campaigns which, within his own lifetime, made him master of a larger empire than any other man has ruled, except his grandson Kublai Khan, who built on his foundations. Thinking of such things, who can say where Japan will stop?

But the new industrial structure which has been built up so swiftly and to such heights in Japan in order to support the political and military expansion may prove to be the Frankenstein monster which will destroy its creator. From the resources and on the markets within her own boundaries, Japan cannot possibly maintain her present towering modern industrial organization. Even to keep the present system running, she must tap constantly new markets and sources of materials. She has chosen to take the road of force to do this, particularly in relation to China. But the further she goes along that line, the greater the resentment she will arouse and the more difficulties she will face in getting what she must have. This road leads straight to the precipice of complete economic collapse. Japan will fall over the precipice, inevitably, if she continues on the present course, even though for a while she may be able to secure a militarily supported dominance over a good share of China.

If at the start of her modernization Japan had embarked on a policy of friendly coöperation with China instead of preparing to dominate on the Asiatic continent, she would be, today, in an infinitely more secure position than she is, and far nearer to that leadership in the Far East in dealing with the West which she desires. As it is, especially since the new venture in Manchuria is proving so costly in money and Chinese antagonism, Japan is dangerously near the precipice. The realization of these costs and of the condemnation and distrust throughout the world which these acts have aroused,

has come to many in Japan who are out of sympathy with the military. The number of these is growing.

It is possible that the Japanese people may rise against those now in control of the government. Taxes are mounting steadily above their already staggering heights. The city workers are enjoying prosperity at the moment, but the farmers, who constitute sixty per cent of the people, are in desperate straits and conditions for them are getting worse rather than better. There are a great many sincere liberals in Japan, though they are at present politically impotent. Real Communism is getting a considerable hold, underground, in Japan. The demand for a Fascist regime also is growing, among both the younger men in the army and those in civil life who have no faith in politicians. A revolutionary overturn may come. And again, it may not.

If such a popular uprising against their control of affairs seems to be near, quite possibly the Japanese military will make some new and spectacular move abroad as a means of retaining control at home: a new move into China or Mongolia; a war with Russia; perhaps even a war with the United States. They know well enough that they would be taking a tremendous risk of defeat and complete ruin for Japan in a war with either Russia or the United States. But there are a good many Japanese today who, in despair at the prospects, are saying: "Japan is ruined anyway. Let us die gloriously."

Though an aggressive Japan has been and still is a menace to China, though Japan for a time may be able not only to hold what she has taken but to take more, this fundamental fact remains to tip the scales in China's favor sooner or later in the contest with Japan: China does not need Japan, but Japan cannot live without China.

COÖPERATION OR DISASTER?

(CHAPTER XVI)

THE nineteenth century has passed into history as the period in which the West, by the use of armed force, took dominance throughout the world. The twentieth will go down as the century in which the Far East freed itself from Western dominance. This the Far Eastern nations already have gone far to accomplish. What next?

The West itself lit the fires of self-assertion in the Far East. Now that the fires are burning, the Far Eastern peoples no more can be stopped from making effective their demand for control of their own affairs and for a determining voice in the affairs of the world than steam forever can be kept sealed in a boiler over roaring flames. The West's own actions will determine whether the pressure of that steam will be released in a devastating explosion or through use in driving forward the ship of civilization.

The West expanded by force—force used to acquire territory and to open the way for trade. The wishes and the rights of the Oriental peoples were ignored or overridden. In recent years the people of the West have begun to realize the dangerous stupidity of relying on force as an instrument of national policy. Public opinion has begun to insist that war be outlawed; that in the councils of the nations the quiet voice of reason should carry more weight than the thundering of cannon; that men's eyes should be more on the scales of justice than on massed battalions; that the respect given to the rights of a nation should not depend on the weight of its armaments or the deadliness of its poison gas. But the governments of the West, while they give lip service to the ideals of peace and reason, still rely on force as the final

arbiter and yield to a nation's desires in proportion to its armed might.

For four centuries the Chinese watched the West forcibly impose itself on the East and on China herself—as others had done, on their way to oblivion. For sixty years they watched Japan rise step by step in world esteem as her armaments increased. Then, after the West's colossal demonstration of the ruinous folly of attempting to settle disputes by the sword, they still watched while the West drew its beautiful blue prints of a new world in which men would deal with each other as civilized beings, reasonably. They saw the palace of peace rise, an elaborate structure of treaties and pledges solemnly entered into between the nations. They wondered how substantial that structure would prove.

They found out in 1931. The Japanese military suddenly swept a sword through the structure of international pledges to carve out for herself at China's expense a new foothold on the continent of Asia. The Chinese heard much fine talk. But they waited in vain for the Western nations to compel respect for treaty pledges. They saw the powers cynically ignoring their own obligations and giving even more respectful consideration to Japan's wishes than before.

In the face of all this, how could the Chinese do otherwise than conclude, as they have, that this still is a barbarian world, and that therefore they must prepare to use barbarian methods if they would secure safety and respect?

The palace of peace looked well. But events proved that it was only a flimsy structure of the tinsel of pious good wishes tacked awkwardly together by nations whose right hands still grasped their swords, not an enduring edifice built of the solid stone of common interest, laid carefully row on row by civilized nations who had put aside their swords to take up the tools of builders.

China, the one creatively great and potentially by far the most powerful nation of the Far East, learned through millenniums of experience that reason and mutual adjustment

are the only sound bases for continuingly profitable human relations. Chinese civilization, so based, has endured. The civilizations of other peoples who trusted to force have disappeared.

China now is passing through a period of disintegration. The reintegration already has begun, however. Whether that reintegration will be around dependence on coöperation or on arms in international relations is for the West to say. If the West should continue to give the lie by its acts of omission and commission to its words of peace, China inevitably will turn to arms.

This would be potentially less disastrous for all civilization if the world still were a large globe on which the various peoples went their own ways in more or less complete isolation. It is not, nor can it be that again unless civilization itself be destroyed. The West's development of the means by which men and ideas and goods can move swiftly about has transformed the earth into a tiny sphere on which every man is the near neighbor of every other. In the old world, nations lived much as single-celled animalcula; even though one destroyed another, the rest were but little disturbed. Today, the world is a many-celled organism through which runs an intricate web of arteries carrying the lifeblood of the whole; injury to one part inevitably harms all the other parts.

Men of the West plumb the depths of the sea and explore the uttermost parts of the earth. They search the mysteries in the infinitely small hearts of things and read the secrets of the remote stars. They move more fleetly over the land than any animal, outfly the swiftest bird, outswim the fastest fish. They build superbly and destroy on a colossal scale. They speak, and the lightning carries their voices around the world. They move their hands and nature's most potent forces do their work for them. All this and much more, they have learned to do. But the art of living together as nations in the continuing peace which roots in mutual respect and fairness, they have not learned.

The West knows much of how to master the forces of nature so that they may be used for man's convenience, and of how to make things which add to the comfort of life. Yet neither the possession of many and mechanically efficient things, nor the knowledge of many facts make a man or a nation truly civilized. A truly civilized society is one in which men live harmoniously together, not by subordinating one to the other, nor by imposing the will or the beliefs of one on the other, but by practicing mutual justice, consideration and tolerance.

Chinese society has endured because it was essentially civilized in this sense. In their day by day living, the Chinese applied the Confucian maxim, "do not do unto others what you would not have them do unto you," far more consistently than Westerners have practiced their Golden Rule. Being essential realistic, they set up no unattainable ideal of universal love. Being practical, they insisted that those whom circumstances threw together must respect each other's rights. Being without fanaticism, they were tolerant, and never sought to impose their culture, their philosophy or their religion on others.

Of skill in mastering things the West knows far more than China. Of the difficult art by which men live together as civilized human beings, it knows far less. China is strenuously at work acquiring that skill for use in a still essentially uncivilized world. The West, for its very life's sake must learn and apply that art so that the shrunken world of today may become civilized and peaceful. Otherwise the West itself and the resurgent Far East will be destroyed together in the clash of the forces and ambitions which the West has evoked.

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
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
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